A | B | C | D | E | F | G | H | I | J | K | L | M | N | O | P | Q | R | S | T | U | V | W | X | Y | Z | |
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1 | Section | Description | Owner | Priority | Comments | Ballot | Status | |||||||||||||||||||
2 | 7.2 | Signing Service warranties should be separated from the CA warranties | Bruce/Ian | 1 | Will be address in Signing Service update ballot | Open | ||||||||||||||||||||
3 | 8.2 | For discussion, “Subsequent signature validation MAY ignore revocation, especially if rejecting the Code will cause the device to fail to boot.” | Ian | 2 | Section deleted | CSC-9 | Closed | |||||||||||||||||||
4 | 8.5 | Do we need the Insurance requirement? | Mike | 3 | 7/16-Mike believes this can be dropped. It comes from the EV SSL Guideline $2M/$5M. 7/30-Since it comes directly from EV TLS, agree to leave it in. | Closed | ||||||||||||||||||||
5 | 9.3.1 | Create timestamp certificate policy OID | Bruce | 2 | CSC-9 | Closed | ||||||||||||||||||||
6 | 9.2.4 | Should we address including givenName and surName in certificates? | 4 | 7/30- Ian to go back to platform team to check behavior. What does Microsoft need? Impacts? Value? Currently in Org field. Do we need this? | Open | |||||||||||||||||||||
7 | 11.1.1 | Discuss item 4, “If the Subject’s or Subject’s Affiliate’s, Parent Company’s, or Subsidiary Company’s date of formation, as indicated by either a QIIS or QGIS, was less than three years prior to the date of the Certificate Request, verify the identity of the Certificate Requester.” | Ian | 4 | CSC-9 | Closed | ||||||||||||||||||||
8 | 11.1.2 | How to identify individuals working on open source code as part of a consortium? | Ian | 3 | Brought up by Microsoft rep at virtual F2F. Hard to get EV for these entities. Is there another way? Need separate meeting to brainstorm. Many open source people need these. | Open | ||||||||||||||||||||
9 | 11.2 | Should EV Guidelines section 11.5 regarding Verified Method of Communication be addressed? | Bruce | 2 | Bruce presented recommendation on 6/18/20 CLOSED, in new document | CSC-2 | Closed | |||||||||||||||||||
10 | 11.5 | High risk certificate requests should either be removed or updated to provide common methods for all CAs. | Ian | 2 | Open | |||||||||||||||||||||
11 | 14 | Consolidate Employee and Third Party requirements for Non-EV and EV Certificates. | Dean/Bruce | 3 | Where it says “For EV”, is there a reason for it to be different than non-EV? Should consolidate Bruce to propose a ballot to resolve CSCWG-7 | CSC-7 | Closed | |||||||||||||||||||
12 | 15 | Consolidate Data Records for CAs, Signing Authorities, and Time-stamp Authorities. | Ian | 1 | Look at BR 5.4.1 and compare to what we list for TSA to see how it can be improved. | CSC-10 | Closed | |||||||||||||||||||
13 | 13.2.1 | CRL language says "MUST issue CRLs" which is not clear which CAs must issue CRLs | Tim H/Ian/Bruce | 2 | CSC-9 | Closed | ||||||||||||||||||||
14 | 13.2.2 | Incorrect reference. Change "after revoking a Subordinate CA Certificate" to "after revoking a Timestamp Certificate" | Ian/Bruce TimH | 2 | CSC-9 | Closed | ||||||||||||||||||||
15 | 16.3 | Subscriber private key protection should be updated. Cloud-based key protection should be considered. | Ian | 1 | Presented on 6/18/20. Recommend removing CC and adding eIDAS. Outcome is that the reqts for keys would be the same for EV and non EV. Ian to propose language. | CSC-6 | Open | |||||||||||||||||||
16 | 17.1 | Review if special audit criteria is needed for Government CAs. | Mike | 3 | 7/16-Going forward all CAs will need WebTrust/ETSI audits. Microsoft will advise in the future when ready to remove. MSFT working with Webtrust team. No Change. | Closed | ||||||||||||||||||||
17 | Review all EV specific requirements to see if they can apply to non-EV | Group | Plan a future meeting to work through the BRs to discuss each difference. Bruce can pre-review and add comments to BRs. Complete - Bruce will propose a ballot to close | CSC-7 | Closed | |||||||||||||||||||||
18 | 17.1 (2) | Indicate allowance for EV and non EV public codesigning report | Tim Crawford | 1 | Will need to address when WebTrust releases the new audit criteria for the merged BRs | Closed | ||||||||||||||||||||
19 | 13.1.5.3.3.b.ii | If no response is received after 7 days, the CA must revoke the certificate except if the CA has documented proof (e.g., OCSP logs) that this will cause significant impact to the general public | Daniella | 2 | Change to: If no response is received after 7 days, the CA must revoke the certificate except if the CA has documented proof (e.g., OCSP logs) that the revocation will cause significant impact to the general public. | CSC-9 | Closed | |||||||||||||||||||
20 | 13.2.1 | Change “blacklist” to “blocklist” | Dean | 2 | Ballot required to change "blacklist" to "blocklist" Text was removed per CSC-8. | CSC-8 | Closed | |||||||||||||||||||
21 | 16.3 | Section 16.3 item 2 reads: "A hardware crypto module with a unit design form factor certified as conforming to at least FIPS 140 Level 2, Common Criteria EAL 4+, or equivalent. " That should probably have been: "A hardware crypto module with a unit design form factor certified as conforming to at least FIPS 140-2 Level 2, Common Criteria EAL 4+, or equivalent. " | Bruce | 2 | Add to clean-up ballot | CSC-9 | Closed | |||||||||||||||||||
