Token Economics Resource List

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2	Token Economics Resources List
3	This is an open source list of valuable tokenomics resources. Additions are very welcome. Please submit them here:
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5	Click To Add
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7	Sheets	What Can You Find There	Who Should Read It
8	1) Token Economics Framework	General economic principles and basic application to blockchain and token ecosystems	Information junkie (Cool nerds) General Public looking to get informed
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10	2) Economics of Tokens Categories	Academic research and papers specific to blockchain and token ecosystem applications	Researchers Hardcore information junkie Complexed frameworks and research
11	3) DeFi Economics	Things you want to know aobut DeFi	Intermediary DeFi users
12	4) DeFi Accounts to follow	Resources to figure DeFi out. YouTube, Newsletter, Twitter	All crypto/defi users. Get your resources here
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14	5) Glossary	Definition of keywords	General Public
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	A	B	C	D
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2	Token Economics Categories (Research + Quality Articles)
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5	The other list focuses on GENERAL ECONOMICS. This list focuses on BLOCKCHAIN SYSTEMS.
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13	Category	Title (Click to view notes or direct link)	Abstract/Context	Link to Digital Ecosystems

14	Bonding Curves	How to Make Bonding Curves for Continuous Token Models	This is a technical primer on how to make your own bonding curves, followed by a discussion about the opportunities and risks involved.
15	Bonding Curves	On Single Bonding Curves for Continuous Token Models	The specifics of the math have a significant impact on both incentivization and scalability; if we incorrectly design these cryptoeconomic models, we risk creating some unsustainable projects or markets ripe for abuse and manipulation. Here are a few realities that I think we need contend with when designing these models
16	Bonding Curves	Tokens 2.0: Curved Token Bonding in Curation Markets	Within the projects announced the past few months, the most important facet from Curation Markets that these projects are adopting is the continuous token bonding curve. They are adopting it a level much more granular than I expected.
17	Bonding Curves	Dynamic Token Bonding Curves	What if we had bonding curves that used the shared funds in a bonding contract, but the curve were based on the individual token holder’s ‘activity’ (i.e. their portion of the total token supply)?
18	Bonding Curves	Token Bonding Curves in Practice	This article explores the practical use of token bonding curves and curation markets to fund, curate and distribute ownership of intellectual property.
19	Bonding Curves	Bonding Curves In Depth: Intuition & Parametrization	Intuition into how one might use bonding curves & some math that will hopefully aid the reader in parameterizing and implementing bonding curves.
20	Bonding Curves	Economic Games as Estimators	Token bonding curves are presented as discrete event games and numerical experiments are used to investigate their signal processing properties with a focus on input-output response dynamics.
21	Business Cycles	Creative Destruction and Uncertainty	Uncertainty rises in recessions. But does uncertainty cause downturns or vice versa? This paper argues that counter-cyclical uncertainty fluctuations are a by- product of technology growth
22	Business Cycles	Innovation, Productivity, and Monetary Policy	(Monetary economics + business cycle) We use a New Keynesian model with endogenous total factor productivity (TFP) to quantify the TFP losses due to the constraints on monetary policy imposed by the zero lower bound (ZLB) and the TFP benefits of tightening monetary policy more slowly than currently anticipated.
23	CBDC	Central Bank Digital Currency and the Future of Monetary Policy	Central bank digital currency (CBDC) could transform all aspects of the monetary system and facilitate the systematic and transparent conduct of monetary policy. In particular, we find that CBDC can serve as a practically costless medium of exchange, secure store of value, and stable unit of account.
24	CBDC	Money and central bank digital currency	Concepts and features of central bank money and private sector money and focuses on the actual performance of these types of money in selected advanced and emerging economies
25	CBDC	The future of central bank money	General thoughts on the role of the central bank’s balance sheet in the economy. The focus will be on central bank liabilities – that is, money created by central banks to be used as a means of payment and store of value.
26	CBDC	Central bank digital currency: Concepts and trends	Four existing proposals for implementing central bank digital currency. Due largely to technical constraints, however, central banks in general have not found a compelling reason to issue their own digital currency.
27	CBDC	Central bank digital currencies - design principles and balance sheet implications	The core principles are: (i) CBDC pays an adjustable interest rate. (ii) CBDC and reserves are distinct, and not convertible into each other. (iii) No guaranteed, on-demand convertibility of bank deposits into CBDC at commercial banks (iv) The central bank issues CBDC only against eligible securities
28	CBDC	The economics of digital currencies	Incentives embedded in the current design of digital currencies pose impediments to their widespread usage.
29	CBDC	A Model for Central Bank Digital Currencies: Do CBDCs Disrupt the Financial Sector?	While CBDCs offer several benefits, many suggest that they impose a threat to financial stability as they might disintermediate commercial banks and facilitate bank runs. To analyze these concerns, we develop an appropriate New Keynesian DSGE framework.
30	Cryptocurrency	Discrete choice modeling with nonstationary panels applied to exchange rate regime choice	(Monterary economics + cryptocurrency) The approach is applied to exchange rate regime choice by monetary authorities, and we provide an analysis of the empirical phenomenon known as ‘‘fear of floating’’.
31	Cryptocurrency	Stable Cryptocurrencies - First Order Principles	The core design features and their interoperative feedback effects revolve around: (1) burning coins through bonds vs. reserves, (2) transaction vs. holding taxes, (3) repegging, and (4) governance.
32	Cryptocurrency	Token-Based Platform Finance	After characterizing the platform owners’ optimal token-management strategy (i.e., in- vestment, payout, and buyback), this work formally analyzes the value added of blockchain technology in the presented setting.
33	Cryptocurrency	Token Economics in Real-Life: Cryptocurrency and Incentives Design for Insolar’s Blockchain Network	how to set up cryptocurrency incentive mechanisms and to operationalize governance is token economics
34	Curation Markets	Desire Paths & Markets for Recommendation	Over the past year, there’s been quite a number of projects that started to experiment with ‘Curation Markets’: protocols that use crypto-economic mechanism design to curate information.
35	Financial Markets	Blockchain Disruption and Decentralized Finance: The Rise of Decentralized Business Models	Benefits of decentralized finance, identifies existing business models, and evaluates potential challenges and limits.
36	Financial Markets	Economics of Technology, Securities and Capital Markets	new investment and financing tools, which were enabled by recent technological advances, such as exchange-traded funds and blockchain-based assets.
37	Governance Mechanism	Sensor Network and Social Choice	How to coordinate decision making without imposing structural or modeled biases	How to coordinate social choices given that preferences changes over time and how to model this preference changes
38	Harbeger Taxation	Radical Markets in the Arts
39	Harbeger Taxation	Exploring Harberger Tax Rates in Virtual Collectibles & Patronage Markets
40	Information Design	Asymmetric Information, Adverse Selection and Online Disclosure: The Case of eBay Motors	Impact of contractible disclosure and changes in disclosure costs on performance and adverse selection on online auction platforms
41	Information Design	Information design in multi-stage games	We fully characterize the distributions over actions, states, and signals that obtain in any (sequential) communication equilibrium of any expansion of multi-stage games, i.e., when players can receive additional signals about past and current states, past actions, and past and current signals (including the additional past signals).
42	Information Design	Lowering the bar and limiting the field: The effect of strategic risk-taking on selection contests	Strategic risk taking bounds the gains to meritocratic contest designers from expanding the contestant pool while low standards mollify risk-taking incentives and thereby increase the correlation between selection and ability.
43	Information Design	Rationality is Self-Defeating in Permissionless Systems.	why it is rational to be irrational when attacking open-world decentralized systems, and why systems whose security depend on rationality assumptions are insecure.
