Sample size (Control + Experiment)

Size of Cash Transfer (USD per month)

Alternative Link

Meta Analysis Link

Other Outcome

Perova, 2009, Welfare impacts of the “Juntos” Program in Peru: Evidence from a non-experimental evaluation. The World Bank

http://www.juntos.gob.pe/modulos/mod_legal/archivos/Evaluacion_Cuasi-Experimental1.pdf

https://bmcpublichealth.biomedcentral.com/track/pdf/10.1186/1471-2458-13-S3-S30

Perova, 2009, Welfare impacts of the “Juntos” Program in Peru: Evidence from a non-experimental evaluation. The World Bank

http://www.juntos.gob.pe/modulos/mod_legal/archivos/Evaluacion_Cuasi-Experimental1.pdf

https://bmcpublichealth.biomedcentral.com/track/pdf/10.1186/1471-2458-13-S3-S30

Perova, 2009, Welfare impacts of the “Juntos” Program in Peru: Evidence from a non-experimental evaluation. The World Bank

http://www.juntos.gob.pe/modulos/mod_legal/archivos/Evaluacion_Cuasi-Experimental1.pdf

https://bmcpublichealth.biomedcentral.com/track/pdf/10.1186/1471-2458-13-S3-S30

Perova, 2009, Welfare impacts of the “Juntos” Program in Peru: Evidence from a non-experimental evaluation. The World Bank

http://www.juntos.gob.pe/modulos/mod_legal/archivos/Evaluacion_Cuasi-Experimental1.pdf

https://bmcpublichealth.biomedcentral.com/track/pdf/10.1186/1471-2458-13-S3-S30

Robertson et al, 2013, Effects of unconditional and conditional cash transfers on child health and development in Zimbabwe: a cluster-randomised trial

https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0140673612621680

https://bmcpublichealth.biomedcentral.com/track/pdf/10.1186/1471-2458-13-S3-S30

Robertson et al, 2013, Effects of unconditional and conditional cash transfers on child health and development in Zimbabwe: a cluster-randomised trial

https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0140673612621680

https://bmcpublichealth.biomedcentral.com/track/pdf/10.1186/1471-2458-13-S3-S30

Robertson et al, 2013, Effects of unconditional and conditional cash transfers on child health and development in Zimbabwe: a cluster-randomised trial

https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0140673612621680

https://bmcpublichealth.biomedcentral.com/track/pdf/10.1186/1471-2458-13-S3-S30

Jackson-Powell & Hanson, 2012, Financial incentives for maternal health: Impact of a national programme in Nepal, Journal of Health Economics
Volume 31, Issue 1

18% increase (95 CI: 5.1-31.1)

https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/abs/pii/S0167629611001615

Jackson-Powell & Hanson, 2012, Financial incentives for maternal health: Impact of a national programme in Nepal, Journal of Health Economics
Volume 31, Issue 1

17% increase (95 CI: 6.1-28.1)

CCT for Healthcare Worker Performance

https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/abs/pii/S0167629611001615

Akresh, et al, 2012, Alternative Cash Transfer Delivery Mechanisms: Impacts on Routine Preventative Health Clinic Visits in Burkina Faso, World Bank Policy Research Working Paper No. 5958

$0.83-$2.25 per month. $9.64-27 annual, which is 9 percent of household per capita expenditures

https://www.researchgate.net/publication/228251484_Alternative_Cash_Transfer_Delivery_Mechanisms_Impacts_on_Routine_Preventative_Health_Clinic_Visits_in_Burkina_Faso

0.43 more routine preventative health clinic visits

Rai, 2014, Breaking with Tradition: Integrating Traditional Birth Attendants with Formal Clinics in Western Kenya, American Institutes for Research

CCT for Healthcare Worker Performance

https://editorialexpress.com/cgi-bin/conference/download.cgi?db_name=CSAE2016&paper_id=522

The effect of the TBA program appears to work only for pregnant women who received a voucher as part of the existing Voucher Program;either that TBAs concentrated their encouragement on women who received vouchers, that voucher-control group women were not receptive to encouragement by the TBAs, or that TBAs did not find it profitable to encourage vouchercontrol group women due to the potential need for side payments to these women.

Rai, 2014, Breaking with Tradition: Integrating Traditional Birth Attendants with Formal Clinics in Western Kenya, American Institutes for Research

CCT for Healthcare Worker Performance

https://editorialexpress.com/cgi-bin/conference/download.cgi?db_name=CSAE2016&paper_id=522

The effect of the TBA program appears to work only for pregnant women who received a voucher as part of the existing Voucher Program;either that TBAs concentrated their encouragement on women who received vouchers, that voucher-control group women were not receptive to encouragement by the TBAs, or that TBAs did not find it profitable to encourage vouchercontrol group women due to the potential need for side payments to these women.

