| A | B | C | D | E | F | G | H | I | J | K | L | M | N | O | P | Q | R | S | T | U | V | W | X | Y | Z | AA | |
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1 | Priority # | ID | Idea | Similarity Score | Cluster | Category | |||||||||||||||||||||
2 | 1 | Jaunrah | "The proposal specifies that the OpCo would only affect operational efficiency, not the strategic goals of the DAO; however, there is a risk of centralizing decision-making if not enough transparency is given. I believe that the OAT role would be key to make this function properly so there would need to be adequate mechanisms for it to be transparent, accountable and with well-defined roles and responsibilities. It should also be subject to checks and balances, with clear guidelines, so that there is no concentration of authority that could potentially undermine the DAO’s decentralization focus. If I understood correctly, the OAT will be responsible for the OpCo to operate with adequate checks on spending, staffing, and project prioritization so it will become a major position within the DAO structure. I am not sure how complex it would be for five persons to oversight every project and maintain a clear boundary between OpCo’s role and the DAO’s mission." | 58.0% | 3 | OpCo Implementation Risks | |||||||||||||||||||||
3 | 2 | duokongcrypto | "From this, we can see that the proposal is well-intentioned, aiming to improve the operational efficiency of DAOs and enhance their attractiveness and competitiveness. However, in actual operation, if the management of OpCo is not in place or the use of funds is not transparent, resources may be wasted. Seeing the above comments, people are most concerned about the management of OpCo’s funds. The proposal plans to allocate 34 million ARBs to OpCo, of which 10 million ARBs will be released first and the remaining 24 million will be distributed gradually over the next 24 months. While the DAO can oversee OpCo, OpCo has a high degree of autonomy, particularly in recruiting and contracting personnel. This raises concerns as to whether OpCo will be able to use the funds efficiently and transparently. If the market fluctuates, will OpCo be able to operate in a stable manner?" | 53.7% | 3 | OpCo Implementation Risks | |||||||||||||||||||||
4 | 3 | Argonaut | "It is true that the structure Arbitrum DAO currently has leads to so much friction and this needs to be addressed, yet we believe that we should avoid centralization when it comes to proposal of this kind. We do recognize the OpCo comes to help and facilitate the solving of these issues, but under the new structure we see a potential centralization that at least every single proposal that has to fall under OpCo’s scope should have OpCo’s members in between the proposer and the proposal itself. That’s why we would like to know if the incorporation of Opco will be mandatory in all the processes mentioned, or if it could be optional?" | 52.2% | 3 | OpCo Implementation Risks | |||||||||||||||||||||
5 | 4 | Pablo | "the Arbitrum constitution could be enhanced to authorize the Foundation or OpCo (or both) to act on the DAO’s behalf and clarify the DAO’s role in funding or indemnifying legal action. Launching an OpCo could be an opportune moment to address these gaps and define the OpCo’s role relative to the DAO." | 51.9% | 3 | OpCo Implementation Risks | |||||||||||||||||||||
6 | 5 | Argonaut | "We appreciate this OpCo tool finally being pushed forward since counting on a legal entity is quite valuable for the DAO and something we consider should have been part of the DAO for a while as to prevent us all from legal issues tha may arise. We like to see that the OpCo also intends to fill gaps after proposals are passed and executed, nevertheless we have certain reservations about what it seems to be a centralization of proposals if they fall under an OpCo’s mandate scope (Financial Management and Ecosystem Support). We see some other delegates have also shared this concern and so we line-up with them to manifest our preoccupation about this." | 50.7% | 3 | OpCo Implementation Risks | |||||||||||||||||||||
7 | 6 | Pablo | "DAO contributors and delegates are legally exposed, a risk that exists across most DAOs. To address this, I developed the Legal Defence scope with Layer Zero at Maker DAO to protect ecosystem participants. Even if we can’t extend that level of coverage to Arbitrum DAO participants, consider how similar protections might apply to the OpCo. This goes beyond E&O insurance; it’s about anticipating legal risks for the entire DAO, with a specific focus on the OpCo." | 44.2% | 3 | OpCo Implementation Risks | |||||||||||||||||||||
