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Here are some ideas of papers that we'd like to read. Feel free to add to the list.
Gray = presented on already
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Author:TopicTitle:Year:Link:
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Jennifer Carrmushy credence, higher-order uncertaintyImprecise Evidence without Imprecise Credences2018https://link.springer.com/article/10.1007%2Fs11098-019-01336-7
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Roger Whitemushy credenceEvidential Symmetry and Mushy Credence2009
https://philpapers.org/rec/WHIESA
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Dmitri Gallowhigher-order evidence, updatingUpdating for Externalists2019https://doi.org/10.1111/nous.12307
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Jonathan WeisbergupdatingUpdating, Undermining and Independence2015
https://philpapers.org/rec/WEIUUA
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Simon HuttegerdeferenceIn Defense of Reflection2013
https://philpapers.org/rec/HUTIDO
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Anna MahtanideferenceDeference, Respect, and Intentionality2017
https://link.springer.com/article/10.1007/s11098-016-0675-6
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Sherrilyn Roushhigher-order evidenceSecond Guessing: A Self-Help Manual 2009https://philpapers.org/rec/ROUSGM
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Sherrilyn Roushhigher-order evidenceBayesian Re-Calibration: A Generalization2017https://www.researchgate.net/publication/319551251_Bayesian_Re-Calibration_A_Generalization
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Julia Staffelnon-ideal epistemologySome part of Unsettled Thoughts2020
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Debona & Staffelnon-ideal epistemologyWhy be Coherent?2018https://philpapers.org/rec/DEBWBC
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Hahn & Oaksfordnon-ideal epistemologyThe Rationality of Informal Argumentation: A Bayesian Approach to Reasoning Fallacies2007https://www.researchgate.net/profile/Mike_Oaksford/publication/6199092_The_Rationality_of_Informal_Argumentation_A_Bayesian_Approach_to_Reasoning_Fallacies/links/0c96051e9a3d941970000000.pdf
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Brian Heddennon-ideal epistemologyHindsight bias is not a bias2019https://philpapers.org/rec/HEDHBI
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Dmitri Gallowobjective probabilityA Subjectivist's Guide to Deterministic Chance2019http://pitt.edu/~jdg83/publication/pdfs/asgtdc.pdf
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Nevin Climenhangaobjective probabilityThe Structure of Epistemic Probability2019
https://docs.google.com/viewer?a=v&pid=sites&srcid=ZGVmYXVsdGRvbWFpbnxuZXZpbmNsaW1lbmhhZ2F8Z3g6MWY2ZmUzNDY2NDdhMWRhMg
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Paul D. Thornobjective probabilityOn the preference for more specific reference classes2017
https://philpapers.org/rec/THOOTP-2
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Peter Epsteinfine-tuningThe fine-tuning argument and the principle of total evidence2017https://www.journals.uchicago.edu/doi/abs/10.1086/693465?journalCode=phos
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Al Wilsonfine-tuningEverettian Confirmation and Sleeping Beauty2013
https://academic.oup.com/bjps/article-abstract/65/3/573/1500193?redirectedFrom=fulltext
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Adam Elgasubjective probabilitySubjective probabilities should be sharp2010
https://www.princeton.edu/~adame/papers/sharp/elga-subjective-probabilities-should-be-sharp.pdf
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Tim Maudlinobjective probabilityThree Roads to Objective Probability2011https://www.oxfordscholarship.com/view/10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199577439.001.0001/acprof-9780199577439-chapter-11
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