Miller et al, 2012, Effectiveness of provider incentives for anaemia reduction in rural China: a cluster randomised trial, BMJ

Cluster randomised field experiment

$0.22 per student per day given to schoo, approx. $142 per month for this study (plus $22 per student who changed target outcome)

https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC3406729/

Sample schools were randomly assigned to a control group, with no intervention, or one of three treatment arms: (a) an information arm, in which principals received information about anaemia; (b) a subsidy arm, in which principals received information and unconditional subsidies; and (c) an incentive arm, in which principals received information, subsidies, and financial incentives for reducing anaemia among students.Twenty seven schools were assigned to the control arm (1816 students at baseline, 1623 at end point), 15 were assigned to the information arm (659 students at baseline, 596 at end point), 15 to the subsidy arm (726 students at baseline, 667 at end point), and 15 to the incentive arm (743 students at baseline, 667 at end point).

https://www.nber.org/papers/w18932.pdf

$0.22, per student per day, an amount sufficient to buy two to three ounces (55-85 g) of red meat.//Incremental incentive payments were made as salary supplements to principals on a per student basis (¥150 per student who changed from anaemic to non-anaemic over the course of the intervention). This amount was chosen to equal roughly two months of salary (¥3000) for successfully reducing the total number of students with anaemia by 50%

Miller et al, 2012, Effectiveness of provider incentives for anaemia reduction in rural China: a cluster randomised trial, BMJ

Cluster randomised field experiment

$22 per student who changed from anaemic to non-anaemic over the course of the intervention

https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC3406729/

Sample schools were randomly assigned to a control group, with no intervention, or one of three treatment arms: (a) an information arm, in which principals received information about anaemia; (b) a subsidy arm, in which principals received information and unconditional subsidies; and (c) an incentive arm, in which principals received information, subsidies, and financial incentives for reducing anaemia among students.Twenty seven schools were assigned to the control arm (1816 students at baseline, 1623 at end point), 15 were assigned to the information arm (659 students at baseline, 596 at end point), 15 to the subsidy arm (726 students at baseline, 667 at end point), and 15 to the incentive arm (743 students at baseline, 667 at end point).

https://www.nber.org/papers/w18932.pdf

$0.22, per student per day, an amount sufficient to buy two to three ounces (55-85 g) of red meat.//Incremental incentive payments were made as salary supplements to principals on a per student basis (¥150 per student who changed from anaemic to non-anaemic over the course of the intervention). This amount was chosen to equal roughly two months of salary (¥3000) for successfully reducing the total number of students with anaemia by 50%

Singh, 2011, Performance Pay and Information: Reducing Child Malnutrition in Urban Slums, MPRA Paper No. 29403

CCT for Healthcare Worker Performance

Rs. 100 *n e.g. if 5 children jump from moderate to mildly malnourished and 2 drop from normal to mildly malnourished, day care worker would get Rs.300 ($6.70).

https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/29403/1/MPRA_paper_29403.pdf

https://www.nber.org/papers/w18932.pdf

Basinga et al, 2011, Effect on maternal and child health services in Rwanda of payment to primary health-care providers for performance: an impact evaluation, The Lancet, VOLUME 377, ISSUE 9775

CCT for Healthcare Worker Performance

$0.18-$4.59 paid per unit depending on outcome.

https://www.shareweb.ch/site/Health/aboutus/Documents/2014_Face2Face_PHC/Quality%20and%20Financing/Basinga%20et%20al_2011_Effect%20on%20maternal%20and%20child%20health%20services%20in.pdf

P4P schemes provide fi nancial incentives to health-care providers for improvements in utilisation and quality of specific care indicators

https://www.nber.org/papers/w18932.pdf

Basinga et al, 2011, Effect on maternal and child health services in Rwanda of payment to primary health-care providers for performance: an impact evaluation, The Lancet, VOLUME 377, ISSUE 9775

56%-132% increase

CCT for Healthcare Worker Performance

$0.18-$4.59 paid per unit depending on outcome.

https://www.shareweb.ch/site/Health/aboutus/Documents/2014_Face2Face_PHC/Quality%20and%20Financing/Basinga%20et%20al_2011_Effect%20on%20maternal%20and%20child%20health%20services%20in.pdf

P4P schemes provide financial incentives to health-care providers for improvements in utilisation and quality of specifi c care indicators

https://www.nber.org/papers/w18932.pdf

Basinga et al, 2011, Effect on maternal and child health services in Rwanda of payment to primary health-care providers for performance: an impact evaluation, The Lancet, VOLUME 377, ISSUE 9775

CCT for Healthcare Worker Performance

$0.18-$4.59 paid per unit depending on outcome.

https://www.shareweb.ch/site/Health/aboutus/Documents/2014_Face2Face_PHC/Quality%20and%20Financing/Basinga%20et%20al_2011_Effect%20on%20maternal%20and%20child%20health%20services%20in.pdf

P4P schemes provide financial incentives to health-care providers for improvements in utilisation and quality of specifi c care indicators

Basinga et al, 2011, Effect on maternal and child health services in Rwanda of payment to primary health-care providers for performance: an impact evaluation, The Lancet, VOLUME 377, ISSUE 9775

CCT for Healthcare Worker Performance

$0.18-$4.59 paid per unit depending on outcome.

https://www.shareweb.ch/site/Health/aboutus/Documents/2014_Face2Face_PHC/Quality%20and%20Financing/Basinga%20et%20al_2011_Effect%20on%20maternal%20and%20child%20health%20services%20in.pdf

