| A | B | C | D | E | F | G | H | I | J | K | L | M | N | O | P | Q | R | S | T | U | V | |
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1 | Respondent ID | Former Senior USG Official | For Beijing, is there any other acceptable outcome for Taiwan aside from unification? | Has Beijing set a hard internal deadline for resolving the Taiwan issue? | There has been speculation by the media and some analysts that China plans to use significant kinetic military force against Taiwan by 2027. Do you believe this is true? | Do China's unprecedented August 2022 military exercises against Taiwan indicate that Beijing is accelerating its timeline for using large-scale military force (i.e., a blockade or invasion) against the island? | Does Beijing have a coherent internal strategy and roadmap, with concrete stages and actionable next steps, to achieve peaceful unification with Taiwan? | What do you assess as Xi’s main priority for Taiwan after the 20th Party Congress, during his next term (2022-2027)? | If Taipei declared independence, would Beijing invade Taiwan immediately (within the next six months)? | Within the next ten years, how likely is it that China will engage in an amphibious invasion of Taiwan with the goal of gaining control of Taipei? | Within the next ten years, how likely is it that China will deliberately escalate its use of force short of invasion against Taiwan (e.g., implement some form of quarantine or blockade)? | Within the next ten years, how likely is it that an unintended military accident or collision will take place in or near the Taiwan Strait? | How would Beijing respond if the United States ended its policy of strategic ambiguity toward Taiwan in favor of strategic clarity to defend the island? | If China invaded Taiwan between now and 2027, does Beijing believe the United States has the military capability to defend Taipei and prevent China from executing a successful amphibious invasion? | How far does Beijing believe the United States would be willing to go to defend Taiwan in the event of an unprovoked PRC invasion of Taiwan? | |||||||
2 | 1 | 1 | No, Beijing is willing to wait for unification but will not accept the status quo permanently | No, Beijing is willing to wait indefinitely as long as it still sees unification as possible | No | No | No | Prevent Taiwan independence, but Xi does not need to make substantial progress on unification | Yes | Possible | Possible | Possible | China would respond negatively and significantly, provoking a U.S.-China or China-Taiwan crisis | Beijing is uncertain, but has confidence in its growing military capabilities | The United States will provide political and economic support and deploy military forces to defend Taiwan. However, the United States is not willing to bear significant costs. | |||||||
3 | 2 | No, Beijing is willing to wait for unification but will not accept the status quo permanently | Yes, achieve unification by the centennial anniversary of the founding of the PRC (by 2049) | Yes | Yes | No | Make progress on unification with the belief that China has exhausted all peaceful options (i.e., Xi plans to unify with Taiwan using coercive and military means) | No | Likely | Very likely | Very likely | China would respond negatively and in a limited way (mainly diplomatically protest the U.S. change) | Beijing is uncertain, but has confidence in its growing military capabilities | The United States will provide political and economic support and deploy military forces to defend Taiwan. The United States is willing to bear substantial costs, but will seek to contain the military conflict to the Indo-Pacific region. | ||||||||
4 | 3 | 1 | No, Beijing is willing to wait for unification but will not accept the status quo permanently | No, Beijing is willing to wait indefinitely as long as it still sees unification as possible | No | No | No | Prevent Taiwan independence, but Xi does not need to make substantial progress on unification | Yes | Unlikely | Possible | Possible | China would respond negatively and significantly, provoking a U.S.-China or China-Taiwan crisis | Beijing is uncertain, but believes the United States still has a military advantage | The United States will provide political and economic support and deploy military forces to defend Taiwan. However, the United States is not willing to bear significant costs. | |||||||
5 | 4 | Yes, Beijing is willing to permanently maintain the status quo | No, Beijing is willing to wait indefinitely as long as it still sees unification as possible | No | No | No | Make progress on peaceful unification, and Xi is willing to use large-scale military force against the island to move forward | Yes | Unlikely | Possible | Unlikely | China would respond negatively and significantly, provoking a U.S.-China or China-Taiwan crisis | Beijing is uncertain, but believes the United States still has a military advantage | The United States will provide political and economic support and deploy military forces to defend Taiwan. The United States is willing to bear substantial costs, but will seek to contain the military conflict to the Indo-Pacific region. | ||||||||
6 | 5 | No, Beijing is willing to wait for unification but will not accept the status quo permanently | No, Beijing is willing to wait indefinitely as long as it still sees unification as possible | No | Yes | No | Make progress on peaceful unification, and Xi is willing to use large-scale military force against the island to move forward | Yes | Likely | Likely | Very likely | China would respond negatively and significantly, provoking a U.S.-China or China-Taiwan crisis | Beijing is uncertain, but has confidence in its growing military capabilities | The United States will provide political and economic support and deploy military forces to defend Taiwan. However, the United States is not willing to bear significant costs. | ||||||||
7 | 6 | 1 | No, Beijing is willing to wait for unification but will not accept the status quo permanently | Yes, achieve unification by the centennial anniversary of the founding of the PRC (by 2049) | No | No | Yes | Make progress on peaceful unification, but Xi is not willing to use large-scale military force against the island | Yes | Possible | Possible | Very likely | China would respond negatively and significantly, provoking a U.S.-China or China-Taiwan crisis | Beijing is uncertain, but believes the United States still has a military advantage | The United States will provide political and economic support and deploy military forces to defend Taiwan. The United States is willing to bear all costs, including risking a global war (and PRC attacks on the continental United States) over Taiwan. | |||||||
