| A | B | C | D | E | F | G | H | I | J | K | L | M | N | O | P | Q | R | S | T | U | V | W | X | Y | Z | AA | AB | AC | AD | AE | AF | AG | AH | AI | AJ | AK | AL | AM | AN | AO | AP | AQ | AR | AS | AT | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
1 | start_date_type | start_date | country | geo_scope | area_name | shutdown_type | affected_network | shutdown_extent | ordered_by | decision_maker | actual_cause | actual_cause_details | info_source | info_source_link | shutdown_status | end_date | duration | gov_justification | gov_just_details | gov_ack | legal_just | legal_method | gov_ack_source | gov_ack_quote | facebook_affected | twitter_affected | whatsapp_affected | instagram_affected | telegram_affected | other_affected | sms_affected | phonecall_affected | telcos_involved | telco_ack | telco_ack_source | telco_ack_quote | election | violence | hr_abuse_reported | users_targeted | users_target_detail | users_notified | econ_impact | event | an_link | region |
2 | Estimated | 5/24/2009 | Iran (Islamic Republic of) | It affected locations in more than one state, province, or region | Nationwide | Shutdown | Broadband, Mobile | Service-based | Executive government | Information control | CSO KIO partners | https://explorer.ooni.org/findings/273244099200; https://www.theguardian.com/world/2009/may/24/facebook-banned-iran; https://time.com/6139988/countries-where-twitter-facebook-tiktok-banned/; https://explorer.ooni.org/chart/mat?probe_cc=IR&since=2016-01-01&until=2016-12-31&time_grain=day&axis_x=measurement_start_day&test_name=web_connectivity&domain=twitter.com; https://explorer.ooni.org/chart/mat?probe_cc=IR&since=2021-01-01&until=2021-12-31&time_grain=day&axis_x=measurement_start_day&test_name=web_connectivity&domain=twitter.com; https://explorer.ooni.org/chart/mat?probe_cc=IR&since=2025-06-01&until=2026-02-28&time_grain=day&axis_x=measurement_start_day&test_name=web_connectivity&domain=twitter.com; https://explorer.ooni.org/chart/mat?probe_cc=IR&since=2017-01-01&until=2017-12-31&time_grain=day&axis_x=measurement_start_day&test_name=facebook_messenger; https://explorer.ooni.org/chart/mat?probe_cc=IR&since=2025-01-01&until=2026-03-09&time_grain=day&axis_x=measurement_start_day&test_name=facebook_messenger | Ongoing | Unknown | No | Yes | Yes | No | No | No | No | No | Unknown | No | No | No | No | Facebook and Twitter were banned formally in Iran in 2009 amid disupted elections and mass protests at the time. OONI Explorer shows anomalies and blocking measurements of both platforms since we began tracking for STOP in 2016. The blocks are ongoing in 2026. | MENA | |||||||||||||||||
3 | Actual | 9/11/2013 | Turkey | It affected locations in more than one state, province, or region | Nationwide | Shutdown | Broadband, Mobile | Service-based | Executive government | Turkey's Directorate of Telecommunication following Istanbul's Criminal Court of Peace | Information control | CSO KIO partners | https://explorer.ooni.org/chart/mat?probe_cc=TR&since=2023-01-01&until=2023-12-31&time_grain=day&axis_x=measurement_start_day&test_name=web_connectivity&domain=www.grindr.com; https://ooni.org/post/2023-jordan-blocks-grindr/#conclusion; https://kaosgl.org/en/single-news/grindr-ban-in-turkey-taken-to-constitutional-court; https://explorer.ooni.org/chart/mat?probe_cc=TR&since=2025-01-19&until=2026-02-19&time_grain=day&axis_x=measurement_start_day&test_name=web_connectivity&domain=www.grindr.com | Ongoing | Other | "Protective measure" | Yes | Yes | https://www.independent.co.uk/tech/gay-hookup-app-grindr-fights-back-against-turkish-ban-with-threat-of-legal-action-8829360.html | No | No | No | No | No | Grindr | No | No | No | No | No | No | LGBTQ groups | No | Grindr has been blocked in Turkey since Sep. 11, 2013, and is ongoing into 2026. The block was in place at the start of our STOP documentation on Jan. 1, 2016. | MENA | |||||||||||
4 | Actual | 9/15/2016 | Indonesia | It affected locations in more than one state, province, or region | Nationwide | Shutdown | Broadband, Mobile | Service-based | Executive government | Communications Ministry following a request from police | Information control | CSO KIO partners | https://explorer.ooni.org/chart/mat?test_name=web_connectivity&axis_x=measurement_start_day&since=2023-09-20&until=2024-09-21&time_grain=day&probe_cc=ID&domain=www.grindr.com; https://ooni.org/post/2023-jordan-blocks-grindr/#conclusion; https://time.com/4496531/indonesia-lgbt-grinder/; https://explorer.ooni.org/chart/mat?probe_cc=ID&since=2024-05-20&until=2025-02-20&time_grain=day&axis_x=measurement_start_day&test_name=web_connectivity&domain=www.grindr.com; https://explorer.ooni.org/chart/mat?probe_cc=ID&since=2025-01-27&until=2026-02-27&time_grain=day&axis_x=measurement_start_day&test_name=web_connectivity&domain=www.grindr.com | Ongoing | Other | Authorities were targeting services that promoted "sexual deviancy" | Yes | No | https://tribune.com.pk/story/1182120/indonesia-blocks-gay-apps-sexual-deviancy/ | No | No | No | No | No | Grindr, Blued, BoyAhoy | No | No | No | No | No | No | LGBTQ groups | No | Grindr and at least two other apps have been blocked in Indonesia since Sep. 15, 2016, and are ongoing into Feb. 2026. | APAC | |||||||||||
5 | Estimated | 10/28/2016 | United Arab Emirates | It affected locations in more than one state, province, or region | Nationwide | Shutdown | Broadband, Mobile | Service-based | Unknown | Information control | CSO KIO partners | https://explorer.ooni.org/chart/mat?probe_cc=AE&since=2016-01-01&until=2016-12-31&time_grain=day&axis_x=measurement_start_day&test_name=web_connectivity&domain=www.grindr.com; https://ooni.org/post/2023-jordan-blocks-grindr/#conclusion; https://explorer.ooni.org/chart/mat?probe_cc=AE&since=2023-01-01&until=2024-04-01&time_grain=day&axis_x=measurement_start_day&test_name=web_connectivity&domain=www.grindr.com; https://explorer.ooni.org/chart/mat?probe_cc=AE&since=2024-01-19&until=2025-02-19&time_grain=day&axis_x=measurement_start_day&test_name=web_connectivity&domain=www.grindr.com; https://explorer.ooni.org/chart/mat?probe_cc=AE&since=2025-01-19&until=2026-02-19&time_grain=day&axis_x=measurement_start_day&test_name=web_connectivity&domain=www.grindr.com | Ongoing | Unknown | No | No | No | No | No | No | No | Grindr | No | No | No | No | No | No | LGBTQ groups | No | Grindr has been blocked in the United Arab Emirates since at least Oct. 28, 2016, and the block is ongoing into 2026. The blocking is currently implemented by means of TLS interference. | MENA | ||||||||||||||
6 | Estimated | 2/9/2017 | Saudi Arabia | It affected locations in more than one state, province, or region | Nationwide | Shutdown | Broadband, Mobile | Service-based | Unknown | Information control | CSO KIO partners | https://explorer.ooni.org/chart/mat?probe_cc=SA&since=2017-01-01&until=2017-12-31&time_grain=day&axis_x=measurement_start_day&test_name=web_connectivity&domain=www.grindr.com; https://ooni.org/post/2023-jordan-blocks-grindr/#conclusion; https://explorer.ooni.org/chart/mat?probe_cc=SA&since=2023-01-01&until=2024-04-01&time_grain=day&axis_x=measurement_start_day&test_name=web_connectivity&domain=www.grindr.com; https://explorer.ooni.org/chart/mat?probe_cc=SA&since=2024-01-19&until=2025-02-19&time_grain=day&axis_x=measurement_start_day&test_name=web_connectivity&domain=www.grindr.com; https://explorer.ooni.org/chart/mat?probe_cc=SA&since=2025-01-19&until=2026-02-19&time_grain=day&axis_x=measurement_start_day&test_name=web_connectivity&domain=www.grindr.com | Ongoing | Unknown | No | No | No | No | No | No | No | Grindr | No | No | No | No | No | No | LGBTQ groups | No | Grindr has been blocked in Saudi Arabia since at least Feb. 9, 2017, and the block is ongoing into 2026. The blocking is currently implemented by means of TLS interference. | MENA | ||||||||||||||
7 | Estimated | 5/12/2017 | Iran (Islamic Republic of) | It affected locations in more than one state, province, or region | Nationwide | Shutdown | Broadband, Mobile | Service-based | Unknown | Information control | CSO KIO partners | https://explorer.ooni.org/chart/mat?probe_cc=IR&since=2017-01-01&until=2017-12-31&time_grain=day&axis_x=measurement_start_day&test_name=web_connectivity&domain=www.grindr.com; https://ooni.org/post/2023-jordan-blocks-grindr/#conclusion; https://explorer.ooni.org/chart/mat?probe_cc=IR&since=2023-01-01&until=2024-04-01&time_grain=day&axis_x=measurement_start_day&test_name=web_connectivity&domain=www.grindr.com; https://explorer.ooni.org/chart/mat?probe_cc=IR&since=2024-01-19&until=2025-02-19&time_grain=day&axis_x=measurement_start_day&test_name=web_connectivity&domain=www.grindr.com; https://explorer.ooni.org/chart/mat?probe_cc=IR&since=2025-01-19&until=2026-02-19&time_grain=day&axis_x=measurement_start_day&test_name=web_connectivity&domain=www.grindr.com | Ongoing | Unknown | No | No | No | No | No | No | Grindr | No | No | No | No | No | No | LGBTQ groups | No | Grindr has been blocked in Iran since at least May 12, 2017, and is ongoing into 2026. | MENA | |||||||||||||||
8 | Actual | 5/15/2017 | Ukraine | It affected locations in more than one state, province, or region | Nationwide | Shutdown | Broadband, Mobile | Service-based | Executive government | Other | Ukrainian authorities imposed a nationwide blocking of VKontakte and Odnoklassniki in line with the 2014 EU Regulation on restrictive measures (sanctions) against the platforms' owners | News media article | https://www.theguardian.com/world/2017/may/16/ukraine-blocks-popular-russian-websites-kremlin-role-war; https://www.kyivpost.com/post/7880; https://explorer.ooni.org/chart/mat?test_name=web_connectivity&axis_x=measurement_start_day&since=2017-01-01&until=2018-01-01&time_grain=day&probe_cc=UA&domain=vk.com; https://explorer.ooni.org/chart/mat?probe_cc=UA&since=2025-01-01&until=2026-03-09&time_grain=day&axis_x=measurement_start_day&test_name=web_connectivity&domain=vk.com | Ongoing | Other | Following sanctions | Yes | https://www.theguardian.com/world/2017/may/16/ukraine-blocks-popular-russian-websites-kremlin-role-war; https://www.kyivpost.com/post/7880 | No | No | No | No | No | VK (VKontakte), Ok.ru (Odnoklassniki) | No | No | Unknown | No | No | No | No | Authorities in Ukraine blocked VK and Odnoklassniki on May 15, 2017 in accordance with EU sanctions against the platforms' owners following Russia's annexation of Crimea. The blocks are ongoing into 2026. | https://www.accessnow.org/ukraines-internet-ban-fights-fire-fire-still-censorship/ | EECA | ||||||||||||
9 | Actual | 5/1/2018 | Iran (Islamic Republic of) | It affected locations in more than one state, province, or region | Nationwide | Shutdown | Broadband, Mobile | Service-based | Executive government | Branch 2 of the Culture and Media Prosecutor's Office | Information control | CSO KIO partners | https://explorer.ooni.org/findings/273244099200; https://explorer.ooni.org/chart/mat?probe_cc=IR&since=2018-04-01&until=2018-07-01&time_grain=day&axis_x=measurement_start_day&test_name=telegram; https://iranhumanrights.org/2018/04/in-a-desperate-move-to-squash-internet-freedom-iran-blocks-telegram/; https://explorer.ooni.org/chart/mat?test_name=telegram&axis_x=measurement_start_day&since=2025-01-09&until=2025-08-09&time_grain=day&probe_cc=IR | Ongoing | National security/ Counter-terrorism | Authorities cited security concerns and the app's use during anti-government protests | Yes | https://www.mizanonline.ir/fa/news/416168/%D8%AF%D8%B3%D8%AA%D9%88%D8%B1-%D9%82%D8%B6%D8%A7%DB%8C%DB%8C-%D8%AF%D8%B1-%D8%AE%D8%B5%D9%88%D8%B5-%D9%85%D8%B3%D8%AF%D9%88%D8%AF%D8%B3%D8%A7%D8%B2%DB%8C-%D9%BE%DB%8C%D8%A7%D9%85-%D8%B1%D8%B3%D8%A7%D9%86-%D8%AA%D9%84%DA%AF%D8%B1%D8%A7%D9%85-%D8%B5%D8%A7%D8%AF%D8%B1-%D8%B4%D8%AF | No | No | No | No | Yes | No | No | Unknown | No | No | No | No | Telegram was blocked by Iranian authorities beginning May 1, 2018. The block is ongoing into 2026. Iranian officials had tried unsuccesfully for months to force the company to move its servers to Iran and comply with its censorship policies. The app was also used heavily by protesters in 2017. | MENA | ||||||||||||||
10 | Actual | 5/24/2019 | Lebanon | It affected locations in more than one state, province, or region | Nationwide | Shutdown | Broadband, Mobile | Service-based | Executive government | Telecommunications Ministry citing an order from the public prosecutor's office | Information control | CSO KIO partners | https://ooni.org/post/2023-jordan-blocks-grindr/#conclusion; https://explorer.ooni.org/chart/mat?probe_cc=LB&since=2023-01-01&until=2024-04-01&time_grain=day&axis_x=measurement_start_day&test_name=web_connectivity&domain=www.grindr.com; https://www.independent.co.uk/news/world/middle-east/grindr-lebanon-ban-lgbt-rights-dating-app-gay-a8933556.html; https://www.middleeasteye.net/news/activists-slam-lebanons-telecoms-ministry-after-it-bans-grindr-app; https://explorer.ooni.org/chart/mat?probe_cc=LB&since=2024-01-01&until=2024-11-23&time_grain=day&axis_x=measurement_start_day&test_name=web_connectivity&domain=www.grindr.com; https://explorer.ooni.org/chart/mat?probe_cc=LB&since=2024-11-01&until=2026-02-19&time_grain=day&axis_x=measurement_start_day&test_name=web_connectivity&domain=www.grindr.com | Ongoing | Unknown | No | No | No | No | No | No | No | Grindr | No | No | No | No | No | No | LGBTQ groups | No | Grindr has been blocked in Lebanon since May 24, 2019, and the block is ongoing into 2026 according to partners. The blocking is currently implemented by means of TLS interference. The app is functionally unusable without a VPN. | MENA | |||||||||||||
