below nat. treshold

development_date

programming_language

source_code_url

validation_method

importance in RECORD

importance in RECORD

Contract splitting to circumwent thresholds or allow only big suppliers to bid

This redflag indicates risk if there are two or more contracts issued for identical items over a short period of time for no apparent reason, which results in the application of a less competitive procurement method. It also indicates risk if the purchase of items that should have been procured jointly, but are procured by each sub-unit (eg one vehicle for on department).

MULTIPLE_PHASES

http://www.worldbank.org/en/topic/governance/brief/anti-corruption

NOT_DEVELOPED

theoretical, contract splitting, procedural indicator

This redflag indicates risk if there is an unreasonably large number of contracts awarded just below national competitive bidding treshold [NCB] OR there are related and simultaneous purchases from the same supplier in amounts just under the NCB threshold

http://www.worldbank.org/en/topic/governance/brief/anti-corruption

NOT_DEVELOPED

quantity, theoretical, contract splitting, price, procedural indicator, statistics

This redflag indicates risk if there is a close similarity between the specifications and the winning bidder’s product or services AND/OR specifications stipulate a brand name without stating “or equivalent” AND/OR there are complaints from other bidders that the specifications match too closely those of a single competitor, or that a bidder prepared the contract specifications

http://www.worldbank.org/en/topic/governance/brief/anti-corruption

NOT_DEVELOPED

theoretical, subject, procedural indicator, bid, rigged specifications

This redflag indicates risk if only a few of the companies that purchase the bidding documents submit bids (especially if more than half drop out) AND/OR relatively few companies submit bids, compared to prior similar tenders AND/OR fewer than the normal or expected number of potential bidders apply for prequalification.

http://www.worldbank.org/en/topic/governance/brief/anti-corruption

NOT_DEVELOPED

theoretical, output indicator, bid, rigged specifications

Company has a high ratio of contracts within sector / at a contracting authority

This redflag indicates risk if the evaluation criteria differ from those issued in the bidding documents AND/OR improper or arbitrary evaluation sub-criteria or procedures are developed at the time of evaluation that differ from the issued bidding documents AND/OR there are changes in the scoring of bids or arbitrary scoring of bids

http://www.worldbank.org/en/topic/governance/brief/anti-corruption

NOT_DEVELOPED

theoretical, process rigging, biased evaluation

This redflag indicates risk if there is a pressure exrcised by project officials on BEC members to select a certain contractor

http://www.worldbank.org/en/topic/governance/brief/anti-corruption

NOT_DEVELOPED

theoretical, analogue indicator

This indicator indicates risk if there is a suspicious bid pattern between bidders, like same or similar telephone or facsimile numbers or address shared by bidders

http://www.worldbank.org/en/topic/governance/brief/anti-corruption

NOT_DEVELOPED

theoretical, collusive bidding, bid

This redflag indicates risk if there are discrepancies between inspection findings, test results, or contract specifications and the contractor’s claims for payment (incl. false statements, missing supporting docs) AND/OR statements contradict results of background or due diligence checks

IMPLEMENTATION

http://www.worldbank.org/en/topic/governance/brief/anti-corruption

NOT_DEVELOPED

This redflag indicates risk if there are only a few companies in the market that always bid together and they take turns winning

http://www.worldbank.org/en/topic/governance/brief/anti-corruption

NOT_DEVELOPED

theoretical, collusive bidding, reputation, statistics

This redflag indicates risk if (more than half of the) companies that buy the bidding documents refrain from submitting bids AND/OR substantially fewer bids have been received than in previous, similar tender AND/OR well-known qualified companies do not bid, especially if they purchased the bidding documents

http://www.worldbank.org/en/topic/governance/brief/anti-corruption

NOT_DEVELOPED

theoretical, collusive bidding, output indicator, bid

Not publishing the call for tenders in the official journal increases the probability of single received and valid bids and the winner’s contract share in every regression. Therefore the indicator's value is set 0, if the call for tender was published in official journal and 1, if no call for tender was published in official journal

Corruption Research Center Budapest

http://tendertracking.eu/about

exclusion of bidders, input indicator, process rigging, weighted indicator, restricted information, binary indicator, leaking confidential information, procedural indicator, algorithmic

the indicator is partially validated. the developers only set forth possible ways of validation of CRI, but according to their own assessment, it takes several years to validate the aforementioned indicators on a whole scale. These elementary validation routes, however, are important as follows:
1. analysis of cross-sectional and time-series distribution of CRI
2. relationship between the amount of spending not reported in the PP database and CRI on the organisational level
3. analysis of profitability and turnover growth of winning firms with different CRI
4. political control of winning companies is collated with their CRI
5. comparison of average CRI of "crony companies" with those whose success is largely unaffected by government change.

extended use of restricted procedures

Every non-open procedure type carries a higher corruption risk than open procedures in terms of single received and valid bids and winner’s contract share. Therefore developers set the indicator's value 0 , if there is ano open procedure, 1, if there is an invitation procedure, 2, if there is a negotiation procedure, and 3, if there are other procedures (e.g. competitive dialogue). Indicator's value is 4, if procedure type is missing/erroneous.