44	Micro-financing	Redesigning micro-finance: Efficient design of micro-credit and informal side contracting	Mechanism design apporach which emphasises the interplay between a formal microcredit contract and informal contractual arrangements
45	Micro-financing	MicroCash: Practical Concurrent Processing of Micropayments	Processing micropayments individually can be expensive, with transaction fees exceeding the payment value itself. By aggregating these small transactions into a few larger ones, and using cryptocurrencies, today's decentralized probabilistic micropayment schemes can reduce these fees.
46	Monetary Economics	Hayek Money: the Cryptocurrency Price Stability Solution	The proposed monetary base adjustment has neutral impact on the overall wallet wealth, as it does not introduce any arbitrary distortion into the intrinsic value dynamics of the wallet.
47	Monetary Economics	Monetary Policy with Negative Interest Rates: Decoupling Cash from Electronic Money	Practical feasibility of recent proposals for decoupling cash from electronic money to achieve a negative yield on cash which would remove the lower bound constraint on monetary policy.
48	Monetary Economics	The mechanism design approach to monetary theory?	Search for fruitful settings or environments in which something that resembles monetary trade actually accomplishes something or in which money is essential.
49	Monetary Economics	Capital Flows and risk taking channels of monetary policy	We study the dynamics linking monetary policy with bank leverage and show that adjustments in leverage act as the linchpin in the monetary transmission mechanism that works through fluctuations in risk-taking.
50	Monetary Economics	Cyclicality of Credit Supply: Firm Level Evidence	The bank-to-bond substitution can only be measured for firms with access to bond markets. However, we show that this substitution behavior has strong predictive power for bank borrowing and investments by small, out-of-sample firms.
51	Monetary Economics	Digital currencies: Threats and opportunities for monetary policy	Risk level and implications of privately issued digital currencies and monetary policies for central bank issued digital currencies
52	Monetary Economics	On the Economic Design of Stablecoins	Two critical dimensions that underpin the economic design of every stablecoin: (1) the volatility of the reserve assets against the reference asset, which defines the risk profile of the stablecoin for coin holders; and (2) the degree to which the stablecoin is exposed to the risk of a death spiral.
53	Monetary Economics	Managed Blockchain Based Cryptocurrencies with Consensus Enforced Rules and Transparency	Managed cryptocurrencies can be imple-mented using private blockchains but are fundamentally differenta s the owners have complete control to do arbitrary activitywithout transparency (since they control the mining). In this work we explore a hybrid approach where a managed cryptocurrency is maintained through distributed consensus based methods.The currency administrator can perform ongoing managementfunctions while the consensus methods enforce the rules of thecryptocurrency and provide transparency for all managementactions.	This enables the introduction of money managementfeatures common in fiat currencies but where the managing entity cannot perform arbitrary actions and transparency is enforced.
54	Monetary Economics	Stable Cryptocurrencies - First Order Principles	The core design features and their interoperative feedback effects revolve around: (1) burning coins through bonds vs. reserves, (2) transaction vs. holding taxes, (3) repegging, and (4) governance.
55	Property Rights	Bargaining position, bargaining power, and the property rights approach	We explore the implications of using the generalized Nash bargaining solution. A prominent finding regarding the suboptimality of joint ownership turns out to be robust. However, in contrast to the standard property rights model, it may well be optimal to give ownership to a party whose investments are less productive, provided that this party's ex-post bargaining power is relatively small.
56	Property Rights	The property right paradigm	Structure of property rights and social implications
57	Property Rights	Information Gathering, Transaction Costs, and the Property Rights Approach	Property rights to theory of firm with endogenous information acquisition
58	Property Rights	Harberger Tax & Link to Blockchain	Harberger tax reduces investment efficiency at a gain in allocative efficiency of ownership. It represents “partial common ownership”. Harberger tax is a fascinating economic model that trades off investment efficiency for allocative efficiency, resulting in large welfare gains. It is hard to implement in practice and the blockchain affords us the ability to question its validity and usefulness.	Blockchains are a ripe breeding ground for experimenting in closed-loop economies, because the on-chain, bearer assets can be enforced using only the ledger. This is particularly relevant in the new, growing arena of non-fungible collectibles, like CryptoKitties. Jacob Horne have explained before the value of there being continuous auctions in this realm: you would always be able to know the price someone would pay for your collectible.
59	Property Rights	Depreciating Licenses	New license format which we argue trades off allocation and investment better than existing license designs: the depreciating license. A term limited license gives you 100% property rights for N years, and 0 thereafter Think of a depreciating license as giving you 100% property rights the first year, 90% the next, 81% thereafter... It's a property license which "decays" gradually over time	NFTs are more than just art. NFTs can be used to tokenise property rights in novel ways
60	Reputation as a Mechanism	How Effective Are Electronic Reputation Mechanisms? An Experimental Investigation	Electronic reputation or “feedback” mechanisms aim to mitigate the moral hazard problems associated with exchange among strangers by providing the type of information available in more traditional close-knit groups, where members are frequently involved in one another’s dealings. In this paper, we compare trading in a market with online feedback (as implemented by many Internet markets) to a market without feedback, as well as to a market in which the same people interact with one another repeatedly (partners market).
61	Reputation as a Mechanism	Incentives of Low-Quality Sellers to Disclose Negative Information	We study incentives of low-quality sellers to disclose negative information when the only way to communicate one’s quality is cheap-talk messages. This setting limits ability of high-quality sellers to separate as any communication strategy they pursue can be costlessly imitated by low- quality sellers.
62	Schelling Point	SchellingPoint: A Minimal-Trust Universal Data Feed	A mechanism that allows you to create a decentralized data feed.
63	Schelling Point	Advanced Contract Programming Example: SchellingCoin	The purpose of this article will be to go through a contract that is an important component of a fully decentralized cryptoeconomic ecosystem: a decentralized oracle. The oracle will be implemented using the SchellingCoin protocol.
64	Schelling Point	The Power of Focal Points Is Limited: Even Minute Payoff Asymmetry May Yield Large Coordination Failures	When payoffs are symmetric across players, salient labels do yield high coordination rates, but that when payoffs are even minutely asymmetric and the salience of labels conflicts with the salience of payoff differences, salient labels may lose much of their effectiveness and coordination rates may be very low.
65	Schelling Point	Focal points in tacit bargaining problems: Experimental evidence	As Schelling proposed, these cues induce systematically unequal payoff distributions. Cues increase efficiency even when equal and efficient divisions are infeasible. Schelling coordination games that model tacit bargaining — independent actors perceive a conflict and anticipate others’ behavior without communication. In their work, based on a game where players allocate an object to one place or another, the non-monetary properties that influence players’ decisions are closeness (distance) to an option, and accession (shared properties between items).	We can relate this data to the double agent incentive. If all voters trying to be convinced to lie perceive, without communication, that the rest of voters will lie too, we need to provide an incentive for them not to if we want to ensure the efficiency of the network.
66	Stable Coin	A Note on Cryptocurrency Stabilisation: Seigniorage Shares	Cryptocurrencies like Bitcoin govern the supply of coin through simple and deterministic coin growth rules. As a result, unanticipated changes in coin demand are reflected in changes in coin price, causing volatility and discouraging usage of coin as media-of-exchange. We argue that next-generation cryptocurrencies should incorporate an elastic supply rule that adjust the quantity of coin supply proportionately to changes in coin market value.
67	Stable Coin	A Classification Framework for Stablecoin Designs	General design, decompose existing stablecoins into various component design elements, explore their strengths and drawbacks, and identify future directions.
68	Token Valuation	Initial Coin Offerings   and the Value of Crypto Tokens	This paper explores how entrepreneurs can use initial coin offerings to fund venture start-up costs. A lack of commitment in monetary policy undermines saving behavior, hence the cost of using tokens to fund start-up costs is inflexibility in future capital raises. Crypto tokens can also facilitate coordination among stakeholders within digital ecosystems when network effects are present.