8 | 7 | 1 | No, Beijing is willing to wait for unification but will not accept the status quo permanently | No, Beijing is willing to wait indefinitely as long as it still sees unification as possible | No | Yes | No | Make progress on peaceful unification, and Xi is willing to use large-scale military force against the island to move forward | Yes | Possible | Likely | Likely | China would respond negatively and significantly, provoking a U.S.-China or China-Taiwan crisis | Beijing is uncertain, but believes the United States still has a military advantage | The United States will provide political and economic support and deploy military forces to defend Taiwan. The United States is willing to bear substantial costs, but will seek to contain the military conflict to the Indo-Pacific region. | |||||||
9 | 8 | No, Beijing seeks unification at the earliest possible opportunity | Yes, achieve unification in the next 15 years (before 2037) | No | No | Yes | Make progress on peaceful unification, and Xi is willing to use large-scale military force against the island to move forward | Yes | Likely | Possible | Possible | China would respond negatively and significantly, provoking a U.S.-China or China-Taiwan crisis | Beijing is uncertain, but has confidence in its growing military capabilities | The United States will provide political and economic support and deploy military forces to defend Taiwan. However, the United States is not willing to bear significant costs. | ||||||||
10 | 9 | 1 | No, Beijing is willing to wait for unification but will not accept the status quo permanently | No, Beijing is willing to wait indefinitely as long as it still sees unification as possible | No | No | Yes | Make progress on peaceful unification, and Xi is willing to use large-scale military force against the island to move forward | No | Unlikely | Very likely | Very likely | China would respond negatively and in a limited way (mainly diplomatically protest the U.S. change) | Beijing is uncertain, but believes the United States still has a military advantage | The United States will provide political and economic support and deploy military forces to defend Taiwan. The United States is willing to bear substantial costs, but will seek to contain the military conflict to the Indo-Pacific region. | |||||||
11 | 10 | No, Beijing is willing to wait for unification but will not accept the status quo permanently | No, Beijing is willing to wait indefinitely as long as it still sees unification as possible | No | No | No | Make progress on peaceful unification, but Xi is not willing to use large-scale military force against the island | Yes | Possible | Possible | Possible | China would respond negatively and significantly, provoking a U.S.-China or China-Taiwan crisis | Beijing is uncertain, but has confidence in its growing military capabilities | The United States will provide political and economic support and deploy military forces to defend Taiwan. The United States is willing to bear substantial costs, but will seek to contain the military conflict to the Indo-Pacific region. | ||||||||
12 | 11 | No, Beijing is willing to wait for unification but will not accept the status quo permanently | No, Beijing is willing to wait indefinitely as long as it still sees unification as possible | No | Yes | No | Make progress on peaceful unification, and Xi is willing to use large-scale military force against the island to move forward | Yes | Possible | Likely | Likely | China would respond negatively and significantly, provoking a U.S.-China or China-Taiwan crisis | Beijing is uncertain, but has confidence in its growing military capabilities | The United States will provide political and economic support and deploy military forces to defend Taiwan. The United States is willing to bear substantial costs, but will seek to contain the military conflict to the Indo-Pacific region. | ||||||||
13 | 12 | 1 | Yes, Beijing is willing to permanently maintain the status quo | Yes, achieve unification in the next fifty years (by 2072) | No | No | Yes | Make progress on peaceful unification, and Xi is willing to use large-scale military force against the island to move forward | Yes | Possible | Possible | Possible | China would respond negatively and significantly, provoking a U.S.-China or China-Taiwan crisis | Beijing is uncertain, but believes the United States still has a military advantage | The United States will provide political and economic support and deploy military forces to defend Taiwan. The United States is willing to bear substantial costs, but will seek to contain the military conflict to the Indo-Pacific region. | |||||||
14 | 13 | No, Beijing is willing to wait for unification but will not accept the status quo permanently | No, Beijing is willing to wait indefinitely as long as it still sees unification as possible | No | No | No | Make progress on peaceful unification, and Xi is willing to use large-scale military force against the island to move forward | Yes | Unlikely | Very likely | Possible | China would respond negatively and significantly, provoking a U.S.-China or China-Taiwan crisis | Beijing is uncertain, but believes the United States still has a military advantage | The United States will provide political and economic support and deploy military forces to defend Taiwan. The United States is willing to bear substantial costs, but will seek to contain the military conflict to the Indo-Pacific region. | ||||||||
15 | 14 | No, Beijing is willing to wait for unification but will not accept the status quo permanently | Yes, achieve unification by the centennial anniversary of the founding of the PRC (by 2049) | No | No | No | Make progress on peaceful unification, but Xi is not willing to use large-scale military force against the island | Yes | Possible | Likely | Likely | China would respond negatively and significantly, provoking a U.S.-China or China-Taiwan crisis | Beijing is uncertain, but believes the United States still has a military advantage | The United States will provide political and economic support and deploy military forces to defend Taiwan. The United States is willing to bear substantial costs, but will seek to contain the military conflict to the Indo-Pacific region. | ||||||||