8 | 7 | raam | "Hi @immutablelawyer - The exploratory work that Entropy conducted with the Arbitrum Foundation is still in its early stages. While the legal entity will provide the DAO with necessary oversight, we believe this is not the core focus of this proposal at this stage. Rather, we believe that it should be on the mission statements and goal of the OpCo, to make sure it realizes the vision of what the DAO needs." | 41.2% | 3 | OpCo Implementation Risks | |||||||||||||||||||||
9 | 8 | JoJo | "While you explain the why of this narrowed choice, i honestly see opco being able to help in other sectors as well. Do you think it would be possible to insert some degree of flexibility for which, if the dao really wants it, OpCo would be able to tap and help/manage specific initiatives outside the 2 categories above?" | 41.0% | 3 | OpCo Implementation Risks | |||||||||||||||||||||
10 | 9 | duokongcrypto | "his proposal is a good idea, through the creation of a company called OpCo, to solve some of the “stuck points” in the implementation of the DAO, such as the lack of a clear person in charge, the decision-making chain is too long, and it is difficult for external contributors to join in a timely manner, etc. OpCo’s role is to make these processes smoother, so that the DAO can be more efficient in the implementation, negotiation, contracting, etc., to ensure the smooth implementation of the strategy. The role of OpCo is to make these processes smoother, so that DAOs can be more efficient in execution, negotiation, contracting, etc., and ensure the smooth implementation of strategies." | 41.0% | 3 | OpCo Implementation Risks | |||||||||||||||||||||
11 | 10 | duokongcrypto | "no rules, need to have KPi system, clear performance indicators, such as implementation progress, financial efficiency, etc., to facilitate the DAO members to assess the performance of OpCo, to avoid waste of resources, it is recommended that OpCo to achieve a specific goal or KPIs when the gradual release of funds to reduce the risk of funding to ensure that each step meets expectations!" | 38.6% | 3 | OpCo Implementation Risks | |||||||||||||||||||||
12 | 11 | seedgov | "What if the DAO passes 20 such Snapshot proposals (i.e., mandating OpCo to facilitate an idea from scratch)?" | 37.4% | 3 | OpCo Implementation Risks | |||||||||||||||||||||
13 | 12 | Jaunrah | "I suggest refining the plan around staffing and with ROI-focused metrics. A clear outline on the number of hires and specific roles, with justifications for each, would help avoid over-hiring risks, maintain cost-efficiency and foster transparency which would reinforce trust and ensure the OpCo team remains accountable to the DAO’s mission." | 37.3% | 5 | Organizational Metrics | |||||||||||||||||||||
14 | 13 | duokongcrypto | " mentions that OpCo’s responsibilities cover a wide range of areas such as operational support, program management and resource allocation. So how can OpCo clearly differentiate its functions from other independent organizations within the existing ecosystem (e.g. foundations, existing DAO programs)? How can overlapping responsibilities or inefficiencies be avoided?" | 36.9% | 3 | OpCo Implementation Risks | |||||||||||||||||||||
15 | 14 | Pablo | "I’m a big advocate of KISS when it comes to an OpCo. Run it lean—these entities are internal service providers to the DAO." | 36.6% | 3 | OpCo Implementation Risks | |||||||||||||||||||||
16 | 15 | jojo | "First, the 6 months to set it up while true are also potentially optimistic. We have becoming good in the dao in setting up legal entities (with the foundation first, gcp kinda replicated that, I assume up to some degree opco will have similar structure); at the same time you need to first find, and then hire, the key personnel. This means it could take more than 6 months, and so spending this much just to create something that might run for only a few months is a waste of money." | 35.6% | 1 | Decentralization Concerns | |||||||||||||||||||||
17 | 16 | pedrob | "Also, one area where the OpCO could also contribute is in the active management of the DAO’s IP. I can elaborate further on this point if needed." | 35.5% | 3 | OpCo Implementation Risks | |||||||||||||||||||||
18 | 17 | maxlomu | "would love as a standard practice to have members of the opCo to also be rewarded in ARB based on project related KPIs. Ex: hitting a milestone by a specific date. We should start to reward accountability in everything that we do as a DAO." | 35.4% | 3 | OpCo Implementation Risks | |||||||||||||||||||||
