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Quote Book / Date publishedKeyword / topicRelevant month / yearHistoriography schoolMore contextMeet the Historian
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ArdaghThe gloom was such that already by the mid 1920s many Germans were losing faith in the very principle of parliamentary democracy; this was above all the cancer that killed the Weimar... A growing number of politicians... came to feel that democracy was unworkable... Probably by 1930 a period of authoritarian rule had become inevitable.
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Bracher... It was indeed Hitler's Weltanschauung (world view) and nothing else that mattered in the end, as is seen from the terrible consequences of his racist anti-Semitism in the planned murder of the Jews."Bracher, KD, 'The role of Hitler: Perspectives and Interpretations' in W Lacquer (ed) , Fascism, Penguin, 1979, p 201rule, role of Hitler, holocaust, intentionalist1933 - 1945intentionalistFrom wikipedia article: Bracher is mainly concerned with the problems of preserving and developing democracy.Bracher has been consistent in all his works in arguing for the value of human rights, pluralism and constitutional values, together with urging that Germans align themselves with the democratic values of the West.He sees democracy as a frail institution and has argued that only a concerned citizenry can guarantee it.
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BracherThe German "Sonderweg" should be limited to the era of the Third Reich, but the strength of the particular German mentality [Sonderbewusstsein] that had arisen already with its opposition to the French Revolution and grew stronger after 1870 and 1918 must be emphasized. Out of its exaggerated perspectives (and, I would add, rhetoric) it become a power in politics, out a myth reality. The road from democracy to dictatorship was not a particular German case, but the radical nature of the National Socialist dictatorship corresponded to the power of the German ideology that in 1933–1945 became a political and totalitarian reality"[4]Lukacs, John The Hitler of History, New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1997 page 201.sonderweg, weimar, myth, rise of hitlersonderweg, sonderbewusstseinIn Bracher's opinion, through it was human choices that led to the collapse of the Weimar Republic and the National Socialist period, the roots of National Socialism can be traced back towards the völkisch ideology of 19th century Germany and Austria-Hungary, which found their fullest expression in the personality of Adolf Hitler.Likewise, Bracher has complained that too many Germans were willing during the Weimar-Nazi time periods to subscribe to a "readiness for acclamatory agreement and pseudo-military obedience to a strong authoritarian state". Through Bracher is opposed to the Sonderweg interpretation of German history, he does believe in a special German mentality (Sonderbewusstsein).
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Broszat, MartinAfter the disappointments of parliamentary democracy, many Germans saw National Socialism as a persuasive alternative. It seemed to offer a strong, determined leadership, a pseudo-democratic mobilisation of the masses and their participation in the promised national revival; it looked like a 'third way' between democracy and the state authoritarianism of the older days. Herein lay the lure of Nazism. BROSZAT, MARTIN. HITLER AND THE COLLAPSE OF WEIMAR GERMANY. LEAMINGTON SPA: BERG :, 1987. P 148.<-- WHY ARE YOU YELLING?rise to power1923 - 1933generally seen as a structuralistGerman historian
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Broszat, Martin“The ‘shame of the Versailles Treaty’, the enemies within who had stabbed the nation in the back” (2)
Hitler and the collapse of Weimar Germany, Published in 1987Ideology
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Broszat, Martin“Nazi ideology was almost totally a product of mass culture and political semi-illiteracy which proliferated since the late 19th century” (38)Hitler and the collapse of Weimar Germany, Published in 1987Ideology
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Broszat, Martin“New propaganda techniques which had been developed first and foremost by Hitler assumes great significance” (3)Hitler and the collapse of Weimar Germany, Published in 1987Use of force pre-1933
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Broszat, Martin“There were the glaring red colours of the swastika flag… aggressive posters and announcements of rallies. Leaflets were distributed from lorries which were driven around town” (3)Hitler and the collapse of Weimar Germany, Published in 1987Use of force pre-1933
