ABCDEFGHIJKLMNOPQRSTUVWXYZ
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2
Cost effectiveness
3
4
Number of employeesQALYs saved per dollar spentDollars per life saved
5
17740.07750854
6
104110.14581401
7
1001490.40268141
8
1000262.30259719
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10
Second order effectsImpact on cost effectivenessEvidence strength
11
Increase in volunteer workSlight positive
Weak/Medium- hypothesis that security of basic needs will increase willingness to take on volunteer work. Demonstrated increase in voluntary care labour in universal basic income trials
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Increased likelihood of people leaving their jobsSlight negative
Weak/Medium - Evidence that this effect is rare from universal basic income trials. Hypothesis that most quitting will occur in jobs judged to be morally unfulfilling (e.g. nurses unlikely to quit their jobs). Hypothesis that threat of quitting will lead to improved workplace conditions.
13
Reduced military and carceral spendingLarge positive
Weak/Medium - Likely to occur if the promise is successful in providing basic needs. Frequent examples of basic needs coverage resulting in reduced crime, lowering incarceration rates and freeing up resources for other areas. Hypothesis that facilitating military deescalation will reduce military spending, freeing up resources for other areas
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Reduction of crimeSlight positive
Medium - Frequent examples of basic needs coverage resulting in reduced crime. Untested in specific case of the promise
15
Reduced effectiveness of other methods for providing food, water, peace and shelter
Slight negative
Weak - hypothesis that providing food, water, shelter and peace will slightly reduce effectiveness of other charities working on these issues, since there are fewer acute cases. Scale of the issues is much larger than charities' abilities to solve them, indicating that 'competition' will be minimal and this effect will be small
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Increased entrepreneurshipSlight positive
Weak - hypothesis that providing food, water, shelter and peace will increase incentives for innovators to innovate, since they can bootstrap for longer to reduce share dilution from pre-seed investment, and since risks are covered by a social safety net
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Cost
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21
Number of employeesUSD spent
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0 (counterfactual)0
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145,000
24
10450,000
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1004,500,000
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100045,000,000
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Cost type
Average annual cost per employee (USD)
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Salary35,000
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Running costs10,000
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Total45,000
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Impact
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Number of employees sharing promiseAdditional QALYs saved over five years due to one year of employment (subtracting counterfactual)
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Reducing hungerProviding waterReducing violent injuryProviding shelterTotal
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18,708,7188,708,7188,708,7188,708,71834,834,872
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1046,291,84846,291,84846,291,84846,291,848185,167,393
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100167,626,313167,626,313167,626,313167,626,313670,505,253
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1000293,147,235293,147,235293,147,235293,147,2351,172,588,939
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Number of employees sharing promiseQALYs saved over five years due to employment of promise-spreaders
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Reducing hungerProviding waterReducing violent injuryProviding shelterTotal
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0 (counterfactual)18,624,56618,624,56618,624,56618,624,56674,498,262
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127,333,28427,333,28427,333,28427,333,284109,333,134
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1064,916,41464,916,41464,916,41464,916,414259,665,655
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100186,250,879186,250,879186,250,879186,250,879745,003,515
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1000311,771,800311,771,800311,771,800311,771,8001,247,087,202
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Number of employees sharing promiseNumber of days spent above that number of promisers within 5 years, but below the next threshold
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2,000200,00020,000,0002,000,000,0008,000,000,000
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04614614611450
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14564604612140
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1042046046134738
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100286456460347260
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1,000108420460347489
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Number of Promisers
% reduction of hunger for those promisers
% reduction of water inaccess for those promisers
% reduction of violent injury for those promisers% reduction of homelessness for those promisers
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2,00090%90%5%90%
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200,00080%90%10%80%
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20,000,00060%90%10%60%
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2,000,000,00090%95%30%90%
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8,000,000,00098%98%40%98%
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Number of employees sharing promiseEstimated days until reaching a given number of promisers
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2,000200,00020,000,0002,000,000,0008,000,000,000
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0300760122116812028
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1235691115116121958
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1010052198114411788
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1001730375912201566
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100021105309901337
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Explanation of maths used to calculate table above
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The following differential equation can be used to calculate dP/dt, the rate of change of promisers per day
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dP / dt = (E * Re + P * Rp)
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Where P is the number of promisers, t is the number of days since there were 100 promisers, E is the number of paid employees sharing the promise, Re is the number of extra promisers per day that employees are able to recruit, and Rp is the number of extra promisers per day that promisers are able to recruit
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This differential equation can be solved to give the following solution
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P = - E * Re / Rp + ( N + E*Re / Rp) * e ^ (Rp * t)
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Where N is the initial number of promisers at t=0 (in this case 100 promisers)
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This can be used to solve for t, so that we can determine how long it takes to get to a certain number of promisers
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t = 1/Rp * ln ( (P + E*Re/Rp) / (N + E*Re/Rp))
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You can see that the formula changes slightly in the final column. This is because the value of Rp changes for this section
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Guarantee an average person freedom from:
QALYs saved per person per yearComment
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Insufficient food0.025Calculation using data below
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Unsafe or lack of drinking water0.01Estimate based on insufficient food QALYs
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Violent injury and violent death0.005Estimate based on insufficient food QALYs
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Homelessness0.001Estimate based on insufficient food QALYs
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90
Average rate of spread of promiseExtra promisers brought in per dayComment
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Per standard promiser (first 2 billion of population)
0.010Calculation from below
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Per employee1
Conservative estimate based on my own experience of being able to recruit a promiser every two hours. Likely to be higher over time as media exposure increases
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Per standard promiser (after 2 billion population)0.004Calculation from below
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Raw spread rate dataExtra promisers brought in per dayComment
96
Defection rate of promisers (first 2 billion of population)
0.5%
Estimate - requires testing. Conservatively high estimate. Hypothesis of lower actual rate, due to minimal advantage of defecting from the promise, as those who feel like helping is hard are simply required to enlist more promisers, requiring minimal benefit
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Defection rate of promisers (after 2 billion population)
0.3%
Estimate - lower defection rates due to higher social pressure
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Sharing rate of promisers (first 2 billion of population)
0.015
I asked several promisers how frequently they thought they would likely recruit new promiser, at a rate that they thought would be sustainable over several years. The answers averaged out at around one new promiser every two weeks, or 0.07 promisers per day. Due to intention-action gaps, the real figure will likely be lower. Also due to founder effect bias, where the first promisers are more enthusiastic than average, the real value will likely be lower. I made this estimate 0.015 as a conservative guess.
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Sharing rate of promisers (after 2 billion population)
0.007
Estimate that the rate of sharing will be slower for the last 2 billion people, since people with higher natural enthusiasm will have already taken the promise. This effect will be balanced by greater social pressure as a high proportion of the population becomes promisers
100