144 and 107 cases

	A	B	C	D	E	F	G	H	I	J	K	L
1	Case Name	Citation	Court	Procedural Posture	Facts	Nature of Parties	Nature of Order / Restriction	First Hearing	First Appeal	Second Appeal	Observations	Notes

2	In re Bynkutram Shaha Roy & Ors.	(1873) 10 L Beng LR 434	Calcutta High Court (Five Justices)	Reference made to full bench noticing a conflict in the law (decisions in Sibchunder Bhuttacharjee v Sadut Ali" and "Queen v Kalika Pershad" — The referred question: "Whether a magistrate is legally competent to issue an order u/s 62 of the Code, prohibiting a landholder from holding a hat on any particular spot on his estate on particular days, on the ground that such order is likely to prevent a riot or affray, or because a riot or affray has already occurred."	Dispute between neighouring zamindars — Petitioner with a view to annoy Respondent (allegedly) established a new market close to an old one belonging to one Bipin Behary — This was said to have caused unlawful assemblies to take place and raised an apprehension of a breach of the peace — Both parties were bound over, and then since Magistrate thought its not going to be enough, made an order u/s 62 of the CrPC 1861	Neighbouring zamindars who had set up markets (Hats) on their plots which led to apprehensions of a breach of the peace	Restriction that Byunkutram was not to hold his Hat at the same time as Bipin Behary did.	Magistrate passed the restriction u/s 62 after having taken bonds to keep the peace. Appeal to HC	HC referred to Full Bench	Full Bench order by Couch CJ — Held that the question must be answered affirmately — "The word “certain” placed before the word act, and afterwards repeated twice in the expression, to take certain order with certain property in his possession,” leaves no reasonable doubt in our minds that the Legislature intended to give full and ample powers to the Magistrate, the chief officer entrusted with the duty of preserving the peace of the district, to restrain any person from doing any act, or to command him to hold any property in his possession subject to any condition, whenever such Magistrate shall consider that such a course of procedure is likely to prevent, or even tends to prevent, a riot or an affray. No doubt, the powers conferred upon the Magistrate by this section ought, like all other powers of discretion created by law, to be exercised in a reasonable manner, and it may further be admitted that the Magistrate is bound, before he issues the order, to satisfy himself upon reasonable grounds that that order is likely to prevent, or tends to prevent, a riot or an affray. But if a Magistrate, after evercising the necessary discretion, issues an order directing a particular landholder not to hold a hat on a particular spot on a particular day, up on the ground that the holding of the hat at that particular place and time by that particular individual is likely to lead to a serious breach of the peace, we cannot, upon a proper construction of s. 62, say that the order is null and void for want of jurisdiction or power. The-law gives a very wide discretion to the Magistrate in matters-affecting the public tranquillity, and it is not for us to enrtail that discretion by construing the Act in a manner contrary to the plain and obvious meaning of the words in which it is expressed." (438-439)	The problem of Hats was apparently acute: "It is notorious that in this country, rival hats are frequent sources of riot and affray; and there is something in the nature of such hats, namely the assemblage of large crowds of men on both sides, which may be said to have a certain tendency to lead to a breach of the peace." (440)
3										Reject the argument that otherwise innocent acts cannot be affected by the provision — "It has been argued that the powers vested in the Magistrate by s. 62 must be confined to those acts and modes of enjoyment of property only which are in themslves unlawful; and that, as there is nothing inherently illegal in a man holding a hat on his own land on any particular day he chooses, the order passed by the Magistrate in this case must be set aside as void for want of power. But not only is this restricted construction not supported by the actual words of the section, but its ado???-tion might in many cases lead to the most dangerous consequences. A particular act or a particular mode of enjoyment of property might be perfectly innocent and lawful in itself. But the act may be done, or the property enjoyed, in that particular mode under circumstances calculated to lead to a serious breach of the peace, attended even with loss of human life; and it would be by no means proper or desirable to hold that even in such cases the chief peace officer of the district has no power to issue an order such as that contemplated by s. 62." (439)
4										Individual rights, such as that to enjoy one's property, can be properly limited by the magistrate for a temporary duration: "It is stated in one of the cases mentioned in the order of reference that a Magistrate has no power under s. 62 to issue an order that would interfere with any one's right to enjoy his own property in any lawful manner he pleases. Whether a Magistrate can under that section, issue such an order as would be utterly destructive of a man's right of property is not a question which we are called upon, in this case, to determine one way or the other. It is sufficient for us, for the purposes of this reference, to say that it is quite within the power of the Magistrate under s. 62 to modify the enjoyment of such rights, at least for a temporary period, by imposing upon the owner of the property such conditions as the Magistrate, after taking into consideration all the facts and surrounding circumstances of each particular case, ??? all consider necessary to prevent a riot or an affray. Every individual right is, to a certain extent, subject to the general interests of society; and after giving our best consideration to the question referred to us, we feel ourselves bound to come to the conclusion that the Legislature has purposely vested the Magistrate with powers sufficient to cover a case like the one mentioned in the order of reference." (440)