69	Token Valuation	MKR Valuation Fundamental
70	Token Valuation	Tokenomics: Dynamic Adoption and Valuation	We provide a dynamic asset-pricing model of (crypto-) tokens on (blockchain-based) platforms.
71	Token Valuation	x*y = k market makers	Liquidity in decentralised exchanges
72	Token Valuation	Bitcoin Pricing, Adoption, and Usage: Theory and Evidence	This paper develops a model of user adoption and use of virtual currency (such as Bitcoin), and focusing on the dynamics of adoption in the presence of frictions arising from exchange rate uncertainty.
73	Token Valuation	Blockchain structure and cryptocurrency prices	A cryptocurrency has two distinctive features: a price determined by the extent of its usage as money, and a blockchain structure that restricts settlement capacity. Limited settlement space creates competition between users of the currency, so speculative activity can crowd out monetary usage. This crowding-out undermines the ability of a cryptocurrency to act as a medium of payment, lowering its value. Higher speculative demand can reduce prices, contrary to standard economic models. Crowding-out also raises the riskiness of investing in cryptocurrency, explaining high observed price volatility.
74	Transaction Cost	Transaction Cost, Institutions and Economic Performance	Institutions and the way they evolve shape economic performance. Together with the technology employed, the, determine the cost of transacting and producing.
75	Transaction Cost	Externalities of internalising contracts (inefficiencies)	Ultimately, the relevance of externalities must lie in the fact that they indicate the presence of some transaction costs. For if there were no costs of transacting, then the potential Pareto improvement could be realized by costless bargaining between self-interested economic agent.
76	Transaction Cost	The Governance of Contractual Relations	If transaction costs are negligible, the organization of economic activity is irrelevant.
77	Transaction Cost	Blockchains as Implementable Mechanisms: Crypto-Ricardian Rent and a Crypto-Coase Theorem	Mechanism design theory to suggest where blockchains may or may not be seen as implementable mechanisms.
78	Transaction Cost	Information Gathering, Transaction Costs, and the Property Rights Approach	A party may acquire private information about its default payoff.
79	Transaction Cost	The economics of rollup fees	The cost of producing and submitting a batch to the base layer is comprised of six key variables.
80	Voting Mechanisms	Continuity and Incentive Compatibility in Cardinal Voting Mechanisms	We show that every cardinal incentive compatible voting mechanism satisfying a continuity condition, must be ordinal. Our results apply to many standard models in mechanism design without transfers, including the standard voting models with any domain restrictions.
81	Voting Mechanisms	Incentives and Behavior in English, Dutch and Sealed-Bid Auctions	The Pareto optimality and price behavior of English and Dutch oral auctions, and First-Price and Second-Price sealed- bid auctions are compared under various procedures for assigning valuations among cash motivated bidders.
82	Voting Mechanisms	Quadratic Voting	We argue that quadratic pricing of votes on collective decisions is analogous to linear pric- ing of private goods and thus solves the tyranny of majority created by the one-person-one- vote rule.
83	Voting Mechanisms	Liberation Through Radical Decentralization	Ethereum is working with Quadratic Voting to address some issues. But there are issues like anonymity and pseudonymity in the crypto-space. Issue of reestablishing monopolies may arise.
84	Voting Mechanisms	Quadratic Vote Buying, Square Root Voting, and Corporate Governance:	example of how Quadratic Buying is applied to corporate governance.
85	Voting Mechanisms	Quadratic Voting as Efficient Corporate Governance (Minority shareholders)	QV is a mechanism design that allows for efficient corporate governance because it allows people to share their true feelings (private valuation) to the issue.
86	Voting Mechanisms	Uncertainty, polarization, and proposal incentives under quadratic voting	QV can provide an incentive for individuals to propose policies with greater uncertainty. The incentives of a potential proposer can come into direct conflict with maximizing social welfare.
87	Voting Mechanisms	Approval Voting and Incentives in Crowdsourcing	Solution: Introduce approval voting. It uses partial knowledge of people + incentive mechanism.
88	Voting Mechanisms	Convicted Staked Inflation Funding	Continuous funding for open source, public blockchain projects
89	Voting Mechanisms	Wait for Quiet Voting	Extend the debating period as appropriate to allow more information to be collected. Calculating a “noise level” from voting and deciding the proposal only when the noise level has fallen sufficiently — applying the thinking that quiet signifies everyone has had their say.
90	Gross Network Value	On Virtual Economies	Several million people currently have accounts in massively multi-player online games, places in cyberspace that are effectively large-scale shared virtual reality environments. The population of these virtual worlds has grown rapidly since their inception in 1996; significantly, each world also seems to grow its own economy, with production, assets, and trade with Earth economies. This paper explores two questions about these developments. First, will these economies grow in importance? Second, if they do grow, how will that affect real-world economies and governments? To shed light on the first question, the paper presents a brief history of these games along with a simple choice model of the demand for game time. The history suggests that the desire to live in a game world is deep-rooted and driven by game technology. The model reveals a certain puzzle about puzzles and games: in the demand for these kinds of interactive entertainment goods, people reveal that they are willing to pay money to be constrained. Still, the nature of games as a produced good suggests that technological advances, and heavy competition, will drive the future development of virtual worlds. If virtual worlds do become a large part of the daily life of humans, their development may have an impact on the macroeconomies of Earth. It will also raise certain constitutional issues, since it is not clear, today, exactly who has jurisdiction over these new economies.
91	Gross Network Value	An Analysis of Virtual Currencies in Online Games	In virtual worlds of MMORPGs (Massively Multiplayer Online Role-Playing Games), we observe that many players purchase virtual items by using real currencies, which is so-called eBaying. Extending the model developed by Castronova (2001), I analyze the value of virtual items in the virtual and real markets. The analysis reveals that incentive for eBaying is inherent to the game design. In addition, I classify the virtual currencies as a Local Exchange Trading Systems (LETS) because they are used in limited communities, not under control of money supply by the central banks, and not subject to interest rates. Since these currencies are not subject to geographical boundaries, they can potentially be global LETS. The eBaying effectively means that the virtual currencies have exchange rates with real currencies, and thus have become meaningful for our economy. The online virtual worlds increase its importance for our life, and so does the virtual currencies.
92	Gross Network Value	Virtual Economics Applying Economics to the Study of Game Worlds	Complex computer games, especially massively multiplayer online games, contain narrative and mechanisms that mimic real economic activities, such as production, trade, and consumption. This has prompted some scholars to apply concepts and techniques from economics to study the complicated interactions inside games worlds. In this paper I review their work, attempt to argue why the approach has merit, and examine its limits and possibilities. In the final part I suggest a possible new avenue, using transaction cost economics to analyse and influence the size and composition of player guilds.
93	Gross Network Value	Virtual Worlds A First-Hand Account of Market and Society on the Cyberian Frontier	In March 1999, a small number of Californians discovered a new world called Norrath, populated by an exotic but industrious people. About 12,000 people call this place their permanent home, although some 60,000 are present there at any given time. The nominal hourly wage is about USD 3.42 per hour, and the labors of the people produce a GNP per capita somewhere between that of Russia and Bulgaria. A unit of Norrath's currency is traded on exchange markets at USD 0.0107, higher than the Yen and the Lira. The economy is characterized by extreme inequality, yet life there is quite attractive to many. The population is growing rapidly, swollen each each day by hundreds of emigres from various places around the globe, but especially the United States. Perhaps the most interesting thing about the new world is its location. Norrath is a virtual world that exists entirely on 40 computers in San Diego. Unlike many internet ventures, virtual worlds are making money -- with annual revenues expected to top USD 1.5 billion by 2004 -- and if network effects are as powerful here as they have been with other internet innovations, virtual worlds may soon become the primary venue for all online activity.