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Broszat, Martin“Headed by a marching band and provided the radical Hitler movement with an image of military discipline and order” (3)“Headed by a marching band and provided the radical Hitler movement with an image of military discipline and order” (3)Use of force pre-1933
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Broszat, Martin“The number of unemployed had been increased by further redundancies of workers and white-collar employees” (11)Hitler and the collapse of Weimar Germany, Published in 1987Economic Crisis
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Broszat, Martin“A mere two-thirds of them received small amounts of unemployment benefit or special crisis payments; the rest were forced to live on meagre benefits provided by community welfare schemes” (11)Hitler and the collapse of Weimar Germany, Published in 1987Economic Crisis
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Broszat, MartinFrom the Vossische Zeitung of 2 October 1930: “Nothing is more depressing to watch than the self-demolition of the bourgeoisie, the psychic suicide of an entire class.. the belief in the bourgeoisie’s right to exist disintegrates even more rapidly than that in the bourgeois existence itself… Large parts of middle-class youth no longer think bourgeois terms; they think either Marxist or fascist” (16)Hitler and the collapse of Weimar Germany, Published in 1987Economic Crisis
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Broszat, Martin“Here, in the depressed situation following the German defeat and revolution, he could generalise and politicise his feeling of personal bitterness and hatred” (1)Hitler and the collapse of Weimar Germany, Published in 1987Conditions which helped the rise of power
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Broszat, Martin(Captain Ernst Rohm- a staff officer in the local Munich command) “From the start Rohm saw Hitler as a propagandistic genius of the volkische movement and supported him wherever possible” (3)Hitler and the collapse of Weimar Germany, Published in 1987Conditions which helped the rise of power
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Broszat, Martin“Started his political career in Munich as an agitator in the counter-revolutionary hothouse” (1)Hitler and the collapse of Weimar Germany, Published in 1987other
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Broszat, Martin“The Nazis gained the largest percentages in the well-to-do bourgeois suburbs of the city) (15)Hitler and the collapse of Weimar Germany, Published in 1987other
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Broszat, Martin “Helps to explain his passionate hatred against what he saw as the source of all evil: ‘Jewish’ pacifism and internationalism” (1)
Hitler and the collapse of Weimar Germany, Published in 1987Ideology
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Broszat, Martin “The worst hit were the 14 to 18-year-olds who had just left school” (11)Hitler and the collapse of Weimar Germany, Published in 1987Economic Crisis
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Bullock, AlanHitler came to office in 1933 as the result, not of any irresistible revolutionary or national movement sweeping him into power, nor even of a popular victory at the polls, did as part of a shoddy political deal with the “Old Gang” whom he had been attacking for months… Hitler’s success owed much to luck and even more to the bad judgement of his political opponents and rivalsHitler: A study in Tyranny p. 253Rise to power
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Corkery and StoneIt used to be considered that (during the Locarno era) the Nazis were a somewhat ineffectual fringe group... (In reality), Hitler was preparing his movement in ways that enabled it to exploit the opportunities that the Slump later gave.Weimar Germany and the Third ReichAscension of Nazi Party
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Corkery and StoneIn 1929 the Nazis began the breakthrough, railing against the Young Plan and Reparations. But it was the depression which set in during that year that really gave the Nazis their chance.Weimar Germany and the Third Reich / J.F. Corkery, R.C.J. Stone.
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Corkery and StoneAware of the way the depression had broken society into sectional pieces, the Nazis skilfully directed their propaganda towards each section... By promising panaceas to everyone Hitler attracted millions to his side.Weimar Germany and the Third Reich / J.F. Corkery, R.C.J. Stone.
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Corkery and Stone(Hitler's Weltanschauung) was half baked, but its vagueness broadened its appeal to a wide range of social groups for it could mean all things to all men.Weimar Germany and the Third Reich / J.F. Corkery, R.C.J. Stone.