5	In re Krishna Mohan Bysack	1 Cal LR 58 (1877)	Calcutta High Court (2 Judges) (Markby J)	Revision against the order of magistrate	Litigation between parties and Krishna Bysack lost the litigation, consequent to which magistrate passed orders u/s 518 ordering that he not build a wall pending further orders.	Rival parties suffering a litigation already.	Litigation between rival parties and consequent to the litigation, the unsuccessful party was ordered u/s 518 by the Magistrate to "not proceed with the building of a wall which he had commenced to erect upon the land in dispute pending further orders"	Magistrate passed order apparently without hearing any evidence and also refused a modification request.	Hold that the order was erroenously passed: "At any rate we have no doubt that the order of the Magistrate was illegal. There is not anywhere in these proceedings the slightest indication that this is a case where any delay which would be occasioned by a resort to less summary proceedings would occasion any serious evil whatever ..." (59)
6								"The Magistrate seems entirely to have forgotten that he has no power at all to take proceedings under Section 518 to prevent a nuisance, except in certain special cases which the Act has defined, namely, where immediate action is rendered necessary, and delay is impossible by reason of the existence of the circumstances mentioned in the Explanation appended to section 518. We consider that the existence of the circumstances there stated, showing the necessity of immediate action, is a condition precedent to the Magistrate having power to act under Section 518 at all. But there is nothing whatever to shew that such circumstances existed in the present case" (59)
7	Shurut Chunder Banerjee & Ors.v. Bama Churn Mookerjee	4 Cal 410 (1879)	Calcutta HC (2 Judges) (White J)	Revision preferred u/s 435 CrPC	Same Hat issue – rival party told to set up a Hat somewhere else by Magistrate on an application which alleged that the chaps had been "resorting to force" to compel people to come to their Hat and not the other chap's, and this order was challenged given this would've ruined their business.	Rival Hat owners	Deputy Magistrate passed an order that the new hat owners desist from holding their market on its new site and remove it within one week to a distance of 20 russees (nearly 0.5 miles) — The Hat was originally near the Kali Temple much like other Hats and this was bound to be a problem for business.	Order passed by Deputy Magistrate on application and taking evidence as well.	Cite a full bench order of Gopi Mohun Mooulik and say that this order is bad — "and that the Magistrate has acted in excess of jurisdiction. He has given an order which will be in effect for all time for the removal of the haut to such a distance elsewhere as to render it of no use to the applicant. The rule is made absolte" (413)
8	Abdool & Ors. v. Luckey Narain Mundul & Ors.	ILR (1879) 5 Cal 132	Calcutta HC (Ainslie & Broughton JJ)	Challenge (probably revision) to order passed by Magistrate u/s 518 of the 1872 Code.	Order passed ex parte: The order of the Magistrate complained of is dated the 21st November 1878, and is in the following terms: "Kine may be slaughtered in the place named in the ikrarnama. They cannot be slaughtered in any other place. A notice to this effect will be issued by beat of drum." — Challenged.	Aggrieved Kine slaughterers.	Ex parte order passed directing slaughtering of Kine in only one place and no other and passed without any restriction of time.	Order passed ex parte.	Allowed revision and set aside the order. HC observations are useful		Interesting that the order discussed 518 in context of preventing breaches of the peace but the statutory language was broad, very broad — so are they using "breach of the peace" as shorthand for this set of annoyances?
9									"The object of Section 518 is to enable a Magistrate, in cases of emergency, to make an immediate order for the purpose of preventing an imminent breach of the peace, &c.; but it is not intended to relieve him of the duty of making a proper enquiry into the circumstances which make it likely that such breach of the peace, &c., will occur. It is, therefore, incumbent on him to limit the operation of his order to such reasonable time as may be necessary to enable him to hold a full and sufficient enquiry, and, if necessary, to deal with the case under the other provisions of the Criminal Procedure Code, which enable him to meet cases of probable breach of the peace, &c. An order made under Section 518 is not bad, simply because it interferes with the legal rights of individuals; but, when such interference is necessary, it is the duty of the Magistrate to limit it as much as possible; and for the purpose he should afterwards hold an enquiry into the circumstances, and determine whether, as a matter of fact, the act prohibited as likely to lead to a breach of the peace, & c, is within or in excess of the legal right of the person forbidden to do it. If it is found that a man is doing that which he is legally entitled to do, and that his neighbour choses to take offence thereat, and to create a disturbance in consequence, it is clear that the duty of the Magistrate is, not to continue to deprive the first of the exercise of his legal right, but to restrain the second from illegally interfering with that exercise of legal rights."
10	Gopi Mohun Moulik v. Taramoni Chowdhrani	4 Cal LR 309	Calcutta HC (Full Bench) (Garth, CJ)	Regular appeal from the decision of the Subordinate Judge of Mymensingh, referred to the Full Bench on a specific question — But before that, the aggrieved party actually filed a civil suit challenging the 518 Order rather than file a revision — Lower Court dismissed the suit and then this appeal came up. So besides the 518 issues, another issue was whether civil courts could set aside orders passed by magistrates with jurisdiction, u/s 518 CrPC	Another Hat matter — closed the Hat entirely for those days — the aggrieved owner suffered heavy losses (naturally) and challenged.	Rival Hat owners	Ordered by Deputy Magistrate of Jamalpur that the Hat could not be held on days it used to be assembled.	Magistrate passed order after taking evidence.	Not an appeal per se but a Civil Suit filed challenging the magistrate's order — dismissed for want of jurisdiction.	Appeal to HC where the questions were referred to the Full Bench. — Note here that the restriction was not for a period, but that the order on its face prohibited the chap from holding his Hat indefinitely.