11 | Estimated | 5/31/2019 | Pakistan | It affected locations in more than one state, province, or region | Nationwide | Shutdown | Broadband, Mobile | Service-based | Executive government | Pakistan Telecommunications Authority | Information control | CSO KIO partners | https://explorer.ooni.org/chart/mat?probe_cc=PK&since=2019-01-01&until=2019-12-31&time_grain=day&axis_x=measurement_start_day&test_name=web_connectivity&domain=www.grindr.com; https://ooni.org/post/2023-jordan-blocks-grindr/#conclusion; https://explorer.ooni.org/chart/mat?probe_cc=PK&since=2023-01-01&until=2024-04-01&time_grain=day&axis_x=measurement_start_day&test_name=web_connectivity&domain=www.grindr.com; https://explorer.ooni.org/chart/mat?probe_cc=PK&since=2023-12-01&until=2024-09-26&time_grain=day&axis_x=measurement_start_day&test_name=web_connectivity&domain=www.grindr.com; https://explorer.ooni.org/chart/mat?probe_cc=PK&since=2024-05-20&until=2025-02-20&time_grain=day&axis_x=measurement_start_day&test_name=web_connectivity&domain=www.grindr.com; https://explorer.ooni.org/chart/mat?probe_cc=PK&since=2025-01-27&until=2026-02-27&time_grain=day&axis_x=measurement_start_day&test_name=web_connectivity&domain=www.grindr.com | Ongoing | Other | "...keeping in view the negative effects of immoral/indecent content streaming." | Yes | No | https://www.reuters.com/article/idUSKBN25T086/ | No | No | No | No | No | Grindr | No | No | No | No | No | No | LGBTQ groups | No | Grindr has been blocked in Pakistan since at least May 31, 2019, and the block is ongoing into Feb. 2026. There was an order sent by the Pakistani government on Sep. 1, 2020 blocking Grindr and other dating apps, but measurement data shows confirmed blockings since May 2019. The blocking is currently implemented by means of TLS interference. | APAC | |||||||||||
12 | Estimated | 1/1/2020 | Qatar | It affected locations in more than one state, province, or region | Nationwide | Shutdown | Broadband, Mobile | Service-based | Unknown | Information control | CSO KIO partners | https://explorer.ooni.org/chart/mat?probe_cc=QA&since=2020-01-01&until=2020-12-31&time_grain=day&axis_x=measurement_start_day&test_name=web_connectivity&domain=www.grindr.com; https://ooni.org/post/2023-jordan-blocks-grindr/#conclusion; https://explorer.ooni.org/chart/mat?probe_cc=QA&since=2023-01-01&until=2024-04-01&time_grain=day&axis_x=measurement_start_day&test_name=web_connectivity&domain=www.grindr.com; https://explorer.ooni.org/chart/mat?probe_cc=QA&since=2024-01-19&until=2025-02-19&time_grain=day&axis_x=measurement_start_day&test_name=web_connectivity&domain=www.grindr.com; https://help.grindr.com/hc/en-us/articles/1500010811581-Censored-countries-regions; https://explorer.ooni.org/chart/mat?probe_cc=QA&since=2025-01-19&until=2026-02-19&time_grain=day&axis_x=measurement_start_day&test_name=web_connectivity&domain=www.grindr.com; https://explorer.ooni.org/chart/mat?test_name=web_connectivity&axis_x=measurement_start_day&since=2025-01-19&until=2026-02-19&time_grain=day&probe_cc=QA&domain=www.grindr.com | Ongoing | Unknown | No | No | No | No | No | No | No | Grindr | No | No | No | No | No | No | LGBTQ groups | No | Grindr has been blocked in Qatar since at least Jan. 1, 2020, and the block is ongoing into 2026. The blocking is currently implemented by means of TLS interference. | MENA | ||||||||||||||
13 | Actual | 6/29/2020 | India | It affected locations in more than one state, province, or region | Nationwide | Shutdown | Broadband, Mobile | Service-based | Executive government | Ministry of Electronics and Information Technology | Conflict | Clash between Indian and Chinese troops in a disputed region led to the ban of TikTok and 58 other Chinese created apps in India | CSO KIO partners | https://www.nytimes.com/2020/06/29/world/asia/tik-tok-banned-india-china.html; https://explorer.ooni.org/chart/mat?probe_cc=IN&since=2020-03-29&until=2021-03-30&time_grain=day&axis_x=measurement_start_day&test_name=web_connectivity&domain=www.tiktok.com; https://explorer.ooni.org/chart/mat?probe_cc=IN&since=2023-03-29&until=2024-03-30&time_grain=day&axis_x=measurement_start_day&test_name=web_connectivity&domain=www.tiktok.com; https://explorer.ooni.org/chart/mat?probe_cc=IN&since=2024-01-20&until=2025-02-20&time_grain=day&axis_x=measurement_start_day&test_name=web_connectivity&domain=www.tiktok.com%2Cs20.tiktokcdn.com%2Cp77-va.tiktokcdn.com%2Cp77-sign-va.tiktokcdn.com%2Cp77-sign-sg-lite.tiktokcdn.com%2Cp19-sign.tiktokcdn-us.com%2Cp19-sign.tiktokcdn-us.com%2Cmcs-va.tiktok.com%2Clf16-tiktok-web.ttwstatic.com%2Clf16-tiktok-common.ibytedtos.com%2Cm.tiktok.com%2Cwww.tiktok.com; https://explorer.ooni.org/chart/mat?probe_cc=IN&since=2025-01-20&until=2026-02-20&time_grain=day&axis_x=measurement_start_day&test_name=web_connectivity&domain=www.tiktok.com%2Cs20.tiktokcdn.com%2Cp77-va.tiktokcdn.com%2Cp77-sign-va.tiktokcdn.com%2Cp77-sign-sg-lite.tiktokcdn.com%2Cp19-sign.tiktokcdn-us.com%2Cp19-sign.tiktokcdn-us.com%2Cmcs-va.tiktok.com%2Clf16-tiktok-web.ttwstatic.com%2Clf16-tiktok-common.ibytedtos.com%2Cm.tiktok.com%2Cwww.tiktok.com | Ongoing | National security/ Counter-terrorism | Yes | No | Section 69A of the Information Technology Act, 2000; Information Technology (Procedure and Safeguards for Blocking of Access of Information by Public) Rules 2009 (https://pib.gov.in/PressReleseDetailm.aspx?PRID=1635206®=3&lang=1) | https://www.bbc.com/news/technology-53225720 | They said the apps were "prejudicial to the sovereignty and integrity of India, defence of India, security of state, and public order." | No | No | No | No | No | TikTok, WeChat, and 57 other Chinese-made apps | No | No | Unknown | No | Yes | Unknown | No | TikTok, WeChat, and 57 other Chinese-made apps were banned in India beginning Jun. 29, 2020 with blocks remaining to this day following military clashes between Indian and Chinese troops in disputed territory. | APAC | ||||||||||
14 | Actual | 11/4/2020 | Ethiopia | It affected locations in more than one state, province, or region | Tigray | Shutdown | Broadband, Mobile | Full network | Unknown | Conflict | Civil war | News media article | https://youtu.be/uEoa-7J6zpY, https://www.business-humanrights.org/en/latest-news/ethiopia-jakenn-publishing-urges-govt-says-current-internet-shutdown-threats-access-to-information-on-ongoing-conflict-in-tigray-region/, https://twitter.com/accessnow/status/1323964706382643200, https://cpj.org/2021/05/journalists-shutdowns-myanmar-ethiopia-kashmir/ | Ongoing | Sabotage/ Third-party Action | https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=uEoa-7J6zpY | Yes | No | No | No | No | No | No | No | No | Yes | No | Yes | Yes | No | This full shutdown happened at the start of the conflict and the government blamed the Tigray military forces for destruction of infrastructure. Nevertheless, after promises of restoration of services by the National Government, the internet services remain largely inaccessible in Tigray, amid various reports of human rights abuses. As of early 2025, connectivity remains constrained and below pre-war levels across Tigray, with availability, reliability, and speed varying widely across urban and rural areas. | https://www.accessnow.org/two-years-internet-shutdowns-tigray/ | Africa | |||||||||||||
15 | Actual | 1/12/2021 | Uganda | It affected locations in more than one state, province, or region | Nationwide | Shutdown | Broadband, Mobile | Service-based | Executive government | Elections | News media article | https://transparency.fb.com/data/internet-disruptions/country/UG/, https://www.nytimes.com/2021/01/13/world/africa/uganda-facebook-ban-elections.html; https://techjaja.com/govt-lifts-social-media-ban-but-there-is-a-catch/; https://nilepost.co.ug/uncategorized/201292/facebook-ban-in-uganda-continues-as-govt-cites-security-concerns; https://explorer.ooni.org/chart/mat?probe_cc=UG&since=2024-01-19&until=2025-02-19&time_grain=day&axis_x=measurement_start_day&test_name=web_connectivity&domain=www.facebook.com; https://www.newvision.co.ug/category/science/ucc-cautions-individuals-using-vpn-to-access-NV_223871; https://explorer.ooni.org/chart/mat?probe_cc=UG&since=2025-01-27&until=2026-02-27&time_grain=day&axis_x=measurement_start_day&test_name=facebook_messenger | Ongoing | Fake news/ Hate speech/ Incendiary content/ Promoting violence | Museveni claimed that Facebook was taking sides during the election. | Yes | Unknown | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes | YouTube, Signal | No | No | Yes | Yes | No | Unknown | No | Facebook remains blocked through the end of 2023, beginning Jan. 12, 2021 preceding national elections in Uganda. Other platforms were restored in 2021. The blocked remained into 2025 as well, with authorities in 2024 citing continued national security concerns and incitement to violence and unrest as reasoning for the continued ban. The block continued in 2026, including after the full network nationwide shutdown in Jan. 2026. | https://www.accessnow.org/the-world-is-watching-uganda-elections/ | Africa | |||||||||||||
16 | Actual | 1/25/2021 | Iran (Islamic Republic of) | It affected locations in more than one state, province, or region | Nationwide | Shutdown | Broadband, Mobile | Service-based | Unknown | Unknown | CSO KIO partners | https://explorer.ooni.org/chart/mat?probe_cc=IR&test_name=signal&since=2022-01-31&until=2023-01-31&axis_x=measurement_start_day; https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2021/1/26/iran-blocks-signal-messaging-app-after-whatsapp-exodus; https://explorer.ooni.org/chart/mat?probe_cc=IR&since=2023-01-01&until=2024-01-01&time_grain=day&axis_x=measurement_start_day&test_name=signal; https://explorer.ooni.org/chart/mat?probe_cc=IR&since=2024-01-01&until=2024-11-23&time_grain=day&axis_x=measurement_start_day&test_name=signal; https://explorer.ooni.org/chart/mat?probe_cc=IR&since=2024-01-19&until=2025-02-19&time_grain=day&axis_x=measurement_start_day&test_name=signal; https://explorer.ooni.org/chart/mat?probe_cc=IR&since=2025-01-19&until=2026-02-19&time_grain=day&axis_x=measurement_start_day&test_name=signal | Ongoing | Unknown | No | No | No | No | No | No | Signal | No | No | No | No | No | No | No | Signal has been blocked in Iran since Jan. 25, 2021. The block is ongoing into 2026. | MENA | ||||||||||||||||
17 | Actual | 3/10/2021 | Russian Federation | It affected locations in more than one state, province, or region | Nationwide | Throttle | Broadband, Mobile | Full network, Service-based | Executive government | Roskomnadzor | Other | Pressure Twitter to comply with Government take down orders. | News media article | https://rkn.gov.ru/news/rsoc/news73464.htm; https://www.accessnow.org/russia-throttled-twitter/; https://censoredplanet.org/throttling; https://explorer.ooni.org/chart/mat?probe_cc=RU&since=2025-01-27&until=2026-02-27&time_grain=day&axis_x=measurement_start_day&test_name=web_connectivity&domain=twitter.com | Ongoing | Illegal content | Roskomnadzor announced that it would slow down Twitter on “100 percent of mobile services and 50 percent desktop services" claiming that the social media company did not delete over 3,000 materials the authorities deemed unlawful. | Yes | Yes | https://rkn.gov.ru/news/rsoc/news73464.htm | No | Yes | No | No | No | No | No | Unknown | No | No | No | Yes | Roskomnadzor announced that it would slow down Twitter on “100 percent of mobile services and 50 percent desktop services" claiming that the social media company did not delete over 3,000 materials the authorities deemed unlawful. On May 17, Russia announced that it would not block Twitter entirely because the company complied with deleting more than 91% of flagged content. | https://www.accessnow.org/russia-throttled-twitter/ | EECA | |||||||||||
18 | Actual | 3/14/2021 | Oman | It affected locations in more than one state, province, or region | Nationwide | Shutdown | Broadband, Mobile | Service-based | Executive government | Oman’s Telecommunications Regulatory Authority (TRA) | Information control | Quoting Al Jazeera, "The chatrooms of Clubhouse, a sort of town square for unfettered discussions of politics and social issues, have provided a window through the censorship. Recent free-flowing exchanges in the region have featured activists from Egypt’s 2011 uprising, feminists in Kuwait, government officials in Libya and even a transgender woman in Saudi Arabia." | Confidential | https://www.aljazeera.com/economy/2021/3/15/oman-blocks-clubhouse-app-fueling-regional-censorship-fears | Ongoing | Other | Authorities blocked the social media audio chat platform Clubhouse "on the grounds of not being licensed to operate" | Yes | Unknown | No | No | No | No | No | Clubhouse | No | No | No | No | No | No | Clubhouse is still blocked across Oman in early 2026. | https://www.accessnow.org/clubhouse/ | MENA | ||||||||||||
19 | Actual | 3/15/2021 | Jordan | It affected locations in more than one state, province, or region | Nationwide | Shutdown | Broadband, Mobile | Service-based | Executive government | Jordanian officials | Protests | CSO KIO partners | https://jordanopensource.org/blog/78/blocking-clubhouse-in-jordan-a-quick-analysis-of-internet-censorship-methods-in-use; https://jordanopensource.org/blog/74/josa-in-light-of-the-latest-internet-shutdowns-the-right-to-internet-access-without-restrictions-must-be-ensured | Ongoing | Unknown | No | Yes | No | No | No | No | Clubhouse, Facebook Live | No | No | Jordan: Zain, Orange, VTel and DAMAMAX | Unknown | No | Yes | Yes | No | On Mar. 15, 2021, following an anti-lockdown protest, Jordanian officials blocked Clubhouse, an audio-only social media app, on a number of major internet service providers (ISPs). It remained blocked as of early 2024, in addition to multiple VPN servers. It is still blocked in early 2026. | https://www.accessnow.org/jordanprotests/ | MENA | |||||||||||||