19 | 18 | seedgov | "Suppose the DAO seeks a new long-term incentive program. With OpCo established, a delegate could propose a Snapshot vote stating, “Should OpCo work on a new incentive program for protocols?” without providing any notion of the execution strategy." | 35.3% | 3 | OpCo Implementation Risks | |||||||||||||||||||||
20 | 19 | seedgov | "How can we be confident that OpCo would be able to facilitate such a proposal, with all it entails?" | 35.3% | 3 | OpCo Implementation Risks | |||||||||||||||||||||
21 | 20 | Disruption Joe | "How do you envision that the OpCo will expand the number of ecosystem contributors outside of OpCo?" | 35.2% | 3 | OpCo Implementation Risks | |||||||||||||||||||||
22 | 21 | seedgov | "While this statement partially addresses the above concern, the point is that OpCo’s assessment of whether an area is beneficial for the DAO may differ from the DAO’s own perspective as expressed through Snapshot." | 35.1% | 3 | OpCo Implementation Risks | |||||||||||||||||||||
23 | 22 | Kuiclub | "- Are the responsibilities of OpCo with the DAO, OAT and the Arbitrum Foundation clearly defined and how can conflicts of authority and responsibility be avoided?" | 34.2% | 3 | OpCo Implementation Risks | |||||||||||||||||||||
24 | 23 | Euphoria | "On coordination with Offchain Labs and the Arbitrum Foundation, it might be useful to discuss role definitions before finalizing the OpCo committee. Clear role allocation upfront would help prevent overlaps and keep the community informed about the distinct responsibilities of each entity." | 33.2% | 1 | Decentralization Concerns | |||||||||||||||||||||
25 | 24 | 0xTALVO.ETH_MTY | "Supporting this makes sense because the OpCo, if implemented correctly, could enhance the DAO’s operational efficiency by providing structure and oversigh. However, to protect decentralization, transparency mechanisms must be robust to prevent power consolidation." | 33.1% | 3 | OpCo Implementation Risks | |||||||||||||||||||||
26 | 25 | Kuiclub | "- If OpCo’s proposed implementation program is rejected by DAO, is there a mechanism in place to ensure that subsequent adjustments are made?" | 32.9% | 3 | OpCo Implementation Risks | |||||||||||||||||||||
27 | 26 | duokongcrypto | "The DAO community needs to keep a watchful eye on OpCo’s operations to ensure that it is delivering the value it is intended to deliver, rather than becoming a “black hole” for funds." | 32.7% | 3 | OpCo Implementation Risks | |||||||||||||||||||||
28 | 27 | Disruption Joe | "It’s really about creating a structure which solves the “holistic approach” to delivering outcomes problem. I believe workstreams with repeatable governance processes and a few key governance principles could do this as well as the OpCo. I do think we need an entity though to hire the people in and supporting the neccessary roles." | 32.4% | 1 | Decentralization Concerns | |||||||||||||||||||||
29 | 28 | seedgov | "Based on this example as a real scenario, monthly expenses per term are around $500,000 (approximately 1M ARB), while the monthly unlocks are 1M ARB (barely enough at current prices). We mention this because it may be worthwhile to review the unlocking rate to avoid situations like the one with AF, where the vesting unlocks were insufficient to cover committed expenses and/or support new initiatives. Our concern is that 1M ARB per month might restrict OpCo’s capacity to expand, creating an operational bottleneck. We understand that part of the initial 10M ARB disbursement could mitigate this situation during the first term and that costs are purposefully overestimated in this example (such as legal expenses, which considers the worst-case scenario), but we wanted to bring this up to avoid OpCo potentially being limited by a vesting scheme." | 32.1% | 6 | Financial Sustainability | |||||||||||||||||||||
30 | 29 | Pablo | "The takeaway? Establish a legal defense and guardian strategy from the outset, and ensure Arbitrum DAO explicitly endorses it so the OpCo can act swiftly." | 32.0% | 3 | OpCo Implementation Risks | |||||||||||||||||||||
31 | 30 | Jaunrah | "This proposal would be very important for the DAO. It would potentially change its dynamics in a variety of ways, mostly I think for the better. While reading the proposal some things crossed my mind which I believe are important to discuss." | 31.8% | 5 | Organizational Metrics | |||||||||||||||||||||