P4P schemes provide financial incentives to health-care providers for improvements in utilisation and quality of specific care indicators

de Walque et al, 2013, Using Provider Performance Incentives to Increase HIV Testing and Counseling Services in Rwanda, The World Bank

CCT for Healthcare Worker Performance

$0.92 per new individual tested for HIV and US$ 4.59 per couple/partner jointly tested

The results also indicate larger impacts of paying for performance on the likelihood that the respondent reports both partners have ever been tested, especially among discordant couples (14.7 percentage point increase) in which only one of the partners is HIV positive

https://www.nber.org/papers/w18932.pdf

Barham et al., 2007, The Impact of the Mexican Conditional Cash Transfer Program on Immunization Rates, BMC International Health and Human Rights

$25, adding 20-30% to the household income

https://www.colorado.edu/ibs/hs/barham/wp/CCTimmunWBfin.pdf

https://openknowledge.worldbank.org/handle/10986/13743

Due to measurement problems for some vaccines, they were limited to examining coverage only against measles and tuberculosis

https://researchonline.lshtm.ac.uk/4671/1/haines.pdf

Thornton, 2006, The Demand for and Impact of Learning HIV Status: Evidence from a Field Experiment

Only for individuals who tested for STD. Biased
allocation (non random): higher number of vouchers given out than
would be expected by chance even when nurses where threatened with termination of
employment; no baseline (assumption is that randomisation of subjects is perfect); some contamination was noted

https://researchonline.lshtm.ac.uk/4671/1/haines.pdf

Gertler, 2001, An Experiment in Incentive-Based Welfare: The Impact of PROGESA on Health in Mexico

$25, adding 20-30% to the household income

http://citeseerx.ist.psu.edu/viewdoc/download?doi=10.1.1.492.6091&rep=rep1&type=pdf

Gertler, 2001, An Experiment in Incentive-Based Welfare: The Impact of PROGESA on Health in Mexico

$25, adding 20-30% to the household income

http://citeseerx.ist.psu.edu/viewdoc/download?doi=10.1.1.492.6091&rep=rep1&type=pdf

Gertler, 2001, An Experiment in Incentive-Based Welfare: The Impact of PROGESA on Health in Mexico

$25, adding 20-30% to the household income

http://citeseerx.ist.psu.edu/viewdoc/download?doi=10.1.1.492.6091&rep=rep1&type=pdf

Gertler, 2001, An Experiment in Incentive-Based Welfare: The Impact of PROGESA on Health in Mexico

$25, adding 20-30% to the household income

http://citeseerx.ist.psu.edu/viewdoc/download?doi=10.1.1.492.6091&rep=rep1&type=pdf

Morris, S.S., et al., 2004b. Conditional cash transfers are associated with a small reduction in the rate of weight gain of preschool children in northeast Brazil. Journal of nutrition, 134 (9),

0.13 Z-scores lighter

Propensity Score matching, Controlled before and after (CBA)

Maluccio, 2004, Impact evaluation of a conditional
cash transfer program: the Nicaraguan Red de Proteccion
Social. FCND Discussion paper No 184. Washington,
DC, IFPRI

1,764 households

$9.33 ($112 per year, 8% of total amount of household expenditures)

http://www.ifpri.org/publication/impact-evaluation-conditional-cash-transfer-program-2

Limited external validity at national scale due to the purposive selection of area

https://bmcpublichealth.biomedcentral.com/track/pdf/10.1186/1471-2458-13-S3-S30

Maluccio, 2004, Impact evaluation of a conditional
cash transfer program: the Nicaraguan Red de Proteccion
Social. FCND Discussion paper No 184. Washington,
DC, IFPRI

1,764 households

$18.67 ($224 per year, 13% of total amount of household
expenditures)

http://www.ifpri.org/publication/impact-evaluation-conditional-cash-transfer-program-2

Limited external validity at national scale due to the purposive selection of area

https://bmcpublichealth.biomedcentral.com/track/pdf/10.1186/1471-2458-13-S3-S30

https://researchonline.lshtm.ac.uk/4671/1/haines.pdf

http://hdl.handle.net/10986/2597

Maluccio, 2004, Impact evaluation of a conditional
cash transfer program: the Nicaraguan Red de Proteccion
Social. FCND Discussion paper No 184. Washington,
DC, IFPRI

5.3% reduction in stunting

1,764 households

$18.67 ($224 per year, 13% of total amount of household
expenditures)

http://www.ifpri.org/publication/impact-evaluation-conditional-cash-transfer-program-2

Limited external validity at national scale due to the purposive selection of area

https://bmcpublichealth.biomedcentral.com/track/pdf/10.1186/1471-2458-13-S3-S30

https://researchonline.lshtm.ac.uk/4671/1/haines.pdf

Maluccio, 2004, Impact evaluation of a conditional
cash transfer program: the Nicaraguan Red de Proteccion
Social. FCND Discussion paper No 184. Washington,
DC, IFPRI

1,764 households

$18.67 ($224 per year, 13% of total amount of household
expenditures)

http://www.ifpri.org/publication/impact-evaluation-conditional-cash-transfer-program-2