16 | 15 | No, Beijing is willing to wait for unification but will not accept the status quo permanently | No, Beijing is willing to wait indefinitely as long as it still sees unification as possible | No | No | No | Make progress on peaceful unification, but Xi is not willing to use large-scale military force against the island | Yes | Possible | Possible | Possible | China would respond negatively and significantly, provoking a U.S.-China or China-Taiwan crisis | Beijing is uncertain, but has confidence in its growing military capabilities | The United States will provide political and economic support and deploy military forces to defend Taiwan. However, the United States is not willing to bear significant costs. | ||||||||
17 | 16 | 1 | No, Beijing is willing to wait for unification but will not accept the status quo permanently | No, Beijing is willing to wait indefinitely as long as it still sees unification as possible | No | No | No | Make progress on peaceful unification, but Xi is not willing to use large-scale military force against the island | Yes | Possible | Possible | Possible | China would respond negatively and in a limited way (mainly diplomatically protest the U.S. change) | Beijing is uncertain, but believes the United States still has a military advantage | The United States will provide political and economic support and deploy military forces to defend Taiwan. However, the United States is not willing to bear significant costs. | |||||||
18 | 17 | No, Beijing is willing to wait for unification but will not accept the status quo permanently | Yes, achieve unification by the centennial anniversary of the founding of the PRC (by 2049) | Yes | No | No | Make progress on unification with the belief that China has exhausted all peaceful options (i.e., Xi plans to unify with Taiwan using coercive and military means) | Yes | Possible | Likely | Unlikely | China would respond negatively and in a limited way (mainly diplomatically protest the U.S. change) | Beijing is uncertain, but has confidence in its growing military capabilities | The United States will provide political and economic support and deploy military forces to defend Taiwan. The United States is willing to bear substantial costs, but will seek to contain the military conflict to the Indo-Pacific region. | ||||||||
19 | 18 | 1 | No, Beijing is willing to wait for unification but will not accept the status quo permanently | No, Beijing is willing to wait indefinitely as long as it still sees unification as possible | No | Yes | No | Make progress on peaceful unification, but Xi is not willing to use large-scale military force against the island | Yes | Unlikely | Unlikely | Possible | China would respond negatively and significantly, provoking a U.S.-China or China-Taiwan crisis | Beijing is uncertain, but believes the United States still has a military advantage | The United States will provide political and economic support and deploy military forces to defend Taiwan. The United States is willing to bear substantial costs, but will seek to contain the military conflict to the Indo-Pacific region. | |||||||
20 | 19 | 1 | No, Beijing is willing to wait for unification but will not accept the status quo permanently | No, Beijing is willing to wait indefinitely as long as it still sees unification as possible | No | No | No | Make progress on peaceful unification, and Xi is willing to use large-scale military force against the island to move forward | Yes | Possible | Possible | Likely | China would respond negatively and significantly, provoking a U.S.-China or China-Taiwan crisis | Beijing is uncertain, but has confidence in its growing military capabilities | The United States will provide political and economic support and deploy military forces to defend Taiwan. The United States is willing to bear substantial costs, but will seek to contain the military conflict to the Indo-Pacific region. | |||||||
21 | 20 | No, Beijing is willing to wait for unification but will not accept the status quo permanently | No, Beijing is willing to wait indefinitely as long as it still sees unification as possible | No | No | No | Make progress on unification with the belief that China has exhausted all peaceful options (i.e., Xi plans to unify with Taiwan using coercive and military means) | Yes | Possible | Possible | Likely | China would respond negatively and in a limited way (mainly diplomatically protest the U.S. change) | Beijing is uncertain, but believes the United States still has a military advantage | The United States will provide political and economic support and deploy military forces to defend Taiwan. The United States is willing to bear substantial costs, but will seek to contain the military conflict to the Indo-Pacific region. | ||||||||
22 | 21 | 1 | No, Beijing seeks unification at the earliest possible opportunity | Yes, achieve unification by the centennial anniversary of the founding of the PRC (by 2049) | No | No | No | Make progress on peaceful unification, and Xi is willing to use large-scale military force against the island to move forward | Yes | Possible | Likely | Possible | China would respond negatively and significantly, provoking a U.S.-China or China-Taiwan crisis | Beijing is uncertain, but has confidence in its growing military capabilities | The United States will provide political and economic support and deploy military forces to defend Taiwan. The United States is willing to bear substantial costs, but will seek to contain the military conflict to the Indo-Pacific region. | |||||||
23 | 22 | No, Beijing is willing to wait for unification but will not accept the status quo permanently | Yes, achieve unification by the centennial anniversary of the founding of the PRC (by 2049) | Yes | No | No | Make progress on peaceful unification, but Xi is not willing to use large-scale military force against the island | Yes | Possible | Likely | Possible | China would respond negatively and in a limited way (mainly diplomatically protest the U.S. change) | Beijing is uncertain, but believes the United States still has a military advantage | The United States will provide political and economic support and deploy military forces to defend Taiwan. The United States is willing to bear substantial costs, but will seek to contain the military conflict to the Indo-Pacific region. | ||||||||