32 | 31 | duokongcrypto | "OpCo has a high degree of independence, especially in recruitment and contracting, and it will be important for DAO to monitor and audit key positions. Need to have a system of rules" | 31.6% | 3 | OpCo Implementation Risks | |||||||||||||||||||||
33 | 32 | JoJo | "It poses, tho, the question: if the dao feels like this type of internalization is the way forward, for grants or other operation outside the opco structure, what would be the way forward? Enlarge this structure, or create a parallel one?" | 30.7% | 5 | Organizational Metrics | |||||||||||||||||||||
34 | 33 | pedrob | "“The OpCo will only enter into legal agreements with service providers for strategies approved by the DAO, provided the following requirements (insert requirements) are met.”" | 30.4% | 3 | OpCo Implementation Risks | |||||||||||||||||||||
35 | 34 | JoJo | "This is one of the key reason why we need the OpCo" | 30.2% | 3 | OpCo Implementation Risks | |||||||||||||||||||||
36 | 35 | JoJo | "This is definitely the biggest risk of the OpCo: becoming an entity that just sucks everything internally. To me, the biggest work will be not to make it work, but to establish the right boundaries for it to not become the decision maker/executor in place of the DAO." | 29.8% | 3 | OpCo Implementation Risks | |||||||||||||||||||||
37 | 36 | seedgov | "Where is the limit to OpCo’s operational capacity?" | 29.8% | 3 | OpCo Implementation Risks | |||||||||||||||||||||
38 | 37 | seedgov | "That said, and while we acknowledge our position may be biased since we are currently Service Providers for the DAO, we believe OpCo should only manage programs when no viable service provider or clear ownership exists and it should supervise those that do." | 29.4% | 3 | OpCo Implementation Risks | |||||||||||||||||||||
39 | 38 | pedrob | "If the idea is for the OpCo to be the PM and facilitator of initiatives, I think it should replace entities like SEED rather than simply oversee them (although SEED, for example, could later be contracted as a service provider to carry out specific tasks within the program)." | 29.3% | 1 | Decentralization Concerns | |||||||||||||||||||||
40 | 39 | duokongcrypto | "2、 Set up a conflict resolution mechanism: If OpCo disagrees with other entities in the ecosystem (e.g., foundations) on resource allocation or decision-making, is there a need to set up a clear conflict resolution process?" | 29.2% | 1 | Decentralization Concerns | |||||||||||||||||||||
41 | 40 | Kuiclub | "Introduce a stage-by-stage review system: OpCo can be set up to conduct a stage-by-stage review every six months to report back to the community on the progress of the current program and the use of funds, and allow the community to make adjustments based on feedback. This flexible adjustment mechanism will allow OpCo to adjust its direction in a timely manner when it encounters bottlenecks and avoid wasting funds." | 29.2% | 1 | Decentralization Concerns | |||||||||||||||||||||
42 | 41 | Disruption Joe | "I’m here to get rid of most government and replace it with better onchain systems. What impetus will we have to drive DAO towards continued decentralization? How will the CEO of OpCo be more incentivized to ensure that a cartel cannot rug builders than they are to follow the normal path which pressures government entities?" | 29.2% | 4 | Legal Framework Issues | |||||||||||||||||||||
43 | 42 | Euphoria | "This proposal is essential for the DAO, as it presents many possible changes, most of which would likely be beneficial." | 29.2% | 5 | Organizational Metrics | |||||||||||||||||||||
44 | 43 | pedrob | "I’m still not entirely clear on this structure—I need to digest the proposal a bit more to fully understand the concept. On one hand, I find the idea of an entity dedicated to the project management of the DAO’s initiatives valuable; on the other hand, doesn’t adding another layer of control over ecosystem actors already fulfilling this role (e.g., SEED Gov) somewhat defeat the purpose?" | 29.1% | 2 | Structural Efficiency | |||||||||||||||||||||
45 | 44 | Euphoria | "While the proposed KPIs include operational metrics, we suggest adding specific outcome-based KPIs that capture the value OpCo brings to the DAO, such as ROI on OpCo-managed initiatives or the speed of implementing strategies compared to previous methods." | 29.1% | 3 | OpCo Implementation Risks | |||||||||||||||||||||
46 | 45 | Disruption Joe | "Overall, thanks for your time. I know my comments may be tough, but they are good hearted. If we can answer those questions, I am supportive. I’m also willing to commit to the success of OpCo if the DAO votes for it, even if I do not." | 29.0% | 3 | OpCo Implementation Risks | |||||||||||||||||||||
