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pRecommendationRelevant Page #sAppendix #TagsNews CoverageCollective Bargaining Agreements (Citation style: Issuing government, Title, Page, Section)LegislationPrecedentPast Task Force RecommendationsOther States where this has been proposed or is in effect?
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1COMMUNITY RELATIONS
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• The City should engage the National Initiative for Building Community Trust and Justice to implement a “Reconciliation Process” in Chicago. Critical elements of the process involve the Superintendent publicly acknowledging CPD’s history of racial disparity and discrimination in police practices and making a public commitment to cultural change required to eliminate racial bias and disparity.
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The Mayor and the President of the Cook County Board should work together to co-sponsor quarterly summits of key stakeholders and community leaders to develop and implement comprehensive criminal justice reform.
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• The Mayor and the President of the Cook County Board should work together to develop and implement programs that address socioeconomic justice and equality, housing segregation, systemic racism, poverty, education, health and safety.
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• CPD should clarify in its general order prohibiting racial profiling and other biased-based policing whether race may be used to any degree in developing grounds for a stop, other than where race is part of a specific suspect description.
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Through its Data Portal, CPD should regularly release incident-level information on arrests, traffic stop reports, investigatory stop reports and predecessor contact cards and officer weapon use (firearm and nonlethal). To facilitate trend analysis, the incident-level data should reach back at least to January 1, 2010.
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CPD should resume publishing annual reports.
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After the ACLU agreement terminates, CPD should continue supervisory review and audits of investigatory stop and pat-down practices, with oversight by the new Community Safety Oversight Board and Inspector General for the Public Safety.
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CPD should develop and use recruitment, selection and promotion strategies that increase diversity and the likelihood that officers will be culturally competent, fair and impartial, especially when policing communities of color.
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CPD should hire a Deputy Chief of Diversity and Inclusion.
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CPD should adopt and promote a clear, progressive policing philosophy grounded in core values such as respect, protecting the sanctity of all life and protecting civil and human rights.
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CPD should bring in experts and credible trainers to deliver comprehensive training on cultural competence and implicit bias for all recruits, officers and supervisors.
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CPD should involve the community in officer training that includes being trained by and partnering with community leaders, organizations and youth.
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CPD, including the Deputy Chief of Diversity and Inclusion, should analyze deployment strategies to ensure officers are culturally competent and have a proper understanding of the neighborhoods where they are assigned.
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Where possible, CPD should assign more experienced officers to high-crime districts, beats and shifts. If new officers are given these difficult assignments, they should be partnered with experienced officers with exemplary disciplinary histories and the proven ability to work with diverse populations. • CPD should adopt community policing as a core philosophy.
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CPD should replace CAPS with localized Community Empowerment and Engagement Districts (CEED) and support them accordingly.
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• CPD should expand the methods it uses to communicate and work with neighborhood residents.
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CPD should reinvest in civilian organizing staff
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• CPD should renew its commitment to beat-based policing and work to expand community patrols.
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CPD should include information about how the public is being involved and how effectively
neighborhood concerns are being addressed in CompStat.
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CPD should evaluate and improve the training officers receive with respect to youths to ensure that all
officers are prepared to engage with youth in ways that are age-appropriate, trauma-informed and
based in a restorative justice model.
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• CPD and CPS should ensure that officers who are assigned to schools have clear job descriptions and
expectations that are shared by CPS and CPD, receive extensive and ongoing training on how to engage
with youth and crisis intervention and are swiftly reassigned if they fail to meet expectations.
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Train the community in Know Your Rights and Responsibilities, by:
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Creating a CPS policy and City Ordinance requiring that students receive instruction on how to exercise
4th, 5th and 6th Amendment rights; and
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Create a technology platform to assist with a public service announcement campaign and informational videos in police stations.
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The City should enact an ordinance, and CPD should promulgate general orders:
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• Mandating that arrestees be allowed to make phone calls to an attorney and/or family member(s)
within one hour after arrest, allowing only for limited exceptions in exigent circumstances;
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Mandating that a legal aid or other provider be contacted within 30 minutes of the arrest of any juvenile, and that CPD wait for legal representation to arrive before any questioning of a juvenile occurs; and
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Confirming that CPD will prominently post information concerning rights to counsel, as already required under state law, and include any willing legal aid provider’s name and 24-hour contact information.