24 | 23 | 1 | No, Beijing is willing to wait for unification but will not accept the status quo permanently | Yes, achieve unification by the centennial anniversary of the founding of the PRC (by 2049) | No | No | Yes | Make progress on peaceful unification, and Xi is willing to use large-scale military force against the island to move forward | No | Possible | Likely | Possible | China would respond negatively and significantly, provoking a U.S.-China or China-Taiwan crisis | Beijing is uncertain, but believes the United States still has a military advantage | The United States will provide political and economic support and deploy military forces to defend Taiwan. The United States is willing to bear substantial costs, but will seek to contain the military conflict to the Indo-Pacific region. | |||||||
25 | 24 | 1 | No, Beijing is willing to wait for unification but will not accept the status quo permanently | No, Beijing is willing to wait indefinitely as long as it still sees unification as possible | No | No | No | Make progress on peaceful unification, but Xi is not willing to use large-scale military force against the island | Yes | Not at all likely | Unlikely | Possible | China would not respond to the U.S. policy change | Beijing is uncertain, but believes the United States still has a military advantage | The United States will provide political and economic support and deploy military forces to defend Taiwan. The United States is willing to bear substantial costs, but will seek to contain the military conflict to the Indo-Pacific region. | |||||||
26 | 25 | No, Beijing is willing to wait for unification but will not accept the status quo permanently | Yes, achieve unification by the centennial anniversary of the founding of the PRC (by 2049) | No | No | Yes | Make progress on peaceful unification, but Xi is not willing to use large-scale military force against the island | Yes | Unlikely | Likely | Very likely | China would respond negatively and significantly, provoking a U.S.-China or China-Taiwan crisis | Beijing is uncertain, but believes the United States still has a military advantage | The United States will provide political and economic support and deploy military forces to defend Taiwan. The United States is willing to bear substantial costs, but will seek to contain the military conflict to the Indo-Pacific region. | ||||||||
27 | 26 | No, Beijing is willing to wait for unification but will not accept the status quo permanently | Yes, achieve unification by the centennial anniversary of the founding of the PRC (by 2049) | No | No | No | Make progress on peaceful unification, but Xi is not willing to use large-scale military force against the island | Yes | Possible | Likely | Very likely | China would respond negatively and in a limited way (mainly diplomatically protest the U.S. change) | Beijing is uncertain, but has confidence in its growing military capabilities | The United States will provide political and economic support and deploy military forces to defend Taiwan. However, the United States is not willing to bear significant costs. | ||||||||
28 | 27 | 1 | No, Beijing seeks unification at the earliest possible opportunity | Yes, achieve unification in the next 15 years (before 2037) | Yes | Yes | Yes | Make progress on peaceful unification, and Xi is willing to use large-scale military force against the island to move forward | Yes | Possible | Very likely | Possible | China would respond negatively and significantly, provoking a U.S.-China or China-Taiwan crisis | Beijing is uncertain, but has confidence in its growing military capabilities | The United States will provide political and economic support and deploy military forces to defend Taiwan. The United States is willing to bear substantial costs, but will seek to contain the military conflict to the Indo-Pacific region. | |||||||
29 | 28 | No, Beijing is willing to wait for unification but will not accept the status quo permanently | Yes, achieve unification by the centennial anniversary of the founding of the PRC (by 2049) | No | No | No | Make progress on peaceful unification, but Xi is not willing to use large-scale military force against the island | Yes | Unlikely | Very likely | Likely | China would respond negatively and significantly, provoking a U.S.-China or China-Taiwan crisis | Yes, Beijing believes the United States can defend Taiwan and successfully repel a PRC invasion | The United States will provide political and economic support and deploy military forces to defend Taiwan. The United States is willing to bear substantial costs, but will seek to contain the military conflict to the Indo-Pacific region. | ||||||||
30 | 29 | No, Beijing seeks unification at the earliest possible opportunity | Yes, achieve unification in the next 5 years (by 2027) | Yes | Yes | No | Make progress on unification with the belief that China has exhausted all peaceful options (i.e., Xi plans to unify with Taiwan using coercive and military means) | Yes | Very Likely | Very likely | Very likely | China would respond negatively and significantly, provoking a U.S.-China or China-Taiwan crisis | Beijing is uncertain, but believes the United States still has a military advantage | The United States will provide political and economic support and deploy military forces to defend Taiwan. The United States is willing to bear substantial costs, but will seek to contain the military conflict to the Indo-Pacific region. | ||||||||
31 | 30 | No, Beijing is willing to wait for unification but will not accept the status quo permanently | No, Beijing is willing to wait indefinitely as long as it still sees unification as possible | No | No | No | Make progress on peaceful unification, but Xi is not willing to use large-scale military force against the island | Yes | Unlikely | Possible | Likely | China would respond negatively and significantly, provoking a U.S.-China or China-Taiwan crisis | Beijing is uncertain, but believes the United States still has a military advantage | The United States will provide political and economic support and deploy military forces to defend Taiwan. The United States is willing to bear substantial costs, but will seek to contain the military conflict to the Indo-Pacific region. | ||||||||
