Empirical Research Database


1		Policy Outcomes and Representation
2	Date	Title	Author(s)	Citation Type	Data Examined	Question(s) Asked	Key Findings

3	2017	All the President’s Friends: Political Access and Firm Value	Jeffrey R. Brown and Jiekun Huang	Working Paper	White House visitor logs from 2009 to 2015, featuring 2,286 meetings between federal government officials and corporate executives from S&P 1500 firms.	Is political access of significant value to corporations?	Corporate executives’ meetings with key policymakers are of significant value to corporations. Such meetings are associated with positive abnormal stock returns, more government contracts, and a higher likelihood of regulatory relief.
4	2017	Fifty Shades of Green	Thomas Ferguson, Paul Jorgensen, and Jie Chen	Report	Campaign contributions from multiple sources given to lawmakers voting on financial reform legislation and telecommunication regulation legislation between 2013 and 2015.	To determine whether campaign contributions can change the votes of lawmakers on key policy issues.	An increase in contributions from regulated industries to the lawmakers in question increases the likelihood that those lawmakers will change their votes in a way that favors the contributing industries.
5	2016	The Appearance and the Reality of Quid Pro Quo Corruption: An Empirical Investigation	Christopher Robertson, D. Alex Winkelman, Kelly Bergstrand, and Darren Modzelewski	Law Journal	A grand jury simulation with 45 participants, and an online mock jury trial with 1,276 participants.	To evaluate quid pro quo corruption and its appearance, in light of Supreme Court claims that campaign finance regulations are unconstitutional unless they target such corruption or its appearance.	“Much of what politicians and benefactors now do...actually does appear to be quid pro quo corruption [to the everyday citizen],” thus indicating that independent spending can give rise to an “appearance of corruption” even under the quid pro quo standard.
6	2016	Money in Exile: Campaign Contributions and Committee Access	Eleanor Neff Powell and Justin Grimmer	Academic Journal	Examines the correlation between PAC spending patterns and Congressional committee membership behavior in the 100th and 111th Congresses.	To understand how money influences the legislative process, looking specifically at interests groups’ connections to committee members as a measure of access and influence.	“Corporations and business PACs use donations to acquire immediate access and favor.”
7	2016	Campaign Contributions Facilitate Access to Congressional Officials: A Randomized Field Experiment	Joshua L. Kalla & David E. Broockman	Academic Journal	A randomized field experiment in which congressional offices were assigned to receive requests for meetings from revealed donors and from constituents.	To test whether senior congressional staffers were more responsive to donors than to non-donors.	Senior congressional staffers were more likely to schedule a meeting with revealed donors than with other constituents.
8	2016	Representing the Preferences of Donors, Partisans, and Voters in the U.S. Senate	Michael J. Barber	Academic Journal	Survey information on the policy preferences of voters and in- and out-of-state contributors in the 2012 federal election cycle.	To analyze the degree of ideological congruence between senators and four constituent subsets: donors, co-partisans, supporters, and registered voters.	“Senators’ preferences reflect the preferences of the average donor better than any other group” and “diverge dramatically from the preference of the average voter in the state.”
9	2016	Quantifying Foreign Institutional Block Ownership at Publicly traded U.S. Corporations	John C. Coates IV, Ronald A. Fein, Kevin Crenny, and L. Vivian Dong	Report	2016 S&P 500 companies with large institutional foreign investors.	To determine the level of foreign institutional block ownership among a leading group of publicly traded corporations.	“Current law still allows substantial avenues for foreign influence over corporate political spending by U.S.-incorporated and -based corporations. Such influence could arise from board representation, manager control, contracts (including lending arrangements), or ownership of significant blocks of stock.”
10	2016	Seismic Denial?	Steve Thompson and Anna Kuchment	Journalism	A case study of the Texas Railroad Commission’s response to public concerns over earthquakes that may have been caused by fracking.	NA	Elected officials on the Texas Railroad Commission may have been influenced by campaign contributions from the oil and gas industry, and prioritized the interests of the industry over the concerns of their constituents.
11	2015	Testing the Marketplace of Ideas	Daniel E. Ho and Frederick Schauer	Law Review	Polling information for over 1.3 million voters in Manhattan, New York, and Hudson County, New Jersey in the 2012 general election.	To test whether “[t]he best test of truth is [an] idea’s power to be accepted in the competition of the market.”	“Constitutional law should become more empirical” and“judges should base their decisions on accurate facts.”