11							"It has appeared at the trial of the said suit, that a haut having been established since 20 or 25 years at Tarajung, the estate of the said Chowdhrani, is duly held every week on Tuesday and Friday. At present, you having set up a new haut at Nalitabari, which is quite close to the said haut, have fixed Tuesdays and Fridays, in other words the days on which the Tarajung haut is held, for holding your newly established Nalitabari haut. Since by reason of the days fixed for holding this newly established rival haut being exactly the days on which the Tarajung haut is held, an occurrence leading to a breach of the peace took place at the said newly established Nalitabari on the 20th of April, 1875, corresponding with the 8th of Bysack of the year 1282 B.S. Consequently, unless the days for holding the said Nalitabari haut be altered, there is every likelihood of men's health and peace being affected, and of affrays and breach of the peace taking place in future. Hence you are hereby prohibited from holding the Nalitabari haut on Tuesdays and Fridays in accordance with the provisions of section 518 of the Criminal Procedure Code, and you are ordered to alter the days for holding the said haut. The 31st May, 1875" (320)			"We believe that this is the first occasion on which this point has been seriously considered by a Full Bench of the Court; and as we are aware that Magistrates in this country have been in the habit of making orders of this nature, restraining persons for an indefinite period from the exercise of civil rights over their property, and as this practice has apparently derived some sanction from former Full Bench decisions of this Court, it has been thought advisable in this instance to take the opinion of the whole of the Judges, in order to determine a question, which undoubtedly is of very great importance to the public." (321)
12										"The provisions of section 62, in the Code of 1861, are substantially the same as those of section 518 of the present Code; but there are certain explanations appended to the latter section which aid us materially in the construction of it." (322)
13										"The first of them relates to the cases to which the section was intended to apply; and shows that it is applicable only where a speedy remedy is called for; and where, for either of the reason specified, a more formal procedure would be inappropriate. We think it would be inconsistent with this expression of the intentions of the Legislature, that a Magistrate should pass under this section an order meant to have more than a temporary operation; and although such order may no doubt, for what seems to the Magistrate sufficient cause, restrain a man in the otherwise lawful exercise of his rights, such restrain ought clearly not to be indefinite in its terms, or to have effect beyond the urgency which it was intended to provide for." (322-23)
14										"We consider that the Magistrate had no jurisdiction to make so wide an order, and that the grant of what is in effect a perpetual injunction is entirely beyond his powers. He might have prohibited the holding of the haut on any particular occasion or occasions, but he had no right to deprive the plaintiff for ever of a right to which he was by law entitled." (323)
15	Sundram Chetti & Ors. v. Queen	ILR (1884) 6 Mad 203	Madras High Court (3) (Turner CJ, Innes J, Kindersley J) (all wrote opinions)	Reference to full bench.	A longstanding dispute between hindus and muslims in the region involving lengthy litigation reached the High Court following an order by the sessions judge wherein certain "inopportune" remarks were allegedly made — The Chief Justice took the opportunity to set the law straight on the issue of processions.	Rival religious groups.					The entire judgment of the Chief Justice is relevant. — Sets out the law on processions and also on how magistrate are required to intervene in cases of emergency and that timely interventions go ahead and prevent riots. — The case itself helps give a glimpse into the usage, with consent, of this "imperfectly controlled power" — use how the CJ himself says that the restraint on these powers was the nature of the officers.
16	Empress v. Babua	ILR (1884) 6 All 132	Allahabad High Court (Straight J)	Revision Petition against order of Magistrate, Mirzapur, which was affirmed by Sessions Judge, Mirzapur.	Basically, This was an application for revision of an order of M.G.S.D. Dale, Magistrate of the Mirzapur district, dated the 3rd August, 1883, and of the order of Mr. W, Barry. Sessions Judge of Mirzapur, dated the 15th September, 1883, affirming the Magistrate's order. It appeared that on the 26th July, 1883, the Magistrate made an order, in which, stating that he had received information that Babua, the applicant in this case, and certain other persons were likely to commit a breach of the peace, by beating the Kotwal of Mirzapar city with shoes, he called upon those persons to give security for their good behaviour for three years, in their own recognizances for Rs. 1,000, and two sureties for Rs. 500 each and ordered Babua to be arrested. Upon the inquiry, it being proved in the Magistrate's opinion that it was necessary, for maintaining good behaviour, that Babua should be ordered to give the security specified, the Magistrate made an order accordingly	Order against certain Bad characters, including Petitioner.	order u/s 107 to furnish bond for keeping the peace. Babua reportedly the "prime mover". This was based on a report. And then the magistrate sought confirmation of these facts from his "conversations" with inhabitants	Order passed by Magistrate who notes the difficulty in getting evidence. Babua was also heard and led witnesses: — "Not one, but nearly every respectable city resident, who has spoken to me no the subject, has condemned this Babua as by repute the biggest black character in the city, and to such an extent has his influence made itself felt for evil, that one and all my informants refuse to come forward in open Court and give evidence against the accused for fear of the consequences. As one native gentleman expressed himself: ‘If’ said he, ‘you insist upon my coming into Court, I must leave Mirzapur, as I should not dare remain there any longer.’ It may readily be understood, therefore, as matters stand, how difficult a thing it is to obtain any evidence at all. In fact, the evidence on which the Court has to rely is certainly not as strong as it ought to be. In a question, however, of proceedings which have for their object the prevention of crime and preservation of the public security rather than the punishment of any particular offence I think, as Magistral in charge of the peace of a large city, I am justified in acting to a great extent upon information which has reached me from trust worthy sources as to the reputed character and habits of the accused; and such information, I unhesitatingly state justifies me in demanding security for Babua's good behaviour."	Sessions Judge affirmed the order. He also "consulted" a few residents of Mirzapur about Babua.	Revision filed, and allowed. — "I regret to have to say that the procedure of the Magistrate in this case has been both unusual and irregular. Conversations out of Court with persons, however respectable, are not legal or proper material upon which to adopt proceedings under ss. 107 or 110 of the Criminal Procedure Code; and while in every was anxious to support the Magistrates in preserving peace and good behaviour in the cities under their charge, it is impossible that this Court can for a moment allow the idea to get current that this is the kind of information required by law to justify issue of the process mentioned in Chapter VIII of the Code. Nor can it permit the Judge's extraordinary remark to the effect that he had “taken the opportunity of consulting a few of the residents of Mirzapur about this Babua, and the account they give of him is very black indeed,” to pass without pointing out in very distinct terms that his action in talking out of Court about a case the was before him judicially was most improper, and must not be repeated. It seems to be thought that the procedure to he followed for taken sureties of the peace or for good behaviour may he of the loosest kind, and it is tune this idea was corrected. No doubt the information to be required by a Magistrate before issuing an order under s. 112 may to some extent be of a hearsay and general description; but when the party to whom the order is directed appears in Conn in obedience to such, order, the inquiry must be conducted on the lines laid down in s. 117. It is not because a man has a bad character that he is therefore necessarily liable to be called upon for sureties of the peace or for good behaviour." (136)