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Corkery and Stone in HitlerHitler hated the Weimar Republic. The 1918-19 Revolution he considered 'the greatest villainy of the century'.Weimar Germany and the Third Reich
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Craig, Gordon A. The Republic's base vulnerability was rooted in the circumstances of its creation, and it is no exaggeration to say that it failed in the end partly because German officers were allowed to put their epaulets [i.e. uniforms] back on again so quickly and because the public buildings were not burned down, along with the bureaucrats who inhabited themGermany 1866-1945, 1980Weakness of the first German RepublicThe duration of the Weimar Republic in Germany, i.e. up until 1933
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Evans, David" Their [the elites] acceptance of Hitler can, in part, be seen as their desire to preserve a conservative, authoritarian system of government. They believed that they could 'tame' Hitler to act as their 'puppet'"p. 118: Years of the Weimar and the Third Reich, David Evans and Jane Jenkins. Published in 1999
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Evans, RichardThe revolutionary conquest of power, still favoured by Röhm, would not work in any case if it was undertaken without the support of the army, so conspicuously lacking in November 1923. Hitler did not, as was sometimes later said, even by himself, embark on a path of ‘legality’ in the wake of the failed putsch. But he did realize that toppling the Weimar ‘system’ would require more than a few ill-directed gunshots, even in a year of supreme crisis such as 1923. Coming to power clearly required collaboration from key elements in the establishment, and although he had enjoyed some support in 1923, it had not proved sufficient. In the next crisis, which was to occur less than a decade later, he made sure he had the army and the key institutions of the state either neutralized, or actively working for him, unlike in 1923Richard Evans, The Coming of the Third Reich, P130.Rise to power, beer hall putsch, rohm1923 - 1933This leads into the later power struggle between Rohm and Hitler. Nazi Revolution in 1933? http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Richard_J._Evans Evans' main interests are in social history and he is much influenced by the Annales School.He largely agrees with Fischer that the way that German society developed in the nineteenth century led to the rise of Nazi Germany, although Evans takes pains to point out that this outcome was one among many possibilities and was not inevitable. For Evans, the values of the 19th-century German middle class had the seeds of National Socialism already germinating. http://www.theguardian.com/education/2003/dec/09/highereducationprofile.academicexperts
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Fest, JoachimHis opponents were the ones to make it possible: they had shorn the parties and the Reichstag of political power; they set up the series of election campaigns; they created the precedent of undermining the constitution.Hitler p.368Rise to power
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Feuchtwanger, E.J"the cement holding the coalition together had gone" [In reference to the young plan]p. 118: Years of the Weimar and the Third Reich, David Evans and Jane Jenkins. Published in 1999rise
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Feuchtwanger, EdgarHitler often refused to take decisions, especially when a decision might damage his popularity, and left his subordinates to thrash these out. He gave those men who were close to him conflicting responsibilities, which often resulted in a state of near anarchy. Some have argued that Hitler was a weak dictator, but this really does not stand up for he could take any decision he wanted to and took some of his major decisions without much consultation. He had little need for the tactic of divide and rule, for none of the other leading Nazis ever challenged his supremacy. The very fact that he had removed himself from day-to-day decisions of government made him the central figure of the Third Reich. It meant that he could take key decisions without having to go through a time-consuming and confusing process of bureaucratic consultation. The Third Reich was not so much a totalitarian state but more a chaotic system of rival empires.Edgar Feuchtwanger, Hitler’s Germany, 2000weak / strong dictator, totalitarianism, rule, leadership1933 - 1945
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Feuchtwanger, Edgar“The most pervasive cause of Weimar’s failure was that too many Germans did not regard it as a legitimate regime”."From Weimar to Hitler."rise. weimar1933
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GearyThe economic crisis acted as a trigger, occasioning the abandonment of political system that had already lost its legitimacy.
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GearyThe weimar Republic had failed to build on the fundamental compromises achieved in 1918 and to use them to create a deep rooted legitimacy of its own: it had lost the struggle for the hearts and minds of the people
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HidenNo single problem 'caused' the downfall of the Weimar Republic... the interaction of... problems, many of which pre-dated the Republic, progressively weakened the new German state.