20 | Actual | 3/16/2021 | China | It affected locations in more than one state, province, or region | Nationwide except for HK SAR | Shutdown | Broadband, Mobile | Service-based | Executive government | Information control | News media article | https://techcrunch.com/2021/03/15/signal-is-down-in-china/?guccounter=1; https://explorer.ooni.org/chart/mat?probe_cc=CN&since=2023-09-20&until=2024-09-21&time_grain=day&axis_x=measurement_start_day&test_name=signal; https://explorer.ooni.org/chart/mat?probe_cc=CN&since=2024-05-20&until=2025-02-20&time_grain=day&axis_x=measurement_start_day&test_name=signal; https://explorer.ooni.org/chart/mat?probe_cc=CN&since=2025-01-27&until=2026-02-27&time_grain=day&axis_x=measurement_start_day&test_name=signal | Ongoing | Unknown | No | No | No | No | No | No | Signal | No | No | China Telecom, China Unicom, China Mobile | No | No | No | No | Signal app was shutdown in China after a surge in downloads in February and March 2021. It remains blocked as of Feb. 2026. | APAC | ||||||||||||||||
21 | Actual | 8/20/2021 | Myanmar | It affected locations in more than one state, province, or region | Kachin's Hpakant, Sagaing | Shutdown | Broadband, Mobile | Full network | Military | Military junta | Conflict | CSO KIO partners | https://www.irrawaddy.com/news/burma/myanmar-junta-cuts-internet-access-in-hpakant.html; https://progressivevoicemyanmar.org/wp-content/uploads/2022/06/Internet-Shutdown-Athan-May-2022-Eng.pdf; https://myanmar-now.org/mm/news/13653; https://t.me/witnessdaily/286479%20https://www.facebook.com/508784185946254/posts/pfbid02mgdifK2uRjVzMArz73qdswYEKxLYAfeqY6D2LiUSgun4cm1MA3iRUDYGYCkgiUZ1l/?mibextid=Nif5oz; https://mpapress.com/သတင်း/50723/; https://www.myitkyinanewsjournal.com/although-the-atom-telenor-phone-line-has-been-restored-in-phakant-it-is-still-difficult-to-communicate/ | Ongoing | Unknown | No | No | No | No | No | No | Yes | Yes | Telecom operators said that they did not know why internet services were blocked or when they would resume, according to locals. | No | Unknown | Unknown | Unknown | Myanmar’s military regime has cut off internet access in Hpakant, Kachin State since Friday, August 20, 2021. Mobile internet services were blocked around 8.30pm on Friday, followed by a shutdown of wifi internet hours later, said residents. On Jan. 4, 2023, service returned on Mytel and Atom SIM cards to townships in Kachin (Hpakant township) and Sagaing (Myemu, Sal Lingyi, Ertao, Ima Pin, Minking, Kant Balu, Katha, Kolin, Butalin, Ye Oo, Depeyin, Khin Oo, Intaw, Kyung Hla townships). However, on Jan. 5, 2023, the internet was cutoff again with no warning. On Oct. 20, 2023, many parts of Sagaing had internet restored with Atom SIM cards, with Taze township using MPT SIM cards. Hpakant, Kachin State was still under a shutdown as of Aug. 6, 2024, according to reports. Atom mobile connections were restored in some areas of Hpakant on Aug. 30. | APAC | ||||||||||||||||
22 | Actual | 9/2/2021 | Nigeria | It affected locations in more than one state, province, or region | Kaduna, Katsina, Sokoto, and Zamfara States | Shutdown | Mobile | Full network | Executive government | Nigerian Communications Commission (NCC) | Conflict | The government ordered ISPs to shut down all telecommunications, including phone and internet, in the midst of counter-terrorism operations | News media article | https://www.news24.com/fin24/international/nigeria-cuts-cellphone-network-in-tense-northern-state-20210905; https://humanglemedia.com/birnin-gwari-is-still-offline-three-years-after-nigerias-telecom-shutdown/; https://advocacyassembly.org/documents/30/Muhammed_Bello_Buhari_Nigeria.pdf | Ongoing | National security/ Counter-terrorism | Yes | https://www.news24.com/fin24/international/nigeria-cuts-cellphone-network-in-tense-northern-state-20210905 | "One of the biggest hurdles to combating banditry is the issue of informers who use mobile networks to communicate with bandits about the movement of troops." | No | No | No | No | No | Yes | Yes | Nigeria: Airtel (Bharti Airtel), Nigeria: MTN | Unknown | No | Yes | Unknown | No | On Sep. 2, 2021, Nigerian authorities ordered ISPs in four states, Kaduna, Katsina, Sokoto, and Zamfara, to shut down all telecommunications, phone and internet in the midst of counter-terrorism operations. Although access was restored in most states around 12 weeks later, reports indicate that Birnin Gwari, Kaduna State, has remained cutoff since 2021 due to infrastructure damage and the unwillingness of telcos to return to the area. | https://www.accessnow.org/press-release/keepiton-authorities-in-nigeria-must-reconnect-people-in-zamfara-north-now/ | Africa | |||||||||||
23 | Actual | 9/14/2021 | Myanmar | It affected locations in more than one state, province, or region | Sagaing’s Pale, Yinmarbin, Kani, Budalin, Ayadaw, Taze, and Ye-U townships, Mandalay’s Mogyoke and Myingyan townships, and Magway's Taungdwingyi townships | Shutdown | Broadband, Mobile | Full network | Military | Military junta | Conflict | Mobile internet and some types of Wi-Fi have been down in several townships. | CSO KIO partners | https://www.myanmar-now.org/en/news/internet-blackout-hits-parts-of-sagaing-and-mandalay-regions; https://www.rfa.org/english/news/myanmar/internet-09162021205144.html; https://progressivevoicemyanmar.org/wp-content/uploads/2022/06/Internet-Shutdown-Athan-May-2022-Eng.pdf; https://myanmar-now.org/mm/news/13653; https://t.me/witnessdaily/286479%20https://www.facebook.com/508784185946254/posts/pfbid02mgdifK2uRjVzMArz73qdswYEKxLYAfeqY6D2LiUSgun4cm1MA3iRUDYGYCkgiUZ1l/?mibextid=Nif5oz | Ongoing | Unknown | No | No | No | No | No | No | Unknown | Unknown | Myanmar: Telenor, Ooredoo, MPT | Unknown | No | Yes | Yes | Unknown | As of Feb. 2022, the shutdowns in Mogok and Myingyan townships in Mandalay region are ongoing. On Jan. 4, 2023, service returned on Mytel and Atom SIM cards to townships in Kachin (Hpakant township) and Sagaing (Myemu, Sal Lingyi, Ertao, Ima Pin, Minking, Kant Balu, Katha, Kolin, Butalin, Ye Oo, Depeyin, Khin Oo, Intaw, Kyung Hla townships). However, on Jan. 5, 2023, the internet was cutoff again with no warning. On Oct. 20, 2023, many parts of Sagaing had internet restored with Atom SIM cards, with Taze township using MPT SIM cards. | APAC | ||||||||||||||
24 | Actual | 9/23/2021 | Myanmar | It affected locations in more than one state, province, or region | Chin state’s Matupi, Tonzang, Paletwa, Falam, Kanpetlet, Thantlang, Tedim, Mindat townships, Magway's Myaing, Gangaw, and Tilin townships | Shutdown | Broadband, Mobile | Full network | Military | Military junta | Conflict | Deliberate infrastructure attacks or targeted disruptions in an active conflict zone | News media article | https://www.myanmar-now.org/en/news/military-cuts-off-internet-connection-in-11-more-townships-in-northwestern-myanmar; https://www.rfa.org/english/news/myanmar/internet-09242021190423.html; https://www.rfa.org/english/news/myanmar/surge-10042021193211.html; https://www.reuters.com/world/asia-pacific/myanmar-air-strikes-reported-battle-internet-cut-more-areas-2021-09-27/; https://progressivevoicemyanmar.org/wp-content/uploads/2022/06/Internet-Shutdown-Athan-May-2022-Eng.pdf; https://www.facebook.com/100064542350311/posts/pfbid0sFcF87FRh7SnEoef3XczkAifnfVYZpFnQDjNPXKLFqewXekKjxwv5wMhhBt5CWEsl/?mibextid=CDWPTG; https://www.facebook.com/zalen.info/posts/pfbid0QsguCXCnPyHnXdbD38h63znbxfgjwWPUkbp5EvEGKwT5jsnShu5pSkZAuvqc682cl; https://www.facebook.com/rfaburmese/videos/977235016601804/; https://www.rfa.org/english/news/myanmar/magway-torture-deaths-02082024183109.html; https://engagemedia.org/2024/myanmar-digital-coup-quarterly-may-2024-july-2024/; https://athanmyanmar.org/myanmar-communication-blackout-2021-to-present/; https://bur.mizzima.com/2024/06/25/25415; https://voiceofmyanmarnews.com/news/2024/09/08/%E1%80%81%E1%80%BB%E1%80%84%E1%80%BA%E1%80%B8%E1%80%95%E1%80%BC%E1%80%8A%E1%80%BA%E1%80%94%E1%80%9A%E1%80%BA%E1%80%80-%E1%80%99%E1%80%BC%E1%80%AD%E1%80%AF%E1%80%B7-%E1%80%9B%E1%80%BE%E1%80%85%E1%80%BA/; https://www.facebook.com/zalen.info/posts/%E1%80%80%E1%80%9C%E1%80%B1%E1%80%B8%E1%80%99%E1%80%BC%E1%80%AD%E1%80%AF%E1%80%B7%E1%80%94%E1%80%9A%E1%80%BA-%E1%80%A1%E1%80%95%E1%80%AB%E1%80%9D%E1%80%84%E1%80%BA-%E1%80%81%E1%80%BB%E1%80%84%E1%80%BA%E1%80%B8%E1%80%95%E1%80%BC%E1%80%8A%E1%80%BA%E1%80%94%E1%80%9A%E1%80%BA%E1%80%90%E1%80%85%E1%80%BA%E1%80%81%E1%80%AF%E1%80%9C%E1%80%AF%E1%80%B6%E1%80%B8%E1%80%94%E1%80%AE%E1%80%B8%E1%80%95%E1%80%AB%E1%80%B8-%E1%80%96%E1%80%AF%E1%80%94%E1%80%BA%E1%80%B8%E1%80%9C%E1%80%AD%E1%80%AF%E1%80%84%E1%80%BA%E1%80%B8%E1%80%99%E1%80%BB%E1%80%AC%E1%80%B8-%E1%80%96%E1%80%BC%E1%80%90%E1%80%BA%E1%80%90%E1%80%B1%E1%80%AC%E1%80%80%E1%80%BA%E1%80%81%E1%80%B6%E1%80%9B-%E1%80%A7%E1%80%95%E1%80%BC/1006220404942459/ | Ongoing | Unknown | No | No | No | No | No | No | Unknown | Yes | No | Yes | Yes | No | The internet was shutdown with few exceptions throughout all of 2022 in townships across the Chin state and Magway region since Sept. 2021. The shutdown was ongoing as of Apr. 3, 2023 in multiple townships of Chin State. The ongoing shutdown had a disastrous effect during Cyclone Mocha in May 2023, exacerbating the effects of the storm. On Sept. 26, 2023, the internet had been restored in Mindat township, Chin State. On Oct. 4, 2023, the internet had been restored in Tedim township, Chin State. Atrocities against resistance fighters on Nov. 7, 2023 in Myauk Khin Yan, Gantkaw township, Magway region confirmed that the internet was still shut off in that township. Continued fighting on Jun. 15, 2024 confirmed that the internet and phone lines were still cut off in Matupi, Chin State. The internet was confirmed to still be shut down in Myaing township, Magway Region as of Jun. 24, 2024. As of Sep. 8, 2024, internet and phone services were still reported to be disconnected across Chin State except for Haka. The shutdown across Chin State was confirmed again on Apr. 12, 2025. | APAC | ||||||||||||||||
25 | Actual | 9/26/2021 | Myanmar | It affected locations in more than one state, province, or region | Sagaing's Pinlebu, Wuntho, Kawlin, Salingyi, Mingin, Kalay townships, Chin's Haka township | Shutdown | Mobile | Full network | Military | Military junta | Conflict | Deliberate infrastructure attacks or targeted disruptions in an active conflict zone | Other | https://freedomhouse.org/country/myanmar/freedom-net/2021; https://progressivevoicemyanmar.org/wp-content/uploads/2022/06/Internet-Shutdown-Athan-May-2022-Eng.pdf; https://myanmar-now.org/mm/news/13653; https://t.me/witnessdaily/286479%20https://www.facebook.com/508784185946254/posts/pfbid02mgdifK2uRjVzMArz73qdswYEKxLYAfeqY6D2LiUSgun4cm1MA3iRUDYGYCkgiUZ1l/?mibextid=Nif5oz; https://t.me/SggScoutNetwork/50514; https://voiceofmyanmarnews.com/news/2024/09/08/%E1%80%81%E1%80%BB%E1%80%84%E1%80%BA%E1%80%B8%E1%80%95%E1%80%BC%E1%80%8A%E1%80%BA%E1%80%94%E1%80%9A%E1%80%BA%E1%80%80-%E1%80%99%E1%80%BC%E1%80%AD%E1%80%AF%E1%80%B7-%E1%80%9B%E1%80%BE%E1%80%85%E1%80%BA/; https://www.facebook.com/athan.foe.myanmar/posts/pfbid0j2XtvaUhzAStTocvNyXgahM348SNFLtZ6YBEDZpZWqyNX96xhtJNjJuDfhSkiYv7l; https://www.ludunwayoo.com/news-mm/2025/02/25/113014/; https://www.tachileik.net/mm/news/39781; https://www.dvb.no/post/714703; https://engagemedia.org/2025/myanmar-digital-coup-quarterly-may-2025-july-2025/ | Ongoing | Unknown | Unknown | No | No | No | No | No | Unknown | Unknown | Unknown | No | Yes | Yes | Activists, protesters, and Myanmar's People Defense Forces | No | In the Sagaing region, 8 townships have experienced a near-constant blackout since Sep. 26, 2021, with 30 additional townships being shutdown (with only 2G service) since Mar. 4, 2022. On Jan. 4, 2023, service returned on Mytel and Atom SIM cards to townships in Kachin (Hpakant township) and Sagaing (Myemu, Sal Lingyi, Ertao, Ima Pin, Minking, Kant Balu, Katha, Kolin, Butalin, Ye Oo, Depeyin, Khin Oo, Intaw, Kyung Hla townships). However, on Jan. 5, 2023, the internet was cutoff again with no warning. On Oct. 20, 2023, many parts of Sagaing had internet restored with Atom SIM cards, with Taze township using MPT SIM cards. On Jan. 9, 2024, it was reported that service on MPT and Atom was restored in parts of Kalay, Sagaing Region. On Sep. 8, 2024, it was reported the Haka township had internet and cell service on MPT and Atom. Athan reported that as of early Feb. 2025, parts of Upper Sagaing Region (including Myinmu, Salingyi, Ayadaw, Yinmabin, Mingin, and Tabayin) had been experiencing some type of shutdown for three and a half years. In Kathar township, Sagaing Division, Atom service returned in Apr. 2025. In Jul. 2025 in Khampat town, Tamu township, Sagaing Division, the military council partially restored Ooredoo service after two years of a shutdown, but WiFi, MPT, and Atom connections remained cut off. | APAC | ||||||||||||||
26 | Estimated | 10/20/2021 | Turkmenistan | It affected locations in more than one state, province, or region | Nationwide | Shutdown | Broadband, Mobile | Service-based | Executive government | Information control | Originally to control information about COVID-19, but continued as part of an ongoing censorship effort | Confidential | https://explorer.ooni.org/chart/mat?probe_cc=TM&since=2024-01-01&until=2024-11-24&time_grain=day&axis_x=measurement_start_day&test_name=facebook_messenger; https://explorer.ooni.org/chart/mat?probe_cc=TM&since=2024-01-01&until=2024-11-24&time_grain=day&axis_x=measurement_start_day&test_name=signal; https://explorer.ooni.org/chart/mat?probe_cc=TM&since=2025-01-27&until=2026-02-27&time_grain=day&axis_x=measurement_start_day&test_name=signal | Ongoing | Unknown | Yes | Unknown | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes | YouTube, VPN services | No | No | Unknown | No | No | Unknown | No | Social media blocks are ongoing from late 2021 into early 2025. Also, in April 2022, the authorities blocked most VPN services and subnets of the world's largest hosting providers in the country. The average connection speed dropped to 22.4 KB/s. | https://www.accessnow.org/turkmenistan-internet-shutdowns/ | EECA | |||||||||||||