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	A	B	C	D
1			Categories	Explanation
2	Related Fields	Mechnical physics	Rules of the world
3	Fields that are related to the design of token based economies, if you’re not into economics	Biology	Humans and animals as systems, how do we behave
4	Genology	Evolution at its finest
5		Control theory	Closed loop system flow
6		Mechanical engineering	The "how" to optimise of economics' "what to optimise"
7			Philosophy	Basic ideologies
8
9
10	Category	Title (Click to view notes or direct link)	Medium

11	Biology	Why is reciprocity so rare in social animals? A protestant appeal.	Paper
12	Biology	Cooperation among cancer cells: applying game theory to cancer	Paper
13	Control theory	PID without a PhD	Paper
14	Control theory	MIT course on Introduction to Nonlinear Systems	Lecture
15	Control theory	Brian Douglas's Control System Lectures	Lecture
16	Control theory	Steve Brunton's Control System Lectures	Lecture
17	Control theory	Analysis and Design of Feedback Systems Course	Lecture notes
18	Control theory	Scenario-Based Modeling of Interdependent Demand and Supply Uncertainties	Paper
19	Philosophy	Fairness behind a veil of ignorance: A welfare analysis for automated decision making	Paper
20	GameFi	https://www.deconstructoroffun.com/	Podcast
21	GameFi	https://naavik.co/business-breakdowns/axie-infinity	Podcast

	A	B	C	D
1
2	DeFi Categories (Research + Quality Resources)
3
4
5	This list focuses on DeFi tools and learning resources.
12
13	Category	Title (Click to view notes or direct link)	Abstract/Context	Link to Digital Ecosystems

14	Bonding Curves	Dynamic Token Bonding Curves	What if we had bonding curves that used the shared funds in a bonding contract, but the curve were based on the individual token holder’s ‘activity’ (i.e. their portion of the total token supply)?
15	Bonding Curves	Token Bonding Curves in Practice	This article explores the practical use of token bonding curves and curation markets to fund, curate and distribute ownership of intellectual property.
16	Bonding Curves	Bonding Curves In Depth: Intuition & Parametrization	Intuition into how one might use bonding curves & some math that will hopefully aid the reader in parameterizing and implementing bonding curves.
17	Bonding Curves	Economic Games as Estimators	Token bonding curves are presented as discrete event games and numerical experiments are used to investigate their signal processing properties with a focus on input-output response dynamics.
18	Cryptocurrency	Discrete choice modeling with nonstationary panels applied to exchange rate regime choice	(Monterary economics + cryptocurrency) The approach is applied to exchange rate regime choice by monetary authorities, and we provide an analysis of the empirical phenomenon known as ‘‘fear of floating’’.
19	Cryptocurrency	Stable Cryptocurrencies - First Order Principles	The core design features and their interoperative feedback effects revolve around: (1) burning coins through bonds vs. reserves, (2) transaction vs. holding taxes, (3) repegging, and (4) governance.
20	Cryptocurrency	Token-Based Platform Finance	After characterizing the platform owners’ optimal token-management strategy (i.e., in- vestment, payout, and buyback), this work formally analyzes the value added of blockchain technology in the presented setting.
21	Cryptocurrency	Token Economics in Real-Life: Cryptocurrency and Incentives Design for Insolar’s Blockchain Network	how to set up cryptocurrency incentive mechanisms and to operationalize governance is token economics
22	Curation Markets	Desire Paths & Markets for Recommendation	Over the past year, there’s been quite a number of projects that started to experiment with ‘Curation Markets’: protocols that use crypto-economic mechanism design to curate information.
23	Financial Markets	Blockchain Disruption and Decentralized Finance: The Rise of Decentralized Business Models	Benefits of decentralized finance, identifies existing business models, and evaluates potential challenges and limits.
24	Financial Markets	Economics of Technology, Securities and Capital Markets	new investment and financing tools, which were enabled by recent technological advances, such as exchange-traded funds and blockchain-based assets.
25	Governance Mechanism	Sensor Network and Social Choice	How to coordinate decision making without imposing structural or modeled biases	How to coordinate social choices given that preferences changes over time and how to model this preference changes
26	Harbeger Taxation	Radical Markets in the Arts
27	Harbeger Taxation	Exploring Harberger Tax Rates in Virtual Collectibles & Patronage Markets
28	Monetary Economics	Hayek Money: the Cryptocurrency Price Stability Solution	The proposed monetary base adjustment has neutral impact on the overall wallet wealth, as it does not introduce any arbitrary distortion into the intrinsic value dynamics of the wallet.
29	Monetary Economics	Monetary Policy with Negative Interest Rates: Decoupling Cash from Electronic Money	Practical feasibility of recent proposals for decoupling cash from electronic money to achieve a negative yield on cash which would remove the lower bound constraint on monetary policy.
30	Monetary Economics	The mechanism design approach to monetary theory?	Search for fruitful settings or environments in which something that resembles monetary trade actually accomplishes something or in which money is essential.
31	Monetary Economics	Capital Flows and risk taking channels of monetary policy	We study the dynamics linking monetary policy with bank leverage and show that adjustments in leverage act as the linchpin in the monetary transmission mechanism that works through fluctuations in risk-taking.
32	Monetary Economics	Cyclicality of Credit Supply: Firm Level Evidence	The bank-to-bond substitution can only be measured for firms with access to bond markets. However, we show that this substitution behavior has strong predictive power for bank borrowing and investments by small, out-of-sample firms.
33	Monetary Economics	Digital currencies: Threats and opportunities for monetary policy	Risk level and implications of privately issued digital currencies and monetary policies for central bank issued digital currencies
34	Monetary Economics	Managed Blockchain Based Cryptocurrencies with Consensus Enforced Rules and Transparency	Managed cryptocurrencies can be imple-mented using private blockchains but are fundamentally differenta s the owners have complete control to do arbitrary activitywithout transparency (since they control the mining). In this work we explore a hybrid approach where a managed cryptocurrency is maintained through distributed consensus based methods.The currency administrator can perform ongoing managementfunctions while the consensus methods enforce the rules of thecryptocurrency and provide transparency for all managementactions.	This enables the introduction of money managementfeatures common in fiat currencies but where the managing entity cannot perform arbitrary actions and transparency is enforced.
35	Monetary Economics	Stable Cryptocurrencies - First Order Principles	The core design features and their interoperative feedback effects revolve around: (1) burning coins through bonds vs. reserves, (2) transaction vs. holding taxes, (3) repegging, and (4) governance.
36	Stable Coin	A Note on Cryptocurrency Stabilisation: Seigniorage Shares	Cryptocurrencies like Bitcoin govern the supply of coin through simple and deterministic coin growth rules. As a result, unanticipated changes in coin demand are reflected in changes in coin price, causing volatility and discouraging usage of coin as media-of-exchange. We argue that next-generation cryptocurrencies should incorporate an elastic supply rule that adjust the quantity of coin supply proportionately to changes in coin market value.
37	Token Valuation	Initial Coin Offerings   and the Value of Crypto Tokens	This paper explores how entrepreneurs can use initial coin offerings to fund venture start-up costs. A lack of commitment in monetary policy undermines saving behavior, hence the cost of using tokens to fund start-up costs is inflexibility in future capital raises. Crypto tokens can also facilitate coordination among stakeholders within digital ecosystems when network effects are present.
38	Token Valuation	MKR Valuation Fundamental
39	Token Valuation	Tokenomics: Dynamic Adoption and Valuation	We provide a dynamic asset-pricing model of (crypto-) tokens on (blockchain-based) platforms.
40	Token Valuation	x*y = k market makers	Liquidity in decentralised exchanges
41	Token Valuation	Bitcoin Pricing, Adoption, and Usage: Theory and Evidence	This paper develops a model of user adoption and use of virtual currency (such as Bitcoin), and focusing on the dynamics of adoption in the presence of frictions arising from exchange rate uncertainty.