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2PUBLIC COMPLAINT PROCESS
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Current Complaint Triage, Investigation & Discipline Recommendate Stages (SEE CURRENT FLOWCHART, page 155, FOR COMPARISON TO PROPOSED CHANGES OUTLINED BELOW)
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The affadavit step, which is an obstacle to the reporting of misconduct, requires investigators' time and resources and leads irectly to the closure of numerous cases each year, would be eliminated. Anonymous complaints and a community engagement process would also faciltate easier reporting.
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Improvements to the investigations conducted by individual police districts, such as requiring a consistent investigative structure and updating data and case tracking systems, would streamline operations and improve accountability.
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The "mediation" program, which presently functions like a plea bargaining and preempts a full investigation of the complaint, would be reformed. Mediation of allegations that could result in serious discipline woudl be prohibited. Additionally, the City would be encouraged to establish a mediation program based on national best practices that involves both police and citizens to promote dialogue and better understanding in accordance with restorative justice principles and objectives.
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IPRA would be replaced by a more independent CIvilian Police Investigative Agency (CPIA). Investigations by CPIA and BIA would be informed by pattern and practice analysis, and would be improved through regular audits by the Inspector General for Public Saftey, greater oversight through the Community Oversight Safety Board, enhanced thecnology and new training. Numerous steps currently mandated by the collective bargaining agreements that hinder the efficiency and effectiveness of investigations would also be eliminated. Examples of current CBA-based practices include allowing officers to amend prior statements after viewing video footage, limitations on when and how interviews of offficers may be conducted and limitations on how closed complaint files can be used in disciplinary proceedings.
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Current Review, Grievance and Adjudication Stages (SEE CURRENT FLOWCHART, page 156, FOR COMPARISON TO PROPOSED CHANGES OUTLINED BELOW)
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Command Channel review, a process by which multiple CPD members in the accused's cahin of command can recommend changing the finding and discipline recommendations made by IPRA or BIA would be eliminated. This process adds time to the process and is a redundant layer of due process.
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Increased transparency and scrutiny would bring much needed accountability to the arbitration process, where the majority of suspsension decisions (other than those which are mediated) are ultimately resolved. When IPRA and BIA recommend disciplien, arbitrators frequently eliminate or reduce the discipline and only maintain the recommended discipline in a minority of cases.
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There would be greater oversight of termination cases before the Police Board through regular, publicly reproted Public Safety Inspector General assessments of disciplinary trends and impediments to imposing discipline.
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The opporutnity for seargents, lieutenants, and captains to challenge a suspension through the grievance process after the Police Board has already issued a decision on the case would be eliminated.
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The investigative oversisight entities (currently IPRA and BIA) would be required to make disciplinary recommendations according to a single, format, publicly available discpilline matrix, thereby more predictability and fairness to the disciplinary stystems. Additionally, there would be greater transparency in their reporting of investigatory findings.
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3OVERSIGHT
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The creation of a new Inspector General for Public Safety, which would audit and monitor CPD and the entire police oversight system.appendix 6: page 158
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The creation of a new Community Safety Oversight Board, which would allow the community to have
a powerful platform and role in the police oversight process.
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. The creation of a new Civilian Police Investigative Agency, which would replace the Independent Police Review Authority in investigating serious cases of police misconduct.
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The implementation of reforms to other components of the police oversight system, including BIA and the Chicago Police Board, to improve investigations and transparency within the system.
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The implementation of additional reforms to remove roadblocks to accountability, including reforms to improve the mediation program across the oversight entities and elimination of command channel review.
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Overhaul to the City’s collective bargaining agreements with policing employee entities.
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4COLLECTIVE BARGAINING AGREEMENT
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The affidavit requirement should be removed so that investigators can identify additional cases of police misconduct.159
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• Anonymous complaints should be allowed to encourage reporting by those who fear retaliation, including whistleblowers.
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• Officers should not be informed of the complainant’s name prior to interrogation. There is little need for the officer to know the name of a complainant prior to interrogation if it is later disclosed during the resolution of the case.