Limited external validity at national scale due to the purposive selection of area

https://bmcpublichealth.biomedcentral.com/track/pdf/10.1186/1471-2458-13-S3-S30

Maluccio, 2004, Impact evaluation of a conditional
cash transfer program: the Nicaraguan Red de Proteccion
Social. FCND Discussion paper No 184. Washington,
DC, IFPRI

1,764 households

$18.67 ($224 per year, 13% of total amount of household
expenditures)

http://www.ifpri.org/publication/impact-evaluation-conditional-cash-transfer-program-2

Limited external validity at national scale due to the purposive selection of area. % of children under age
5 who are underweight

https://bmcpublichealth.biomedcentral.com/track/pdf/10.1186/1471-2458-13-S3-S30

https://researchonline.lshtm.ac.uk/4671/1/haines.pdf

Maluccio, 2004, Impact evaluation of a conditional
cash transfer program: the Nicaraguan Red de Proteccion
Social. FCND Discussion paper No 184. Washington,
DC, IFPRI

1,764 households

$9.33 ($112 per year, 8% of total amount of household expenditures)

http://www.ifpri.org/publication/impact-evaluation-conditional-cash-transfer-program-2

Limited external validity at national scale due to the purposive selection of area

https://bmcpublichealth.biomedcentral.com/track/pdf/10.1186/1471-2458-13-S3-S30

Rivera, 2004, Impact of the Mexican Programmefor Education, Health, and Nutrition (Progresa) on Rates of Growth and Anemia in Infants and Young Children: A Randomized Effectiveness Study. JAMA

$25, adding 20-30% to the household income

Subversion of randomisation. Doubts on the quality of the data confirmed by Berhman
2001/2005 (same set of data used): leakage problems, nonrandom assignment of papilla, attrition of sample, etc"

Rivera, 2004, Impact of the Mexican Programmefor Education, Health, and Nutrition (Progresa) on Rates of Growth and Anemia in Infants and Young Children: A Randomized Effectiveness Study. JAMA

$25, adding 20-30% to the household income

Subversion of randomisation. Doubts on the quality of the data confirmed by Berhman
2001/2005 (same set of data used): leakage problems, nonrandom assignment of papilla, attrition of sample, etc"

https://researchonline.lshtm.ac.uk/4671/1/haines.pdf

Attanasio, 2005, How effective are conditional cash transfers? Evidence from
Colombia. Institute for Fiscal Studies Briefing Notes

22.8-33.2% increase

691 Households

Longitudinal panel, Controlled before and after (CBA)

http://hdl.handle.net/10986/2597

Does not take cluster correlation into account. Differences at baseline between control and treatment sites are mentioned in the text but no further precision is given

https://researchonline.lshtm.ac.uk/4671/1/haines.pdf

Attanasio, 2005, How effective are conditional cash transfers? Evidence from
Colombia. Institute for Fiscal Studies Briefing Notes

691 Households

Longitudinal panel, Controlled before and after (CBA)

Does not take cluster correlation into account. Differences at baseline between control and treatment sites are mentioned in the text but no further precision is given

https://researchonline.lshtm.ac.uk/4671/1/haines.pdf

Attanasio, 2005, How effective are conditional cash transfers? Evidence from
Colombia. Institute for Fiscal Studies Briefing Notes

691 Households

Longitudinal panel, Controlled before and after (CBA)

http://hdl.handle.net/10986/2597

Does not take cluster correlation into account. Differences at baseline between control and treatment sites are mentioned in the text but no further precision is given

https://researchonline.lshtm.ac.uk/4671/1/haines.pdf

Barham & Maluccio, 2009, Eradicating diseases: The effect of conditional cash transfers on vaccination coverage in rural Nicaragua. Journal of Health Economics

Experiment clustered at the locality level

$22.67 (average $272 dollar annually, or approximately 17 percent of total annual household expenditures

https://www.colorado.edu/ibs/pubs/hs/hs2008-0001.pdf

https://pdfs.semanticscholar.org/56b0/d794013b7cb67957c755deaafe334a84c05b.pdf

All beneficiary families, regardless of whether there were school-age children in the household, received a food security transfer of $224 a year if the health conditionalities were met. Families who had children between the ages of 7–13 who had not yet completed fourth grade also received a school attendance transfer of $112 per household per year and a per child school transfer for school supplies of $21 per year.

https://bmcpublichealth.biomedcentral.com/track/pdf/10.1186/1471-2458-13-S3-S30

de Brauw and Peterman, 2011, Can conditional cash transfers improve maternal health and birth outcomes? Evidence from El Salvador’s Comunidades Solidarias Rurales, in IFPRI Discussion Paper2011, International Food Policy Research Institute

12.3% (s.e.: 5.4-9.9, 95% CI 0.129, -0.006)

http://www.ifpri.org/publication/can-conditional-cash-transfers-improve-maternal-health-and-birth-outcomes

https://ideas.repec.org/p/fpr/ifprid/1080.html

https://bmcpregnancychildbirth.biomedcentral.com/track/pdf/10.1186/1471-2393-14-30

https://www.cgdev.org/sites/default/files/impact-conditional-cash-transfer-health.pdf