17										"There must be satisfactory evidence in the one case that he has done something or taken some step, that indicates an intention to break the peace, or that is likely to occasion a breach of the peace; and in the other that he is within the category of persons mentioned in s. 110, the determination of which question must always be guided by the considerations pointed out in Empress v. Nawab (1). I am well aware that is Mirzapur, particularly, the task of the Magistrate in preserving order is an extremely difficult and anxious one; but neither he, nor the Judge, nor this Court is empowered by law to put a man in prison simply because he has an evil reputation. If respectable persons, who can prove facts which would constitute the credible information legally necessary to justify issue of process and requirement of security, have not the courage to come forward and assist the Magistrate in the prevention of breaches of the peace or of crimes by giving evidence in Court, it is unfortunate, to say the least of it, but the Magistrate is not therefore entitled to act upon inadequate proof obtained aliunde, which be himself describes “as not so strong as it ought to be” if in the interest of public order or security to property the attendance in Court of such persons was necessary, the Magistrate had the power, if he chose to exercise it, of compelling their appearance." (137)
18										Imp: "No adequate information is disclosed upon the face of the order showing that the alleged apprehended breach of the peace—namely, the alleged intended assault upon the City Kotwal—could not he prevented otherwise than by the arrest of Babua. This the lair requires the Magistrate to record, and it is not enough for him merely to express a belief that such a course is necessary. Not only must he have “reason to fear the commission of a breach of the peace,” but “that such breach of the peace cannot be prevented otherwise than by the immediate arrest of such.”" (138)
19	Queen Empress v. Sheodin & Anr.	(1888-90) 6 All 77	Allahabad High Court (Mahmood J)	Revision before the HC —	In 1876 a Magistrate passed an order under s. 518, directing the Saraogis of Etah to take one of their annual religious processions along a particular route and at a particular hour. In 1886, in which year there was no fresh promulgation of the order, the Saraogis took their procession along another route and at a different hour, and for so doing some of them were convicted and sentenced under s. 188 of the Penal Code — These were sets of hindu religious groups that held beliefs inimical to each other.	Conflicting religious groups	2nd September, 1876, the Magistrate, acting under the authority which s. 518 of the Criminal Procedure Code (Act X of 1872) conferred upon him, promulgated an order whereby it was determined that the Saraogis were to take the procession of Rath-Jatra, or Parasnath-ka-Mela, as the ritual is called there, by a particular route and at a particular time. The object of making the night as the time when the Rath, or chariot — The order was followed for a few years after that even without it being promulgated specifically.	The magistrate passed an order — these guys were prosecuted for 188, and convicted.	Sessions Judge reversed conviction, finding that the 1886 order was not the same as the 1876 order and there was no violation of the order currently in force.	HC Agreed. — "I am entirely of the same opinion. It seems to me that in interpreting statutes of a penal character it is important to see that the powers conferred upon the Magistrates are duly exercised with reference to the rendering unlawful of acts that would otherwise be lawful. Under the old Code, Act X of 1872, s. 518 gave to Magistrates the power to issue orders in cases of obstruction, danger to human life, or riots, and the explanation to the section clearly shows that the Legislature in conferring this power intended it only to be applied to emergent matters. That section, however, did not prescribe any limitation or duration as to the duration of the order remaining in force; but a Full Bench of the Calcutta High Court in Gopi Mohun Mullick v. Taramoni Chowdhrani(1) concurred in holding upon general principles of the interpretation of such statutes that the Magistrate was not empowered to pass an order under s. 518 of Act X of 1872, which would have more than a temporary operation, and that the grant of what is in effect an order for a perpetual injunction was beyond such magisterial jurisdiction. I follow the principles of that ruling, and I cannot help thinking that s. 144 of the present Code, in modifying the [118] law contained in the corresponding s. 518 of the old Code, takes into account what Garth, C.J., said in the Full Bench case to which I have referred, and I say this because I find that whilst s. 518 of the old Code was silent as to the duration of a Magistrate's order passed for the purposes mentioned, the present Code in the last paragraph of s. 144 contains express provisions, saying that “no order under this section shall remain in force for more than two months from the making thereof, unless in cases of danger to human life, health or safety, or a likelihood of a riot or an affray, the Local Government, by notification in the official Gazette, otherwise directs.” This, then, is the present law, and I think also was virtually the older law, though, of course, no duration was named in the older Code." (117-118)	Interesting thta the HC was taking "judicial notice" of the conflict between Vaishnavites and Shaivites on certain aspects.
20					It appears that in September, 1886, when the Saraogis contemplated the performance of the ceremony of Rath-Jatra, or religious procession of the chariot of Parsanath, which in many respects and incidents is analogous to the procession of the chariot of Jagarnath—a Vishnava Hindu deity—they applied to the Magistrate for certain police arrangements, no doubt expecting possible disturbances by the Vaishnav section of the community. Thereupon the Magistrate, by an order of the 13th September, 1886, which may perhaps be taken to have been passed under s. 144 of the Criminal Procedure Code (Act X of 1882), issued no specific directions to the petitioners Saraogis, but directed the District Superintendent of Police to make the usual arrangements. The procession took place on the 14th September, 1886, in the forenoon of the day, and it proceeded by a route and at a time not prescribed by the Magistrate's order of the 2nd September, 1876, which pointed out night to be the time when the Bath was to be paraded
21	Queen Empress v. Nathu & Ors.	ILR (1884) 6 All 214	Allahabad High Court (Straight J)	Revision against orders passed by the Magistrate asking 69 persons to execute bonds to keep the peace u/s 107	Same dispute of Saraogis taking out a procession and other side being offended — This happens in 1883 November.	Religious groups in conflict.	u/s 107 after taking some evidence — Magistrate passed the following order: This case has arisen out of a procession which the Saraogia of Kosi have obtained permission from Government to hold next week. The Banias of Kosi are very indignant at the, as they consider the holding of the procession of the idol of Parasnath to be an outrage on their religious feelings. I have no doubt that unless some preventive measures are taken, the Banias and their adherents will molest this procession. The evidence on that point taken to-day is, in my opinion, conclusive. I do not, however think it necessary to take security from all the accused. It will suffice to take security from the ringleaders only, while as to the others personal recognizances will suffice, I further think the securities and recognizances should be for the term of one year, as during the coming year several Saraogi ceremonias will take place. I accordingly direct that all the sixty-nine persons named above do enter into security in the sum of Rs. 500 each person to keep the peace for the term of one year from to-day.” The Magistrate further directed that the ten “ringleaders” should give two sureties in the sum of Rs. 250, or one surety in the sum of Rs. 500, to keep the peace the term of one year from the same date (217)	Magistrate passed order.	Revision filed — overturned order. — "Parties against whom process is issued under the section relating to sureties of the peace are entitled to something more than a mere assertion in writing by the Magistrate, that he has been informed that a breach of the peace is likely to occur, in order to enable them, it they are in a position to do so, to bring evidence to rebut the truth of such information. But farther than this, the very loose statements of the tahsildar and sub-inspector of police, as to the large majority of persons summoned, were quite insufficient to justify the wholesale orders for security passed by the Magistrate. Moreover as the mela, at which a disturbance was anticipated, would have been over in less than a fortnight, it was a most excessive exercise of power to require all the parties to find security for one year. As a matter of fact, five of them have now been in jail for upwards of two months, for non-compliance with an order passed upon the flimsiest materials. I do not say that such was the case here, indeed I am certain the Magistrate had the most laudable objects in view, but the provisions of the Code of Criminal Procedure as to finding security for the peace may be easily converted into an engine of injustice and oppression, and this Court is bound to watch proceedings adopted thereunder with the closest scrutiny." (218)		Important rhetoric on the nature of the CRPC being abused as a tool.