47 | 46 | Kuiclub | "- Although the OpCo proposal includes a buffer, the high budget may lead to excessive initial expenditure, can more funds be released in stages?" | 28.6% | 7 | Budget Transparency | |||||||||||||||||||||
48 | 47 | Jaunrah | "I would like to add that this proposal is a way of institutionalizing work that is already being done by entities such as Entropy and others. By institutionalizing, could there be a risk of creating a pseudo-centralized structure, undermining Arbitrum’s decentralization?" | 28.5% | 5 | Organizational Metrics | |||||||||||||||||||||
49 | 48 | Disruption Joe | "The number of people who can be hired should really be explicit. For example, you could say that a new strategy would require a paid steward, but no more than one without the DAO explicitly voting to add another role." | 28.3% | 5 | Organizational Metrics | |||||||||||||||||||||
50 | 49 | jameskbh | ". The opCo is a very important topic! While I’m still digesting the concept, I would like to ask:" | 28.3% | 5 | Organizational Metrics | |||||||||||||||||||||
51 | 50 | seedgov | "Despite the bonus, OAT members’ compensation seems low. This is a critical role for both the DAO and OpCo, effectively overseeing all operations and requiring candidates to forgo other jobs/positions for full-time commitment. The opportunity cost for joining the OAT is high, and we worry that a low base compensation might deter potential applicants (who must also have a seniority level commensurate with the role)." | 28.2% | 1 | Decentralization Concerns | |||||||||||||||||||||
52 | 51 | pedrob | "Especially considering this point. It’s not clear when the OpCo should be involved and when it shouldn’t, leaving it up to the discretion of the delegates. Ideally, this should be more clearly defined, in my opinion, to prevent a repeat of what happened with the ARDC (which led the DAO Advocate to proactively make decisions on resource usage)." | 28.2% | 3 | OpCo Implementation Risks | |||||||||||||||||||||
53 | 52 | seedgov | "We are slightly concerned that this option might create an incentive for “lazy” proposals that rely on OpCo to fill in the details. Don’t get us wrong—we understand the rationale behind including this option. However, it might be better to establish clearer boundaries on what can be requested from OpCo. To better illustrate our point, let’s take an example:" | 27.8% | 3 | OpCo Implementation Risks | |||||||||||||||||||||
54 | 53 | pedrob | "I think this is a key issue to address. I’m thrilled with the idea of an organization that coordinates the DAO’s initiatives to promote efficiency in resource management and align initiatives towards consolidating the DAO’s mission, vision, and objectives." | 27.8% | 2 | Structural Efficiency | |||||||||||||||||||||
55 | 54 | Jaunrah | "On a positive manner, I would like to add that this is overall a good proposal as it would make strategy execution more efficient and it would also likely attract enhanced talent to improve contributor quality." | 27.3% | 5 | Organizational Metrics | |||||||||||||||||||||
56 | 55 | JoJo | "it is expected that delegates vote against such a proposal if it can be better executed via OpCo’s involvement." | 26.4% | 3 | OpCo Implementation Risks | |||||||||||||||||||||
57 | 56 | Euphoria | "In general, we acknowledge the work done for drafting this proposal and support the direction of this initiative, as it aims to build a more structured and operational approach for the DAO." | 26.1% | 2 | Structural Efficiency | |||||||||||||||||||||
58 | 57 | Kuiclub | "34m ARB is a significant amount of money, it is recommended that OpCo provide a detailed plan for the use of the funds after launch and set up stage by stage KPIs to ensure that the funds are used effectively, the budget includes a larger buffer, although this will allow for market volatility, how can we ensure that there is true transparency in the use of these funds? In addition to semi-annual reporting, is there more frequent reporting on the use of funds, or is real-time financial visualization provided?" | 25.9% | 7 | Budget Transparency | |||||||||||||||||||||
59 | 58 | Euphoria | "Regarding legal needs, is a full-time, in-house legal counsel necessary? Clarifying the specific responsibilities they would cover would help assess the need for a full-time position." | 25.6% | 5 | Organizational Metrics | |||||||||||||||||||||