32 | 31 | No, Beijing is willing to wait for unification but will not accept the status quo permanently | Yes, achieve unification by the centennial anniversary of the founding of the PRC (by 2049) | No | No | No | Make progress on peaceful unification, but Xi is not willing to use large-scale military force against the island | Yes | Possible | Possible | Possible | China would respond negatively and in a limited way (mainly diplomatically protest the U.S. change) | Beijing is uncertain, but believes the United States still has a military advantage | The United States will provide political and economic support and deploy military forces to defend Taiwan. The United States is willing to bear substantial costs, but will seek to contain the military conflict to the Indo-Pacific region. | ||||||||
33 | 32 | No, Beijing is willing to wait for unification but will not accept the status quo permanently | Yes, achieve unification by the centennial anniversary of the founding of the PRC (by 2049) | No | No | Yes | Make progress on peaceful unification, and Xi is willing to use large-scale military force against the island to move forward | Yes | Possible | Possible | Possible | China would respond negatively and in a limited way (mainly diplomatically protest the U.S. change) | Beijing is uncertain, but has confidence in its growing military capabilities | The United States will provide political and economic support and deploy military forces to defend Taiwan. The United States is willing to bear substantial costs, but will seek to contain the military conflict to the Indo-Pacific region. | ||||||||
34 | 33 | Yes, Beijing is willing to permanently maintain the status quo | No, Beijing is willing to wait indefinitely as long as it still sees unification as possible | No | No | No | Make progress on peaceful unification, but Xi is not willing to use large-scale military force against the island | No | Unlikely | Very likely | Possible | China would respond negatively and in a limited way (mainly diplomatically protest the U.S. change) | No, Beijing does not believe the United States can defend Taipei and repel a PRC invasion | The United States will provide political and economic support and deploy military forces to defend Taiwan. However, the United States is not willing to bear significant costs. | ||||||||
35 | 34 | 1 | No, Beijing is willing to wait for unification but will not accept the status quo permanently | Yes, achieve unification by the centennial anniversary of the founding of the PRC (by 2049) | Yes | Yes | No | Make progress on peaceful unification, and Xi is willing to use large-scale military force against the island to move forward | Yes | Possible | Very likely | Likely | China would respond negatively and significantly, provoking a U.S.-China or China-Taiwan crisis | Beijing is uncertain, but has confidence in its growing military capabilities | The United States will provide political and economic support and deploy military forces to defend Taiwan. However, the United States is not willing to bear significant costs. | |||||||
36 | 35 | No, Beijing is willing to wait for unification but will not accept the status quo permanently | Yes, achieve unification by the centennial anniversary of the founding of the PRC (by 2049) | No | No | No | Make progress on peaceful unification, but Xi is not willing to use large-scale military force against the island | Yes | Possible | Possible | Very likely | China would respond negatively and in a limited way (mainly diplomatically protest the U.S. change) | Beijing is uncertain, but has confidence in its growing military capabilities | The United States will provide political and economic support and deploy military forces to defend Taiwan. The United States is willing to bear substantial costs, but will seek to contain the military conflict to the Indo-Pacific region. | ||||||||
37 | 36 | No, Beijing is willing to wait for unification but will not accept the status quo permanently | Yes, achieve unification by the centennial anniversary of the founding of the PRC (by 2049) | No | No | No | Make progress on peaceful unification, but Xi is not willing to use large-scale military force against the island | No | Unlikely | Possible | Very likely | China would respond negatively and significantly, provoking a U.S.-China or China-Taiwan crisis | Beijing is uncertain, but believes the United States still has a military advantage | The United States will provide political and economic support and deploy military forces to defend Taiwan. The United States is willing to bear substantial costs, but will seek to contain the military conflict to the Indo-Pacific region. | ||||||||
38 | 37 | 1 | No, Beijing is willing to wait for unification but will not accept the status quo permanently | Yes, achieve unification by the centennial anniversary of the founding of the PRC (by 2049) | Yes | Yes | No | Make progress on peaceful unification, and Xi is willing to use large-scale military force against the island to move forward | Yes | Possible | Likely | Very likely | China would respond negatively and significantly, provoking a U.S.-China or China-Taiwan crisis | Beijing is uncertain, but believes the United States still has a military advantage | The United States will provide political and economic support and deploy military forces to defend Taiwan. The United States is willing to bear substantial costs, but will seek to contain the military conflict to the Indo-Pacific region. | |||||||
39 | 38 | 1 | No, Beijing is willing to wait for unification but will not accept the status quo permanently | Yes, achieve unification by the centennial anniversary of the founding of the PRC (by 2049) | No | No | No | Prevent Taiwan independence, but Xi does not need to make substantial progress on unification | No | Possible | Possible | Likely | China would respond negatively and in a limited way (mainly diplomatically protest the U.S. change) | Beijing is uncertain, but believes the United States still has a military advantage | The United States will provide political and economic support and deploy military forces to defend Taiwan. The United States is willing to bear substantial costs, but will seek to contain the military conflict to the Indo-Pacific region. | |||||||
40 | 39 | No, Beijing is willing to wait for unification but will not accept the status quo permanently | No, Beijing is willing to wait indefinitely as long as it still sees unification as possible | No | No | No | Make progress on peaceful unification, but Xi is not willing to use large-scale military force against the island | No | Unlikely | Very likely | Likely | China would respond negatively and significantly, provoking a U.S.-China or China-Taiwan crisis | Beijing is uncertain, but believes the United States still has a military advantage | The United States will provide political and economic support and deploy military forces to defend Taiwan. The United States is willing to bear all costs, including risking a global war (and PRC attacks on the continental United States) over Taiwan. | ||||||||