22									"So as to the remaining fifty-nine, there should have been some clear and distinct proof on record affecting each of them, and warranting the inference that such person was likely to commit a breach of the peach or to do a wrongful act like. Iy to occasion a breach of the peace, if the Magistrate's notions of his powers under Chapter VII. of the Code are correct, there would be nothing to prevent his ordering the whole of the Hindu or Muhammadan inhabitants of a place over which he has charge, upon information of the vaguest character, to enter into large recognizances with heavy sureties. I do not wish to say a word more than is absolutely necessary, as I am aware that the Magistrate has an exceedingly difficult district to deal with, and I should be sorry in any way to weaken his legitimate authority or action but the Criminal Procedure Code must not be made use of for the purpose of supplying administrative deficiencies in the shape of an inadequate police force to keep a place in order. Every person, to whom a summons is issued calling on him to show cause why he should not find security, is entitled to proper information as to the materials upon which process has been granted against him, and to a reasonable interval within which to prepare himself to meet such information by evidence or otherwise, as the matter may require. Moreover, his case should he considered by itself and on its own merits, and except in rare instances it should not be mixed up with, and should never be prejudice by, that of other persona Nor should the order for security be in an excessive sum, or for the extreme term of twelve months, except when absolutely necessary." (219)
23	In re Rahmat-Ullah	ILR (1895) 17 All 485 (FB)	Allahabad High Court (3 Judges) (Edge, CJ & Banerji & Burkitt JJ)	Revision against orders passed y the magistrate of Benares.			Order by magistrate to Rahmat Ullah that he should re-built two baradaris which had fallen partly in the rain and which he had by misconception dismantled. — rebuild them "on their old side, and of the same shape and stone structure as they were formerly, and directed him to begin rebuilding at once". — Further, the order also restrictied anyone, even if holding a decree, to act in any way on the plot without permission of the DM (487)	DM passed the impugned order	"Those words are undoubtedly very wide and equally vague, but we must assume that the Legislature in using those words in the section did not intend to give a Magistrate such extraordinary powers as would enable him to order, under that section, a building which had fallen down in private grounds to be re-built by the owner of those grounds. If Mr. Raid's contention as to the re-building part of the order were correct, a litigant who had established his right to open windows in his house or to maintain open ancient windows in his house could be restrained for two mouths by a Magistrate's order under s. 144; and in certain cases; by a further order of a Local Government under that section, permanently, from availing himself of the right decreed to him by the Civil Court, and that even if the decree were a decree of the Queen in Council. We may give another illustration. A, a private person, in order to prevent his neighbour B overlooking A's premises, might put up a boarding on his own land, and on his removing it if B objected that the removal of the hoarding would cause annoyance to him and his family, who could be overlooked from A's ground, the Magistrate could, if Mr. Raid's contention is correct, make a lawful order under s. 144 ordering A to resuscitate the hoarding on his own ground, which he had pulled down. There must be a reasonable construction put on these vague words of the statute." (488) (Those words is the text of 144 talking about "certain" Acts in respect of property under one's possession / control.)		Interesting remarks: "In order to avoid being misunderstood, we think it right to say that it is necessary that a Magistrate should have the extensive powers which are conferred on him by s. 144 of Act No. X of 1882, and we think that as long as his order is within that section, that is, so long as he has jurisdiction under that section to make it, he should be given the widest discretion. The powers under that section are intended to be used summarily for the protection of the [490] public, including private individuals, and the preservation of the peace. If this order had been one which the Magistrate had power to make under s. 144, we should have had no jurisdiction or power to interfere with it. We may say further that the Magistrate of Benares, in our opinion, acted with the very best intentions, but unfortunatey he did exceed his jurisdiction." (489-90)
24									No power to frustrate the execution of a lawful decree of civil court: "Where a Magistrate happens to be Collector, he may have to execute the decree, if execution is sought against ancestral property, but there he is a quasi Court executing the decree; but as Magistrate, his duty in connection with the execution of a Civil Court decree begins and ends with the rendering of necessary protection to the officers of the Civil Court lawfully executing the decree of the Civil Court, and neither he nor the Local Government, under s. 144, has any jurisdiction to make any order restraining the execution of a Civil Court decree, or threatening with a prosecution under s. 188 of the Penal Code, 1860 any person who attempts to execute a Civil Court decree in the particular place, without the Magistrate's permission." (489)
25	Kirpa Singh v. Emperor	1912 Cri LJ (1897 case though)	Chief Court of Punjab (Stogdon J)	Revision against conviction u/s 295, 298 IPC against Kirpa Singh — Tahsildar conducted the initial inquiry.	Alleged that Kirpa Singh & ors had hurt religious sentiments by slaughtering two goats by Jhatka without permission	Seems like Hindu shop-owners came up against a Muslim Tahsildar / and DC as well.	This is the interesting part — There is no 144 order as such, but in the build-up to the case, there is an issue of how do we close the shop of these meat sellers. In that regard, it is said that the Dy. Commissioner oredered it to be closed but then during the appeal hearings it appeared that there was no such order and the Tahsildar himself had taken these steps. — "What authority the Tahsildar had to issue such an order is not apparent. The District Magistrate could have issued an order under section 144, Criminal Procedure Code, but it seems pretty evident that he did not do so. It is clear that the Tahsildar, who is a Musalman, wanted the shop closed, and that he ordered accused to close it. It is said that they promised to comply with his order, but instead of doing so set it at defiance." (602)	Conviction	Dismissed appeal	Acquitted	interesting to see how religious disputes got magnified and the exercise of power by authorities is well-known / aspired to.