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Hitler“’National Socialism’… ‘National’ means above everything to act with boundless and all-embracing love for the people and, if necessary, even to die for it… ‘social’ means …to build up the state and the community… the people are to be ready to die for it” rise - ideology
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Hitler“In Germany where everyone who is a German at all has the same blood, has the same eyes and speaks the same language, here there can be no class, here there can be only a single people”rise - ideology
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Hitler"What we must fight for is to safeguard the existence and reproduction of our race and our people… and the purity of our blood, the freedom and independence of the fatherland"Mein Kampfrise - ideology
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Holtfrerich, Carl-Ludwig The Nazi rise to power was essentially linked to the Great Depression which was a world-wide phenomenon and had little to do with the domestic conflictrise, world-wide1927, 1933-39
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KershawThe handover of power to Hitler on 30th January 1933 was the worst possible outcome to the irrecoverable crisis of weimar democracy. It did not have to happen. It was at no stage a foregone conclusion.power
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Kershaw, IanThe adoration of Hitler by millions of German people, who otherwise might have been only marginally committed to Nazism, meant that the person of the Führer became the focal point of the Nazi system of rule. With Hitler’s massive personal popularity, the regime could repeatedly call upon plebiscites for support. This legitimised its actions at home and abroad, defused opposition and boosted the independence of the Nazi leadership from the traditional national-conservative elites, who had imagined they would keep Hitler in check. Hitler’s popularity sustained the frenetic and increasingly dangerous momentum of Nazi rule. Most important of all, Hitler’s huge platform of popularity made his own power position ever more unassailable, and made possible the process by which his personal ideological obsessions became translated into attainable reality.Ian Kershaw, The Hitler Myth: Image and Reality, 1984myth, rule, leadership1933 - 1945
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Kershaw, Ian"…Working towards the Fuhrer in this way pushed policy along, without close direction from above but operating in a mutually reinforcing fashion with the interests of the policy-makers and wholly eliminating the possibility of any contrary lines of policy development""Hitler", published 1994, p.104Working towards the fuhrer, Hitler, Nazi Party Operation, Policies 1933 onwards
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Kershaw, Ian"The year that ought to have seen the spectre of Hitler banished for good brought instead - though this could scarcely be clearly seen at the time - the genesis of his later absolute pre-eminence in the volkisch movement and his ascendancy to supreme leadership".P.223 Hitler 1889-1936 HubrisRise1923
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Kershaw, Ian"The dilemma for all non-Nazis looking for an authoritarian solution was how to bring one about without Hitler. For Hitler, the problem was how, having mobilized the masses, to get to power if those holding power continued to refuse to give it to him".P.379 Hitler 1889-1936 HubrisRise1932
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Kershaw, Ian"As usual, Hitler had the capacity to channel disappointment and depression into outright aggression. And, whatever hesitation he showed before making a decision, once made, he never doubted that he had been right, that no other course of action had been possible".P.381 Hitler 1889-1936 HubrisRise1933
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Kershaw, IanHitler’s rise from humble beginning to ‘seize’ power by ‘triumph of the will’ was the stuff of Nazi legend. In fact, political miscalculation by those with regular access to the corridors of power rather than any actions on the part of the Nazi leader played a larger role in placing him in the Chancellor’s seat.Hitler, 1889-1936: Hubris p. 424Rise to power, Propaganda, Leader
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Kershaw, IanIn his public portrayal, he was a man of the people, his humble origins emphasising the rejection of privilege and the sterile old order in favour of a new, vigorous, upwardly-mobile society built upon strength, merit and achievement.The Hitler Myth Propaganda, Rise to power
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Kolb, EberhardThe first German republic was encumbered [hampered] by a basic weakness due to the circumstances of its foundation. In the form it took in 1919, parliamentary democracy was truly accepted and zealously defended by only a minority of the populationThe Weimar Republic, 2005Weakness of the first German Republic, weakness of democracy 1919-1933
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Laffan There was nothing predestinal about Hitler's triumph in 1933. Like the democrats in 1918, the National Socialists came to power more because of the enemies' weakness and failures than because of their own strength
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Lee, StephenThe SA proceeded to intimidate opponents, disrupt other parties' meetings and engage in bloody clashes in the streetEuropean Dictatorships 1918-1945rise to power
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Lowe, Norman "probably the crucial cause of the failure of the [Wiemar] republic was the economic problems which plagued it constantly and which it proved incapable of solving permanently."Modern World History,2005 Rise of Hitler
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Mason, TimPersonally, Hitler had a preference for creating new organs of state to carry out specific projects. He had a preference, too, for choosing ‘the right man for the job’ and giving him the powers to carry it out, regardless; and there is no doubt that he carefully sought out men who were loyal to, and dependent upon, him for all top positions in the regime. More importantly, his personal popularity was a source of power. However, while this shielded Hitler against ultimate contradictions by ministers and generals, it was not much help in the practical business of selecting goals, reaching decisions and making policy. Hitler’s sense of dependence upon his own popularity was so great that the cult of the Führer may well have contributed to government inaction in domestic affairs. Hitler was certainly careful not to associate himself with any measure that he thought might be unpopular. In this sense Hitler can be seen to have been a ‘weak dictator’. Tim Mason, Nazism, Fascism and the Working Class 1995 weak / strong dictator, totalitarianism, rule, leadership1933 - 1945