42	Transaction Cost	Transaction Cost, Institutions and Economic Performance	Institutions and the way they evolve shape economic performance. Together with the technology employed, the, determine the cost of transacting and producing.
43	Transaction Cost	Externalities of internalising contracts (inefficiencies)	Ultimately, the relevance of externalities must lie in the fact that they indicate the presence of some transaction costs. For if there were no costs of transacting, then the potential Pareto improvement could be realized by costless bargaining between self-interested economic agent.
44	Transaction Cost	The Governance of Contractual Relations	If transaction costs are negligible, the organization of economic activity is irrelevant.
45	Transaction Cost	Blockchains as Implementable Mechanisms: Crypto-Ricardian Rent and a Crypto-Coase Theorem	Mechanism design theory to suggest where blockchains may or may not be seen as implementable mechanisms.
46	Transaction Cost	Information Gathering, Transaction Costs, and the Property Rights Approach	A party may acquire private information about its default payoff.
47		An analysis of Uniswap markets
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	A	B
1
2	DeFi Categories (Resources and People to Follow)
3
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5	This list focuses on DeFi tools and learning resources. In alphabetical order
12	Filter Category 👇🏼	Sort 👇🏼
13	Category	Title (Click to view notes or direct link)

14	Newsletter	Bankless
15	Newsletter	Delphi Digital
16	Newsletter	Economics Design
17	Newsletter	Messari
18	Newsletter	SpencerNoon
19	Newsletter	The Daily Gwei
20	Newsletter	The Defiant
21	Newsletter	Token Tuesday
22	Telegram Channel (Resource)	https://t.me/s/DelphiDigitalAlerts
23	Telegram Channel (Resource)	t.me/thedailyape
24	Twitter (Anon)	@devops199fan
25	Twitter (Builder)	@AndreCronjeTech
26	Twitter (Builder)	@ASvanevik
27	Twitter (Builder)	@cyounessi1
28	Twitter (Builder)	@haydenzadams
29	Twitter (Builder)	@kaiynne
30	Twitter (Builder)	@sassal0x
31	Twitter (Builder)	@SBF_Alameda
32	Twitter (Builder)	@StaniKulechov
33	Twitter (Investor)	@Arthur_0x
34	Twitter (Investor)	@AutismCapital
35	Twitter (Investor)	@cmsholdings
36	Twitter (Investor)	@Darrenlautf
37	Twitter (Investor)	@FUTURE_FUND_
38	Twitter (Investor)	@hosseeb
39	Twitter (Investor)	@iam__vance
40	Twitter (Investor)	@iamDCinvestor
41	Twitter (Investor)	@mrjasonchoi
42	Twitter (Investor)	@nic__carter
43	Twitter (Investor)	@ana_yanakieva
44	Twitter (Investor)	@Rewkang
45	Twitter (Investor)	@SpartanBlack_1
46	Twitter (Investor)	@zhusu
47	Twitter (NFT Investor)	@AndrewSteinwold
48	Twitter (NFT Investor)	@CaoArmand
49	Twitter (NFT Investor)	@DCLBlogger
50	Twitter (NFT Investor)	@Delphi_Digital
51	Twitter (NFT Investor)	@gabuschl
52	Twitter (NFT Investor)	@j1mmyeth
53	Twitter (NFT Investor)	@jbrukh
54	Twitter (NFT Investor)	@Jihoz_Axie
55	Twitter (NFT Investor)	@pranksyNFT
56	Twitter (NFT Investor)	@SuperRareJohn
57	Twitter (NFT Investor)	@WhaleShark_Pro
58	Twitter (Research)	@Alexintosh
59	Twitter (Research)	@ASvanevik
60	Twitter (Research)	@BanklessHQ
61	Twitter (Research)	@ceterispar1bus
62	Twitter (Research)	@danrobinson
63	Twitter (Research)	@Darrenlautf
64	Twitter (Research)	@DeFi_Dad
65	Twitter (Research)	@EconsDesign
66	Twitter (Research)	@hasufl
67	Twitter (Research)	@Interaxis
68	Twitter (Research)	@nlw
69	Twitter (Research)	@pythianism
70	Twitter (Research)	@RyanWatkins_
71	Twitter (Research)	@safetyth1rd
72	Twitter (Research)	@tarunchitra
73	Twitter (Research)	@twobitidiot
74	Twitter (Research)	@defiprime
75	YouTube	Economics Design
76	YouTube	Finematics
77	YouTube	Interaxis
78	YouTube	Token Engineering
79	YouTube	DeFi Weekly
80	YouTube	Chris Blec on DeFi
81	YouTube	DeFi Dad
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	A	B	C	D
1
2	Tokenomics Glossary List
3
4
5	Term (English)	Definition	Category	Term (Chinese)

6	51% attacks	Someone controls majority of the network hash rate. They change transaction history and stop new transactions from being confirmed.	Bad behaviour	51% 算力攻击
7	Bribery attacks	Attack where participants bribe nodes offchain to control transactions	Bad behaviour	贿赂攻击
8	Desynchronization attacks	Attack on the system where the attacker blocks communication between all parties.	Bad behaviour	去同步攻击
9	Digital Currency	An electronically produced money, which is a method of payment, store of value and unit of account. Types of digital currency available: Central Bank Digital Currency (legal tender), cryptocurrency, virtual currency	Blockchain Terms	数字货币
10	Double spending attacks	A person spends the set of coins in more than one transaction	Bad behaviour	双重支付
11	Eclipse attacks	The attacker monopolizes all of the victim’s incoming and outgoing connections, thus isolating the victim from the rest of its peers in the network. The attacker can then filter the victim’s view of the blockchain, force the victim to waste compute power on obsolete views of the blockchain, or coopt the victim’s compute power for its own nefarious purposes	Bad behaviour
12	Grinding attacks	A hostile actor uses greater computational power than other miners to outperform legitimate miners and find kernels that allow them to perform the main chain.	Bad behaviour	研磨攻击
13	Long-range attacks	Attacks where the miner attempts to start a fork not five or ten blocks behind the head of the main chain, as happens normally, but hundreds of thousands of blocks back.	Bad behaviour	远程攻击
14	Nothing at stake attacks	In the event of a fork, whether the fork is accidental or a malicious attempt to rewrite history and reverse a transaction, the optimal strategy for any miner is to mine on every chain, so that the miner gets their reward no matter which fork wins.	Bad behaviour	无利害关系攻击
15	Past majority attack	The ability of someone controlling a majority of network hash rate to revise transaction history and prevent new transactions from confirming.	Bad behaviour	过数攻击
16	Selfish-mining	Groups of miners collude to increase their revenue by centralising bitcoin mining operations.	Bad behaviour	自私开采
17	Bitcoin	Cryptocurrency and worldwide payment system. It is the first decentralized digital currency.	Blockchain Terms	比特币
18	Blockchain	A blockchain is a digitized, decentralized, public ledger of all cryptocurrency transactions.	Blockchain Terms	区块链
19	Consensus mechanism	A consensus mechanism is a fault-tolerant mechanism that is used in computer and blockchain systems to achieve the necessary agreement on a single data value or a single state of the network among distributed processes or multi-agent systems.	Blockchain Terms	共识机制
20	Protocol	The official procedure or system of rules governing actions in the network	Blockchain Terms	网络数据交换规则
21	Smart contract	A smart contract is a computer protocol intended to digitally facilitate, verify, or enforce the negotiation or performance of a contract	Blockchain Terms	解密智能合约
22	Token Design	Designing the token with strategic rules and governance	Blockchain Terms	通证设计
23	Token Economics	A blend of technical engineering and economics. It ensures the cryptoasset is applicable to its use case.	Blockchain Terms	通证经济 / 经济模型
24	Fork	Duplicate source code and add special features to your chain.	Blockchain Terms	分叉
25	Cooperative game theory	Game with competition between groups of players ("coalitions") due to the possibility of external enforcement of cooperative behavior (e.g. through contract law).	Economics Concept	合作博弈
26	Game Theory	Strategic decision making: how to make a choice given various options	Economics Concept	对策论
27	Incentives	Inducement or supplemental reward that serves as a motivational device for a desired action or behavior.	Economics Concept	博弈论激励
28	Inflation	Rate at which prices increase and the value of the currency falls.	Economics Concept	通货膨胀
29	Information Theory	Study of the quantification, storage and communication of information.	Economics Concept	信息论
30	Market Design	Market design is a kind of economic engineering, utilizing laboratory research, game theory, algorithms, simulations, and more. 2 broad theoretical efforts: aution theory and matching theory.	Economics Concept	市场设计
31	Mechanism Design	Mechanism design is a field in economics and game theory that takes an engineering approach to designing economic mechanisms or incentives, toward desired objectives, in strategic settings, where players act rationally.	Economics Concept	机制设计
32	Money supply	Supply of money in the system	Economics Concept	货币供应量
33	Nash equilibrium	Nash Equilibrium is a concept within game theory where the optimal outcome of a game is where there is no incentive to deviate from their initial strategy.	Economics Concept	纳什均衡
34	Network Economics	Network economics refers to business economics that benefit from the network effect.	Economics Concept	网络经济
35	Schelling Point	A solution where people naturally tend to in the absence of communication.	Economics Concept	谢林点
36	Signalling	Signalling is the idea that one party (termed the agent) credibly conveys some information about itself to another party (the principal)	Economics Concept	通信理论
37	Strategic decision	A decision where you get the maximum benefits, considering all other possible options	Economics Concept	决策
38	AML	Anti-money laundering	Gov Regulation	反洗黑钱
39	KYC	Know your customer, as in knowing their identity, if they are real or bots, etc.	Gov Regulation	客户身份验证
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	A	B	C	D	E	F
1				Categories	Levels	Definition
2	Token Economics Resources List			🎥 Videos	1 Foundation	Foundation to get started as you deep dive into this rabbit hole of economics.