26	In re Bireshwar Basu Majumdar & ors.	(1897-98) 2 CWN 70	Calcutta High Court (2) (Ghose & Wilkins JJ)	Revision	"These three rules relate to certain orders made by the Sub-Divisional Magistrate of Goalundo on the 8th June and on subsequent dates, directing that certain zemindars should remove certain prostitutes whom they had settled upon their lands to some other part of Goalundo, and because they did nob obey the said order, that they should be prosecuted under sec. 188, I.P.C. These orders we might here mention, not only affect the zemindars, but also the prostitutes; and the applications that were made to us and upon which the rules were granted were applications made on behalf of the zemindars as ales on behalf of the prostitutes" — "t appears upon a refevence to the record that the Magistrate had, at one time, authorized the said prostitutes being settled by the zemindars upon a particular portion of their property; but subsequently, upon representations being made to him by certain railway officials, he ordered that their houses should be taken down, that they should remove from the lands upon which they had settled, within 24 hours, and that they should take up their quarters on the other side of the railway line which belonged to some other proprietor, and which the said Magistrate thought was the appropriate place where they should go and live." (70)	Order against zamindars and prostitutes who were living on their land, made at the behest of the railway officials who seem to be bothered by this arrangement.	Told the prostitutes / zamindars to raze the huts and settle elsewhere. — Order passed by the Sub-Divisional Magistrate.	Order passed.	Revision preferred. Held that the 144 orders were ultra vires — "We are of opinion that s. 144 CrPC was not intended to apply to such a case as was before the Sub-Divisional Magistrate"
27									"The zemindars had, under leases entered into between them and the prostitutes, settled them upon one portion of their property: apparently the prostitutes spent some money in building their huts, and were living there for some little time; and it was then represented to the Sub-Divisional Officer that if some of the residents of Goalundo were to visit these prostitutes, they would have to cross the railway lines and thereby their lives might be endangered; and thereupon, and for no other reason that we can discover upon this record, it was ordered that they should be forthwith removed. Though it may, no doubt, be argued that the words “such Magistrate * * * may direct any person to abstain from a certain act, or to take certain order with certain property in his possession,” &c., as occurring in the first clause to sec. 144, Cr, P.C., are of such general character as may cover a case like this, and that a Magistrate is entitled to make an order of the kind against the person who is in possession of such property, yet we do not think that it was ever the intention of the Legislature that orders like those with which we are concerned should be made in the circumstances of the case before the Magistrate." (71)
28	Golam Mahamad @ Alamgir v. Bhuban Mohan Moitra & Ors.	(1897-98) 2 CWN 422	Calcutta High Court (2) (Ghose & Rampini JJ)	Revision against orderpassed by the Sub-Divisional Magistrate of Nattore	On the basis of a police report 02.07.1897 which stated that there was dispute between two parties as both of them were trying to keep the raiyats of a particular mehal called Taraf Kalam under their control by enticement, the SDM passed an order u/s 144 enjoining the person "not to go to the said Taraf Kalam nor allow any of your relations or servants or any other persons to go to the said Taraf Kalam" (423) — The principal noticee was a Minor, on top of everything else.	Acting on police report qua certain parties.	See facts.	Order passed without hearing.	Revision - allowed - "We think this rule must be made absolute. The order which the magistrate has made and which purports to be an order under sec. 144, Cr. P.C. is to the effect that the Petitioner should not go to a certain village, or must not allow any of his servants, relations or friends to go there; such an order is of the most indefinite character; indefinite as to persons and indefinite as to time." (423)
29	Roop Lal Dass v. David Manook & Anr.	(1897-98) 2 CWN 572	Calcutta High Court (2) Maclean CJ & Banerji J)	Revision. — tricky beause now you have 433 amended in the crpc, which ousts the HC jurisdiction in revision for such orders.	Petitioner was the mortgagee of certain valuable property, and in due course of law he obtained a decree in a suit to enforce his mortgage security, and under that decree the property was put up for sale and purchased by himself, and he obtained a certificate in February 1898. He then, in accordance with the ordinary procedure of the Civil Courts, obtained delivery of possession of the property in question, without any opposition on the part of the mortgagor, the judgment-debtor. On the is February, the present complainant, one David Manook, who, so far as one can judge has no interest whatever in the property, lodged a complaint against the Petitioner in the Court of the Joint-Magistrate of Dacca, alleging that the Petitioner, with some 200 men was trying to oust him from his bungalow, which is part of the above mortgaged property, and upon that allegation the Joint Magistrate of Dacca, purporting to act under sec. 144 of the Criminal Procedure Code, ordered the Petitioner or any of his subordinates to refrain from entering upon the lands or property known as Oottar Shahpur, and required him to show cause on the 1st March following why the said order should not be rescinded or modified" (572-73)	144 order ensued out of a litigation	Joint-Magistrate, Dacca, ordered that Petitioner or any of his subordinates from entering upon the property that the petitioner had just recently acquired possession of." — Order passed on complaint but no evidence.	Order passed and affirmed: "On the 1st March, the Joint Magistrate called the case on, and in absence of the pleader of the Petitioner passed this order:— “Notice hung up in accused's house. He is absent. Order made absolute.” It appears from the Petitioner's evidence in support of this rule that about ten minutes after the above order had been made, the pleader of the Petitioner came into Court and asked the Joint Magistrate to allow him to state his case, but the Magistrate declined to hear him and made this order, “Rup Lall was absent when called on and the order made absolute. This petition was put in too late—File.” I think the Magistrate ought, under the circumstances, to have heard the Petitioner's pleader, and that he exercised an unwise discretion, in not doing so. The matter is then taken on appeal to the District Magistrate, who confirmed the view taken by the Joint-Magistrate. Hence the application to this Court." (573)	went to HC — "It is urged for the Petitioner that the order is bad on at least two grounds: (1) the case is not within sec. 144; 2) the property in question is situated outside the local jurisdiction of the Court of the Joint-Magistrate of Dacca. As regards the first point, it is sufficient to say that looking at the nature of the case and to the language of the section in question, the section does not apply to a case like the present. The order puporting to be made under that section is, therefore, bad." (573)