41 | 40 | 1 | No, Beijing is willing to wait for unification but will not accept the status quo permanently | Yes, achieve unification by the centennial anniversary of the founding of the PRC (by 2049) | No | Yes | No | Prevent Taiwan independence, but Xi does not need to make substantial progress on unification | No | Possible | Possible | Possible | China would respond negatively and significantly, provoking a U.S.-China or China-Taiwan crisis | Beijing is uncertain, but has confidence in its growing military capabilities | The United States will provide political and economic support and deploy military forces to defend Taiwan. The United States is willing to bear substantial costs, but will seek to contain the military conflict to the Indo-Pacific region. | |||||||
42 | 41 | 1 | No, Beijing is willing to wait for unification but will not accept the status quo permanently | Yes, achieve unification by the centennial anniversary of the founding of the PRC (by 2049) | No | No | No | Prevent Taiwan independence, but Xi does not need to make substantial progress on unification | No | Possible | Unlikely | Unlikely | China would respond negatively and in a limited way (mainly diplomatically protest the U.S. change) | Beijing is uncertain, but believes the United States still has a military advantage | The United States will provide political and economic support and deploy military forces to defend Taiwan. The United States is willing to bear substantial costs, but will seek to contain the military conflict to the Indo-Pacific region. | |||||||
43 | 42 | No, Beijing is willing to wait for unification but will not accept the status quo permanently | Yes, achieve unification by the centennial anniversary of the founding of the PRC (by 2049) | No | No | No | Make progress on peaceful unification, and Xi is willing to use large-scale military force against the island to move forward | Yes | Possible | Possible | Likely | China would be deterred from the use of force against Taiwan | Beijing is uncertain, but believes the United States still has a military advantage | The United States will provide political and economic support and deploy military forces to defend Taiwan. The United States is willing to bear substantial costs, but will seek to contain the military conflict to the Indo-Pacific region. | ||||||||
44 | 43 | 1 | No, Beijing is willing to wait for unification but will not accept the status quo permanently | Yes, achieve unification by the centennial anniversary of the founding of the PRC (by 2049) | No | No | No | Make progress on peaceful unification, but Xi is not willing to use large-scale military force against the island | No | Unlikely | Possible | Likely | China would respond negatively and significantly, provoking a U.S.-China or China-Taiwan crisis | Beijing is uncertain, but has confidence in its growing military capabilities | The United States will provide political and economic support and deploy military forces to defend Taiwan. However, the United States is not willing to bear significant costs. | |||||||
45 | 44 | 1 | No, Beijing is willing to wait for unification but will not accept the status quo permanently | No, Beijing is willing to wait indefinitely as long as it still sees unification as possible | No | No | No | Prevent Taiwan independence, but Xi does not need to make substantial progress on unification | Yes | Possible | Possible | Possible | China would respond negatively and significantly, provoking a U.S.-China or China-Taiwan crisis | Beijing is uncertain, but has confidence in its growing military capabilities | The United States will provide political and economic support and deploy military forces to defend Taiwan. However, the United States is not willing to bear significant costs. | |||||||
46 | 45 | No, Beijing seeks unification at the earliest possible opportunity | Yes, achieve unification in the next 15 years (before 2037) | Yes | No | No | Make progress on unification with the belief that China has exhausted all peaceful options (i.e., Xi plans to unify with Taiwan using coercive and military means) | No | Possible | Very likely | Very likely | China would be deterred from the use of force against Taiwan | Beijing is uncertain, but believes the United States still has a military advantage | The United States will provide political and economic support and deploy military forces to defend Taiwan. The United States is willing to bear substantial costs, but will seek to contain the military conflict to the Indo-Pacific region. | ||||||||
47 | 46 | 1 | No, Beijing is willing to wait for unification but will not accept the status quo permanently | Yes, achieve unification by the centennial anniversary of the founding of the PRC (by 2049) | No | Yes | No | Make progress on peaceful unification, and Xi is willing to use large-scale military force against the island to move forward | Yes | Possible | Likely | Possible | China would respond negatively and significantly, provoking a U.S.-China or China-Taiwan crisis | Beijing is uncertain, but has confidence in its growing military capabilities | The United States will provide political and economic support and deploy military forces to defend Taiwan. The United States is willing to bear substantial costs, but will seek to contain the military conflict to the Indo-Pacific region. | |||||||
48 | 47 | No, Beijing seeks unification at the earliest possible opportunity | Yes, achieve unification by the centennial anniversary of the founding of the PRC (by 2049) | No | No | No | Make progress on peaceful unification, and Xi is willing to use large-scale military force against the island to move forward | Yes | Unlikely | Possible | Possible | China would respond negatively and significantly, provoking a U.S.-China or China-Taiwan crisis | Beijing is uncertain, but has confidence in its growing military capabilities | The United States will provide political and economic support and deploy military forces to defend Taiwan. However, the United States is not willing to bear significant costs. | ||||||||