27 | Estimated | 12/3/2021 | China | It affected locations in more than one state, province, or region | Nationwide | Shutdown | Broadband, Mobile | Service-based | Executive government | Information control | CSO KIO partners | https://explorer.ooni.org/chart/mat?probe_cc=CN&since=2021-01-01&until=2021-12-31&time_grain=day&axis_x=measurement_start_day&test_name=web_connectivity&domain=www.grindr.com; https://ooni.org/post/2023-jordan-blocks-grindr/#conclusion; https://explorer.ooni.org/chart/mat?probe_cc=CN&since=2023-01-01&until=2024-04-01&time_grain=day&axis_x=measurement_start_day&test_name=web_connectivity&domain=www.grindr.com; https://explorer.ooni.org/chart/mat?probe_cc=CN&since=2023-09-20&until=2024-09-21&time_grain=day&axis_x=measurement_start_day&test_name=web_connectivity&domain=www.grindr.com; https://www.them.us/story/grindr-removed-china-app-stores-privacy; https://explorer.ooni.org/chart/mat?probe_cc=CN&since=2024-05-20&until=2025-02-20&time_grain=day&axis_x=measurement_start_day&test_name=web_connectivity&domain=www.grindr.com; https://explorer.ooni.org/chart/mat?probe_cc=CN&since=2025-01-27&until=2026-02-27&time_grain=day&axis_x=measurement_start_day&test_name=web_connectivity&domain=www.grindr.com | Ongoing | Unknown | No | No | No | No | No | No | No | Grindr | No | No | No | No | No | No | LGBTQ groups | No | Grindr has been blocked in China since approximately Dec. 3, 2021, and the block is ongoing into Feb. 2026. The app was reportedly removed from Apple and Android app stores in early 2022. The blocking is currently implemented by means of DNS injection. | APAC | ||||||||||||||
28 | Actual | 1/6/2022 | Myanmar | It affected more than one city in the same state, province, or region | Loikaw, Demoso, Bawlakhe, Hpasawng, and Mese townships in Kayah State | Shutdown | Mobile | Full network | Military | Military junta | Conflict | Deliberate infrastructure attacks or targeted disruptions in an active conflict zone | CSO KIO partners | https://progressivevoicemyanmar.org/wp-content/uploads/2022/06/Internet-Shutdown-Athan-May-2022-Eng.pdf | Ongoing | Unknown | No | No | No | No | No | No | Unknown | Unknown | Unknown | No | Yes | Yes | No | Mobile internet has been virtually inaccessible for most of 2022 in Kayah State since Jan. 6 for Loikaw and Feb. 1 for at least 4 other townships. The shutdowns are ongoing. | APAC | |||||||||||||||
29 | Estimated | 2/6/2022 | Pakistan | It only affected one city, county, or village | Panjgur, Balochistan | Shutdown | Broadband, Mobile | Full network | Unknown | Conflict | Originally due to fighting between the Pakistani army and Baloch separatist troops | News media article | https://www.indianarrative.com/world-news/pakistan-launches-information-war-against-baloch-nationalists-blocks-internet-after-heavy-fighting-in-pak-military-camps-31534.html; https://www.pakistanpressfoundation.org/internet-access-in-panjgur/; https://thebalochistanpost.net/2023/03/protest-against-a-year-long-internet-shutdown-in-panjgur/; https://tribune.com.pk/letter/2254764/panjgur-without-internet; https://www.eurasiareview.com/10032024-balochistan-path-to-harmony-and-prosperty-in-panjgur-district-analysis/; https://tribune.com.pk/letter/2255714/internet-and-panjgur; https://dailyintekhab.pk/archives/506203; https://www.urdunews.com/node/881682; https://thebalochistanpost.net/2024/11/internet-shutdown-expands-to-kech-gwadar-and-khuzdar-following-panjgur/; https://killswitch.pk/?q=node/209; https://www.dawn.com/news/1913567; https://www.dawn.com/news/1971023 | Ongoing | Unknown | No | No | No | No | No | No | Unknown | Unknown | Unknown | No | Yes | Unknown | No | The internet was shut down in Panjgur, Balochistan since at least Feb. 2022, and it is ongoing into late 2024 and likely early 2025. The Balochistan Liberation Army (BLA) engaged Pakistan's Frontier Corps (FC) in early Feb. 2022, leading to high military casualties on both sides and the suspension of mobile internet indefinitely for the city. The order was again extended for at least 6 months in May 2025. There were continued reports of a shutdown in Feb. 2026. | APAC | ||||||||||||||||
30 | Estimated | 2/11/2022 | Oman | It affected locations in more than one state, province, or region | Nationwide | Shutdown | Broadband, Mobile | Service-based | Executive government | Information control | CSO KIO partners | https://explorer.ooni.org/chart/mat?probe_cc=OM&since=2022-01-01&until=2022-12-31&time_grain=day&axis_x=measurement_start_day&test_name=web_connectivity&domain=www.grindr.com; https://ooni.org/post/2023-jordan-blocks-grindr/#conclusion; https://explorer.ooni.org/chart/mat?probe_cc=OM&since=2024-01-19&until=2025-02-19&time_grain=day&axis_x=measurement_start_day&test_name=web_connectivity&domain=www.grindr.com; https://explorer.ooni.org/chart/mat?probe_cc=OM&since=2025-01-19&until=2026-02-19&time_grain=day&axis_x=measurement_start_day&test_name=web_connectivity&domain=www.grindr.com | Ongoing | Unknown | No | No | No | No | No | No | No | Grindr | No | No | No | No | No | No | LGBTQ groups | No | Grindr has been blocked in Oman since at least Feb. 11, 2022, and the block is ongoing into 2026. The blocking is currently implemented by means of TLS interference. | MENA | ||||||||||||||
31 | Actual | 2/26/2022 | Russian Federation | It affected locations in more than one state, province, or region | Nationwide | Shutdown, Throttle | Broadband, Mobile | Service-based | Executive government | Information control | Platform blocks began just as Russia invaded Ukraine | CSO KIO partners | https://ooni.org/post/2022-russia-blocks-amid-ru-ua-conflict/, https://www.businessinsider.com/what-happens-social-media-and-news-go-dark-in-russia-2022-3, https://www.theverge.com/2022/3/14/22976603/russia-bans-instagram-facebook-meta-call-to-violence, https://explorer.ooni.org/chart/mat?probe_cc=RU&test_name=facebook_messenger&since=2022-01-01&until=2022-12-31&axis_x=measurement_start_day; https://explorer.ooni.org/chart/mat?probe_cc=RU&since=2024-01-19&until=2025-02-19&time_grain=day&axis_x=measurement_start_day&test_name=web_connectivity&domain=twitter.com; https://explorer.ooni.org/chart/mat?probe_cc=RU&since=2024-01-19&until=2025-02-19&time_grain=day&axis_x=measurement_start_day&test_name=web_connectivity&domain=www.facebook.com; https://explorer.ooni.org/chart/mat?probe_cc=RU&since=2024-01-19&until=2025-02-19&time_grain=day&axis_x=measurement_start_day&test_name=web_connectivity&domain=www.instagram.com; https://explorer.ooni.org/chart/mat?probe_cc=RU&since=2025-01-27&until=2026-02-27&time_grain=day&axis_x=measurement_start_day&test_name=facebook_messenger | Ongoing | Unknown | No | Yes | Yes | No | Yes | No | No | No | No | No | Yes | Yes | No | Russia implemented platform blocks started with a centralized throttling of Twitter on Feb. 26 and expanded to ordering ISPs to fully block Facebook, Twitter, and Instagram on Mar. 4. These shutdowns endeavored to suppress dissenting opinions about the invasion of Ukraine. All three platforms were blocked throughout 2024 into 2025 and 2026. | https://www.accessnow.org/digital-rights-ukraine-russia-conflict/ | EECA | |||||||||||||||
32 | Actual | 5/24/2022 | Myanmar | It affected more than one city in the same state, province, or region | Dawei, Launglong, and Thayetchaung townships, Tanintharyi Region | Shutdown | Mobile | Full network | Military | Military junta | Conflict | Deliberate infrastructure attacks or targeted disruptions in an active conflict zone | CSO KIO partners | https://www.bnionline.net/en/news/mobile-network-and-internet-cut-some-townships-tanintharyi; https://athanmyanmar.org/my-mm/%E1%81%82%E1%81%80%E1%81%82%E1%81%84-%E1%80%81%E1%80%AF%E1%80%94%E1%80%BE%E1%80%85%E1%80%BA%E1%81%8A-%E1%80%96%E1%80%B1%E1%80%96%E1%80%B1%E1%80%AC%E1%80%BA%E1%80%9D%E1%80%AB%E1%80%9B%E1%80%AE%E1%80%9C/ | Ongoing | Unknown | No | No | No | No | No | No | Unknown | Yes | Unknown | No | Yes | Unknown | No | Mobile internet and phone lines were disconnected by the junta in multiple townships in Tanintharyi Region starting May 24, 2022 alongside severe fighting. The shutdowns are ongoing as of Mar. 2024. | APAC | |||||||||||||||
33 | Estimated | 6/12/2022 | Latvia | It affected locations in more than one state, province, or region | Nationwide | Shutdown | Broadband, Mobile | Service-based | Executive government | National Electronic Mass Media Council (NEPLP) | Other | VKontakte (VK) and two other platforms were blocked in Latvia in accordance with EU sanctions against the platforms' owners | News media article | https://news.err.ee/1608596623/lsm-latvia-blocks-russian-vkontakte-odnoklassniki-sites; https://eng.lsm.lv/article/features/media-literacy/russian-social-media-networks-vkontakte-odnoklassniki-to-be-blocked-in-latvia.a456465/; https://explorer.ooni.org/chart/mat?test_name=web_connectivity&axis_x=measurement_start_day&since=2022-01-01&until=2022-12-31&time_grain=day&probe_cc=LV&domain=vk.com; https://explorer.ooni.org/chart/mat?probe_cc=LV&since=2023-01-01&until=2023-12-31&time_grain=day&axis_x=measurement_start_day&test_name=web_connectivity&domain=vk.com; https://explorer.ooni.org/chart/mat?probe_cc=LV&since=2024-01-01&until=2024-12-31&time_grain=day&axis_x=measurement_start_day&test_name=web_connectivity&domain=vk.com; https://explorer.ooni.org/chart/mat?probe_cc=LV&since=2025-01-01&until=2025-12-31&time_grain=day&axis_x=measurement_start_day&test_name=web_connectivity&domain=vk.com | Ongoing | Other | Yes | EU Sanctions | https://eng.lsm.lv/article/features/media-literacy/russian-social-media-networks-vkontakte-odnoklassniki-to-be-blocked-in-latvia.a456465/ | "In accordance with sanctions imposed by the European Union (EU), NEPLP decided to limit the activities of 'VKontakte' (vk.com), 'Odnoklassniki' (ok.ru) and 'Moi mir' (my.mail.ru) in Latvia." | No | No | No | No | No | VK (VKontakte), Ok.ru (Odnoklassniki), Moi mir (my.mail.ru) | No | No | Unknown | No | No | No | Yes | Authorities in Latvia blocked VK, Odnoklassniki, and Moi mir in accordance with EU sanctions against the platforms' owners (Yury Kovalchuk and Vladimir Kiriyenko) following Russia's full-scale invasion of Ukraine in 2022. The NEPLP announced the shutdown order on May 12, 2022, and evidence of anomalies in OONI measurements began appearing Jun. 12. The blocks are ongoing, albeit inconsistently applied across providers over the years. This is Latvia's first recorded shutdown. | Europe | |||||||||||
34 | Actual | 9/21/2022 | Iran (Islamic Republic of) | It affected locations in more than one state, province, or region | Nationwide | Shutdown | Broadband, Mobile | Service-based | Unknown | Protests | Growing protests following the death in police custody of Mahsa Amini | CSO KIO partners | https://ooni.org/post/2022-iran-technical-multistakeholder-report/#blocking-of-whatsapp-instagram-skype-viber-and-linkedin; https://explorer.ooni.org/chart/mat?probe_cc=IR&since=2023-01-01&until=2024-01-01&time_grain=day&axis_x=measurement_start_day&test_name=whatsapp; https://explorer.ooni.org/chart/mat?probe_cc=IR&since=2024-01-01&until=2024-11-24&time_grain=day&axis_x=measurement_start_day&test_name=whatsapp; https://apnews.com/article/iran-social-media-whatsapp-google-d886b47c427f33f96fb85e7c78d0b831; https://explorer.ooni.org/chart/mat?probe_cc=IR&since=2024-01-19&until=2025-02-19&time_grain=day&axis_x=measurement_start_day&test_name=whatsapp; https://explorer.ooni.org/chart/mat?probe_cc=IR&since=2024-01-19&until=2025-02-19&time_grain=day&axis_x=measurement_start_day&test_name=web_connectivity&domain=www.instagram.com; https://explorer.ooni.org/chart/mat?probe_cc=IR&since=2025-01-19&until=2026-02-19&time_grain=day&axis_x=measurement_start_day&test_name=web_connectivity&domain=www.instagram.com | Ongoing | Unknown | No | No | No | Yes | Yes | No | Skype, Viber, LinkedIn | No | No | Iran: MCI (TCI), Iran: MTN Irancell, Iran: Rightel (Tamin Telecom) | No | No | Yes | Yes | No | Starting Sep. 21, WhatsApp and Instagram were blocked by ISPs across the country, with Skype, LinkedIn, and Viber soon to follow. WhatsApp and Google Play were restored in 2024 on Dec. 24, but the rest were ongoing into 2026. | MENA | ||||||||||||||
35 | Actual | 12/16/2022 | Jordan | It affected locations in more than one state, province, or region | Nationwide | Shutdown | Broadband, Mobile | Service-based | Executive government | Protests | Mass protests over fuel prices in Maan led to the death of a senior police officer, prompting the Jordanian authorities to "temporarily" ban TikTok | News media article | https://apnews.com/article/jordan-amman-dfee2613c4f45e12faf5874b0c473628, https://twitter.com/jo_osa/status/1603769860584099840 | Ongoing | Fake news/ Hate speech/ Incendiary content/ Promoting violence | Yes | No | https://apnews.com/article/jordan-amman-dfee2613c4f45e12faf5874b0c473628 | The platform was banned “after its misuse and failing to deal with publications inciting violence and disorder.” - Jordan’s Public Security Directorate | No | No | No | No | No | TikTok | No | No | Unknown | No | Yes | Unknown | No | TikTok was banned in Jordan beginning Dec. 16 after a police officer was killed in Maan during massive protests. It remains blocked as of early 2026 according to partners. | MENA | ||||||||||||
36 | Actual | 3/21/2023 | Tanzania, United Republic of | It affected locations in more than one state, province, or region | Nationwide | Shutdown | Broadband, Mobile | Service-based | Executive government | Information control | CSO KIO partners | https://explorer.ooni.org/findings/203466718601; https://ooni.org/post/2024-tanzania-lgbtiq-censorship-and-other-targeted-blocks/#lgbtiq-social-networks; https://explorer.ooni.org/chart/mat?probe_cc=TZ&since=2025-01-27&until=2026-02-27&time_grain=day&axis_x=measurement_start_day&test_name=web_connectivity&domain=www.grindr.com | Ongoing | Unknown | No | No | No | No | No | No | Grindr, Hornet, PlanetRomeo (ROMEO) | No | No | No | No | No | No | LGBTQ groups | No | Grindr was blocked in Tanzania starting Mar. 21. The block is ongoing as of early 2026 according to partners, and includes two other LGBTQ+ dating apps. | Africa | |||||||||||||||