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• The provisions delaying interviews in shooting cases for at least 24 hours should be revised to ensure that officers are separated and remain separated from other officers until all officers have given statements. The Department of Justice’s Consent Decree with the Los Angeles Police Department contains such a requirement. When formal questioning begins, the inquiry will start with a recitation of any and all conversations that the officer has had with law enforcement between the shooting and the commencement of the interview.
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• Officers should no longer have a right to amend statements if they have not been provided with the audio or video evidence, and reviews of the footage should not be pre-conditions to charging a Rule 14 violation.
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• Investigations of complaints known to CPD for five years or more should not require Superintendent permission. This is an unnecessary rule, as the statute of limitation will apply for criminal matters, and, for administrative matters, the nature and severity of the conduct should determine whether the complaint should be investigated. Should an individual continue to make such decisions, the authority should be vested in someone outside of CPD, such as the Chief Administrator of IPRA (or its successor, CPIA).
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• The provision requiring destruction of records should be eliminated. The rule is in tension, if not outright conflict, with general principles of public record-keeping, deprives the public of important information that is rightfully theirs, and may include the destruction of information that serves numerous operational and public policy objectives.
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• The provision that forbids CPD from rewarding officers who act as whistleblowers should be removed.
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• The CBAs should be amended to require police officers to disclose secondary employment, as other City workers are required to do.
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• The CBA dictates the manner in which interrogators can ask questions, which presents an unnecessary burden on interrogators and potentially sets them up to violate the CBA for a technicality. The policy does not appear to comport with any best practices and should be eliminated.
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• The CBA requires that officers must be informed of the nature of the allegation prior to interrogation. This provision is presently interpreted very specifically to mean a detailed recitation of the facts that support all possible charges. Moreover, if the officer lies to investigators during the investigation, new allegations must be presented to the officer. This provision should be amended to allow for more general recitation of allegations.160
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Design an open and public selection process for a Chief Administrator.
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Establish selection requirements for the Chief Administrator and investigators to avoid bias
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Provide a grant of jurisdiction that ensures that CPIA is informed by community complaints.
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Establish a clear, easy-to-understand mission statement.
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Remove barriers to accountability.
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Gather and leverage data generated by civil litigation and criminal motions to suppress to learn more about trends in citizen complaints.
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5CIVILIAN POLICE MONITORING
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IPRA should be replaced with a new Civilian Police Investigative Agency (CPIA). The City Council should enact legislation that ensures the new civilian oversight entity is established in accordance with the principles described below.
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• Design an open and public selection process for a Chief Administrator. The new Community Safety Oversight Board should select the Chief Administrator. It is important that CPIA be perceived as legitimate; the selection of this position should be insulated from politics, transparent and widely inclusive. The selection process should also include multiple opportunities for significant community input that will be seriously considered by the selection committee.
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• Establish selection requirements for the Chief Administrator and investigators to avoid bias. In order to prevent bias (and the perception of bias), previously sworn employees of CPD (and nonsworn employees who have worked for CPD within the past five years) and the Cook County State’s Attorney Office should be prohibited from serving as investigators and/or the Chief Administrator. Individuals who hold these positions must reflect the City’s diversity.
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• Provide a grant of jurisdiction that ensures that CPIA is informed by community complaints. CPIA must be empowered to investigate the issues that are of most pressing concern to the community. CPIA’s jurisdiction should be expanded beyond IPRA’s current jurisdiction to include unlawful search and seizures and denial of access to counsel. At the end of CPIA’s first year of operation, an outside, independent entity should evaluate whether the expanded jurisdiction of CPIA is appropriate and achievable.
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• Establish a clear, easy-to-understand mission statement. This is essential to provide civilians and officers with a fair and impartial complaint system and to employ the preponderance of the evidence standard when deliberating on complaints.
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• Remove barriers to accountability. No credible allegation should be ignored because of technical complaint submission requirements (like an affidavit requirement) or because the civilian involved is hesitant or unable to provide a complaint form. The Chief Administrator should be empowered to investigate any incidents that fall under her jurisdiction, even in the absence of sworn complaints. Complaints must be accepted from anyone with personal knowledge of the incident. The Chief Administrator may launch investigations based on any credible source, including media accounts, a review of use of force reports or referrals from other oversight entities.