60 | 59 | Argonaut | "On the other hand, , should’n we consider some kind of pilot before starting with this program for a total amount of 30 months? We know it’s been stated that 6 months will be for the setup and the next 24 for operations from the entity, but most of what we see here is an oficial launching for something that haven’t been tested yet and considering everything that implies and the funds it requires, Maybe 1 year which is not a long period of time but it is also not a short period as well, and 6 months for setting up while the next 6 for operations and then and only then if the OpCo demonstrates that it is really useful then require for an extension up to 20 more months" | 25.5% | 1 | Decentralization Concerns | |||||||||||||||||||||
61 | 60 | maxlomu | "Would also love @SEEDGov feedback as they have been running a similar initiative for the Everclear DAO and I’m sure they learned a lot from it" | 25.4% | 5 | Organizational Metrics | |||||||||||||||||||||
62 | 61 | Kuiclub | "he advantage of this proposal is that it could help the Arbitrum DAO to deal more systematically with a number of important long-term projects, while avoiding the current fragmentation problem.OpCo provides a more structured framework for efficiently integrating and managing resources." | 25.3% | 2 | Structural Efficiency | |||||||||||||||||||||
63 | 62 | deelabs | "We find this proposal to be a comprehensive and well-thought-out framework for establishing an operational entity that could meaningfully enhance Arbitrum’s execution capabilities. The initiative is proficient in addressing current operational inefficiencies while maintaining appropriate governance oversight and control mechanisms." | 25.0% | 6 | Financial Sustainability | |||||||||||||||||||||
64 | 63 | larva | "I very hope OpCo can address this pain point." | 24.5% | 3 | OpCo Implementation Risks | |||||||||||||||||||||
65 | 64 | 0xTALVO.ETH_MTY | "Clear roles, reporting systems, and accountable oversight by the Operational Audit Team (OAT) will be essential for maintaining alignment with the DAO’s strategic direction without compromising decentralized principles." | 24.5% | 2 | Structural Efficiency | |||||||||||||||||||||
66 | 65 | Kuiclub | "It is recommended that a stricter control mechanism be established in terms of governance and cost transparency, and that a more flexible adjustment space and exit plan be provided in order to adapt to future changes. A set of phased exit strategies should be formulated so that if OpCo fails to achieve the expected results, its responsibilities and budget can be gradually downsized, and its functions can eventually be transferred to other more suitable internal mechanisms of DAOs to ensure that funds and resources are not wasted." | 24.5% | 7 | Budget Transparency | |||||||||||||||||||||
67 | 66 | Jaunrah | "It would be proper to expand on this assertion to make sure that it is kept that way. This is no easy task. It would need a very well-thought definition of the OpCos boundaries and their restrictions. It would also need frequent, profound reporting and transparent metrics for spending and audits." | 24.5% | 5 | Organizational Metrics | |||||||||||||||||||||
68 | 67 | Disruption Joe | "How will the CEO of OpCo be more incentivized to ensure that a cartel cannot rug builders than they are to follow the normal path which pressures government entities?" | 24.4% | 4 | Legal Framework Issues | |||||||||||||||||||||
69 | 68 | Disruption Joe | "I just read the Ethereum Foundation report and I love this concise values statement at the beginning. What would be the core values of this OpCo?" | 24.2% | 1 | Decentralization Concerns | |||||||||||||||||||||
70 | 69 | duokongcrypto | "1、For OAT members and the OpCo core team, regular public meetings and reports could be set up to show progress to the community and to receive questions and feedback." | 24.0% | 1 | Decentralization Concerns | |||||||||||||||||||||
71 | 70 | Gabriel | "Overall, I agree with the proposal and am inclined to vote in favor. However, I would prefer to see something smaller that can grow over time in terms of responsibilities, budget, and team members. I don’t think starting with such a large setup and expense from the beginning is the best approach." | 23.1% | 1 | Decentralization Concerns | |||||||||||||||||||||
72 | 71 | duokongcrypto | "contingency measures need to be put in place to protect resources from being wasted. the structure needs to be very simplified and clear. the DAO should need to have the ability and constraints of a veto, and have contingency plans in place at all times if it doesn’t do a good job." | 22.9% | 2 | Structural Efficiency | |||||||||||||||||||||