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Mau & KrausnickThe enemies of the Republic refused to accept the State as much from the outset.German History 1933-45 p13Failure of the Weimar Republic
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Mommsen, Hans"The moderate Bourgeoisie were unable and unwilling to accept the social and political conditions of post-war Germany... This produced an unprecedented rise in protest voting that benefited first and foremost the NSDAP, a party that was extremely adept at exploiting the social resentments of the German middle class"Pg. 318: The Rise and Fall of Weimar Democracy, 1989, Hans Mommsenrise of hitler, economic crisis
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Muhlberger, Detlef “They like so many in the society, had become disillusioned with democracy…The NSDAP could therefore claim to be the only party cutting across the whole political spectrum, representing the Volskgemeinschaft as a whole and overcoming class division”p. 118: Years of the Weimar and the Third Reich, David Evans and Jane Jenkins. Published in 1999rise
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Nicholls, AJHitler’s appointment was quite unnecessary……..The Nazis could not have threatened the state if they had been denied power. Their movement was waning, a further period of frustration would have finished them off” rise1933
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Overy, RichardMillions of Germans dependant on pensions, or fixed incomes from investments or mortgages, were ruined; unemployment rose and there was widespread hunger in the cities. the conditions made for political extremism.p.20- The Third Reich: A ChronicleRise
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Overy, RichardHitler came to power in 1933 through the support of the conservative elite of generals and landowners who agreed to share power wit him in a national governmentp.65 - The Inter-War Crisis 1919-1939, R.J.Overy, 1994Rise1933
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Overy, RichardOn 30 June 1934 Hitler bloodily suppressed opponents in his own party on the so-called Night of the Long Knives. In 1936 Heinrich Himmler, head of Hitler's personal security, the SS, assumed leadership of all the police and security forces in Germany and, with Hitler's blessing, established a vast apparatus of terror and repressionp.65 - The Inter-War Crisis 1919-1939, R.J.Overy, 1994Rise, Force 1934 and 1936
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Overy, RichardHitler began to move from the local to the national stage, paving the way for the startling expansion of the movement when Germany was plunged once again into political and economic crisis.P.33- The Third Reich- a ChronicleRise of Hitler
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Overy, Richardthe failure to save the currency in Germany was seen as a kind of moral lapse on the part of the state and highlighted its fragile and immature characterp.69 - The Inter-War Crisis 1919-1939, R.J.Overy, 1994Rise, Economy1920s
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Overy, RichardIn the 1920s a strong anti-democratic movement in Europe, which united both left and right in opposition to liberal parliamentary politicsp.67 - The Inter-War Crisis 1919-1939, R.J.Overy, 1994Rise, Ideology1920s
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Overy, RichardIn Germany, liberal democracy was rejected by its critics as an alien system, imposed from without to further the economic interests and cultural imperialism of westerners and internationalistsp.69 - The Inter-War Crisis 1919-1939, R.J.Overy, 1994Rise, Ideology1920s
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Overy, Richard"Anti-communism remained one of the principal factors pushing voters towards support for Hitler's party, because National Socialism was... the only force... willing to take the battle directly into communist strongholds."P.35: The Third Reich- A ChronicleRise of Hitler, Conditions which helped rise to power
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Overy, Richard"Fear of a communist revival was a powerful one among all political and social groups, particularly the moderate socialists."P.35: The Third Reich- A ChronicleRise of Hitler
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Overy, RichardGermany was forced in the Treaty to confess its 'war guilt'.... this left a legacy of bitterness and resentment for a whole generation of Germans who felt that their only crime had been to lose the war. No party in Germany, either right or left, was reconciled to the Treatyp.77 - The Inter-War Crisis 1919-1939, R.J.Overy, 1994Rise, Ideology, Conditions, ToV1918
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Overy, RichardDuring the 1920s Germany's economy revived sufficiently to make it once again the foremost industrial power on the continentp.80 - The Inter-War Crisis 1919-1939, R.J.Overy, 1994rise, economic
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Overy, RichardThe course of German history between the wars was not determined by Hitler alone but was shaped by economic, cultural and social forces of which Nazism was in integral part. The rise of Hitler was neither inevitable nor irresistible, though they must sometimes have seemed so.Hitler and the Third ReichShort term causes, Rise to power
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Payne(Hitler) projected a messianic image to his followers and, together with his remarkable oratorical ability, had also developed great skill in striking careful poses, adjusted according to his audience.A history of fascism, p160Rise1919 - 1933
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PayneUntil 1928 the NSDAP tried to appeal to blue collar workers only, but after 1929, Hitler made a fundamental change: the NSDAP would aim at all levels of society. This new strategy quickly paid dividends. In 1929 the partly greatly increased its membership. p161, A History of Fascism 1914- 1945ideology
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Perry, K"Stresseman's death was a turning point in the history of the Republic largely because he had no successor. No later foreign minister contributed his unflagging pursuit of national aims with the diplomatic skill that won foreign confidence. His realism contributed to one of real place in the inter war years and, if he had lived to guide Germany through the approaching of world depression, Hitler might never have come to power"p. 118: Years of the Weimar and the Third Reich, David Evans and Jane Jenkins. Published in 1999rise: economic crisis
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PeukertPerhaps the miracle of Weimar is that the Republic survived as long as it did…The Republic had already been heading for the crossroads before the immediate crisis of 1929-30 occurred. Everything had been pointing towards a possible crash.