49 | 48 | No, Beijing is willing to wait for unification but will not accept the status quo permanently | No, Beijing is willing to wait indefinitely as long as it still sees unification as possible | No | No | No | Prevent Taiwan independence, but Xi does not need to make substantial progress on unification | No | Possible | Likely | Likely | China would respond negatively and significantly, provoking a U.S.-China or China-Taiwan crisis | Beijing is uncertain, but believes the United States still has a military advantage | The United States will provide political and economic support and deploy military forces to defend Taiwan. The United States is willing to bear substantial costs, but will seek to contain the military conflict to the Indo-Pacific region. | ||||||||
50 | 49 | 1 | No, Beijing is willing to wait for unification but will not accept the status quo permanently | No, Beijing is willing to wait indefinitely as long as it still sees unification as possible | No | No | No | Make progress on peaceful unification, and Xi is willing to use large-scale military force against the island to move forward | Yes | Possible | Possible | Possible | China would respond negatively and significantly, provoking a U.S.-China or China-Taiwan crisis | Beijing is uncertain, but has confidence in its growing military capabilities | The United States will provide political and economic support and deploy military forces to defend Taiwan. The United States is willing to bear all costs, including risking a global war (and PRC attacks on the continental United States) over Taiwan. | |||||||
51 | 50 | 1 | No, Beijing is willing to wait for unification but will not accept the status quo permanently | No, Beijing is willing to wait indefinitely as long as it still sees unification as possible | No | No | Yes | Make progress on peaceful unification, but Xi is not willing to use large-scale military force against the island | Yes | Unlikely | Possible | Likely | China would respond negatively and significantly, provoking a U.S.-China or China-Taiwan crisis | Beijing is uncertain, but believes the United States still has a military advantage | The United States will provide political and economic support and deploy military forces to defend Taiwan. The United States is willing to bear substantial costs, but will seek to contain the military conflict to the Indo-Pacific region. | |||||||
52 | 51 | 1 | No, Beijing is willing to wait for unification but will not accept the status quo permanently | No, Beijing is willing to wait indefinitely as long as it still sees unification as possible | No | No | No | Make progress on peaceful unification, and Xi is willing to use large-scale military force against the island to move forward | Yes | Possible | Possible | Very likely | China would respond negatively and in a limited way (mainly diplomatically protest the U.S. change) | Beijing is uncertain, but believes the United States still has a military advantage | The United States will provide political and economic support and deploy military forces to defend Taiwan. The United States is willing to bear substantial costs, but will seek to contain the military conflict to the Indo-Pacific region. | |||||||
53 | 52 | No, Beijing is willing to wait for unification but will not accept the status quo permanently | Yes, achieve unification by the centennial anniversary of the founding of the PRC (by 2049) | No | No | No | Make progress on peaceful unification, but Xi is not willing to use large-scale military force against the island | Yes | Possible | Possible | Possible | China would respond negatively and significantly, provoking a U.S.-China or China-Taiwan crisis | Yes, Beijing believes the United States can defend Taiwan and successfully repel a PRC invasion | The United States will provide political and economic support and deploy military forces to defend Taiwan. The United States is willing to bear substantial costs, but will seek to contain the military conflict to the Indo-Pacific region. | ||||||||
54 | 53 | No, Beijing is willing to wait for unification but will not accept the status quo permanently | Yes, achieve unification in the next 5 years (by 2027) | Yes | No | Yes | Make progress on peaceful unification, and Xi is willing to use large-scale military force against the island to move forward | Yes | Likely | Likely | Possible | China would respond negatively and in a limited way (mainly diplomatically protest the U.S. change) | Beijing is uncertain, but believes the United States still has a military advantage | The United States will provide political and economic support and deploy military forces to defend Taiwan. However, the United States is not willing to bear significant costs. | ||||||||
55 | 54 | No, Beijing is willing to wait for unification but will not accept the status quo permanently | No, Beijing is willing to wait indefinitely as long as it still sees unification as possible | No | No | Yes | Make progress on unification with the belief that China has exhausted all peaceful options (i.e., Xi plans to unify with Taiwan using coercive and military means) | No | Unlikely | Very likely | Likely | China would respond negatively and in a limited way (mainly diplomatically protest the U.S. change) | Beijing is uncertain, but believes the United States still has a military advantage | The United States will provide political and economic support and deploy military forces to defend Taiwan. The United States is willing to bear substantial costs, but will seek to contain the military conflict to the Indo-Pacific region. | ||||||||
56 | 55 | No, Beijing is willing to wait for unification but will not accept the status quo permanently | Yes, achieve unification by the centennial anniversary of the founding of the PRC (by 2049) | No | No | No | Prevent Taiwan independence, but Xi does not need to make substantial progress on unification | Yes | Possible | Possible | Possible | China would respond negatively and significantly, provoking a U.S.-China or China-Taiwan crisis | Beijing is uncertain, but believes the United States still has a military advantage | The United States will provide political and economic support and deploy military forces to defend Taiwan. The United States is willing to bear substantial costs, but will seek to contain the military conflict to the Indo-Pacific region. | ||||||||