Corruption Research Center Budapest

http://tendertracking.eu/about

exclusion of bidders, input indicator, process rigging, weighted indicator, restricted information, leaking confidential information, procedural indicator, algorithmic

the indicator is partially validated. the developers only set forth possible ways of validation of CRI, but according to their own assessment, it takes several years to validate the aforementioned indicators on a whole scale. These elementary validation routes, however, are important as follows:
1. analysis of cross-sectional and time-series distribution of CRI
2. relationship between the amount of spending not reported in the PP database and CRI on the organisational level
3. analysis of profitability and turnover growth of winning firms with different CRI
4. political control of winning companies is collated with their CRI
5. comparison of average CRI of "crony companies" with those whose success is largely unaffected by government change.

This indicator is contradictory to the prescriptions of the EU Public Procurement Directive or the Hungarian Public Procurement Law, but according to the authors is in line with a corrupt rent extraction logic, since contract awards are annulled and relaunched more often when there were multiple bidders .The indicator's value is set 0, if the contract was awarded in a non-annulled procedure and 1, if the contract was awarded in a procedure annulled, but relaunched. Both annulations by the procuring entities or courts are taken into consideration.

Corruption Research Center Budapest

MULTIPLE_PHASES

http://tendertracking.eu/about

input indicator, process rigging, weighted indicator, binary indicator, procedural indicator, algorithmic

the indicator is partially validated. the developers only set forth possible ways of validation of CRI, but according to their own assessment, it takes several years to validate the aforementioned indicators on a whole scale. These elementary validation routes, however, are important as follows:
1. analysis of cross-sectional and time-series distribution of CRI
2. relationship between the amount of spending not reported in the PP database and CRI on the organisational level
3. analysis of profitability and turnover growth of winning firms with different CRI
4. political control of winning companies is collated with their CRI
5. comparison of average CRI of "crony companies" with those whose success is largely unaffected by government change.

This redflag indicates risk if the period between the advertisement and the bid submission deadline is very short. The Worldbank's Handbook does not imply actual timespan.

http://www.worldbank.org/en/topic/governance/brief/anti-corruption

NOT_DEVELOPED

theoretical, temporal indicator, restricted information, statistics

This redflag indicates risk if a bid's due date has been extended after some of the bids have been submitted AND/OR Some or all bids are disqualified for simple errors AND/OR Complaints from bidders that they were not allowed to submit bids AND/OR A bid is “forgotten” in the safe.

http://www.worldbank.org/en/topic/governance/brief/anti-corruption

NOT_DEVELOPED

exclusion of bidders, theoretical, partially analogue indicator, bid manipulation, bid

This redflag indicates risk if technical specifications are copied from the bidding documents or are incomplete AND/OR the manufacturer’s authorization is missing, outdated or inadequate AND/OR The bid does not match procurement requirements (e.g., in terms of quantity, quality, qualifications) AND/OR Pages of a bid are missing or not signed (when required)

http://www.worldbank.org/en/topic/governance/brief/anti-corruption

NOT_DEVELOPED

theoretical, process rigging, bid, biased evaluation

This redflag indicates risk if there is a suspicious bid pattern that consists of unreasonably high bid prices submitted by losing bidders for which there is no legitimate explanation and which cannot be attributed to an error. The World Bank does not indicate accurate ratio for suspiciously high amount.

http://www.worldbank.org/en/topic/governance/brief/anti-corruption

NOT_DEVELOPED

theoretical, collusive bidding, price, bid, statistics

This redflag indicates risk the increase in contract value (e.g., unit costs)

IMPLEMENTATION

http://www.worldbank.org/en/topic/governance/brief/anti-corruption

NOT_DEVELOPED

theoretical, process rigging, price, abuse of contract changes and amendments

This redflag indicates risk if a successful bidder subcontracts work to losing bidder(s), which may include those that withdraw their bids AND/OR cross-ownership of bidding companies or family ties (similar names of key staff and owners or family members own the bidding companies)

http://www.worldbank.org/en/topic/governance/brief/anti-corruption

NOT_DEVELOPED

theoretical, collusive bidding, reputation, statistics

exclusion of unfavourable bidders by authority

This numeric redflag-component is part of an index (CRI) that indicates risk risk of grand corruption. Developers rely on the scheme that in order to award the contract to a "specific" bidder, the procuring entity - if it could not deter all but one bidder from submissing bids - excludes the bids of all unwanted bidders on administrative or formal grounds or unfairly assesses the bids to favour a particular bidder. Therefore the value is set to 1, if 1 bid was NOT excluded, and 0, if more than 1 bid NOT excluded. Input indicators of the model, correlate with this output.

Corruption Research Center Budapest

MULTIPLE_PHASES

http://tendertracking.eu/about

output indicator, binary indicator, bid, algorithmic

the indicator is partially validated. the developers only set forth possible ways of validation of CRI, but according to their own assessment, it takes several years to validate the aforementioned indicators on a whole scale. These elementary validation routes, however, are important as follows:
1. analysis of cross-sectional and time-series distribution of CRI
2. relationship between the amount of spending not reported in the PP database and CRI on the organisational level
3. analysis of profitability and turnover growth of winning firms with different CRI
4. political control of winning companies is collated with their CRI
5. comparison of average CRI of "crony companies" with those whose success is largely unaffected by government change.