[UPDATED] Fixed costs of starting the charity. $100k set up costs estimated, based on the 2021 seed funding.

[UPDATED] Costs roughly based on 4 staff members plus additional buffer. $175,000 ongoing costs estimated based on thinking through likely salary and operating costs.

[UPDATED] We reason that it might take a year for taxes to rise after policy officially changes, and that we would help with monitoring of enforcement for an additional year after that.

[UPDATED] We reason that the advocacy campaign will either succeed or fail within 3 years - if progress is not made in that period, there is intractability due to political conditions that further years of work cannot overcome.

WHO best buys - https://www.who.int/ncds/management/a_Assessment_of_need_and_intervention_coverage.pdf

Cost of regulation per person * number of people

[UPDATED] Our sense is that if political conditions are favourable for change in the first place, we could persuade policymakers within 2 years on average.

[COMMENT] We keep the standardized discount rate for future economic benefits and costs, but (a) this is separate from the discounting for other issues like policy reversal, and (b) we note some discomfort with the concept of discounting future benefits on a pure time-preference basis.

[UPDATED] The secular decline in smoking occurs year-on-year, and so we incorporate it by discounting the health/economic benefits accrued every year, rather than treating it as a level effect as the previous CEA did. Further, we assume that the global decline in smoking is half attributable to endogenous tax increases nad half attributable to secular cultural/economic changes https://escholarship.org/uc/item/0z43b5dv#main

[UPDATED] We calculated this by looking at the number of tax increases and dividing it by the number of years since 1996 (the first year since the last tax increase). For sources, see https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/media/57a08c36e5274a31e0001084/Mongolia-Final_Report-Tobacco_report_Eng.pdf and https://tobaccocontrol.bmj.com/content/29/Suppl_4/s249

[COMMENT] Sums the above

Total annual DALYs lost from health due to tobacco consumption

GBD compare 2019

[UPDATED] We discounted for the reduction in the freedom of choice to smoke. Refer to the Autonomy Calculations Sheet for how we arrived at this specific discount rate

[UPDATED] Health benefits discounted by loss of freedom of choice

[UPDATED] The theoretical concern here is that smokers lose happiness from no longer being able to smoke, but empirically, Gruber and Mullainathan (2002) find that the self-reported happiness of potential smokers rises when cigarette taxes are increased. See https://www.nber.org/papers/w8872. Thus, we conservatively apply a 0% discount on this point (while a more accurate CEA would take into account the *gain* in happiness.

WHO 2019 report

[UPDATED] We model black market activity reducing the effectiveness of tax increases. We note that (a) empirical analysis show that tobacco tax increases in Mongolia have not increased illicit smoking; but also that (b) those illicit smokers that already exist would not be affected by the tax increase at all; and (c) notwithstanding the empirical results, we reason that such an aggressive tax increase is likely to increase illicit smoking. Putting this together, we calculate the new counterfactual tobacco consumption level by summing (i) existing illicit tobacco consumption level, which we assume by increases by 10% from the base, and (ii) licit tobacco consumption level, which falls as a result of the tax increase https://tobaccocontrol.bmj.com/content/29/Suppl_4/s249

[UPDATED] As above

[UPDATED] As above

[UPDATED] As above

"Estimates for low- and middle-income countries (LMICs) are more variable and somewhat greater in absolute terms (further from zero), with estimates clustered around –0.5" - The Economics of Tobacco and Tobacco Control

WHO 2019 report

[UPDATED] The WHO target is that the tax makes up 75% of the retail price, not that the tax is 75% of the base. See https://www.who.int/europe/activities/promoting-taxation-on-tobacco-products Increasing the tax to the extent that it is 3x the base price (i.e. 75% of final retail price) naturally leads to a very aggressive overall price increase (more than a doubling), which we find unrealistic. We aim instead for a 60% excise tax (so that the tax component is 1.5x the non-tax component)

[UPDATED] Increasing the tax to the extent that it is 3x the base price (i.e. 75% of final retail price) naturally leads to a very aggressive overall price increase

Calculation - (reduction by initial level * price increase * elasticity) - trend in tobacco consumption

[COMMENT] We think there are good reasons to both expect the probability to be larger than the base-rate of past attempts. Lobby will be more difficult, but we will be more competent, and tax increases have occurred in the recent past. We therefore decide not to change the estimate.

https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/NY.GDP.PCAP.CD?locations=MN

https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/SP.POP.TOTL?locations=MN

IMF World Economic Outlook 2021 predicted growth 2023-2026 average. See Future growth rates tab.

https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/NY.GDP.MKTP.CD?locations=MN

"The estimated total economic costs of smoking in LMICs range from 1.1% to 1.7% of GDP" - Tobacconomics

[UPDATED] We averaged Joel's and Mathias's moral weights. Joel's moral weights were calculated by the IDinsight survey on how much the Kenyan/Ghanan beneficiaries valued saving a life relative to doubling income, while Mathias went with GiveWell's estimate.

[UPDATED] To reflect changes in expected years of operation and success timing

[UPDATED] Only incorporates pure economic discounting

[UPDATED] Only incorporates pure economic discounting as well as the chance that such costs are not incurred due to policy reversal