3	This is an open souce list of valuable tokenomic resources. You can find basic economic principles & basic applications to token ecosystems here.			💡 Blogs/Articles	1.1 Economics of Blockchain	Economics of the blockchain platform. E.g. governance, protocols, security, etc.
4				📚 Books	1.2 Economics of Tokens	Economics of token is the description of how a token in an ecosystem operates.
5				🔎 Academic Papers	3 Economics of Token Pillars	4 pillars that define the economics of token (above)
6				🎧 Podcast	1.2.1 Market Design	Designing the correct market/environment for the token and network to thrive
7				💯 Resources	1.2.2 Mechanism Design	Creating proper mechanisms, incentives and governance for the network to behave optimally
8				🔮Others	1.2.3 Token Design	Design of the token properties like inflation, deflation, supply, etc.
9
10	Category	Levels	Title (Click to view notes or direct link)	Context

11	🔎 Academic Papers	1 Foundation	A Framework for Triple-Entry Bookkeeping
12	🔎 Academic Papers	1 Foundation	Blockchain Economics
13	📚 Books	1 Foundation	Accounting in 3 Dimensions
14	📚 Books	1 Foundation	Information Rules - Shapiro and Varian
15	📚 Books	1 Foundation	Machine Platform Crowd
16	📚 Books	1 Foundation	The Economics of E-Commerce
17	📚 Books	1 Foundation	Triple-Entry Bookkeeping and Income Momentum by Yuji Ijiri
18	💯 Resources	1 Foundation	Crypto Reading List	Resource List
19	💯 Resources	1 Foundation	MASSIVE cryptoeconomics resource list - Github 1	Resource List
20	💯 Resources	1 Foundation	MASSIVE cryptoeconomics resource list - Github 2	Resource List
21	💯 Resources	1 Foundation	Resource for Cryptoeconomics	Resource List
22	💯 Resources	1 Foundation	Token Engineering Reading Resources	Resource List
23	💯 Resources	1 Foundation	Twitter list of Cryptoeconomics people	Resource List
24	🔮Others	1 Foundation	Crypto Token Economy Design	Presentation Slides
25	💡 Blogs/Articles	1 Foundation	Basic Blockchain Glossary	Glossary
26	💡 Blogs/Articles	1 Foundation	DAOs, DACs, DAs and More: An Incomplete Terminology Guide	Glossary
27	💡 Blogs/Articles	1 Foundation	ELI5: Crypto economics vs Tokenomics	Explain Like I'm 5
28	💡 Blogs/Articles	1 Foundation	ELI5: Tokenomics	Explain Like I'm 5
29	💡 Blogs/Articles	1 Foundation	ELI5: Tokenomics vs Economics	Explain Like I'm 5
30	💡 Blogs/Articles	1 Foundation	The Emergence of a Blockchain-Based Token Economy
31	💡 Blogs/Articles	1 Foundation	How Formal Verification Can Ensure Flawless Smart Contracts
32	💡 Blogs/Articles	1 Foundation	Token Economics brief introduction
33	💡 Blogs/Articles	1 Foundation	Tokenomics: how we design them and why the token matters more than the money
34	💡 Blogs/Articles	1 Foundation	What is Cryptocurrency Game Theory: A Basic introduction
35	💡 Blogs/Articles	1 Foundation	Research and Analytics for Engineered Economic Systems
36	💡 Blogs/Articles	1 Foundation	What is Tokenomics
37	🎥 Videos	1 Foundation	Token Economic video series by LisaJYTan (me)
38	🎥 Videos	1 Foundation	The Ethics of Money Production
39	🔮Others	1.1 Economics of Blockchain	Blockchains & Their Consensus Protocols
40	🔮Others	1.1 Economics of Blockchain	Cryptoeconomics Slides from Devcon4
41	🔎 Academic Papers	1.1 Economics of Blockchain	An empirical study of Namecoin and lessons for decentralized namespace design
42	🔎 Academic Papers	1.1 Economics of Blockchain	A Rational Protocol Design Treatment of Bitcoin
43	🔎 Academic Papers	1.1 Economics of Blockchain	Byzantine Fault Tolerance in a Distributed System
44	🔎 Academic Papers	1.1 Economics of Blockchain	Can peer-to-peer live streaming systems coexist with free riders?