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• Gather and leverage data generated by civil litigation and criminal motions to suppress to learn more about trends in citizen complaints. The civil rights and criminal defense bars in Chicago have, through decades of litigation, developed rich data regarding CPD policy and practice. This information has largely been untouched by the various oversight entities. This represents a significant missed opportunity to ensure accountability. CPIA should be charged with investigating the facts of all civil lawsuits, which, if submitted as a complaint, would fall under its jurisdiction. Further, CPIA should develop a process to gather the facts contained in all criminal motions to suppress that allege facts, which if submitted as a complaint, would fall under its jurisdiction to determine if a full investigation is warranted.
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• Establish clear lines of jurisdiction. Misconduct investigations often reveal multiple layers of wrongdoing. For example, in a use of force investigation, it may become clear that an officer filed a false police report. CPIA does not have original jurisdiction to investigate false reporting, but, if the false reporting is related to a force investigation, the monitor should be empowered to investigate it and issue appropriate findings.
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• Empower CPIA with the authority needed to investigate. CPIA must have the ability to collect evidence, conduct prompt interviews, subpoena witnesses and enforce its subpoena power by retaining outside, independent counsel. This is an existing power within IPRA and should be continued in a new body unabated.
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• Civilian oversight should run currently with criminal investigations. In the past, IPRA investigations have consistently stalled while the Cook County State’s Attorney determined whether or not it would move forward with criminal charges under the same set of facts as IPRA was investigating. The practice led to long delays in investigating and resolving IPRA’s cases after the State’s Attorney’s Office closed its investigation. This need not be the case. While it may sometimes make sense for an IPRA investigator to pause her or his investigation to preserve the integrity of the criminal matter, this rule is not universal. Rather, it is better practice to presume that the matters should be run concurrently, and both entities should meet regularly to determine if one or the other investigation should be paused during the process or, in the ideal, if both cases can be investigated at the same time.
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• Ensure an accessible, safe and comfortable complaint process. Civilians must be able to file complaints via the internet, over the phone and in their communities. The new body should use national models, such as New York City’s Civilian Complaint Review Board, which has developed a model of hosting meetings within city neighborhoods on a posted rotating basis to take and verify complaints.
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• Conduct community education regarding rights and the oversight process. CPIA must be responsible for launching a public education/community engagement campaign that educates the public about their rights and the complaint/investigative process.
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• Establish community oversight over CPIA. CPIA must be legitimately accountable to members of the community. The community must have the power to require that CPIA hold public hearings through the new Community Safety Oversight Board, CPIA must develop (and be responsive to) a civilian feedback process, and CPIA must be audited by an independent third-party entity selected by those on the selection committee if an auditing function is not otherwise available in the City. Additionally, CPIA must hold regular community meetings to inform the public of its actions.
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• Proactively prevent abuse and misconduct through policy and practice recommendations and use-of-force analyses. CPIA must conduct pattern and practice analyses both proactively and reactively where it has subject matter jurisdiction. This should include proactive analyses of potential patterns of police misconduct that are within its subject matter jurisdiction, including information found in court filings, judicial findings, internal CPD documents and incidents where individuals were charged with offenses commonly believed to cover up police misconduct (such as assault on a police officer, disorderly conduct, resisting arrest and misconduct investigations), and other potential pattern evidence, and the establishment of a transparent process (that is informed by community concerns) for CPIA to make training, policy, and procedure recommendations to CPD. In turn, CPD must publically respond to these recommendations.
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• Operate with complete transparency. CPIA must prioritize keeping the public informed by posting summary reports of each completed investigation; publishing comprehensive annual reports on its work; and establishing a transparent process to make training, policy and procedure recommendations to CPD and a transparent process to make public CPD’s response. CPIA should also promptly respond to all requests from the new Community Safety Oversight Board.
