critical of Contract Co and MRT. Contract Co needs clear guidelines on circumstances of transfering the functions

does not support Contract Co, but supports MRT "independent of ICANN Board" and "positioned to contract with the IANA Functions Operator"; ICANN Board "should not be the final authority on delegation and re-delegation processes"

does not support the proposed creation of a new contracting entity, prefers "spilling the board" to contracting. Too many new structures created. Draft raises more questions than it answers

supports basic elements but concerned about uncertainty related to Contract Co

need a strong backstop for RZ changes. Proposes an alternative model

supports basic principles of CWG proposal, concerned about relation btw Contract Co and MRT, and about MRT composition

Contract Co must exist. Strong support for separability.

direct customers of DNS IANA need greater influence and recognition. Oversight scope should be confined to technical and operational issues. CSC should be able to initiate a rebid

ICANN should stay in US jurisdiction. MRT should be multistakeholder. What about RZ authorization?

could accept either model, but prefers to build new stewardship model around ICANN with "binding obligations and the potential to set up a new entity"; does not believe ICANN Board should have any role in ccTLD delegation and redelegation

Contract Co should only validate changes, don't need anything else. Thinks MRT will inevitably make policy

don’t duplicate accountability reforms

supports most elements

rely on CCWG-Accountability

rely on CCWG-Accountability

"ICANN was purpose-built to be the permanent home of the IANA functions"

supports most elements

supports most elements

supports most elements; suggests that "GAC, GNSO or ccNSO could recommend or elect representatives from the five Regions respectively"

incorporate Contract Co in neutral state

concerned about jurisdiction of Contract Co

CSC should be registries only. Too complex.Willing to entertain internal solution but wants reinforcement of separation between policy and IANA.

concerned about jurisdiction of Contract Co

support for the general approach, sees a lack of completeness

concerned about jurisdiction and NTIA role as Administrator, relationship between MRT and ICANN Board

An "increasingly polticized and large MRT might backlash, reproduces ICANN policy making; ccTLD and gTLD policy authority need to be clearly distinguished; don't mention fees. "Contract Co., MRT, CSC or IAP would be in a position to decide on a matter of ccTLD delegation/re-delegation, but should only abide to check that the due process has been followed"

supports most elements

not enough detail to fully support most elements. Willing to consider internal solution but thinks Contract Co enhances accountability

concerned about ccTLDs that have no contract with ICANN.

proposes very specific edits and modifications to the CWG plan; suggests CSC as members of Contract Co, and elected MRT as Board

wants NTIA to remain in control

supports most elements, but very concerned about growing complexity and that some don't understand what IANA does

thinks a Council of members would make separability unnecessary

supports separability but not via contract co.

explains how status quo works and asks for a new solution to pay attention to these things; argues checks and balances in current three party arrangement has been important part of current success

proposal is a good way to replace NTIA but needs a lot of work; MRT of 10–12 people should be the maximum size

supports separate contracting authority but proposes what he thinks is simpler alternative

there should be a "nuclear option" but try to find a solution within ICANN via a "golden bylaw" triggered by registries

does not explicitly support or oppose plan, comments on a few details regarding the CSC and ccTLDs

wants even stronger structural separation

does not support review of delegation/redelegation reports by CSC; afraid registries could be outvoted in MRT

proposed MRT, CSC, ConCo should be "collapsed" into a single body, constitued of (direct) IFO customers, e.g. cc- and gTLD representatives.

expresses preference for geographic balance of MRT over other considerations

MRT should not be standing, grant more functions to CSC

Raises questions about compliance with US and other security policies and standards

Should not grant ICANN an indefinite monopoly. Use the phrase "IANA Naming Functions Operator" to avoid any ambiguity or doubt about the scope of this proposal