45	🔎 Academic Papers	1.1 Economics of Blockchain	Decentralized Caching for Content Delivery Based on Blockchain
46	🔎 Academic Papers	1.1 Economics of Blockchain	Demystifying Incentives in the Consensus Computer
47	🔎 Academic Papers	1.1 Economics of Blockchain	Eclipse Attacks on Bitcoin’s Peer-to-Peer Network	Blockchain Attack
48	🔎 Academic Papers	1.1 Economics of Blockchain	Economics of Blockchain
49	🔎 Academic Papers	1.1 Economics of Blockchain	Formal Rules for a Society Neutral Among Communities
50	🔎 Academic Papers	1.1 Economics of Blockchain	A Platform Architecture for Multi-Tenant Blockchain-Based Systems
51	🔎 Academic Papers	1.1 Economics of Blockchain	The Public Blockchain Ecosystem: An Empirical Analysis
52	🔎 Academic Papers	1.1 Economics of Blockchain	Quantum Distributed Consensus
53	🔎 Academic Papers	1.1 Economics of Blockchain	Some Simple Economics of the Blockchain
54	🔎 Academic Papers	1.1 Economics of Blockchain	Some Simple Economics of the Blockchain (2)
55	🔎 Academic Papers	1.1 Economics of Blockchain	The Myth of the Rational Voter - Why Democracies Choose Bad Policies
56	🔎 Academic Papers	1.1 Economics of Blockchain	What Really Matters in Auction Design
57	📚 Books	1.1 Economics of Blockchain	Understanding Merkle Trees - Why use them, who uses them, and how to use them
58	💡 Blogs/Articles	1.1 Economics of Blockchain	Blockchain Security: Different Types of Blockchain Attacks	Blockchain Attack
59	💡 Blogs/Articles	1.1 Economics of Blockchain	[Case Study] Bitcoin's Security Model	Case Study
60	💡 Blogs/Articles	1.1 Economics of Blockchain	[Case Study] Consesus Compare: Tendermint BFT vs. EOS dPoS	Case Study
61	💡 Blogs/Articles	1.1 Economics of Blockchain	3 applications to Cryptoeconomics
62	💡 Blogs/Articles	1.1 Economics of Blockchain	3 Types of Blockchain platform attacks
63	💡 Blogs/Articles	1.1 Economics of Blockchain	A Proof of Stake Design Philosophy (esp 2 layer of defense part)
64	💡 Blogs/Articles	1.1 Economics of Blockchain	Against on-chain governance
65	💡 Blogs/Articles	1.1 Economics of Blockchain	Behavioral Crypto-Economics: The Challenge and Promise of Blockchain Incentive Design
66	💡 Blogs/Articles	1.1 Economics of Blockchain	Blockchain and Coordination Games: Failures and Focal Points
67	💡 Blogs/Articles	1.1 Economics of Blockchain	Blockchains and the Opportunity of the Commons
68	💡 Blogs/Articles	1.1 Economics of Blockchain	Blockchain’s Problem with Unknown Unknowns
69	💡 Blogs/Articles	1.1 Economics of Blockchain	Casper (ETH) & Game Theory
70	💡 Blogs/Articles	1.1 Economics of Blockchain	Cryptoeconomics 101
71	💡 Blogs/Articles	1.1 Economics of Blockchain	Empirical Cryptoeconomics
72	💡 Blogs/Articles	1.1 Economics of Blockchain	Engineering Security Through Coordination Problems
73	💡 Blogs/Articles	1.1 Economics of Blockchain	Long-Range Attacks: The Serious Problem With Adaptive Proof of Work	Blockchain Attack
74	💡 Blogs/Articles	1.1 Economics of Blockchain	Making Sense of Cryptoeconomics
75	💡 Blogs/Articles	1.1 Economics of Blockchain	Minimal Slashing Conditions
76	💡 Blogs/Articles	1.1 Economics of Blockchain	Nash equilibrium and blockchain platforms
77	💡 Blogs/Articles	1.1 Economics of Blockchain	Notes on Blockchain Governance
78	💡 Blogs/Articles	1.1 Economics of Blockchain	Privacy on Blockchain
79	💡 Blogs/Articles	1.1 Economics of Blockchain	Problems with Ethereum
80	💡 Blogs/Articles	1.1 Economics of Blockchain	SchellingCoin: A Minimal-Trust Universal Data Feed
81	💡 Blogs/Articles	1.1 Economics of Blockchain	Selfish Mining: A 25% Attack Against the Bitcoin Network
82	💡 Blogs/Articles	1.1 Economics of Blockchain	State of Ethereum Protocol #2: The Beacon Chain
83	💡 Blogs/Articles	1.1 Economics of Blockchain	The Emergence of Cryptoeconomic Primitives
84	💡 Blogs/Articles	1.1 Economics of Blockchain	The P + epsilon Attack
85	💡 Blogs/Articles	1.1 Economics of Blockchain	The Proof-of-Work Concept
86	💡 Blogs/Articles	1.1 Economics of Blockchain	The Triangle of Harm
87	💡 Blogs/Articles	1.1 Economics of Blockchain	Towards a Practice of Token Engineering
88	💡 Blogs/Articles	1.1 Economics of Blockchain	Understanding Blockchain Fundamentals, Part 1: Byzantine Fault Tolerance
89	💡 Blogs/Articles	1.1 Economics of Blockchain	Understanding Crypto-Economic Security through Game Theory
90	💡 Blogs/Articles	1.1 Economics of Blockchain	Vulnerability: Proof of Work vs. Proof of Stake
91	💡 Blogs/Articles	1.1 Economics of Blockchain	Wet VS Dry Layers
92	🎥 Videos	1.1 Economics of Blockchain	Cryptoeconomic Mechanism Design w Vlad Zamfir
93	🎥 Videos	1.1 Economics of Blockchain	Ethereum 2.0 - Economics of Beacon Chain & more
94	🎥 Videos	1.1 Economics of Blockchain	How to Destroy Bitcoin: Game Theory and Network Attacks
95	🎥 Videos	1.1 Economics of Blockchain	Introduction to Cryptoeconomics
96	🔎 Academic Papers	1.2 Economics of Tokens	An (Institutional) Investor’s Take on Cryptoassets
97	📚 Books	1.2 Economics of Tokens	The Age of Cryptocurrency By Paul Vigna and Michael J. Casey
98	📚 Books	1.2 Economics of Tokens	Understanding Bitcoin: Cryptography, Engineering and Economics By Pedro Franco
99	💡 Blogs/Articles	1.2 Economics of Tokens	Dividend Tokens, Explained
100	💡 Blogs/Articles	1.2 Economics of Tokens	The Token Handbook - Hackernoon
101	💡 Blogs/Articles	1.2 Economics of Tokens	Tokenomics Model (by Miguel Cabellero)
102	💡 Blogs/Articles	1.2 Economics of Tokens	What is tokenomics
103	🔎 Academic Papers	1.2.1 Market Design	School choice: A mechanism design approach
104	🔎 Academic Papers	1.2.1 Market Design	Market Design for a Blockchain-Based Financial System
105	🔎 Academic Papers	1.2.1 Market Design	Market Design for Kidney Exchange
106	🔎 Academic Papers	1.2.1 Market Design	The Job Market for New Economists: A Market Design Perspective
107	🔎 Academic Papers	1.2.1 Market Design	Automated Trading in Agents-based Markets for Communication Bandwidth
108	🔎 Academic Papers	1.2.1 Market Design	Is there a market for ideas?
109	🔎 Academic Papers	1.2.1 Market Design	What have we learned from market design?
110	🔎 Academic Papers	1.2.1 Market Design	The Art of Designing Markets
111	🔎 Academic Papers	1.2.1 Market Design	Market Design for a Blockchain-Based Financial System
112	📚 Books	1.2.1 Market Design	Matchmakers: The New Economics of Multisided Platforms
113	📚 Books	1.2.1 Market Design	The Handbook of Market Design
114	📚 Books	1.2.1 Market Design	Who Gets What and Why - Alvin Roth
115	💡 Blogs/Articles	1.2.1 Market Design	Market Design with Tokens
116	🔎 Academic Papers	1.2.2 Mechanism Design	Blockchains as Implementable Mechanisms: Crypto-Ricardian Rent and a Crypto-Coase Theorem
117	🔎 Academic Papers	1.2.2 Mechanism Design	Cryptodemocratic Governance of Special Economic Zones
118	🔎 Academic Papers	1.2.2 Mechanism Design	Cooperative Game Theoretic Analysis
119	🔎 Academic Papers	1.2.2 Mechanism Design	Economist as an Engineer: Game theory, experimentation, and computation as tools for design economics.
120	🔎 Academic Papers	1.2.2 Mechanism Design	Mechanism Design Theory
121	🔎 Academic Papers	1.2.2 Mechanism Design	Mechanism Theory by Matthew O Jackson (Great paper!)