Lim et al, 2010, India’s Janani Suraksha Yojana, a conditional cash transfer programme to increase births in health facilities: an impact evaluation. Lancet

Matching, withversus-without comparison, differences in differences

$13.30 (600 Indian rupees) in urban areas and $15.60 (700 rupees) in rural areas. / $22.20 (1000 rupees) in urban areas and $31.10 (1400 rupees) in rural areas in High-focus states

https://www.thelancet.com/journals/lancet/article/PIIS0140-6736(10)60744-1/abstract

Lim et al. report large declines in perinatal and neonatal deaths associated with India's JSY

https://www.cgdev.org/sites/default/files/impact-conditional-cash-transfer-health.pdf

Powell-Jackson et al, 2010, Financial incentives for maternal health: impact of a national programme in Nepal. J Health Econ. 2012

https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC4021703/

Very small and insignificant decline in neonatal mortality

https://www.cgdev.org/sites/default/files/impact-conditional-cash-transfer-health.pdf

Powell-Jackson et al, 2010, Financial incentives for maternal health: impact of a national programme in Nepal. J Health Econ. 2012

https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC4021703/

Very small and insignificant decline in neonatal mortality

https://www.cgdev.org/sites/default/files/impact-conditional-cash-transfer-health.pdf

Powell-Jackson et al, 2010, Financial incentives for maternal health: impact of a national programme in Nepal. J Health Econ. 2012

CCT for Healthcare Worker Performance

https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC4021703/

Very small and insignificant decline in neonatal mortality

https://www.cgdev.org/sites/default/files/impact-conditional-cash-transfer-health.pdf

Urquieta et al, 2009, Impact of Oportunidades on skilled attendance at delivery in rural areas. Econ Dev Cult Change

Regression discontinuity design, differences in differences

https://www.journals.uchicago.edu/doi/abs/10.1086/596598

https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC4021703/

https://bmcpregnancychildbirth.biomedcentral.com/track/pdf/10.1186/1471-2393-14-30

https://www.cgdev.org/sites/default/files/impact-conditional-cash-transfer-health.pdf

Gutierrez et al, 2011, Evaluacion Externa de Impacto del Programa de Transferencias Monetarias Condicionadas: Mi Familia Progresa. Washington, DC: Banco Interamericano de Desarrollo

$40 (300 Q) 21% of the minimum wage or 15% of the cost
of the food basket.

https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC4021703/

https://www.cgdev.org/sites/default/files/impact-conditional-cash-transfer-health.pdf

Morris,et al, 2004, Monetary incentives in primary health care and effects on use and coverage of preventive health care interventions in rural Honduras: Cluster randomised trial. Lancet

Cluster randomized trial, with a pretest and posttest crosssection design

https://www.cgdev.org/sites/default/files/impact-conditional-cash-transfer-health.pdf

Barber and Gertler, 2009, Empowering women to obtain high quality care: evidence from an evaluation of Mexico's conditional cash transfer programme. Health Policy Plan.

Regression discontinuity design, differences in differences

https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC2724849/

https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC4021703/

https://www.cgdev.org/sites/default/files/impact-conditional-cash-transfer-health.pdf

Lim et al, 2010, India’s Janani Suraksha Yojana, a conditional cash transfer programme to increase births in health facilities: an impact evaluation. Lancet

Matching, with versus -without comparison, differences in differences

CCT for Healthcare Worker Performance

Accredited social health activists [ASHAs]) receive payments of $4.40 (200 rupees) in urban areas and $13.30( 600 rupees) in rural areas per in-facility delivery assisted by them in high-focus states

https://www.thelancet.com/journals/lancet/article/PIIS0140-6736(10)60744-1/abstract

Healthcare worker incentive provided in tandem with payments to mothers themselves

https://www.cgdev.org/sites/default/files/impact-conditional-cash-transfer-health.pdf

Lim et al, 2010, India’s Janani Suraksha Yojana, a conditional cash transfer programme to increase births in health facilities: an impact evaluation. Lancet

Matching, with versus -without comparison, differences in differences

$13.30 (600 Indian rupees) in urban areas and $15.60 (700 rupees) in rural areas. / $22.20 (1000 rupees) in urban areas and $31.10 (1400 rupees) in rural areas in High-focus states

https://www.thelancet.com/journals/lancet/article/PIIS0140-6736(10)60744-1/abstract

Lim et al. report large declines in perinatal and neonatal deaths associated with India's JSY

https://www.cgdev.org/sites/default/files/impact-conditional-cash-transfer-health.pdf

de Brauw and Peterman, 2011, Can conditional cash transfers improve maternal health and birth outcomes? Evidence from El Salvador’s Comunidades Solidarias Rurales, in IFPRI Discussion Paper2011, International Food Policy Research Institute

15.3% increase (95% CI 0.147, 0.159)

http://www.ifpri.org/publication/can-conditional-cash-transfers-improve-maternal-health-and-birth-outcomes

https://ideas.repec.org/p/fpr/ifprid/1080.html

https://www.cgdev.org/sites/default/files/impact-conditional-cash-transfer-health.pdf

Morris,et al, 2004, Monetary incentives in primary health care and effects on use and coverage of preventive health care interventions in rural Honduras: Cluster randomised trial. Lancet