37 | Estimated | 5/1/2023 | India | It affected more than one city in the same state, province, or region | Jammu & Kashmir | Shutdown | Broadband, Mobile | Service-based | Executive government | Government of India, Ministry of Electronics and Information Technology | Information control | CSO KIO partners | https://timesofindia.indiatimes.com/india/government-bans-14-messaging-apps-used-by-jk-terrorists/articleshow/99917838.cms; https://www.moneycontrol.com/technology/delhi-hc-directs-centre-to-furnish-blocking-order-for-briar-messaging-app-article-12808201.html; https://drive.google.com/file/d/13IMaJDEpPtTaBe5RLKN6AFUVYVdSRr2R/view?usp=drive_link; https://indianexpress.com/article/india/national-security-matter-delhi-hc-upholds-order-blocking-briar-app-9441255/ | Ongoing | National security/ Counter-terrorism | "Agencies keep track of channels used by Overground workers (OGWs) and terrorists to communicate among themselves. While tracking down one of the communication, agencies found that the mobile application does not have representatives in India and it is difficult to track down activities happening on the app," said an official. | Yes | Yes | Section 69A of the Information Technology Act, 2000 | https://risingkashmir.com/centre-blocks-14-apps-in-jammu-and-kashmir-for-spreading-terror | No | No | No | No | No | Crypviser, Enigma, Safeswiss, Wickrme, Mediafire, Briar, BChat, Nandbox, Conion, IMO, Element, Second line, Zangi, Threema | No | No | Unknown | No | No | No | No | 14 messaging apps were blocked across all of India starting in early May 2023. Later court proceedings confirmed that the blocks were in fact limited to Jammu & Kashmir. The Delhi HC upheld the Briar ban largely because it was limited to J&K. | APAC | |||||||||||
38 | Actual | 8/2/2023 | Ethiopia | It affected more than one city in the same state, province, or region | Amhara region | Shutdown | Broadband, Mobile | Full network, Service-based | Executive government | Conflict | Escalation of conflict between federal military forces and Amhara Fano fighters | CSO KIO partners | https://ehrc.org/amhara-region-concerning-human-rights-violations-in-the-context-of-the-armed-conflict/; https://twitter.com/CloudflareRadar/status/1696160808407839068; https://twitter.com/CARDEthiopia/status/1687027063046221824?s=20 | Ongoing | Unknown | No | Yes | Yes | Yes | No | No | Unknown | Unknown | No | No | Yes | Yes | No | Starting at 18:00 UTC Aug. 2, mobile and broadband internet plus multiple social media platforms were shut down across Amhara, Ethiopia in the midst of escalating conflict between federal and regional militaries. Numerous atrocities and war crimes were documented in the midst of the ongoing shutdown, which is still mostly in place despite some some returns to limited connectivity as of early 2025. | https://www.accessnow.org/press-release/open-statement-internet-shutdown-amhara/; https://twitter.com/accessnow/status/1762387557512290493; https://www.accessnow.org/keepiton-in-conflict-the-human-impact-of-internet-shutdowns-in-amhara-region-ethiopia/ | Africa | |||||||||||||||
39 | Actual | 8/8/2023 | Jordan | It affected locations in more than one state, province, or region | Nationwide | Shutdown | Broadband, Mobile | Service-based | Executive government | Information control | CSO KIO partners | https://explorer.ooni.org/findings/179818906201; https://ooni.org/post/2023-jordan-blocks-grindr/; https://explorer.ooni.org/chart/mat?probe_cc=JO&since=2025-01-13&until=2026-02-19&time_grain=day&axis_x=measurement_start_day&axis_y=probe_asn&test_name=web_connectivity&domain=www.grindr.com | Ongoing | Unknown | No | No | No | No | No | No | Grindr | No | No | No | No | No | No | LGBTQ groups | No | Grindr was blocked in Jordan starting Aug. 8. The block is ongoing as of early 2025 according to partners. As of early 2026, the block may have been lifted on at least one ASN in 2025 (AS8376), with partners indicating some people have been able to access it without a VPN. However, anomalies remain on all other networks with aggregated OONI measurements. | MENA | |||||||||||||||
40 | Actual | 8/13/2023 | Tanzania, United Republic of | It affected locations in more than one state, province, or region | Nationwide | Shutdown | Broadband, Mobile | Service-based | Executive government | Information control | CSO KIO partners | https://explorer.ooni.org/findings/185407756401; https://explorer.ooni.org/chart/mat?probe_cc=TZ&since=2023-11-01&until=2024-11-24&time_grain=day&axis_x=measurement_start_day&test_name=web_connectivity&domain=www.clubhouse.com; https://explorer.ooni.org/chart/mat?probe_cc=TZ&since=2024-01-19&until=2025-02-19&time_grain=day&axis_x=measurement_start_day&test_name=web_connectivity&domain=www.clubhouse.com; https://explorer.ooni.org/chart/mat?probe_cc=TZ&since=2025-01-27&until=2026-02-27&time_grain=day&axis_x=measurement_start_day&test_name=web_connectivity&domain=www.clubhouse.com | Ongoing | Unknown | No | No | No | No | No | No | Clubhouse | No | No | No | No | No | No | No | Clubhouse was blocked in Tanzania starting Aug. 13. The block is ongoing as of early 2026. | Africa | ||||||||||||||||
41 | Actual | 10/9/2023 | Palestine, State of | It affected locations in more than one state, province, or region | Gaza Strip | Shutdown | Broadband, Mobile | Full network | Non-government | Military of the State of Israel | Conflict | Combination of targeted bombings of network installations, disabling of 2 out of 3 primary mobile communication lines for all of the Gaza Strip, and targeted airstrikes on ISP offices and infrastructure | CSO KIO partners | https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2023/10/9/israel-announces-total-blockade-on-gaza; https://www.ochaopt.org/content/hostilities-gaza-strip-and-israel-flash-update-4; https://twitter.com/muhammadshehad2/status/1711408136806969624; https://twitter.com/SaulStaniforth/status/1711647388241207374; https://www.accessnow.org/publication/palestine-unplugged/#NewStarMax | Ongoing | Sabotage/ Third-party Action | No | No | No | No | No | No | Yes | Yes | Palestine: AjyalFi, Palestine: AlfaNet, Palestine: CityNet, Palestine: DCC, Palestine: DCC Khan Younis, Palestine: DCC North, Palestine: DCC Rafah, Palestine: Fusion, Palestine: JetNet, Palestine: NewStarMax, Palestine: PalWifi, Palestine: SpeedClick, Palestine: TechHub-HiNet | Yes | https://www.facebook.com/HiNet.Gaza/posts/pfbid02YKcy7r9ywaiqLYMZr5KEEWZDPvd3yoPUMKKzzNrFuDnApsMQhST2Q8nQBDuTV5Msl | On October 9, TechHub-HiNet posted on its Facebook page the following message: “We no longer have anything to offer to ensure the continuity of internet service due to the attacks and destruction our internet servers have suffered, leading to a complete service interruption.” | No | Yes | Yes | No | An escalation of bombings of the Gaza Strip by the Israeli military included targeted shutdowns of 13 ISPs between the hours of 12:00pm UTC to 4:30pm UTC on Oct. 9. Many of these providers had already dealt with significant network damage and disruptions since Oct. 7, but went fully offline on Oct. 9. This impacted ~411,000 people and ~37.2% of the total market share of ISPs at the time. AjyalFi slowly came back online starting Oct. 20. NewStarMax came back partially online around 12:00pm UTC on Oct. 19 but experienced many shutdowns afterwards. The remaining 11 ISPs are still completely offline as of Dec. 31 (the total becomes 12 with NetStream's shutdown from Oct. 26). See https://accessnow.org/palestine-unplugged for further references, measurement data, and analysis. Update, January 2025: Of the 12 ISPs that were offline at the start of 2024, only 4 (AlfaNet, Netstream, Speedclick, and TechHub-HiNet) came back into service and showed a return of traffic (between June and October, 2024). | https://www.accessnow.org/publication/palestine-unplugged/ | MENA | |||||||||||
42 | Actual | 12/16/2023 | Pakistan | It affected locations in more than one state, province, or region | Nationwide | Shutdown | Broadband, Mobile | Service-based | Unknown | Information control | CSO KIO partners | https://explorer.ooni.org/findings/324516225200; https://explorer.ooni.org/chart/mat?probe_cc=PK&since=2023-10-01&until=2025-10-15&time_grain=day&axis_x=measurement_start_day&test_name=telegram; https://explorer.ooni.org/chart/mat?probe_cc=PK&since=2025-01-01&until=2025-02-01&time_grain=day&axis_x=measurement_start_day&test_name=telegram; https://explorer.ooni.org/chart/mat?probe_cc=PK&since=2025-01-01&until=2026-02-27&time_grain=day&axis_x=measurement_start_day&test_name=telegram | Ongoing | Unknown | No | No | No | No | No | Yes | No | No | No | No | No | No | No | Telegram was blocked in Pakistan beginning Dec. 16, 2023 continuously until late 2025. There are no public orders or government statements available acknowledging this decision. OONI data suggests the block was implemented by means of TLS interference, which is consistent with how other blocks have been implemented in Pakistan. Some ISPs appear to only block Telegram Web (telegram.org) while others also block the mobile app. OONI data also shows that on Jan. 4, 2025 alone, Telegram was unblocked with no explanation along with X and Signal (which were both indefinitely blocked) before showing consistent anomalies across networks the following day. The Telegram blocking was ongoing and active as of Feb. 2026. | APAC | |||||||||||||||||
43 | Actual | 2/16/2024 | Myanmar | It affected locations in more than one state, province, or region | Nationwide | Shutdown | Broadband, Mobile | Service-based | Military | Military junta | Conflict | The junta blocked WhatsApp, Facebook Messenger, and X | CSO KIO partners | https://explorer.ooni.org/chart/mat?probe_cc=MM&since=2024-01-01&until=2026-02-11&time_grain=day&axis_x=measurement_start_day&test_name=facebook_messenger; https://explorer.ooni.org/chart/mat?probe_cc=MM&since=2024-01-01&until=2026-02-11&time_grain=day&axis_x=measurement_start_day&test_name=whatsapp; https://explorer.ooni.org/chart/mat?probe_cc=MM&since=2024-01-01&until=2026-02-11&time_grain=day&axis_x=measurement_start_day&test_name=web_connectivity&domain=x.com%2Ctwitter.com; https://www.rfa.org/english/news/myanmar/google-signal-blocked-myanmar-07232024151304.html | Ongoing | Unknown | No | Yes | Yes | Yes | Unknown | Unknown | No | No | Unknown | No | Unknown | Unknown | No | The junta blocked WhatsApp, Facebook Messenger, and X in Myanmar beginning by Feb. 16, 2024 according to data from OONI. The blockings are ongoing into early 2026. | APAC | |||||||||||||||
44 | Actual | 2/17/2024 | Pakistan | It affected locations in more than one state, province, or region | Nationwide | Shutdown | Broadband, Mobile | Service-based | Executive government | Ministry of Interior | Information control | X/Twitter was blocked throughout Pakistan | CSO KIO partners | https://explorer.ooni.org/chart/mat?probe_cc=PK&since=2023-09-24&until=2024-09-25&time_grain=day&axis_x=measurement_start_day&test_name=web_connectivity&domain=twitter.com; https://explorer.ooni.org/search?since=2024-02-17&until=2024-02-18&probe_cc=PK&test_name=web_connectivity&domain=twitter.com&failure=true; https://www.nation.com.pk/19-Mar-2024/information-minister-takes-u-turn-admits-x-twitter-services-suspended-in-pakistan; https://x.com/DRM_News/status/1780529965370405077; https://explorer.ooni.org/chart/mat?probe_cc=PK&since=2024-05-20&until=2025-02-20&time_grain=day&axis_x=measurement_start_day&test_name=web_connectivity&domain=twitter.com; https://x.com/OpenObservatory/status/1920219636513009877#m; https://explorer.ooni.org/findings/255040833200; https://explorer.ooni.org/chart/mat?probe_cc=PK&since=2025-01-01&until=2025-02-01&time_grain=day&axis_x=measurement_start_day&test_name=web_connectivity&domain=twitter.com | Ended | 5/7/2025 | 446 | National security/ Counter-terrorism | Yes | No | https://www.reuters.com/world/asia-pacific/pakistan-blocked-social-media-platform-x-over-national-security-ministry-says-2024-04-17/ | No | Yes | No | No | No | No | No | Unknown | No | Unknown | Unknown | No | X/Twitter was blocked across Pakistan 9 days after the Feb. 8 election on Feb. 17. Initially, on Mar. 13 the Information Minister Atta Tara denied any issues with X, but later, he admitted it was suspended from before they came into power from the election. On Apr. 17, the Sindh High Court directed the Ministry of Interior to rescind its letter to the Pakistan Telecommunication Authority (PTA) to block the platform. However, measurement data shows the block was active nationwide as of Feb. 2025. OONI data also shows that on Jan. 4, 2025 alone, Telegram was unblocked with no explanation along with X and Signal (which were both indefinitely blocked) before showing consistent anomalies across networks the following day. OONI data later suggested that the block ended as of May 7, 2025. | APAC | |||||||||||
45 | Actual | 4/6/2024 | Myanmar | It only affected one city, county, or village | Myawaddy township, Kayin State | Shutdown | Mobile | Full network | Military | Military junta | Conflict | Internet and phone lines were cut off by the military council in an area of active conflict | CSO KIO partners | https://athanmyanmar.org/myanmar-communication-blackout-2021-to-present/; https://engagemedia.org/2024/myanmar-digital-coup-quarterly-february-2024-april-2024/; https://www.facebook.com/story.php?story_fbid=782296280664647&id=100066528465996&mibextid=oFDknk&rdid=fzruHsPiwTkiWHbC; https://t.me/MPANews/18021; https://www.rfa.org/burmese/news/myawaddy-phone-line-thailand-06172024114234.html; https://kicnews.org/2025/06/%E1%80%99%E1%80%BC%E1%80%9D%E1%80%90%E1%80%AE%E1%80%90%E1%80%BD%E1%80%84%E1%80%BA-%E1%80%96%E1%80%AF%E1%80%94%E1%80%BA%E1%80%B8%E1%80%9C%E1%80%AD%E1%80%AF%E1%80%84%E1%80%BA%E1%80%B8%E1%80%94%E1%80%BE/; https://engagemedia.org/2025/myanmar-digital-coup-quarterly-may-2025-july-2025/ | Ongoing | Unknown | No | No | No | No | No | No | Yes | Yes | Unknown | No | Yes | Unknown | No | Mobile internet and phone services were cut off by the military council in Myawaddy township, Kayin State starting around 11:00 on Apr. 6. The shutdown was active until at least Apr. 9 as residents feared fighting would move into the city. There was further confirmation of the ongoing shutdown into June as people had been trying to get service from Thai cell towers across the border. Residents confirmed on Jun. 21, 2025, that internet and phone lines from junta-controlled networks were still cut off from April 2024. Thai authorities had shut down electricity and internet multiple times since then. | APAC | |||||||||||||||