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RaffWithout the sympathy and assistance of the various [foreign] powers, the republic had proved unable in the end to withstand the stress and strains of the lost war. The Allies' lack of sympathy burdened the fledgling republic form its earliest days with handicaps which even a firmly entrenched government, heir to a long democratic tradition, could scarcely have borne. How much less... in Germany, habituated to an omnipresent [always there] and authoritarian government.
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SalmonNazism came to power as a result of a miscalculation by conservative politicians and the military after a large number but by no means a majority, of the electorate had put it in a position to contend for power
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ShirerShirer sees Hitler as a natural continuation of German History, he's an outcome of the militaristic and autocratic rule of Wilhelm I and II and Bismarck.Shirer argues that origins of German nationalism lay far in the past. This is seen as a 'deterministic' approach. Other historians agree: There were no longstanding traditions of democracy because Germany did not emerge as a unified nation until 1871. (From: P104 – 108, “An issue considered: How was it possible for the nazis to come to power in Germany in 1933?” of Evans, David, and Jane Jenkins. Years Of Weimar And The Third Reich. London: Hodder & Stoughton, 1999.)rise
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Simpson, William“Nazism lacked a coherent ideology. It was a mishmash of ideas and policies linked only by Hitler’s belief in them” rise - ideology
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Taylor, AJPThere was nothing mysterious in Hitler's victory; the mystery is rather that it had been so long delayed.The Course of German History: A Survey of the Development of Germany since 1815 (New York, 1946), pp. 189-192 and 203-214.
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Taylor, AJP"It was the great depression that put the wind in Hitler's sails"
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Taylor, AJPHitler was appointed Chancellor by President Hindenburg in a strictly constitutional way and for solidly democratic reasons. Whatever ingenious speculators, liberal or Marxist, might say, Hitler was not made Chancellor because he would help the German capitalists to destroy the trade unions, nor because he would give the German generals a great army, still less a great war. He was appointed because he and his Nationalist allies could provide a majority in the Reichstag, and thus end the anomalous four years of government by presidential decree. He was not expected to carry through revolutionary changes in either home or foreign affairs. On the contrary the conservative politicians led by Papen, who recommended him to Hindenburg, kept the key posts for themselves and expected Hitler to be a tame figurehead. These expectations turned out to be wrong. Hitler broke the artificial bonds which had been designed to tie him and gradually became an all-powerful dictator, though more gradually than the legend makes out. He changed most things in Germany. He destroyed political freedom and the rule of law; he transformed German economics and finance; he quarrelled with the Churches; he abolished the separate states and made Germany for the first time a united country. .p129, The Origins of the second world warrise, appointment1933
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Thimme, Annelise"Stresseman could not have stopped the world economic crisis, nor could he have prevented the growth of German right-wing, extremism. Good fortune allowed him to die at the peak of his success before events could vindicate the words 'the end of Germany' that he exclaimed of Hitler's putsch in1923"p. 118: Years of the Weimar and the Third Reich, David Evans and Jane Jenkins. Published in 1999rise: economic crisis
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Vondung, KlausThe ideology of National Socialism in Nazi Germany was set up and organised with a striking similarity to Christian churches at the time. He himself as head of the party was set up as a near messianic figure and his party establishing the various holidays and festivals within Germany. What can be considered as very effective propaganda in actual fact created a cult mentality that served to put the National Socialist Party in the same vein as many large religions.Totalitarian Movements and Political Religions,Rise of Hitler
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