5.6% decrease (95% CI -0.157, 0.045)

Cluster randomized trial, with a pretest and posttest crosssection design

Post-partum checkups/visits after birth

https://www.cgdev.org/sites/default/files/impact-conditional-cash-transfer-health.pdf

de Brauw and Peterman, 2011, Can conditional cash transfers improve maternal health and birth outcomes? Evidence from El Salvador’s Comunidades Solidarias Rurales, in IFPRI Discussion Paper2011, International Food Policy Research Institute

5.9% decrease (95% CI -0.050, -0.068)

http://www.ifpri.org/publication/can-conditional-cash-transfers-improve-maternal-health-and-birth-outcomes

https://ideas.repec.org/p/fpr/ifprid/1080.html

Post-partum checkups/visits after birth

https://www.cgdev.org/sites/default/files/impact-conditional-cash-transfer-health.pdf

de Brauw and Peterman, 2011, Can conditional cash transfers improve maternal health and birth outcomes? Evidence from El Salvador’s Comunidades Solidarias Rurales, in IFPRI Discussion Paper2011, International Food Policy Research Institute

6.5% decrease (95% CI -0.059, 0.065)

http://www.ifpri.org/publication/can-conditional-cash-transfers-improve-maternal-health-and-birth-outcomes

https://ideas.repec.org/p/fpr/ifprid/1080.html

Adequate prenatal monitoring

https://www.cgdev.org/sites/default/files/impact-conditional-cash-transfer-health.pdf

Morris,et al, 2004, Monetary incentives in primary health care and effects on use and coverage of preventive health care interventions in rural Honduras: Cluster randomised trial. Lancet

Cluster randomized trial, with a pretest and posttest crosssection design

https://www.cgdev.org/sites/default/files/impact-conditional-cash-transfer-health.pdf

18.7% increase

https://researchonline.lshtm.ac.uk/4671/1/haines.pdf

Lim et al, 2010, India’s Janani Suraksha Yojana, a conditional cash transfer programme to increase births in health facilities: an impact evaluation. Lancet

Matching, with versus -without comparison, differences in differences

$13.30 (600 Indian rupees) in urban areas and $15.60 (700 rupees) in rural areas. / $22.20 (1000 rupees) in urban areas and $31.10 (1400 rupees) in rural areas in High-focus states

https://www.thelancet.com/journals/lancet/article/PIIS0140-6736(10)60744-1/abstract

Lim et al. report large declines in perinatal and neonatal deaths associated with India's JSY

https://www.cgdev.org/sites/default/files/impact-conditional-cash-transfer-health.pdf

Powell-Jackson et al, 2010, Financial incentives for maternal health: impact of a national programme in Nepal. J Health Econ. 2012

https://www.cgdev.org/sites/default/files/impact-conditional-cash-transfer-health.pdf

Barber and Gertler, 2009, Empowering women to obtain high quality care: evidence from an evaluation of Mexico's conditional cash transfer programme. Health Policy Plan.

12.2% increase (95% CI: 77.5–80.3; P < 0.001).

Regression discontinuity design, differences in differences

https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC2724849/

https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC4021703/

https://www.cgdev.org/sites/default/files/impact-conditional-cash-transfer-health.pdf

https://www.cgdev.org/sites/default/files/impact-conditional-cash-transfer-health.pdf

Gutierrez et al, 2011, Evaluacion Externa de Impacto del Programa de Transferencias Monetarias Condicionadas: Mi Familia Progresa. Washington, DC: Banco Interamericano de Desarrollo

$40 (300 Q) 21% of the minimum wage or 15% of the cost
of the food basket.

https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC4021703/

https://www.cgdev.org/sites/default/files/impact-conditional-cash-transfer-health.pdf

Amarante et al, 2011, Do Cash Transfers Improve Birth Outcomes? Evidence from Matched Vital Statistics, Social
Security and Program Data, in NBER Working Paper 2011, The National Bureau of Economic Research.

Regression discontinuity design, differences in differences

$56 (UY$1,360 at the 2005 exchange rate, equivalent to approximately US$103 in PPP terms)

Due to limited resources and coordination across government ministries, these conditionalities were never enforced

https://www.cgdev.org/sites/default/files/impact-conditional-cash-transfer-health.pdf

1.5% reduction in birthweight

Feldman et al, 2009, Contraceptive Use, Birth Spacing, and Autonomy: An Analysis of the Oportunidades
Program in Rural Mexico. Studies in Family Planning

https://pdfs.semanticscholar.org/4265/20bc618b56202fed578374c2624a23e15438.pdf

https://www.cgdev.org/sites/default/files/impact-conditional-cash-transfer-health.pdf

Lamadrid-Figueroa et al, 2010, Heterogeneous impact of the social programme Oportunidades on use of
contraceptive methods by young adult women living in rural areas. Journal of Development Effectiveness,

https://www-tandfonline-com.ezproxy.eui.eu/doi/full/10.1080/19439341003599726

https://www.cgdev.org/sites/default/files/impact-conditional-cash-transfer-health.pdf

Macours, 2009, Cash Transfers, Behavioral Changes, and the Cognitive Development of Young Children: Evidence from a Randomized Experiment. Policy Research Working Paper

https://bmcpublichealth.biomedcentral.com/track/pdf/10.1186/1471-2458-13-S3-S30

Barber and Gertler, 2009, Empowering women to obtain high quality care: evidence from an evaluation of Mexico's conditional cash transfer programme. Health Policy Plan.