46 | Actual | 4/17/2024 | Malaysia | It affected locations in more than one state, province, or region | Nationwide | Shutdown | Broadband, Mobile | Service-based | Executive government | Malaysian Communications & Multimedia Commission | Information control | CSO KIO partners | https://explorer.ooni.org/findings/44213966401; https://explorer.ooni.org/chart/mat?probe_cc=MY&since=2023-09-20&until=2024-09-21&time_grain=day&axis_x=measurement_start_day&test_name=web_connectivity&domain=www.grindr.com; https://imap.sinarproject.org/news/internet-censorship-update-blocking-of-grindr-com-website; https://explorer.ooni.org/chart/mat?probe_cc=MY&since=2024-01-20&until=2025-02-20&time_grain=day&axis_x=measurement_start_day&test_name=web_connectivity&domain=www.grindr.com; https://explorer.ooni.org/chart/mat?probe_cc=MY&since=2025-01-27&until=2026-02-27&time_grain=day&axis_x=measurement_start_day&test_name=web_connectivity&domain=www.grindr.com | Ongoing | Unknown | No | No | No | No | No | No | Grindr | No | No | Malaysia: Celcom, Malaysia: DiGi Telecommunications, Malaysia: Maxis, Malaysia: Telekom Malaysia, Malaysia: Time, Malaysia: U Mobile, Malaysia: YTL Corporation | No | No | No | No | LGBTQ groups | No | Grindr was blocked in Malaysia starting on Apr. 17 (2024). Not all networks have applied the block consistently, but it is ongoing into 2025. There was likely a brief period where it was unblocked on most networks between Mar. 28 and May 10 (2025), but otherwise the block is ongoing into Feb. 2026, albeit inconsistently across networks. | APAC | |||||||||||||
47 | Actual | 4/18/2024 | Kyrgyzstan | It affected locations in more than one state, province, or region | Nationwide | Shutdown | Broadband, Mobile | Service-based | Executive government | State National Security Committee | Information control | TikTok was blocked in Kyrgyzstan citing concerns over impacts to children's health | CSO KIO partners | https://explorer.ooni.org/findings/154621229001; https://kaktus.media/doc/499556_tiktok_zakryvaut_na_territorii_kyrgyzstana._provayderam_postypilo_pismo.html; https://explorer.ooni.org/chart/mat?probe_cc=KG&since=2024-01-01&until=2025-02-12&time_grain=day&axis_x=measurement_start_day&test_name=web_connectivity&domain=www.tiktok.com%2Cs20.tiktokcdn.com%2Cp77-va.tiktokcdn.com%2Cp77-sign-va.tiktokcdn.com%2Cp77-sign-sg-lite.tiktokcdn.com%2Cp19-sign.tiktokcdn-us.com%2Cp19-sign.tiktokcdn-us.com%2Cmcs-va.tiktok.com%2Clf16-tiktok-web.ttwstatic.com%2Clf16-tiktok-common.ibytedtos.com%2Cm.tiktok.com%2Cwww.tiktok.com; https://explorer.ooni.org/chart/mat?probe_cc=KG&since=2025-01-27&until=2026-02-27&time_grain=day&axis_x=measurement_start_day&test_name=web_connectivity&domain=www.tiktok.com%2Cs20.tiktokcdn.com%2Cp77-va.tiktokcdn.com%2Cp77-sign-va.tiktokcdn.com%2Cp77-sign-sg-lite.tiktokcdn.com%2Cp19-sign.tiktokcdn-us.com%2Cp19-sign.tiktokcdn-us.com%2Cmcs-va.tiktok.com%2Clf16-tiktok-web.ttwstatic.com%2Clf16-tiktok-common.ibytedtos.com%2Cm.tiktok.com%2Cwww.tiktok.com | Ongoing | Other | Impacts to children's health, including their "intellectual, mental, spiritual and moral development" | Yes | Yes | Article 21-1 of the Law of the Kyrgyz Republic On Communications | https://kaktus.media/doc/499556_tiktok_zakryvaut_na_territorii_kyrgyzstana._provayderam_postypilo_pismo.html | "This letter states that in the Kyrgyz segment TikTok 'there is no systematic and principled approach to censorship of content', in particular, according to the State Committee for National Security, in the 'children's information space'. In its letter, the committee refers to the Law 'On measures to prevent harm to children's health, their physical, spiritual, moral development.' ... 'In order to prevent harm to the health of children, their intellectual, mental, spiritual and moral development, in accordance with paragraph 8 of the Rules for conducting radio frequency appointments approved by the decree of the Government of the Kyrgyz Republic of September 22, 2023 No501, and on the basis of Article 21-1 of the Law of the Kyrgyz Republic 'On Communications' GKNB asks to restrict access to the TikTok written service in the Kyrgyz Republic - says the letter." | No | No | No | No | No | TikTok | No | No | Kyrgyzstan: Alfa (Megacom), Kyrgyzstan: AUCA (American University of Central Asia), Kyrgyzstan: Megaline, Kyrgyzstan: Nurtel, Kyrgyzstan: Saimanet Telecommunications | Unknown | No | No | No | Yes | Following an order originally drafted in Sept. 2023, authorities in Kyrgyzstan implemented a ban of TikTok starting Apr. 18 due to concerns over children's health and moral development. The block was implemented by means of TLS interference and is ongoing into 2026. The Ministry of Culture, the Ministry of Digital Development, State National Security Committee, and the Regulatory and Suspension Service of Communications all played a part in pushing for the ban. | EECA | ||||||||
48 | Actual | 7/14/2024 | Myanmar | It affected locations in more than one state, province, or region | Nationwide | Shutdown | Broadband, Mobile | Service-based | Military | Military junta | Conflict | The junta banned the use of Signal across the country | CSO KIO partners | https://explorer.ooni.org/chart/mat?probe_cc=MM&since=2024-07-01&until=2024-09-20&time_grain=day&axis_x=measurement_start_day&test_name=signal; https://burma.irrawaddy.com/news/2024/07/20/387392.html; https://engagemedia.org/2024/myanmar-digital-coup-quarterly-may-2024-july-2024/; https://explorer.ooni.org/chart/mat?probe_cc=MM&since=2024-05-20&until=2025-02-20&time_grain=day&axis_x=measurement_start_day&test_name=signal; https://explorer.ooni.org/chart/mat?probe_cc=MM&since=2024-01-05&until=2025-11-05&time_grain=day&axis_x=measurement_start_day&test_name=signal; https://explorer.ooni.org/chart/mat?probe_cc=MM&since=2025-10-01&until=2026-02-27&time_grain=day&axis_x=measurement_start_day&test_name=signal | Ongoing | Unknown | No | No | No | No | No | No | Signal | No | No | Unknown | No | No | No | No | Signal was blocked in Myanmar beginning Jul. 14, 2024. The blocking was ongoing as of Feb. 2026. | APAC | ||||||||||||||
49 | Actual | 7/20/2024 | Equatorial Guinea | It affected more than one city in the same state, province, or region | Annobon | Shutdown | Mobile | Full network | Executive government | Protests | Internet and cell services were cutoff for the island province of Annobon after residents led protests against the government on discrimination and environmental issues | CSO KIO partners | https://x.com/HRF/status/1815829086549250148; https://www.laplata1.com/2024-07-20/dejaron-aislados-del-mundo-a-los-habitantes-de-la-republica-de-annobon-el-regimen-corto-la-cobertura-telefonica-e-internet-105940/; https://pulse.internetsociety.org/shutdowns/internet-suspended-in-annobon-equatorial-guinea-august-2024; https://monitor.civicus.org/explore/hrds-arbitrarily-arrested-prosecuted-internet-shutdown-in-annobon-province/; https://ambolegadu.com/en/obiang-versus-elon-musk-restringen-starlink-de-guinea-ecuatorial/ | Ongoing | Unknown | No | No | No | No | No | No | Starlink | Yes | Yes | Equatorial Guinea: GITGE | Unknown | No | Yes | Yes | No | The internet was shutdown for the province of Annobon, Equatorial Guinea beginning around 15:00 (UTC+0) on Jul. 20 to quell protests and prevent information from leaving the island. There were reports of widespread arrests and security forces shooting into crowds of protestors. Starlink was technically banned as well per the shutdown order. The shutdown was ongoing into early 2026. | https://www.accessnow.org/press-release/keepiton-equatorial-guinea-authorities-end-internet-shutdown-in-annobon/ | Africa | |||||||||||||
50 | Actual | 7/21/2024 | Myanmar | It affected more than one city in the same state, province, or region | Kachin State | Shutdown | Broadband, Mobile | Full network | Military | Military junta | Conflict | Internet and phone lines were cut off by the military council in an area of active conflict | CSO KIO partners | https://engagemedia.org/2024/myanmar-digital-coup-quarterly-may-2024-july-2024/; https://www.rfa.org/burmese/program_2/phone-internet-cut-off-kachin-07222024080819.html; https://burmese.kachinnews.com/2024/08/20/zm2-27/; https://www.bnionline.net/mm/news-106405; https://engagemedia.org/2024/myanmar-digital-coup-quarterly-august-2024-october-2024/; https://www.dvb.no/post/671580; https://www.bnionline.net/mm/news-107385; https://www.facebook.com/story.php?story_fbid=897164979277838&id=100069530328978&rdid=gcWnOwIq5RgTVQdb; https://engagemedia.org/2025/myanmar-digital-coup-quarterly-november-2024-january-2025/; https://www.myitkyinanewsjournal.com/phone-and-internet-outages-in-kachin-state-have-been-ongoing-for-6-months/; https://burmese.kachinnews.com/2025/01/06/zm1-224/; https://www.myitkyinanewsjournal.com/although-phone-lines-have-been-restored-in-tanai-city-it-is-still-difficult-to-make-calls/; https://www.dvb.no/post/689654; https://burmese.kachinnews.com/2025/06/17/am1-271/; https://burmese.kachinnews.com/2025/06/25/zz1-252/; https://www.facebook.com/athan.foe.myanmar/posts/%E1%80%86%E1%80%80%E1%80%BA%E1%80%9E%E1%80%BD%E1%80%9A%E1%80%BA%E1%80%9B%E1%80%B1%E1%80%B8%E1%80%9C%E1%80%AD%E1%80%AF%E1%80%84%E1%80%BA%E1%80%B8-%E1%80%96%E1%80%BC%E1%80%90%E1%80%BA%E1%80%90%E1%80%B1%E1%80%AC%E1%80%80%E1%80%BA%E1%80%81%E1%80%B6%E1%80%91%E1%80%AC%E1%80%B8%E1%80%9E%E1%80%8A%E1%80%BA%E1%80%B7-%E1%80%9E%E1%80%AF%E1%80%B6%E1%80%B8%E1%80%9B%E1%80%AC%E1%80%81%E1%80%BC%E1%80%B1%E1%80%AC%E1%80%80%E1%80%BA%E1%80%86%E1%80%9A%E1%80%BA%E1%80%B7%E1%80%84%E1%80%AB%E1%80%B8%E1%80%9B%E1%80%80%E1%80%BA-%E1%80%80%E1%80%81%E1%80%BB%E1%80%84%E1%80%BA%E1%80%95%E1%80%BC%E1%80%8A%E1%80%BA%E1%80%94%E1%80%9A%E1%80%BA-%E1%80%80%E1%80%81%E1%80%BB%E1%80%84%E1%80%BA%E1%80%95%E1%80%BC%E1%80%8A/1047760937525724/; https://burmese.kachinnews.com/2025/09/09/zz1-284/; https://www.facebook.com/myitkyinanewsjournal.mm/photos/%E1%80%80%E1%80%81%E1%80%BB%E1%80%84%E1%80%BA%E1%80%99%E1%80%BE%E1%80%AC-%E1%80%96%E1%80%AF%E1%80%94%E1%80%BA%E1%80%B8%E1%80%94%E1%80%B2%E1%80%B7%E1%80%A1%E1%80%84%E1%80%BA%E1%80%90%E1%80%AC%E1%80%94%E1%80%80%E1%80%BA-%E1%80%95%E1%80%BC%E1%80%90%E1%80%BA%E1%80%90%E1%80%B1%E1%80%AC%E1%80%80%E1%80%BA%E1%80%94%E1%80%B1%E1%80%90%E1%80%AC-%E1%81%81%E1%81%85-%E1%80%9C%E1%80%9B%E1%80%BE%E1%80%AD%E1%80%95%E1%80%BC%E1%80%AE-%E1%80%A1%E1%80%B1%E1%80%AC%E1%80%80%E1%80%BA%E1%80%90%E1%80%AD%E1%80%AF%E1%80%98%E1%80%AC%E1%81%82%E1%81%81%E1%80%80%E1%80%81%E1%80%BB%E1%80%84%E1%80%BA%E1%80%95%E1%80%BC%E1%80%8A%E1%80%BA%E1%80%94%E1%80%9A%E1%80%BA%E1%80%9B%E1%80%B2%E1%80%B7%E1%80%99%E1%80%BC/847526584621003/; https://burmese.kachinnews.com/2025/10/28/zz2-69/; https://www.facebook.com/watch/?v=832030659798095 | Ongoing | Unknown | No | No | No | No | No | No | Yes | Yes | Myanmar: Atom, Myanmar: MPT, Myanmar: Mytel, Myanmar: Ooredoo | Unknown | No | Yes | Unknown | No | Internet services and phone lines were cut off by the military council across all 18 townships of Kachin State at 10:00am local time on Jul. 21. People resorted to using Chinese providers by the border when possible, or Starlink if they had it available in their area. By Aug. 20, some mobile connections started to be restored in parts of Kachin. Myitkyina was still cutoff as of Sep. 13 as locals tried to connect with IP Star and Starlink. However, the regime was inspecting local businesses for satellite connection nodes and making arrests in the process. The shutdown was still prevalent across Kachin State as of Oct. 3 and Nov. 18. Connections were restored on Mytel in Bhamo around 4:00pm (local time) on Dec. 2. Myitkyina regained partial access to MPT service by Jan. 6, 2025, and some other townships (like Danai City) had MPT, Ooredoo, and Atom service in certain neighborhoods, but most of Kachin State had been undergoing a shutdown for 6 months as of Jan. 21, 2025 as fighting was ongoing between the Kachin Independence Army (KIA) and junta. By Jun. 17, 2025, Mytel mobile service returned to Myitkyina. As of Jun. 25, 2025, the following townships had service available: Myitkyina (Mytel, Atom), Hpakant (MPT), Puta-O (Ooredoo, Atom), Khaung Lan Phu (MEC), and Naungmon town had some MPT, with the rest Kachin state offline. The state reached one-year of a shutdown on Jul. 21, 2025. Mohnyin had Mytel mobile service return on Sep. 9, 2025. The state reached 15 months of a shutdown on Oct. 21, 2025. Puta-O had Mytel service return by Oct. 28, 2025. The state reached 16 months of a shutdown by late Nov. 2025. | APAC | ||||||||||||||