12	2015	Campaign Finance Laws, Policy Outcomes, and Political Equality in the American States	Patrick Flavin	Academic Journal	A time-series analysis in the states from 1977 to 2008, examining the relationship between the degree to which states regulate campaign spending and the state’s spending priorities.	To determine whether states with stricter campaign finance regulations represent citizens’ interests more equally as measured by state spending priorities.	“States with stricter campaign finance laws devote a larger proportion of their annual budget to public welfare spending in general and to cash assistance programs in particular.” Also that “there is no relationship between the strictness of campaign finance laws and spending decisions for non-redistributive policy areas.”
13	2015	Where Money Matters in Congres (chapter: Legislative Consequences of Fundraising Influence)	Eleanor Neff Powell	Forthcoming Book	A dataset of appearances at congressional fundraising events, fundraising event data, and legislative votes in the 112th Congress.	To determine how congressional fundraising event appearances serve as a mechanism of influence in which members who receive fundraising assistance from their peers are more likely to support legislative priorities of the members who provided them with financial assistance.	Members of Congress are more likely to vote for legislative priorities of other members who have provided their election efforts with financial assistance.
14	2014	Testing Theories of American Politics: Elites, Interest Groups, and Average Citizens	Martin Gilens and Benjamin I. Page	Academic Journal	Almost 2,000 national survey responses to proposed policy changes between 1981 and 2002, analyzed alongside income level data.	To determine which actors (average citizens, economic elites, or interest groups) have the most influence over public policy.	Did not directly address the influence of campaign spending, but found that elected officials responded to policy preferences of economic elites and groups representing business interests while “the policy preferences of the average American have only a minuscule...impact upon public policy.”
15	2014	The Benefits of a Relational Approach to Corporate Political Activity: Evidence from Political Contributions to Tax Policy Makers	Jennifer L. Brown, Katharine D. Drake, and Laura Wellman	Academic Journal	Data on PAC contributions, lobbying expenditures, and the annual accounting statements for more than 2,600 firms from 2000 to 2003 and 2009 to 2012.	To determine whether firms that invest in relationships with tax policymakers via campaign contributions accrue greater future tax benefits.	Firms who give consistently to politicians, including through PACs, are more likely to pay lower tax rates.
16	2006	Let Them Do Their Jobs: The Compelling Government Interest in Protecting the Time of Candidates and Elected Officials	Mark Alexander	Law Journal	Statements from Members of Congress about the time and travel required by constant fundraising, compiled by Martin Schram for the Center for Responsive Politics.	To illustrate that there is a compelling government interest in protecting the time of elected officials and that this interest supports limits on campaign spending.	Candidates must spend “countless hours raising money by courting a limited group of individuals, instead of meeting voters, engaging opponents, debating or voting on legislation, and the like.” Expenditure limits are the best solution to this problem.
17	2006	PACs, Issue Context, and Congressional Decisionmaking	Christopher Witko	Academic Journal	A case study of 20 pieces of legislation proposed in the 103rd and 104th House of Representatives, focusing specifically on the voting patterns of Members who received contributions from issue-PACs that took positions on the bills in question.	To understand the influence of PAC contributions on legislative behavior.	“PACs are able to influence voting on non-ideological/non-visible issues, but are more likely to influence participation on ideological/visible issues.”
18	2006	Let Them Do Their Jobs: The Compelling Government Interest in Protecting the Time of Candidates and Elected Officials	Mark Alexander	Law Journal	Statements from Members of Congress about the time and travel required by constant fundraising, compiled by Martin Schram for the Center for Responsive Politics in 1995 and 2003.	To illustrate that there is a compelling government interest in protecting the time of elected officials, and that this interest supports limits on campaign spending.	Candidates must spend “countless hours raising money by courting a limited group of individuals, instead of meeting voters, engaging opponents, debating or voting on legislation, and the like.” Expenditure limits are the best solution to this problem.
19	2003	Why is There so Little Money in U.S. Politics?	Stephen Ansolabehere, John M. De Figueiredo, and James M. Snyder Jr.	Academic Journal	Six models of campaign contributions and spending based on findings from 40 studies in the existing literature.	To understand money in politics as a political investment.	“[O]verall, PAC contributions show relatively few effects on voting behavior.”