Regression discontinuity design, differences in differences

https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC2724849/

https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC4021703/

https://www.cgdev.org/sites/default/files/impact-conditional-cash-transfer-health.pdf

Barber and Gertler, 2009, Empowering women to obtain high quality care: evidence from an evaluation of Mexico's conditional cash transfer programme. Health Policy Plan.

Regression discontinuity design, differences in differences

https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC2724849/

https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC4021703/

https://www.cgdev.org/sites/default/files/impact-conditional-cash-transfer-health.pdf

Macours, 2009, Cash Transfers, Behavioral Changes, and
the Cognitive Development of Young Children: Evidence from a
Randomized Experiment. Policy Research Working Paper 2

http://documents.worldbank.org/curated/en/564251468142783015/pdf/WPS4759.pdf

https://bmcpublichealth.biomedcentral.com/track/pdf/10.1186/1471-2458-13-S3-S30

Macours, 2009, Cash Transfers, Behavioral Changes, and
the Cognitive Development of Young Children: Evidence from a
Randomized Experiment. Policy Research Working Paper 2

http://documents.worldbank.org/curated/en/564251468142783015/pdf/WPS4759.pdf

https://bmcpublichealth.biomedcentral.com/track/pdf/10.1186/1471-2458-13-S3-S30

Macours, 2009, Cash Transfers, Behavioral Changes, and
the Cognitive Development of Young Children: Evidence from a
Randomized Experiment. Policy Research Working Paper 2

http://documents.worldbank.org/curated/en/564251468142783015/pdf/WPS4759.pdf

https://bmcpublichealth.biomedcentral.com/track/pdf/10.1186/1471-2458-13-S3-S30

Levy & Ohls, 2010, Evaluation of Jamaica's PATH Conditional Cash Transfer Programme, Journal of Development Effectiveness, vol. 2, iss. 4

http://www.3ieimpact.org/en/evidence/impact-evaluations/details/80/?search_path=/evidence/impact-evaluations/&publication_status=&author=&title=&q=conditional+cash+clinic&published_to=&published_from=&result_number=3&total_results=7

Levy & Ohls, 2010, Evaluation of Jamaica's PATH Conditional Cash Transfer Programme, Journal of Development Effectiveness, vol. 2, iss. 4

http://www.3ieimpact.org/en/evidence/impact-evaluations/details/80/?search_path=/evidence/impact-evaluations/&publication_status=&author=&title=&q=conditional+cash+clinic&published_to=&published_from=&result_number=3&total_results=7

Eichler and Levine, 2009, Performance Incentives for Global Health: Potential
and Pitfalls. Washington DC: Center for Global Development.

Not available

CCT for Healthcare Worker Performance

https://www.cgdev.org/sites/default/files/9781933286297-Levine-performance-incentives.pdf

https://www.nber.org/papers/w18932.pdf

https://www.nber.org/papers/w18932.pdf

Eichler and Levine, 2009, Performance Incentives for Global Health: Potential
and Pitfalls. Washington DC: Center for Global Development.

Not available

CCT for Healthcare Worker Performance

https://www.cgdev.org/sites/default/files/9781933286297-Levine-performance-incentives.pdf

https://www.nber.org/papers/w18932.pdf

Eichler and Levine, 2009, Performance Incentives for Global Health: Potential
and Pitfalls. Washington DC: Center for Global Development.

Not available

CCT for Healthcare Worker Performance

https://www.cgdev.org/sites/default/files/9781933286297-Levine-performance-incentives.pdf

https://www.nber.org/papers/w18932.pdf

Regalia and Castro, 2009, Nicaragua: Combining Demand- and Supply-Side Incentives

Not available

CCT for Healthcare Worker Performance

https://www.cgdev.org/doc/books/PBI/11_CGD_Eichler_Levine-Ch11.pdf

https://www.nber.org/papers/w18932.pdf

Regalia and Castro, 2009, Nicaragua: Combining Demand- and Supply-Side Incentives

Not available

CCT for Healthcare Worker Performance

https://www.cgdev.org/doc/books/PBI/11_CGD_Eichler_Levine-Ch11.pdf

https://www.nber.org/papers/w18932.pdf

Morris,et al, 2004, Monetary incentives in primary health care and effects on use and coverage of preventive health care interventions in rural Honduras: Cluster randomised trial. Lancet

Cluster randomized trial, with a pretest and posttest crosssection design

vaccinated with DPT1/pentavalent

https://researchonline.lshtm.ac.uk/4671/1/haines.pdf

Macours, Karen, and Renos Vakis. 2008. “Changing Households’ Investments
and Aspirations Through Social Interactions: Evidence from a Randomized
Transfer Program in a Low-Income Country.” Unpublished manuscript, Johns
Hopkins University, Baltimore, MD, and World Bank, Washington, DC.