51 | Actual | 8/8/2024 | Venezuela (Bolivarian Republic of) | It affected locations in more than one state, province, or region | Nationwide | Shutdown | Broadband, Mobile | Service-based | Executive government | President Nicolás Maduro | Protests | Violent post-election protests in Venezuela were met with a massive number of media outlets being blocked as well as multiple social media and messaging platforms | CSO KIO partners | https://vesinfiltro.org/noticias/2025-08-08-x-signal/; https://x.com/vesinfiltro/status/1821996420154671442?s=46; https://x.com/vesinfiltro/status/1821780041652388295; https://x.com/vesinfiltro/status/1822017938087408020; https://x.com/gbastidas/status/1821690103846056064?s=46; https://x.com/vesinfiltro/status/1821658243610890508?s=46; https://x.com/OpenObservatory/status/1828028323269611553; https://explorer.ooni.org/chart/mat?test_name=signal&axis_x=measurement_start_day&since=2024-07-27&until=2024-08-27&time_grain=day&probe_cc=VE; https://x.com/espaciopublico/status/1820255786938908967?s=46; https://explorer.ooni.org/chart/mat?probe_cc=VE&since=2024-07-27&until=2025-02-12&time_grain=day&axis_x=measurement_start_day&test_name=signal; https://explorer.ooni.org/chart/mat?probe_cc=VE&since=2024-07-27&until=2025-02-12&time_grain=day&axis_x=measurement_start_day&test_name=web_connectivity&domain=twitter.com; https://www.hrw.org/news/2024/09/04/venezuela-brutal-crackdown-protesters-voters; https://explorer.ooni.org/chart/mat?probe_cc=VE&since=2024-08-01&until=2025-12-17&time_grain=day&axis_x=measurement_start_day&test_name=signal; https://explorer.ooni.org/chart/mat?probe_cc=VE&since=2024-08-01&until=2025-12-17&time_grain=day&axis_x=measurement_start_day&test_name=web_connectivity&domain=x.com%2Ctwitter.com; https://explorer.ooni.org/chart/mat?probe_cc=VE&since=2025-06-27&until=2026-02-27&time_grain=day&axis_x=measurement_start_day&test_name=signal; https://explorer.ooni.org/chart/mat?probe_cc=VE&since=2025-06-27&until=2026-02-27&time_grain=day&axis_x=measurement_start_day&test_name=web_connectivity&domain=twitter.com | Ongoing | Fake news/ Hate speech/ Incendiary content/ Promoting violence | On Sunday, August 5, Nicolás Maduro expressed his intention to regulate or block TikTok, Instagram and X in Venezuela, accusing these apps of "being the main instruments" to increase "hatred and fascism." | Yes | No | https://x.com/espaciopublico/status/1820255786938908967?s=46 | No | Yes | No | No | No | Signal, Reddit, Microsoft Teams | No | No | No | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes | Signal, X, Reddit, and Microsoft Teams were blocked in Venezuela starting Aug. 8 to crack down on dissent during post-election protests. These blocks were ongoing into 2025. During the blockings, authorities in Venezuela committed widespread human rights violations through deadly force against protestors, scores of arrests and disappearances, and an array of technology-enabled political violence. The results of the elections were widely considered fraudelent on the international stage. The blocks were ongoing into 2026. | https://www.accessnow.org/press-release/open-letter-technology-enabled-political-violence-venezuela/ | LAC | ||||||||||
52 | Actual | 8/9/2024 | Russian Federation | It affected locations in more than one state, province, or region | Nationwide | Shutdown | Broadband, Mobile | Service-based | Executive government | Roskomnadzor | Information control | Signal was blocked in Russia | CSO KIO partners | https://x.com/OpenObservatory/status/1828028326205653462; https://explorer.ooni.org/chart/mat?probe_cc=RU&since=2024-07-27&until=2025-02-19&time_grain=day&axis_x=measurement_start_day&test_name=signal; https://timeline-ru.net/timeline; https://www.reuters.com/technology/russian-users-report-glitches-with-secure-messenger-app-signal-2024-08-09/; https://www.svoboda.org/a/roskomnadzor-obyavil-o-blokirovke-v-rossii-messendzhera-signal/33072598.html; https://explorer.ooni.org/chart/mat?probe_cc=RU&since=2025-01-27&until=2026-02-27&time_grain=day&axis_x=measurement_start_day&test_name=signal | Ongoing | Unknown | No | No | No | No | No | No | Signal | No | No | No | No | No | No | No | Signal was blocked across Russia beginning Aug. 9. The block was ongoing into 2026. | EECA | ||||||||||||||
53 | Estimated | 8/26/2024 | Pakistan | It affected locations in more than one state, province, or region | Nationwide | Shutdown | Mobile | Service-based | Unknown | Information control | Signal was blocked on a few mobile networks across Pakistan | CSO KIO partners | https://explorer.ooni.org/chart/mat?probe_cc=PK&since=2024-07-27&until=2024-09-26&time_grain=day&axis_x=measurement_start_day&test_name=signal; https://explorer.ooni.org/m/20240825211415.244828_PK_signal_3742ced7c0c95471; https://killswitch.pk/?q=2024; https://x.com/OpenObservatory/status/1828028326205653462; https://explorer.ooni.org/chart/mat?test_name=signal&axis_x=measurement_start_day&since=2024-01-19&until=2025-02-19&time_grain=day&probe_cc=PK; https://explorer.ooni.org/chart/mat?probe_cc=PK&since=2025-01-01&until=2025-02-01&time_grain=day&axis_x=measurement_start_day&test_name=signal | Ongoing | Unknown | No | No | No | No | No | No | Signal | No | No | Pakistan: Jazz, Pakistan: Ufone, Pakistan: Zong | Unknown | No | No | No | No | Signal was blocked on select mobile carriers in Pakistan starting around Aug. 26, 2024. On Nov. 6, it seems to have been applied across all providers measured by OONI. OONI data also shows that on Jan. 4, 2025 alone, Telegram was unblocked with no explanation along with X and Signal (which were both indefinitely blocked) before showing consistent anomalies across networks the following day. The Signal blocking was ongoing and active as of Feb. 2026. | APAC | ||||||||||||||
54 | Actual | 8/30/2024 | Tanzania, United Republic of | It affected locations in more than one state, province, or region | Nationwide | Shutdown | Broadband, Mobile | Service-based | Executive government | Political instability | X (formerly Twitter), Telegram, and Briar were blocked across major ISPs in Tanzania in response to alleged opposition party plans to free political prisoners from a jail | CSO KIO partners | https://explorer.ooni.org/findings/188763810301; https://paradigmhq.org/press-release-net-rights-coalition-calls-on-tanzania-to-stop-restricting-access-to-x-former-twitter/; https://x.com/tanpol/status/1829436930053833118; https://thechanzo.com/2024/06/11/political-heat-on-x-twitter-forces-ruling-party-supporters-to-call-for-app-ban-in-tanzania-citing-pornography/; https://www.digest.tz/igtwg-condemns-x-platform-restriction-tanzanias-renewed-censorship-amid-political-tensions/; https://zainafoundationtz.org/wp-content/uploads/2024/09/TZReport-on-Internet-Shutdown-Incident-Twitter.pdf; https://explorer.ooni.org/chart/mat?probe_cc=TZ&since=2024-08-01&until=2025-12-12&time_grain=day&axis_x=measurement_start_day&test_name=telegram; https://explorer.ooni.org/chart/mat?probe_cc=TZ&since=2024-09-01&until=2025-12-14&time_grain=day&axis_x=measurement_start_day&test_name=web_connectivity&domain=briarproject.org; https://explorer.ooni.org/chart/mat?probe_cc=TZ&since=2025-01-27&until=2026-02-27&time_grain=day&axis_x=measurement_start_day&test_name=telegram | Ongoing | Unknown | No | No | Yes | No | No | Yes | Briar | No | No | Tanzania: Airtel (Bharti Airtel), Tanzania: Habari, Tanzania: Tigo (Millicom), Tanzania: Vodacom | Unknown | No | Unknown | No | No | X was blocked on major ISPs in Tanzania on Aug. 30 in the midst of online campaigning from the opposition party and criticism of the ruling party's human right abuses. The platform was blocked by means of TLS interference. Evidence was uncovered later in 2025 that on the same day X was blocked (Aug. 30, 2024), Telegram was also blocked. However, even though access to X returned the same day, Telegram remained blocked indefinitely across multiple networks with uneven implementation nationally through 2024. By early Jun. 2025, Telegram was blocked on virtually all major ISPs through at least Dec. 2025. Additionally, the messaging app Briar, as evident by anomalies in OONI data on 'briarproject.org', was also likely blocked starting Sep. 4, 2024 until at least Dec. 2025, becoming more inaccessible across more ISPs over time. The Telegram block was ongoing as of Feb. 2026. | https://www.accessnow.org/press-release/civil-society-asks-who-blocked-x-tanzania/ | Africa | |||||||||||||
55 | Actual | 10/8/2024 | Turkey | It affected locations in more than one state, province, or region | Nationwide | Shutdown | Broadband, Mobile | Service-based | Judiciary | Ankara's 1st Penal Court of Peace following directives from the Ankara Chief Public Prosecutor's Office | Information control | Discord was banned in Turkey based on the spread of illegal content on the platform | CSO KIO partners | https://x.com/OpenObservatory/status/1843815747094753847; https://bianet.org/haber/turkey-bans-discord-after-revelations-of-incel-cyberbullying-child-exploitation-300552; https://www.dw.com/en/turkey-blocks-discord-messaging-platform/a-70445259; https://explorer.ooni.org/chart/mat?probe_cc=TR&since=2024-08-08&until=2026-02-13&time_grain=day&axis_x=measurement_start_day&test_name=web_connectivity&domain=discord.com | Ongoing | Illegal content | Concerns over child sexual abuse and obscenity on the platform led to the ban | Yes | "A decision has been made to remove all publications from content and block access from Turkey to the specified URLs due to sufficient suspicion of the crimes of 'child sexual abuse and obscenity,'" [Turkish Justice Minister Yilmaz Tunc] said on his X account. Tunc insisted that the decision has been made to protect children. "We are determined to protect our youth and children, the guarantee of our future, from harmful and illegal content on social media and the internet," Tunc added. | No | No | No | No | No | Discord | No | No | Turkey: Goknet, Turkey: Millenicom, Turkey: Superonline, Turkey: Turkcell, Turkey: TurkNet, Turkey: TurkSat, Turkey: Turk Telecom (Oger Telecom) | Unknown | No | Yes | No | No | Authorities in Turkey banned Discord effective Oct. 8, 2024 following public outrage over incel groups which were using the platform to praise femicides and producing and sharing content related to animal torture and child abuse. Russian authorities blocked the platform on the same day. The block is ongoing into 2026. The Information and Communications Technologies Authority confirmed the ban. | MENA | |||||||||||
56 | Actual | 10/8/2024 | Russian Federation | It affected locations in more than one state, province, or region | Nationwide | Shutdown | Broadband, Mobile | Service-based | Executive government | Roskomnadzor | Information control | Discord was blocked in Russia | CSO KIO partners | https://meduza.io/feature/2024/09/27/rkn-gotovitsya-zablokirovat-discord-etot-messendzher-sozdavali-dlya-geymerov-no-im-polzuyutya-dazhe-uchastniki-voyny-v-ukraine; https://x.com/OpenObservatory/status/1843815747094753847; https://explorer.ooni.org/chart/mat?probe_cc=RU&since=2024-09-01&until=2025-02-19&time_grain=day&axis_x=measurement_start_day&test_name=web_connectivity&domain=discord.com; https://timeline-ru.net/timeline; https://explorer.ooni.org/chart/mat?probe_cc=RU&since=2025-01-27&until=2026-02-27&time_grain=day&axis_x=measurement_start_day&test_name=web_connectivity&domain=discord.com | Ongoing | Unknown | No | No | No | No | No | No | Discord | No | No | No | No | No | No | No | Discord was blocked across Russia beginning Oct. 8. This was the same day Turkish authorities blocked Discord. The block was ongoing into 2026. | EECA | ||||||||||||||
57 | Actual | 11/16/2024 | Myanmar | It affected more than one city in the same state, province, or region | Rakhine State | Shutdown | Mobile | Full network | Unknown | Conflict | Internet and phone lines were cut off in an area of active conflict | CSO KIO partners | https://t.me/TheWesternNews/16112; https://burmese.narinjara.com/news/detail/682aef07c8875ede02973750; https://burmese.narinjara.com/news/detail/68b83360e33bea7df628c0c7; https://engagemedia.org/2025/myanmar-digital-coup-quarterly-august-2025-october-2025/; https://burmese.narinjara.com/news/detail/68c90eee8e07c5a80bf07693; https://www.facebook.com/westernnewsagency/posts/-%E1%80%99%E1%80%AC%E1%80%94%E1%80%BA%E1%80%A1%E1%80%B1%E1%80%AC%E1%80%84%E1%80%BA%E1%80%99%E1%80%BC%E1%80%AD%E1%80%AF%E1%80%B7%E1%80%94%E1%80%9A%E1%80%BA%E1%80%90%E1%80%BD%E1%80%84%E1%80%BA-mpt-%E1%80%96%E1%80%AF%E1%80%94%E1%80%BA%E1%80%B8%E1%80%9C%E1%80%AD%E1%80%AF%E1%80%84%E1%80%BA%E1%80%B8-%E1%80%95%E1%80%BC%E1%80%94%E1%80%BA%E1%80%90%E1%80%95%E1%80%BA%E1%80%86%E1%80%84%E1%80%BA%E1%80%95%E1%80%B1%E1%80%B8%E1%80%99%E1%80%8A%E1%80%BA%E1%80%9F%E1%80%AF-%E1%80%9B%E1%80%81%E1%80%AD%E1%80%AF%E1%80%84%E1%80%BA%E1%80%85%E1%80%85%E1%80%BA%E1%80%80%E1%80%B1%E1%80%AC%E1%80%84%E1%80%BA%E1%80%85%E1%80%AE%E1%80%95%E1%80%BC%E1%80%B1%E1%80%AC-w/1286510340155056/; https://t.me/TheWesternNews/22995 | Ongoing | Unknown | Yes | https://www.facebook.com/westernnewsagency/posts/-%E1%80%99%E1%80%AC%E1%80%94%E1%80%BA%E1%80%A1%E1%80%B1%E1%80%AC%E1%80%84%E1%80%BA%E1%80%99%E1%80%BC%E1%80%AD%E1%80%AF%E1%80%B7%E1%80%94%E1%80%9A%E1%80%BA%E1%80%90%E1%80%BD%E1%80%84%E1%80%BA-mpt-%E1%80%96%E1%80%AF%E1%80%94%E1%80%BA%E1%80%B8%E1%80%9C%E1%80%AD%E1%80%AF%E1%80%84%E1%80%BA%E1%80%B8-%E1%80%95%E1%80%BC%E1%80%94%E1%80%BA%E1%80%90%E1%80%95%E1%80%BA%E1%80%86%E1%80%84%E1%80%BA%E1%80%95%E1%80%B1%E1%80%B8%E1%80%99%E1%80%8A%E1%80%BA%E1%80%9F%E1%80%AF-%E1%80%9B%E1%80%81%E1%80%AD%E1%80%AF%E1%80%84%E1%80%BA%E1%80%85%E1%80%85%E1%80%BA%E1%80%80%E1%80%B1%E1%80%AC%E1%80%84%E1%80%BA%E1%80%85%E1%80%AE%E1%80%95%E1%80%BC%E1%80%B1%E1%80%AC-w/1286510340155056/ | No | No | No | No | No | Yes | Yes | Myanmar: MPT, Myanmar: Mytel | Unknown | No | Yes | Unknown | No | Internet service and phone lines were cut off for almost all of Rakhine State since the evening of Nov. 16 until at least Dec. 4. According to a local source, a heavy weapon hit an MPT tower in the An-Padan area where fighting between the Arakan Army and military council was ongoing. As a result, it is unclear who directly caused the shutdown. Reports in May and Sep. 2025 indicated that the shutdown in junta-controlled areas of Rakhine State was ongoing from late 2024 well into 2025, with only brief periods of connectivity returning in Sittwe on Mytel in Aug. 2025 before being cut off again with no explanation. MPT was also restored in Sept. 2025 in some parts of Sittwe. A spokesperson for the State Security and Peace Commission (SSPC) - i.e. the military council - said in Oct. 2025 that MPT would be restored in Manaung. | APAC | ||||||||||||||