22 | 1.2 | Effective date for CSC-7 should not be 1 July 2021 | Bruce | 2 | Effective date shouod be 8 March 2021 which is the date the IP review was completed | CSC-8 | Closed | |||||||||||||||||||
23 | 11.8 | Two person control | Tim C | Review what CAs are doing today. Can review when we resolve the differences between Non-EV and EV. Two person control is required for both Non and EV certificates. Bruce will propose a ballot to resolve. | CSC-7 | Closed | ||||||||||||||||||||
24 | 17.8 | Key Gen: This section creates a bit of an issue, because BR 6.1.1.1 provides requirements for all CA key generation, but EVG 17.7 only speaks to root CA keys. This would seem to indicate there are no requirements around EV issuing CA generations. | Tim C | Tim: My recommendation would be all CA key generation follows BR 6.1.1.1. Review what CAs are doing now Non-EV vs EV discussion Bruce will propose ballot to close | CSC-7 | Closed | ||||||||||||||||||||
25 | 9.2.3 | Cleanup to change: For Non-EV Code Signing Certificates, this field MUST not be present in a Code Signing Certificate | Inaba | Cleanup | This field MUST not be present in a Code Signing Certificate | CSC-7 | Closed | |||||||||||||||||||
26 | Appendix A Timestamp Tokens | SHA-1 | Ian | Ian to propose a change to this section. SHA-1 to be allowed to be used until April 2022 for this purpose (timestamp token-legacy implementations). Supports .NET framework versions 4.7.2 and older | CSC-4 | Closed | ||||||||||||||||||||
27 | General | Make references to BRs version specific | Tim H | Section 4 of Definitions calls our specific versions of the BRs and EV guidelines | CSC-2 | Closed | ||||||||||||||||||||
28 | Appendix A | SHA-1 and 3072 per Corey email, https://lists.cabforum.org/pipermail/cscwg-public/2020-December/000250.html | Corey | 2 | Certificate requirement - Existing roots may be 3072, new roots must be 4096; Subordinate CA minimum is 3072, new must be 4096; Code Signing or Time-stamping certificate minimum is 3072, but may be 4096 Cross-certificate to extend ubiquity for a new root may be issued from 2048 root. Cross-certificate must expire by 31 December 2030 or Microsoft could apply a “not before’ date. SHA-1 - CAs can support SHA-1 revocation responses after the sunset date (confirm date); SHA-1 Time-stamp certificates can be issued until 30 April 2022 | CSC-9 | Closed | |||||||||||||||||||
29 | 4 | SSL BR and SSL EV Guidelines versions | Bruce | 2 | Need plan to update CSBRs with latest acceptable versions of the SSL BR/EVGs | Open | ||||||||||||||||||||
30 | Appendix A | Certified tokens which support 3072/4096. The industry does not appear to have many tokens which meet the CSBR requirements. | 1 | No action | Closed | |||||||||||||||||||||
31 | 13 | Certificate suspension | Dimitris | 2 | Reference to SSL BRs may make the requirement about certificate suspension unclear. Could be resolved with a ballot indicating that certificate suspension is not allowed | Open | ||||||||||||||||||||
32 | 13.2 and Appendix B | CRL/OCSP requirements for code signing and time-stamping certificates | Ian | 1 | Ballot to make CRL mandatory and OCSP optional | CSC-8 | Closed | |||||||||||||||||||
33 | 11.2.1 | CSBR 11.2.1 has incorrect language which states, "A Timestamp Authority is NOT REQUIRED to validate in any way data submitted to it for timestamping. It simply adds the time to the data that are presented to it, signs the result and appends its own Timestamp Certificate." | Corey/Ian | 2 | Ian to correct in ballot CSC-8 | CSC-8 | Closed | |||||||||||||||||||
34 | All | Move CSBRs to RFC 3647 format and into pandoc format | Corey | 1 | Open | |||||||||||||||||||||
35 | 9.2.1 | CSBR 9.2.1 states “No stipulation”. Update CSBRs to ensure SAN is not allowed. | Tim H | 2 | Open | |||||||||||||||||||||
36 | Dedicated Root Hierachy | Bruce | 2 | It was agreed that a Dedicated Root PKI hierchy could have a single root which could have seperate Subordinate CAs which can issue Non-EV Code Siging, EV Code Signing and Time-stamping certificates. | Closed | |||||||||||||||||||||
37 | Appendix C | Code Signing dedicated root. If used can it cover the CSBRs and also have Non-EV, EV and TS subordinate CAs. Also, Appendix C is referencing the SSL BRs for test certificates which would require SSL test certificates. | Bruce/Corey | 2 | CSC-9 | Closed | ||||||||||||||||||||
38 | 11.1.1 | Tim states, I’m hearing from our code signing validation people that 11.1.1, which refers to non-EV CS certificates, has a requirement for additional validation for companies less than three years old (we’ve discussed this recently), but this requirement is missing for EV code signing certificates. | Tim H | 2 | Ballot to resolve that non-EV requirement is higher tha EV requirement | Open | ||||||||||||||||||||
39 | 9.2. | Email address in subject DN | Tim H | 2 | Open | |||||||||||||||||||||
40 | 13.2.1 | Invalidity Date | Corey | 1 | Windows does not support Invalidity Date. Ballot to provide calrification in CSBRs. | CSC-12 | Closed | |||||||||||||||||||
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