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• Provide resources to be rigorous and independent. In order to provide sufficient oversight and meet the demands of an expanded jurisdiction that includes explicit obligations regarding community engagement and policy and practice recommendations, CPIA must have sufficient resources, and those resources should, to the extent possible, be insulated from the political process. CPIA’s funding should be a percentage of CPD’s budget so that the office cannot be defunded. This funding should provide CPIA with sufficient resources and powers to conduct prompt, unbiased and independent investigations into police misconduct that are of the highest quality. Best practices within the field indicate that the budget should be tied to 1% of CPD’s budget and/or a ratio of 1 CPIA investigator for every 250 sworn CPD officers.
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• Provide complainant support. CPIA should provide supportive services to complainants, including regular updates regarding the investigation, information about the process and outcomes and referrals to outside service providers when needed. All of the investigators who work for CPIA and BIA should be trained to work with victims of trauma and taught to conduct victim/trauma-sensitive interviews.
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• Develop and adopt standardized penalties. As with other oversight entities, CPIA should adopt a discipline matrix, a national best practice that determines a fixed set of penalties for behavior and history. A matrix has been used informally at IPRA for over a year and should be formally reviewed and adopted.
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• Establish penalties for CPD’s failure to cooperate. Require CPD to fire officers who lie during misconduct investigations. Require CPD to fire and refer for criminal prosecution any officer who retaliates against any person who reports police abuse.
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• Ensure the appropriate use of the mediation program. CPIA should establish clear and bright line rules regarding the cases and procedures for its mediation program. To the extent possible, CPIA should create a program that is in line with national best practices for mediation for citizen oversight organizations.
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• Address limits imposed by the CBAs. Require that the collective bargaining agreements conform with rigorous, transparent and accountable civilian oversight.
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6INDEPENDENT POLICE REVIEW AUTHORITY
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We recommend that IPRA should continue to conduct police misconduct investigations until CPIA is able to assume responsibility for those investigations. During this interim period, the following actions should be taken:
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• IPRA should contract with an independent, third-party entity, such as the Police Assessment Resource Center (PARC) or the National Association for Civilian Oversight of Law Enforcement (NACOLE), to conduct an ongoing audit of IPRA’s operations and to audit each completed investigation prior to finalization. IPRA staff should defer to the outside entity’s findings regarding deficiencies in investigative practices and findings.
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• IPRA should immediately begin implementing, where possible, the transparency requirements recommended for CPIA.
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• IPRA, with oversight and guidance from the City of Chicago Inspector General and the incoming Chief Administrator of CPIA, should begin the process of drafting a series of transition memos that will attempt to memorialize institutional knowledge regarding technology infrastructure, complaint intake processes, investigative protocols, interactions with the police department, and all other topics identified as critical to a successful transition to CPIA.
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• IPRA should engage in the community outreach activities described for CPIA.
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• IPRA should review and clarify its process and criteria for the affidavit override process and keep data related to it. IPRA should also be more proactive in seeking affidavits. Investigators used to actively seek out the affidavits, sometimes even knocking on doors. Investigators now play a much more passive role and have placed the burden on the complainant.
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• IPRA should develop and adopt a clear discipline matrix that provides a range of potential penalties for different types of misconduct, along with aggravating and mitigating factors that can be considered.
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7INDEPENDENT INSPECTOR GENERAL FOR PUBLIC SAFETY
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Based on our review of the national experience with police oversight generally and police auditing specifically, we have concluded that Chicago would benefit tremendously from the creation of an independent monitoring entity. The creation of this position would greatly enhance the transparency, accountability and quality of the oversight structure. The Task Force recommends that the new entity be housed within the City of Chicago Office of the Inspector General because it already has relevant expertise, the general authority to conduct this work and has begun to audit some police department functions and build up institutional knowledge. We also recommend the following related to the new Inspector General’s powers and obligations:
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• Give the inspector general a broad scope of authority to review and make recommendations. Enabling legislation should follow the models set out in Los Angeles, Denver and New York, where the inspector general or monitor's powers are defined in broad terms, rather than providing a list of narrow functions, which could be interpreted as significantly restricting the auditor's authority. The enabling legislation should leave no doubt that the inspector general may perform the functions laid out below. While the inspector general would have the power to make findings and issue recommendations, the inspector general could not override the decision of another investigative body.
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