73 | 72 | seedgov | "Does this mean that once fully operational, OpCo will act as the PM for all initiatives, effectively replacing current SPs?" | 22.7% | 1 | Decentralization Concerns | |||||||||||||||||||||
74 | 73 | Pablo | "Arbitrum DAO’s decentralization is beneficial for transparency but not ideal for rapid off-chain legal response." | 22.7% | 2 | Structural Efficiency | |||||||||||||||||||||
75 | 74 | JoJo | "All in all i think the proposal is well thought. I am unsure about the categorization of grants outside of ecosystem growth, would dare to say it could fall into it, but maybe is just semantic." | 22.2% | 5 | Organizational Metrics | |||||||||||||||||||||
76 | 75 | seedgov | "Do you think it is possible to establish predefined salary ranges for the different roles? (beyond the chiefs). We understand that this isn’t easy, as the final salary for each position will depend on a variety of hard-to-predict factors, but it would be valuable for the DAO to have a sense of which roles warrant a $100k salary per year versus those that merit $200k (as an example)." | 22.2% | 5 | Organizational Metrics | |||||||||||||||||||||
77 | 76 | immutablelawyer | "Still have to read through the proposal - however, I noticed that the term DAO-Adjacent legal entity was used yet no clarity on the entity-type and jurisdiction was provided. Since you mentioned that this is already in process (which to be honest [I’m gonna be pedantic here] I do not like since the proposal first has to pass), can we get some clarity on this?" | 21.9% | 4 | Legal Framework Issues | |||||||||||||||||||||
78 | 77 | Pablo | "My experience with the Maker DAO patent case has informed my thinking a lot here: without an authorized entity to defend the DAO, it nearly faced a default judgment. Luckily, a colleague on the DAI Foundation board spun up a dedicated SPV at the last moment to handle the litigation." | 21.9% | 2 | Structural Efficiency | |||||||||||||||||||||
79 | 78 | pedrob | "What you’re proposing here as a role for the DAO’s operations is even more abstract than what was required of the ARDC, and thus more complex." | 21.8% | 2 | Structural Efficiency | |||||||||||||||||||||
80 | 79 | Disruption Joe | "In the Viable Systems Model, OpCo should really stick to facilitating the DAO through processes to accomplish level 4 and conduct most activities at level 3. It should only sign paychecks to level 2 and be the counterparty for continuation if needed at level 1." | 21.7% | 2 | Structural Efficiency | |||||||||||||||||||||
81 | 80 | Euphoria | "To determine “product-market fit” for OpCo, establishing a set of measurable criteria could provide consistency in evaluating success. Without clear benchmarks, perspectives may vary widely across stakeholders." | 21.5% | 1 | Decentralization Concerns | |||||||||||||||||||||
82 | 81 | Kuiclub | "However, I personally feel that it is important to note that the creation of such an entity also brings certain administrative costs and risks, such as issues of trust in a small number of managers and whether it can be efficient in the long term, a point that has been echoed previously in the financial proposal 「[Non-Constitutional] Treasury Management v1.2 - #20 by kuiclub" | 21.5% | 4 | Legal Framework Issues | |||||||||||||||||||||
83 | 82 | jojo | "Furthermore, i don’t personally see in 6 months we will see the real effect. The new personnel will have to first get acquainted to the dao, ingrain in the mechanism, and then find synergies." | 20.7% | 2 | Structural Efficiency | |||||||||||||||||||||
84 | 83 | jameskbh | "In the Budget we have an estimation of the team size (10 FTE) and their salary range. Is there a proposed internal organizational chart, so we can see the distribution between the areas OpCo will take care of?" | 20.6% | 1 | Decentralization Concerns | |||||||||||||||||||||
85 | 84 | pedrob | "I don’t have a clear solution because it is indeed challenging, but I’d like to see ideas on how this would be materialized in practice and how friction could be avoided to prevent paying for a large structure that, in practice, lacks concrete mandates." | 20.2% | 5 | Organizational Metrics | |||||||||||||||||||||
86 | 85 | Pablo | " seems light on details about the level of deference to DAO governance (via qualified code deference mechanisms). I’d like to see more depth here." | 19.8% | 2 | Structural Efficiency | |||||||||||||||||||||