57 | 56 | 1 | No, Beijing is willing to wait for unification but will not accept the status quo permanently | No, Beijing is willing to wait indefinitely as long as it still sees unification as possible | No | No | No | Make progress on peaceful unification, but Xi is not willing to use large-scale military force against the island | No | Possible | Likely | Very likely | China would respond negatively and in a limited way (mainly diplomatically protest the U.S. change) | Beijing is uncertain, but has confidence in its growing military capabilities | The United States will provide political and economic support and deploy military forces to defend Taiwan. However, the United States is not willing to bear significant costs. | |||||||
58 | 57 | 1 | Yes, Beijing is willing to permanently maintain the status quo | No, Beijing is willing to wait indefinitely as long as it still sees unification as possible | Yes | No | No | Make progress on peaceful unification, and Xi is willing to use large-scale military force against the island to move forward | Yes | Possible | Possible | Likely | China would respond negatively and significantly, provoking a U.S.-China or China-Taiwan crisis | Beijing is uncertain, but has confidence in its growing military capabilities | The United States will provide political and economic support and deploy military forces to defend Taiwan. The United States is willing to bear substantial costs, but will seek to contain the military conflict to the Indo-Pacific region. | |||||||
59 | 58 | No, Beijing is willing to wait for unification but will not accept the status quo permanently | Yes, achieve unification by the centennial anniversary of the founding of the PRC (by 2049) | Yes | No | No | Make progress on peaceful unification, and Xi is willing to use large-scale military force against the island to move forward | Yes | Possible | Likely | Likely | China would respond negatively and in a limited way (mainly diplomatically protest the U.S. change) | Beijing is uncertain, but has confidence in its growing military capabilities | The United States will provide political and economic support and deploy military forces to defend Taiwan. However, the United States is not willing to bear significant costs. | ||||||||
60 | 59 | No, Beijing is willing to wait for unification but will not accept the status quo permanently | Yes, achieve unification in the next 15 years (before 2037) | No | No | No | Make progress on peaceful unification, and Xi is willing to use large-scale military force against the island to move forward | Yes | Likely | Very likely | Likely | China would respond negatively and in a limited way (mainly diplomatically protest the U.S. change) | Beijing is uncertain, but has confidence in its growing military capabilities | The United States will provide political and economic support and deploy military forces to defend Taiwan. However, the United States is not willing to bear significant costs. | ||||||||
61 | 60 | 1 | No, Beijing is willing to wait for unification but will not accept the status quo permanently | Yes, achieve unification in the next 15 years (before 2037) | No | Yes | No | Make progress on peaceful unification, and Xi is willing to use large-scale military force against the island to move forward | Yes | Possible | Likely | Likely | China would respond negatively and significantly, provoking a U.S.-China or China-Taiwan crisis | Beijing is uncertain, but has confidence in its growing military capabilities | The United States will provide political and economic support and deploy military forces to defend Taiwan. However, the United States is not willing to bear significant costs. | |||||||
62 | 61 | No, Beijing is willing to wait for unification but will not accept the status quo permanently | Yes, achieve unification in the next fifty years (by 2072) | No | No | No | Make progress on peaceful unification, but Xi is not willing to use large-scale military force against the island | No | Possible | Very likely | Likely | China would respond negatively and significantly, provoking a U.S.-China or China-Taiwan crisis | Beijing is uncertain, but believes the United States still has a military advantage | The United States will provide political and economic support and deploy military forces to defend Taiwan. The United States is willing to bear substantial costs, but will seek to contain the military conflict to the Indo-Pacific region. | ||||||||
63 | 62 | No, Beijing is willing to wait for unification but will not accept the status quo permanently | Yes, achieve unification by the centennial anniversary of the founding of the PRC (by 2049) | No | Yes | Yes | Make progress on peaceful unification, but Xi is not willing to use large-scale military force against the island | Yes | Unlikely | Very likely | Likely | China would respond negatively and in a limited way (mainly diplomatically protest the U.S. change) | Beijing is uncertain, but believes the United States still has a military advantage | The United States will provide political and economic support and deploy military forces to defend Taiwan. However, the United States is not willing to bear significant costs. | ||||||||
64 | 63 | No, Beijing is willing to wait for unification but will not accept the status quo permanently | No, Beijing is willing to wait indefinitely as long as it still sees unification as possible | No | No | No | Make progress on peaceful unification, but Xi is not willing to use large-scale military force against the island | Yes | Unlikely | Likely | Likely | China would respond negatively and significantly, provoking a U.S.-China or China-Taiwan crisis | Beijing is uncertain, but believes the United States still has a military advantage | The United States will provide political and economic support and deploy military forces to defend Taiwan. The United States is willing to bear substantial costs, but will seek to contain the military conflict to the Indo-Pacific region. | ||||||||
65 | 64 | No, Beijing is willing to wait for unification but will not accept the status quo permanently | Yes, achieve unification by the centennial anniversary of the founding of the PRC (by 2049) | No | No | Yes | Make progress on peaceful unification, and Xi is willing to use large-scale military force against the island to move forward | Yes | Possible | Likely | Very likely | China would respond negatively and significantly, provoking a U.S.-China or China-Taiwan crisis | Beijing is uncertain, but believes the United States still has a military advantage | The United States will provide political and economic support and deploy military forces to defend Taiwan. However, the United States is not willing to bear significant costs. | ||||||||
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