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1 | Timestamp | Your Name | Your Question | ||||||||||||||||||

2 | 4/7/2014 16:41:59 | Haden - TA | Week 1's questions have been answered in class. Please submit questions for Week 2! | ||||||||||||||||||

3 | 4/10/2014 15:00:45 | Xinxing Jiang | In the Penalty Kick Game mentioned in the video about minmax and maxmin strategy, why do we compute maxmin strategy of player 1, i.e., s1(L), by setting derivative of s2(L) to 0? | ||||||||||||||||||

4 | 4/13/2014 22:26:32 | anonymous | It says that there is no loss of generality in having the sigma map from Di to Ai instead of from Di to strategies. I have some intuition as to why this might be so but can you perhaps give a proof of this or your reasoning for why this is so? Thanks | ||||||||||||||||||

5 | 4/14/2014 11:56:14 | anon | How do you get from the mixed minmax/maxmin strategy for one player to their minmax/maxmin value without knowing what mixed strategy the other player is going to play? (i.e. how do you compute minmax/maxmin values for mixed strategies) | ||||||||||||||||||

6 | 4/14/2014 12:38:47 | anonymous | In the example shown in the lecture video of mixed and behavourial strategy : the mixed strategy eqb'm is a pure strategy eqb'm (R,D). So then in the behav strategy when we randomise with p and 1 - p over L and R , is that not a mixed strategy as well ? I guess i don't see the difference between the two. | ||||||||||||||||||

7 | 4/14/2014 13:42:09 | anonymous | Could we have concrete examples of how to calculate correlated equilibria? How do we calculate the utility for these equilibria? | ||||||||||||||||||

8 | 4/14/2014 16:21:58 | Haden - TA | We have answered the questions above. Please submit questions for Week 3! | ||||||||||||||||||

9 | 4/20/2014 14:55:27 | Anonymous | Could you go through an example of maximizing payoff using behavioral strategy (in an imperfect information extensive form game) when neither player has a dominant strategy? Thank you. | ||||||||||||||||||

10 | 4/20/2014 15:45:56 | Xinxing Jiang | In my opinion, the difference between mixed and behavior strategy is like this. For mixed strategy, when facing an information set, a player only tosses a biased coin once, then follows it every time he faces the such information set. For mixed strategy, a player tosses a biased coin every time independently when he is at an information set. Is that right? | ||||||||||||||||||

11 | 4/20/2014 16:26:22 | Tim | What were the statistics on HW1 scores? | ||||||||||||||||||

12 | 4/21/2014 16:28:10 | Haden - TA | We have answered the questions above. Please submit questions for Week 4! | ||||||||||||||||||

13 | 4/28/2014 20:08:06 | Haden - TA | We have answered the questions above. Please submit questions for Week 5! | ||||||||||||||||||

14 | 5/3/2014 13:03:04 | anonymous | Can you go through the intuition of minimax-Q learning and its relationship to the deriving the maxmin value/strategy that we have done previously in class? Thank you! | ||||||||||||||||||

15 | 5/4/2014 20:49:21 | Xinxing Jiang | Is there a general way to solve for Bayesian (Nash) Equilibrium? | ||||||||||||||||||

16 | 5/5/2014 13:44:24 | anonymous | Can you go over how the shapley values were calculated for the voting example in the lecture videos talking about the core. | ||||||||||||||||||

17 | 5/8/2014 22:17:47 | anonymous | When you answer the Shapley value question from the previous student, could you also go over how to compute the core with a concrete example? The textbook says we can compute the core using a linear feasibility problem with the constraint given on p. 375 of the hard copy version of the textbook. However, I don't really understand how they applied the constraint (written in formal mathematical language) to the Parliament example on p. 375 (which is described in high-level language rather than formal math). How did they go from the constraint to the conclusion "We can see that if the sum of the payoffs to parties B, C, and D is less than $100 million, then this set of agents has incentive to deviate"? | ||||||||||||||||||

18 | 5/10/2014 13:30:21 | anonymous | Could you go over an example of solving for the ESS in a game? Specifically, could you choose one where you would have to minimize f(s') = u(s,s') - u(s',s') to prove s is ESS, like they did on p. 218 of the textbook (hardcopy version)? Thanks! | ||||||||||||||||||

19 | 5/10/2014 18:27:48 | anon | Can you go over how to get the equilibrium of a congestion game? It makes sense for the simple examples (i.e. Braess) but I'm having trouble wrapping my head around the more complex examples; I'm confused about the difference between finding the equilibrium VS finding the path with the optimal flow. | ||||||||||||||||||

20 | 5/12/2014 10:39:25 | anonymous | Can we go over an example of solving for complex selfish routing games? Specifically, is there some procedure we can use when there are more than two paths from s to t? | ||||||||||||||||||

21 | 5/12/2014 15:23:18 | Haden - TA | We have answered the questions above. Please submit questions for Week 7! (Don't ask questions about midterm via this form. Ask on the forum instead.) | ||||||||||||||||||

22 | 5/19/2014 22:04:32 | Haden - TA | No class on May 26. Our last class will be on June 2. Ask us any questions! | ||||||||||||||||||

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