http://hdl.handle.net/10986/2597

Rusa, L., Schneidman, M., Fritsche, G., & Musango, L. (2009). Rwanda: Performance-based financing in the public sector. In R. Eichler & R. Levine (Eds.), Performance incentives for global health: potential and pitfalls. Washington DC: Center for Global Development.

https://www.nber.org/papers/w18932.pdf

Powell-Jackson et al, 2010, Financial incentives for maternal health: impact of a national programme in Nepal. J Health Econ. 2012

https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC4021703/

Very small and insignificant decline in neonatal mortality

https://www.cgdev.org/sites/default/files/impact-conditional-cash-transfer-health.pdf

Amarante et al, 2011, Do Cash Transfers Improve Birth Outcomes? Evidence from Matched Vital Statistics, Social
Security and Program Data, in NBER Working Paper 2011, The National Bureau of Economic Research.

Regression discontinuity design, differences in differences

$56 (UY$1,360 at the 2005 exchange rate, equivalent to approximately US$103 in PPP terms)

Due to limited resources and coordination across government ministries, these conditionalities were never enforced

https://www.cgdev.org/sites/default/files/impact-conditional-cash-transfer-health.pdf

Amarante et al, 2011, Do Cash Transfers Improve Birth Outcomes? Evidence from Matched Vital Statistics, Social
Security and Program Data, in NBER Working Paper 2011, The National Bureau of Economic Research.

Regression discontinuity design, differences in differences

$56 (UY$1,360 at the 2005 exchange rate, equivalent to approximately US$103 in PPP terms)

Due to limited resources and coordination across government ministries, these conditionalities were never enforced

https://www.cgdev.org/sites/default/files/impact-conditional-cash-transfer-health.pdf

Morris,et al, 2004, Monetary incentives in primary health care and effects on use and coverage of preventive health care interventions in rural Honduras: Cluster randomised trial. Lancet

Cluster randomized trial, with a pretest and posttest crosssection design

http://hdl.handle.net/10986/2597

https://researchonline.lshtm.ac.uk/4671/1/haines.pdf

Carvalho, Natalie, Naveen Thacker, Subodh S. Gupta, and Joshua A. Salomon. 2014. “More Evidence on the Impact of India's Conditional Cash Transfer Program, Janani Suraksha Yojana: Quasi-Experimental Evaluation of the Effects on Childhood Immunization and Other Reproductive and Child Health Outcomes.” PLoS ONE 9 (10)

propensity score matching analysis with logistic regression

CCT for Healthcare Worker Performance

Accredited social health activists [ASHAs]) receive payments of $4.40 (200 rupees) in urban areas and $13.30( 600 rupees) in rural areas per in-facility delivery assisted by them in high-focus states

https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC4193776/

Carvalho, Natalie, Naveen Thacker, Subodh S. Gupta, and Joshua A. Salomon. 2014. “More Evidence on the Impact of India's Conditional Cash Transfer Program, Janani Suraksha Yojana: Quasi-Experimental Evaluation of the Effects on Childhood Immunization and Other Reproductive and Child Health Outcomes.” PLoS ONE 9 (10)

propensity score matching analysis with logistic regression

CCT for Healthcare Worker Performance

Accredited social health activists [ASHAs]) receive payments of $4.40 (200 rupees) in urban areas and $13.30( 600 rupees) in rural areas per in-facility delivery assisted by them in high-focus states

https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC4193776/

Carvalho, Natalie, Naveen Thacker, Subodh S. Gupta, and Joshua A. Salomon. 2014. “More Evidence on the Impact of India's Conditional Cash Transfer Program, Janani Suraksha Yojana: Quasi-Experimental Evaluation of the Effects on Childhood Immunization and Other Reproductive and Child Health Outcomes.” PLoS ONE 9 (10)

propensity score matching analysis with logistic regression

$13.30 (600 Indian rupees) in urban areas and $15.60 (700 rupees) in rural areas. / $22.20 (1000 rupees) in urban areas and $31.10 (1400 rupees) in rural areas in High-focus states

https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC4193776/

Carvalho, Natalie, Naveen Thacker, Subodh S. Gupta, and Joshua A. Salomon. 2014. “More Evidence on the Impact of India's Conditional Cash Transfer Program, Janani Suraksha Yojana: Quasi-Experimental Evaluation of the Effects on Childhood Immunization and Other Reproductive and Child Health Outcomes.” PLoS ONE 9 (10)

propensity score matching analysis with logistic regression

$13.30 (600 Indian rupees) in urban areas and $15.60 (700 rupees) in rural areas. / $22.20 (1000 rupees) in urban areas and $31.10 (1400 rupees) in rural areas in High-focus states

https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC4193776/

Chaudhury, Friedman and Onishi (2013) "Philippines conditional cash transfer program: Impact evaluation 2012",World Bank

http://documents.worldbank.org/curated/en/537391468144882935/pdf/755330REVISED000Revised0June0402014.pdf

Chaudhury, Friedman and Onishi (2013) "Philippines conditional cash transfer program: Impact evaluation 2012",World Bank

http://documents.worldbank.org/curated/en/537391468144882935/pdf/755330REVISED000Revised0June0402014.pdf