87 | 86 | deelabs | "The financial framework appears reasonable, with the 34M ARB allocation including appropriate buffers for market volatility. The vesting structure of 1M ARB every 30 days over 24 months, combined with the ability to convert some ARB to stablecoins, provides both operational stability and risk management." | 19.6% | 6 | Financial Sustainability | |||||||||||||||||||||
88 | 87 | JoJo | "Does this mean that OpCo will be responsible for the overviewing of this contracted sp/individual? If not I might have missed the main value point of this, beside coordination." | 19.5% | 1 | Decentralization Concerns | |||||||||||||||||||||
89 | 88 | Disruption Joe | "Would you accept people buying ARB to use in governance as a KPI?" | 19.4% | 6 | Financial Sustainability | |||||||||||||||||||||
90 | 89 | Disruption Joe | "People see bloating government entity and less opportunities in the ecosystem and think this isn’t fair." | 19.3% | 4 | Legal Framework Issues | |||||||||||||||||||||
91 | 90 | pedrob | "I think this is very well-conceived but challenging to implement in practice. Take, for instance, the lessons from the ARDC by the DAO Advocate role L2BEAT, where they faced difficulties obtaining proactive engagement from the delegates, who where supposed to require work from the ARDC." | 19.2% | 2 | Structural Efficiency | |||||||||||||||||||||
92 | 91 | larva | "My only concern is that 34M ARB is not a small amount—even unlocking just 10M initially could create significant selling pressure in today’s low-liquidity market. Ethereum Foundation has faced heavy criticism for continuous ETH sales, even in smaller amounts, which have still impacted the market. I believe it’s essential to consider ARB’s liquidity and potential price fluctuations before deploying these funds; otherwise, ARB holders may end up suffering the most." | 19.2% | 6 | Financial Sustainability | |||||||||||||||||||||
93 | 92 | Disruption Joe | "I’d much prefer not creating a government entity that is designed to bloat from the start. A good first step is clarifying roles and responsibilities. Then clarifying the processes that can legitimately add more roles, change responibilities, and update legacy processes when the environment changes." | 19.1% | 4 | Legal Framework Issues | |||||||||||||||||||||
94 | 93 | deelabs | "l shows a thorough understanding of existing limitations, particularly within the Financial Management and Ecosystem Support categories, where the lack of structured operational frameworks and clear ownership has arguably hindered effective execution. The proposed solution thoughtfully balances the need for operational efficiency with the preservation of Arbitrum’s bottom-up, decentralized nature." | 19.1% | 6 | Financial Sustainability | |||||||||||||||||||||
95 | 94 | deelabs | "We are in support of this proposal as it represents an important step forward in enhancing the ecosystem’s operational capabilities while maintaining appropriate governance controls and accountability mechanisms." | 19.0% | 6 | Financial Sustainability | |||||||||||||||||||||
96 | 95 | immutablelawyer | "In response to @raam 's comment as well I do not agree that legal should not be a main focus here. In this regard, my concern is that we’re falling behind industry-standard when it comes to spinning up DAO-adjacent entities via governance. In most if not all cases where this is done, the proposer (in the proposal) always gives sufficient clarity on the underlying legal structure to be used (Ref. dYdX Ops, MakerDAO, Lido Finance, Cosmos, ZKSync etc. - I can probably name 10+ others)." | 18.7% | 4 | Legal Framework Issues | |||||||||||||||||||||
97 | 96 | Disruption Joe | "What impetus will we have to drive DAO towards continued decentralization?" | 18.7% | 2 | Structural Efficiency | |||||||||||||||||||||
98 | 97 | deelabs | "One aspect of the proposal that could benefit from further considearation is the 30-month initial term. While it provides operational stability, it may be worth exploring interim performance review mechanisms beyond the suggested bi-annual reports." | 18.6% | 1 | Decentralization Concerns | |||||||||||||||||||||
99 | 98 | JoJo | "most DAO programs operate in silos, leading to, among other things, redundant efforts and non-existing cross-initiative resources" | 18.5% | 2 | Structural Efficiency | |||||||||||||||||||||
100 | 99 | Disruption Joe | "This government will cost 10 million ARB to setup and 24 million ARB to run for 2 years and doesn’t include any funds going to the builders in the ecosystem." | 18.4% | 6 | Financial Sustainability |