122	🔎 Academic Papers	1.2.2 Mechanism Design	Obviously Strategy-Proof Mechanisms
123	🔎 Academic Papers	1.2.2 Mechanism Design	Foundations of Transaction Fee Mechanism Design
124	🔎 Academic Papers	1.2.2 Mechanism Design	The Economic Models of Voting
125	🔎 Academic Papers	1.2.2 Mechanism Design	Cryptocurrency Egalitarianism: A Quantitative Approach
126	🔎 Academic Papers	1.2.2 Mechanism Design	Egalitarian PoW by CryptoNote 2013
127	🔎 Academic Papers	1.2.2 Mechanism Design	The Ricardian Contract
128	🔎 Academic Papers	1.2.2 Mechanism Design	Priority-based Assignment with Reserves and Quotas
129	📚 Books	1.2.2 Mechanism Design	Game Theory Bargaining and Auction Strategies
130	📚 Books	1.2.2 Mechanism Design	Introducing Game Theory - A Graphic Guide
131	📚 Books	1.2.2 Mechanism Design	Rules of Play: Game Design Fundamentals
132	📚 Books	1.2.2 Mechanism Design	Theory of Games and Economic Behavior by John von Neumann & Oskar Morgenstern
133	📚 Books	1.2.2 Mechanism Design	The strategy of conflict by Thomas Schelling	Game theory analysis
134	💡 Blogs/Articles	1.2.2 Mechanism Design	Bribery Attacks for TCR	Governance
135	💡 Blogs/Articles	1.2.2 Mechanism Design	[Case Study] 28 Examples of Mechanism Design in Blockchain	Case Study
136	💡 Blogs/Articles	1.2.2 Mechanism Design	[Case Study] How manipulation-resistant are Prediction Markets?	Case Study
137	💡 Blogs/Articles	1.2.2 Mechanism Design	A signaling theory model of cryptocurrency issuance and value
138	💡 Blogs/Articles	1.2.2 Mechanism Design	On Collusion
139	💡 Blogs/Articles	1.2.2 Mechanism Design	Economic Mechanisms
140	💡 Blogs/Articles	1.2.2 Mechanism Design	Economics of Tokenized Incentives 1: Intro to Pay for Performance
141	💡 Blogs/Articles	1.2.2 Mechanism Design	Governance Protocol & Voting: Existing Development	Resource List
142	💡 Blogs/Articles	1.2.2 Mechanism Design	Mechanism Design for Cryptoeconomic Applications
143	💡 Blogs/Articles	1.2.2 Mechanism Design	Overview of stablecoins
144	💡 Blogs/Articles	1.2.2 Mechanism Design	The Token Curated Registry Reading List
145	💡 Blogs/Articles	1.2.2 Mechanism Design	Token curated registries
146	💡 Blogs/Articles	1.2.2 Mechanism Design	Token Network Effects
147	💡 Blogs/Articles	1.2.2 Mechanism Design	Consensus mechanisms in blockchain systems
148	💡 Blogs/Articles	1.2.2 Mechanism Design	Commit & Reveal Voting
149	💡 Blogs/Articles	1.2.2 Mechanism Design	Voting Design
150	🎥 Videos	1.2.2 Mechanism Design	[Lecture Series] Algorithmic Game Theory	Lecture Series
151	🎥 Videos	1.2.2 Mechanism Design	Institutional Punishsment (Karl Sigmund)
152	🎧 Podcast	1.2.2 Mechanism Design	Ricardian Contract & Digital Assets
153	💯 Resources	1.2.3 Token Design	Monetary Economics Resource List	Resource List
154	🔎 Academic Papers	1.2.3 Token Design	Dynamic Price Competition with Network Effects
155	🔎 Academic Papers	1.2.3 Token Design	Economics of Discount Token (not peer-reviewed)
156	🔎 Academic Papers	1.2.3 Token Design	Going Beyond the Coinbase Transaction Fee: Alternative Reward Schemes for Miners in Blockchain Systems
157	🔎 Academic Papers	1.2.3 Token Design	Price Stability Tokenomics	Case Study
158	🔎 Academic Papers	1.2.3 Token Design	Trends in crypto-currecies and blockchain technologies
159	🔎 Academic Papers	1.2.3 Token Design	Zhou Xiaochuan: Reform the international monetary system
160	📚 Books	1.2.3 Token Design	The Mystery of Banking by Murray Newton Rothbard
161	💡 Blogs/Articles	1.2.3 Token Design	Considering “Token Velocity”
162	💡 Blogs/Articles	1.2.3 Token Design	[Case Study] Designing Multi-Token Economies	Case Study
163	💡 Blogs/Articles	1.2.3 Token Design	[Case Study] Bitcoin & Ocean Protocol	Case Study
164	💡 Blogs/Articles	1.2.3 Token Design	[Case Study] What are Gnosis Tokens? — the New Access Based Token Model	Case Study
165	💡 Blogs/Articles	1.2.3 Token Design	A Business Guide to Token Usage, Utility and Value
166	💡 Blogs/Articles	1.2.3 Token Design	Aligning incentives in ICOs
167	💡 Blogs/Articles	1.2.3 Token Design	Analyzing Token Sale Model
168	💡 Blogs/Articles	1.2.3 Token Design	Asset-Backed Security Tokens: What you can learn from the Economics of Property Rights
169	💡 Blogs/Articles	1.2.3 Token Design	Blockchain and Coordination Games: Failures and Focal Points
170	💡 Blogs/Articles	1.2.3 Token Design	Blockchain Incentive Structures: What they are and why they matter
171	💡 Blogs/Articles	1.2.3 Token Design	Cryptoasset Valuations by Chris Burniske
172	💡 Blogs/Articles	1.2.3 Token Design	ETH Research Centre
173	💡 Blogs/Articles	1.2.3 Token Design	First/second price auctions
174	💡 Blogs/Articles	1.2.3 Token Design	Hyperdeflationary Monetary Systems
175	💡 Blogs/Articles	1.2.3 Token Design	Incomplete Contracts and Blockchain
176	💡 Blogs/Articles	1.2.3 Token Design	Love and Circularity in the Time of Crypto
177	💡 Blogs/Articles	1.2.3 Token Design	MV=PQ: A Counter Argument
178	💡 Blogs/Articles	1.2.3 Token Design	Nash Equilibrium and blockchain platforms
179	💡 Blogs/Articles	1.2.3 Token Design	On Inflation, Transaction Fees and Cryptocurrency Monetary Policy
180	💡 Blogs/Articles	1.2.3 Token Design	On Medium-of-Exchange Token Valuations - PQ=MV
181	💡 Blogs/Articles	1.2.3 Token Design	On Value, Velocity and Monetary Theory
182	💡 Blogs/Articles	1.2.3 Token Design	The Blockchain Token Velocity Problem
183	💡 Blogs/Articles	1.2.3 Token Design	The Quantity Theory of Money for Tokens
184	💡 Blogs/Articles	1.2.3 Token Design	Tokens: Investment Vehicle or Medium of Exchange (Not Both)
185	💡 Blogs/Articles	1.2.3 Token Design	Understanding Token Velocity
186	💡 Blogs/Articles	1.2.3 Token Design	Valuing Cryptoassets from the Ground Up
187	💡 Blogs/Articles	1.2.3 Token Design	Velocity Thesis: Cryptoasset Valuation
188	💡 Blogs/Articles	1.2.3 Token Design	Desire paths market for recommendations	Token Bonding Curve
189	💡 Blogs/Articles	1.2.3 Token Design	Curved token bonding in Curation Market	Token Bonding Curve
190	💡 Blogs/Articles	1.2.3 Token Design	Continuous organisations	Token Bonding Curve
191	💡 Blogs/Articles	1.2.3 Token Design	How to make bonding curves for continuous token models	Token Bonding Curve
192	🎧 Podcast	1.2.3 Token Design	How Do You Value a Cryptocurrency?
193	🎥 Videos	1.2.3 Token Design	Token Design as Optimisation Design
194	🎥 Videos	1.2.3 Token Design	Transaction Fee Economics
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	A	B	C	D
1			Categories	Explanation
2	Web3
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10	Category	Title (Click to view notes or direct link)	Medium

11	MEV	Flashbots	Substack