30									Jurisdiction now an issue, but found that where the order is entirely ultra vires then the revisional jurisdiction is not ousted — "As to our jurisdiction to entertain the present application, by reason of the language of the last part of sec. 435 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, the reasoning and the decision in the case of Ananda Chandra Bhuttacharjee v. Carr-Stephen appear to me to be well-founded. If this were not so, Magistrates might, by affecting to act under sec. 144, when the case was not within that section, oust the jurisdiction of this Court to interfere." (573)		Carr Stephen case is here: https://indiankanoon.org/doc/1321699/
31	Empress v. Carr Stephen
32	Empress v. Protab Chunder Ghosh	(1897-98) 2 CWN 593	Calcutta High Court (2) (Maclean CJ & Banerjee J)	Reference from L. Pallt., Esq., Sessions Judge of Jessore., arising from a 144 order passed by the District Magistrate of Jessore — See the first appeal part.		Boat operators in the town.	Order passed ex parte without notice by the DM, Jessore: — "Whereas it appears from the report of the Civil Surgeon of Jessore that the crowding of boats in the river Kabadak opposite the town of Kotechandpore above the Fakirparah ghats dangerous to the health of the residents of the town and should be stopped with this exception that three or four boats containing altogether not tiara than twenty-five men in them may be allowed to come up above the said ghat to discharge their cargo for a period of three days at a time and then return to a place opposite to or not above the said Fakirparah ghat,—it is accordingly hereby ordered that, all persons having charge of or any control Over boats on the river Kabadak which are now moored above the Fakirparah ghat do within three days of receipt of this order remove their boats down the river to place opposite to or not above the and ghat and that after such removal any three or four boats containing not more than twenty-five persons in all may be allowed to come up above the said ghat at a time and stay for not more than three days and then return being succeeded in turn by others to the same number for a similar period In order to determine which boats should have preference for the three days' stay above the said ghat and in what order they should go, it is further directed that a list of the boats affected by this order be sent to the Sub-Divisional Officer of Jhenida who will decide in what order they should go taking all the circumstances of the cases into consideration, and it is directed that except in the order prescribed by the Sub-Divisional Officer no boats sh ill proceed above the aid ghat. This order is addressed to the crown, lessees, proprietors or any other persona having control over the movements of the said boats and is passed under sec. 141 of the Criminal Procedure Code. It extends to all boats not being mere dingis and will have effect for two months from the date of publication. The Fakirparah ghat is the ghat situated below Mr. Macleod's house and above the Solemanpur ghat.”	Order passed ex parte arising out of a Report of the Civil Surgeon of Jessore.	Sessions Judge heard and then made reference — "The most important and vital point in the case, however is that the order itself is of a nature not justified by the provisions of sec. 144, Cr. P.C. The heading of the chapter, which consists only of this section, shows the nature of this provision of the law as contemplated by the Legislature. The heading is “temporary orders in urgent cases of nuisance.” And the first paragraph which sets forth the circumstances which would justify an order under sec. 144, Cr. P.C., uses, the phrase “in cases …. where immediate prevention or speedy remedy is desirable.” Thus it is clear that the section is intended only to apply to urgent cases of nuisance where immediate prevention or speedy remedy is desirable and where a temporary order would meet the requirements of the case Now in the present case the Magistrate appeared to have been of opinion that the health of the town was likely to be endangered by the crowding of boats opposite the town of Kotechandpur. And he accordingly passed this order regulating the number of boats which were to be allowed to proceed to the place and the length of time they were to be allowed to Stay, I do not see how an order of this nature can be said to be one passed to provide for an urgent case of nuisance in which immediate prevention or speedy remedy is desirable. The question of providing for the general health of a town by regulating the boat traffic is not a question which can in any way be considered one concerning an “urgent case of nuisance” making “immediate prevention or speedy remedy desirable.” It is not a question of the kind intended to be dealt with by an order under sec. 144, Cr. P.C." (594) (emphasis mine)	Court — Agreed with sessions judge — "We agree with the learned Sessions Judge in thinking that an order like the one made in this case, regulating the boat traffic at a certain landing-place, in the manner directed by the order, is not an order that is authorized by sec. 144 of the Code of Criminal Procedure. The very terms of the order go to show that it is not one directing any person to abstain from a certain act or to take certain order with certain property in his possession or under his management within the meaning of tic section. That being so, the order is not authorised by the provisions of the law under which it purports to have been made, and there is no other how that we are aware of under which the Magistrate could make Such an order, nor does the mere fact of the order purporting to be made under sec. 144, Cr. P.C., prevent this Court from interfering with it in revision, if the order is on that cannot be made under that section. " (594-95)	Interesting analogy to be drawn with what seems to be happening in Delhi these days! Orders of general import not directed to prevent any immediate emergency etc.
33	Mahamaddi Mollah & Ors. v. Empress	(1897-98) 2 CWN 747	Calcutta High Court (2) (Ameer Ali & Henderson JJ)	Revision —	Petitioners had erected certain huts on land leased to them and held their shops in them. They were migrating and the huts / structures were used by successors as well - SDM issued a notice calling upon people to remove huts "within three hours of receipt" of the notice	Ex parte order against everyone	Order passed by the SDM, Goalundc: :"Whereas it appears from the Goalundo Police Sub-Inspector's report, dated the 25th instant, that one Mahamaddi Mollah of Barat has erected huts in the Barat Bazar, at the instigation of Asarati Mir Naib, in violation of this office order, dated 3rd idem, directing them to erect huts in accordance to the plan prepared by Bengal Police Sub-Inspector and G.R. Police Sub-Inspector of Goalundo Ghat; and as this will undoubtedly cause obstruction and annoyance to public and many also endanger public health and give rise to a riot or an affray the said Mahamaddi Mollah is directed to remove the huts in question within 3 hours from the time of service of this notice; and to erect them according to the plan mentioned above. He is distinctly given to understand that he would be criminally prosecuted under sec. 188, I.P.C., if he fails to carry out this order I pass this order ex parte as immediate remedy is desirable." (748)	Ex parte order issued by SDM	Revision filed. Allowed.		Again, interesting to see how admin type stuff is / was being done through 144 ex parte orders — similarities to today's scenario.
34									"No cause has been shewn in this matter; but the Deputy Magistrate has submitted an explanation; but there is nothing on the record, or in the explanation to show that there was any such emergency in the matter which required him to take action under sub-sec. (2), sec. 144, Cr. P.C., as he has done. It is only in cases coming under sub-sec. (2) that the law declares that the order may be made ex parte; and, as we have already pointed out, there is nothing on the record, or in the explanation, to show that the matter was of such a nature that the circumstances did not admit of the service in due time of the notice upon the person against whom the order is directed the law provides that ordinarily in proceedings under sec. 144, Cr. P.C., notice should issue upon the person against whom the order was directed. It is only in cases coming under sub-sec. (2) that service of notice is dispensed with. Under such circumstances we set aside the order, leaving the Magistrate to take such steps as he may think necessary, in case he considers any further action is required" (748-49)
35	Brojo Nath Ghose & Anr. v. Empress	(1899-00) 4 CWN 226	Calcutta High Court (Prinsep & Hill JJ)	Revision. Petitioner's convicted u/s 188 IPC as they violated 144 orders and held a Hat	144 Order banning Petitioners from holding a Hat which they violated — challenged conviction by assailing the order.	Rival Hat owners	acted on a complaint by one Hat owner to pass orders u/s 144	Order passed on complaint by one Hat owner — ultimate prosecution also led by the private party.	Challenged in revision — allowed. Largely because there was nothing to show that an order was needed u/ 144: "Now, there is not only no evidence as to the probable result of disobedience to the order under sec. 144, but there is no sufficient ground upon which such a finding could have been arrived at. No about, within our experience, the establishment of a rival hat at a place near to an old hat and to be held on the same day has often led to a breach of the peace, but it would not be safe or proper that such occurrences do sometimes take place should alone form a sufficient ground for a conviction under sec. 188, I.P.C. It would be as well to consider that the prevalence of a crime in a particular locality was evidence that the accused did commit such a crime without any evidence thereof. On these grounds, we think that the conviction under sec. 188, I.P.C., is bad, and we accordingly set it aside as well as the sentence and make the rule absolute." (228)		Veiled remark about taking judicial notice of the surroundings to pass such orders.
36	Panchkarla Ranganayakulu v. HG Pendergast	?	Madras High Court (Collins CJ, Shepard J)	A suit on the right to carry out a procession and whether or not such a right existed for one community and then seekign damages gaint police for taking away their banners.	Hindu sect sought a declaration that they had a right to carry out a procession, and also sought an injunction against rival group from stopping them — but the issue in this second appeal was one of seeking damages against the police who took away the banners of the plaintiffs during the procession.	Rival religious sects.	Not a restrictive order but a challenge to police acts of taking away the banners of the religious group carrying out the procession.		In short: "Both the lower courts agreed in granting the plaintiffs a declaration that they had a right to celebrate in the public streets a certain festival but an injunction was refused and no damages awarded for taking possession of certain banners."	Nominal damages, because this power could not be located under the Madras Police Act: "It is not disputed by the Government Pleader that the plaintiffs had a right to pass in procession through the streets of Masulipatam and the only question that arises is, was the defendant justified in taking possession of the banners which undoubtedly he removed from the procession. I carefully guard myself in this judgment by stating that it is the powers of the police in this District that I am alone dealing with and both Mr. Pattabhiramayyar, the Vakil for the appellants, and the Government Pleader admit that the powers of the police over processions are defined by the Madras Police Act XXIV of 1859. Section 49 of that Act defines the powers of the police--they may direct the conduct of all assemblies and processions in the public streets, prescribe the routes by which and the times at which such processions may pass, keep order in the public streets and prevent obstructions; they may also regulate the use of music in the streets on the occasion of native festivals and may direct crowds of twelve or more persons to disperse when they have reason to apprehend any breach of the peace. The powers thus given to the police are large and set out with particularity, but I fail to see that the Superintendent of Police has any power to remove from the procession any banners belonging to the processionists and to order those banners to be taken to the Police Station. I am of opinion therefore that the respondent in taking possession of the banners committed in law a tortious act, but under the circumstances 1 give only nominal damages, viz., one Rupee: in fact only nominal damages has been asked for. The decree must be modified accordingly and in other respects I would dismiss the appeal."
37	Ramanadhan Chetti v. Murugappa Chetti (petitioner v/ counter-petitioner)	ILR (1901) 24 Mad 45	Madras (White CJ & Moore J)	revision against a 144 order	Order passed calling upon petiitioner "not to interfere with the management of the kovil" ie. temple.	Rival groups interested in running / controlling temple affairs.	Head Assistant Magistrate passed orders calling upon one party (petitioner) "not to interfere with the management of the kovil"	Order passed. Not clear whether evidence was taken.	Revision — dismissed — Held that not to interfere in the management was an order directing petitioner to "abstain from a certain act" which was within the meaning of 144. — Partially, the order was modified, insofar as one condition was found to be in violaton of 144(5).
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