58 | Estimated | 12/13/2024 | Russian Federation | It affected locations in more than one state, province, or region | Nationwide | Shutdown | Broadband, Mobile | Service-based | Executive government | Roskomnadzor | Information control | Viber was blocked in Russia | CSO KIO partners | https://economictimes.indiatimes.com/tech/technology/russian-watchdog-blocks-viber-messaging-app/articleshow/116307970.cms?from=mdr; https://timeline-ru.net/timeline; https://explorer.ooni.org/chart/mat?probe_cc=RU&since=2024-01-01&until=2025-02-19&time_grain=day&axis_x=measurement_start_day&test_name=web_connectivity&domain=viber.com; https://www.thebarentsobserver.com/news/banned-and-blocked-russia-says-goodbye-to-messaging-apps/441875 | Ongoing | National security/ Counter-terrorism | Yes | https://economictimes.indiatimes.com/tech/technology/russian-watchdog-blocks-viber-messaging-app/articleshow/116307970.cms?from=mdr | "Russia's communications watchdog Roskomnadzor in a statement said the block was related to a violation of rules concerning the prevention of terrorism, extremism, and drug dealing." | No | No | No | No | No | Viber | No | No | No | No | No | No | No | Viber was blocked across Russia starting in December. The block was ongoing into 2026. | EECA | ||||||||||||
59 | Actual | 12/15/2024 | Russian Federation | It affected locations in more than one state, province, or region | Nearly every region | Shutdown | Broadband, Mobile | Service-based | Executive government | Roskomnadzor | Information control | YouTube was blocked again beginning in Dec. 2024 | CSO KIO partners | https://meduza.io/news/2024/12/23/trafik-youtube-v-rossii-upal-do-20-servis-de-fakto-zablokirovan; https://www.rferl.org/a/youtube-practically-blocked-in-russia-expert-says/33251568.html; https://transparencyreport.google.com/traffic/overview?fraction_traffic=start:1704067200000;end:1739923199999;product:21;region:RU&lu=fraction_traffic&hl=en; https://timeline-ru.net/timeline; https://transparencyreport.google.com/traffic/overview?fraction_traffic=start:1733011200000;end:1771459199999;product:21;region:RU&lu=fraction_traffic&hl=en | Ongoing | Unknown | No | No | No | No | No | No | YouTube | No | No | No | No | No | No | No | YouTube was blocked across nearly every region of Russia starting Dec. 15 after briefly returning in November. The block was ongoing into 2026. | EECA | ||||||||||||||
60 | Actual | 12/20/2024 | Myanmar | It only affected one city, county, or village | Phyu township, Bago Region | Shutdown | Mobile | Full network | Military | Military junta | Conflict | Internet and phone lines were cut off by the military council in an area of active conflict | CSO KIO partners | https://yktnews.com/2024/12/197508/; https://engagemedia.org/2025/myanmar-digital-coup-quarterly-november-2024-january-2025/; https://yktnews.com/2025/01/197878/; https://athanmyanmar.org/myanmar-communication-blackout-2021-to-present/ | Ended | 1/2/2025 | 14 | Unknown | No | No | No | No | No | No | Yes | Yes | Myanmar: Atom | Unknown | No | Yes | Yes | No | Internet service and phone lines were cut off by the military council in Phyu township, Bago Region on Dec. 20 until at least Dec. 30 as fighting between resistance forces and the regime intensified. The regime was bombing Phyu and nearby villages daily, causing locals to flee. There were also reports of junta troops looting from villages. New reports in early Jan. 2025 indicated the shutdown was ongoing until at least Jan. 2, conciding with daily drone strikes in villages by the regime and including one incident on Dec. 31, 2024 which killed 7 people and injured many others in a Hindu temple. | APAC | ||||||||||||
61 | Estimated | 1/1/2025 | Myanmar | It only affected one city, county, or village | Townships around Mingaladon Air Force Base, Yangon Region | Shutdown | Mobile | Full network | Military | Military junta | Conflict | Internet and phone lines were cut off by the military council | CSO KIO partners | http://ftp.dvb.no/post/686469; https://engagemedia.org/2025/myanmar-digital-coup-quarterly-november-2024-january-2025/; https://athanmyanmar.org/myanmar-communication-blackout-2021-to-present/ | Unknown | Unknown | No | No | No | No | No | No | Yes | Yes | Unknown | No | Unknown | Unknown | No | Mobile internet and phone lines were cut off frequently in townships around Mingaladon Air Force Base, Yangon Region starting in early January due to the installation of jammers by the military council. Yangon locals noted that mobile connections are often disrupted near government offices. | APAC | |||||||||||||||
62 | Actual | 1/2/2025 | Myanmar | It affected locations in more than one state, province, or region | Multiple villages along the Pathein River and up the coast, Gwa township, Rakhine State and Thabaung township, Ayeyarwady Region | Shutdown | Mobile | Full network | Military | Military junta | Conflict | Internet and phone lines were cut off by the military council in an area of active conflict | CSO KIO partners | https://www.dmgburmese.com/%E1%80%9E%E1%80%90%E1%80%84%E1%80%BA%E1%80%B8/gwabdntd.html; https://engagemedia.org/2025/myanmar-digital-coup-quarterly-november-2024-january-2025/; https://athanmyanmar.org/myanmar-communication-blackout-2021-to-present/ | Unknown | Unknown | No | No | No | No | No | No | Yes | Yes | Myanmar: Atom, Myanmar: MPT, Myanmar: Mytel | Unknown | No | Yes | Unknown | No | Internet service and phones lines were cut off by the military council in multiple villages along the Pathein River and up the coast, Gwa township, Rakhine State and Thabaung township, Ayeyarwady Region starting the morning of Jan. 2. The shutdown came in the midst of fighting between the Arakan Army and junta troops in the area. Gwa residents reported that phone lines were cut off right after junta troops fled a communication tower they previously controlled. | APAC | ||||||||||||||
63 | Estimated | 1/3/2025 | Myanmar | It affected more than one city in the same state, province, or region | Rakhine State | Shutdown | Mobile | Full network | Military | Arakan Army (AA) | Conflict | Internet and phone lines were cut off by the AA in an area of active conflict | CSO KIO partners | https://www.facebook.com/photo/?fbid=1062360075903418&set=-%E1%80%9B%E1%80%81%E1%80%AD%E1%80%AF%E1%80%84%E1%80%BA-%E1%80%9E%E1%80%AD%E1%80%99%E1%80%BA%E1%80%B8%E1%80%95%E1%80%AD%E1%80%AF%E1%80%80%E1%80%BA%E1%80%92%E1%80%B1%E1%80%9E%E1%80%99%E1%80%BB%E1%80%AC%E1%80%B8%E1%80%90%E1%80%BD%E1%80%84%E1%80%BA-%E1%80%96%E1%80%AF%E1%80%94%E1%80%BA%E1%80%B8%E1%80%9C%E1%80%AD%E1%80%AF%E1%80%84%E1%80%BA%E1%80%B8%E1%80%94%E1%80%BE%E1%80%84%E1%80%B7%E1%80%BA-%E1%80%A1%E1%80%84%E1%80%BA%E1%80%90%E1%80%AC%E1%80%94%E1%80%80%E1%80%BA%E1%80%9C%E1%80%AD%E1%80%AF%E1%80%84%E1%80%BA%E1%80%B8%E1%80%80%E1%80%AD%E1%80%AF-aa-%E1%80%91%E1%80%AD%E1%80%94%E1%80%BA%E1%80%B8%E1%80%81%E1%80%BB%E1%80%AF%E1%80%95%E1%80%BA%E1%80%91%E1%80%AC; https://engagemedia.org/2025/myanmar-digital-coup-quarterly-november-2024-january-2025/; https://www.facebook.com/dmgnewsagency/posts/%E1%80%9C%E1%80%B1%E1%80%80%E1%80%BC%E1%80%B1%E1%80%AC%E1%80%84%E1%80%BA%E1%80%B8%E1%80%90%E1%80%AD%E1%80%AF%E1%80%80%E1%80%BA%E1%80%81%E1%80%AD%E1%80%AF%E1%80%80%E1%80%BA%E1%80%99%E1%80%BE%E1%80%AF-%E1%80%95%E1%80%AD%E1%80%AF%E1%80%99%E1%80%AD%E1%80%AF%E1%80%95%E1%80%BC%E1%80%AF%E1%80%9C%E1%80%AF%E1%80%95%E1%80%BA%E1%80%9C%E1%80%AC-%E1%80%96%E1%80%AF%E1%80%94%E1%80%BA%E1%80%B8%E1%80%A1%E1%80%84%E1%80%BA%E1%80%90%E1%80%AC%E1%80%94%E1%80%80%E1%80%BA%E1%80%99%E1%80%BB%E1%80%AC%E1%80%B8%E1%80%80%E1%80%AD%E1%80%AF-%E1%80%9E%E1%80%90%E1%80%AD%E1%80%91%E1%80%AC%E1%80%B8%E1%80%9E%E1%80%AF%E1%80%B6%E1%80%B8%E1%80%85%E1%80%BD%E1%80%B2%E1%80%80%E1%80%BC%E1%80%9B%E1%80%94%E1%80%BA-a/1009919547848308/; https://www.facebook.com/100063883071441/posts/1072612151544877/?rdid=KFQz0miHXqvMfKpl | Unknown | Unknown | No | No | No | No | No | No | Yes | Yes | Unknown | No | Yes | Unknown | No | Internet service and phone lines were cut off by the Arakan Army (AA) in areas under their control across Rakhine State. Although access had been largely cutoff across the state since Nov. 16, 2024, with mixed reports of attribution between infrastructure damage, lack of fuel for towers, and deliberate shutdowns by the regime, new reports in early 2025 indicated that the AA was imposing shutdowns in areas it controlled due to security concerns around junta airstrikes. An AA spokesperson, Khaing Thu Kha, warned locals to be cautious while using mobile phones and the internet to avoid detection during airstrikes. Locals had to rely on radios for information, which caused radio prices to surge. | APAC | |||||||||||||||
64 | Estimated | 1/3/2025 | Myanmar | It only affected one city, county, or village | Kanpauk area, Yebyu township, Tanintharyi Region | Shutdown | Broadband, Mobile | Full network | Unknown | Conflict | Internet and phone lines were cut off in an area of active conflict | CSO KIO partners | https://engagemedia.org/2025/myanmar-digital-coup-quarterly-november-2024-january-2025/; https://www.daweiwatch.com/10/01/2025/104320/ | Unknown | Unknown | No | No | No | No | No | No | Yes | Yes | Myanmar: Atom, Myanmar: MPT, Myanmar: Mytel | Yes | https://www.daweiwatch.com/10/01/2025/104320/ | [Google Translate] "When contacted on the official social media pages of MPT and Atom regarding the low and outages in phone and internet connections, Atom replied that the reason for the low and outages was because of the repair of communication lines in some areas of Ye Phyu Township." | No | Unknown | Unknown | No | Internet services and phone lines were cut off in Kanpauk area, Yebyu township, Tanintharyi Region starting around Jan. 3. Service was down daily for about 5 hours, and was completely unavailable in low-lying villages and neighborhoods. Fiber internet through Mytel was affected. | APAC | |||||||||||||
65 | Actual | 1/5/2025 | Pakistan | It only affected one city, county, or village | Quetta, Balochistan | Shutdown | Broadband, Mobile | Full network | State government | Government of Balochistan | Protests | The political party Jamiat Ulema-Islam-Fazl (JUI-F) announced a strike following alleged rigging of election results, prompting state authorities to shut down the internet | CSO KIO partners | https://killswitch.pk/?q=node/206; https://www.thenews.com.pk/latest/1268998-cellphone-internet-services-suspended-in-quetta; https://www.dawn.com/news/1884002 | Ended | 1/7/2025 | 3 | Unknown | Unknown | No | No | No | No | No | Unknown | Unknown | Unknown | Yes | No | No | Unknown | Broadband and mobile internet was suspended in the city of Quetta, Balochistan from Jan. 5 to Jan. 7. The shutdown was imposed by the state government in response to a protest strike planned by the JUI-F party against alleged election rigging. | APAC | |||||||||||||
66 | Actual | 1/7/2025 | Russian Federation | It only affected one city, county, or village | St. Petersburg | Shutdown | Broadband, Mobile | Full network | Non-government | Ukrainian Cyber Alliance | Conflict | Ukrainian hackers claimed responsibility for a cyberattack on Russian ISP NODEX which led to an internet shutdown | CSO KIO partners | https://x.com/CloudflareRadar/status/1877096258583589247; https://t.me/UCAgroup/38; https://blog.cloudflare.com/q1-2025-internet-disruption-summary/#russia | Ended | 1/8/2025 | 2 | Sabotage/ Third-party Action | No | No | No | No | No | No | No | No | Russia: NODEX | Yes | https://vk.com/wall-7622_825 | [Google Translate] "Dear Subscribers, our technical staff is still working on restoring the network. The process is painstaking and long. We express our deep gratitude to those who support us in this difficult moment! This is really important for us. Let me remind you that our network was attacked by Ukrainian hackers, which resulted in its complete failure. At the moment, its functioning is being restored. There will be communication. When, is still unknown." | No | No | No | No | A cyberattack by the Ukrainian Cyber Alliance led to an internet shutdown of Russian network NODEX, based in St. Petersburg. The shutdown lasted from 0:00 on Jan. 7 to 16:00 on Jan. 8 (all UTC+0). | EECA | ||||||||||
67 | Actual | 1/8/2025 | Venezuela (Bolivarian Republic of) | It affected locations in more than one state, province, or region | Nationwide | Shutdown | Broadband, Mobile | Service-based | Executive government | Information control | TikTok was blocked in Venezuela ahead of and following Maduro's inauguration | CSO KIO partners | https://vesinfiltro.org/noticias/2025-01-09_bloqueos/; https://x.com/vesinfiltro/status/1877330408280359029; https://x.com/hsiciliano/status/1877112738406871159; https://x.com/vesinfiltro/status/1876847225659101286; https://explorer.ooni.org/chart/mat?probe_cc=VE&since=2024-12-31&until=2025-05-31&time_grain=day&axis_x=measurement_start_day&axis_y=probe_asn&test_name=web_connectivity&domain=www.tiktok.com%2Cs20.tiktokcdn.com%2Cp77-va.tiktokcdn.com%2Cp77-sign-va.tiktokcdn.com%2Cp77-sign-sg-lite.tiktokcdn.com%2Cp19-sign.tiktokcdn-us.com%2Cp19-sign.tiktokcdn-us.com%2Cmcs-va.tiktok.com%2Clf16-tiktok-web.ttwstatic.com%2Clf16-tiktok-common.ibytedtos.com%2Cm.tiktok.com%2Cwww.tiktok.com | Ended | 2/2/2025 | 26 | Unknown | No | No | No | No | No | No | TikTok | No | No | No | No | No | No | No | TikTok was blocked in Venezuela from Jan. 8 ahead of Maduro's inauguration, lasting until Feb. 2. The blocking seemed to take place daily for 6-8 hours. There were also at least 21 VPN services blocked in this timeframe as well. | LAC | |||||||||||||
68 | Actual | 1/9/2025 | Belarus | It affected locations in more than one state, province, or region | Nationwide | Shutdown | Broadband, Mobile | Service-based | Executive government | Other | At least 7 platforms were blocked in preparation for possibly shutting them down during the upcoming election | News media article | https://global.espreso.tv/world-about-ukraine-youtube-access-temporarily-cut-off-in-belarus-center-for-countering-disinformation-suggests-why; https://news.zerkalo.io/life/79043.html; https://news.zerkalo.io/life/88016.html; https://transparencyreport.google.com/traffic/overview?hl=en&fraction_traffic=start:1736294400000;end:1736726399999;product:21;region:BY&lu=fraction_traffic; https://explorer.ooni.org/chart/mat?probe_cc=BY&since=2025-01-01&until=2025-01-14&time_grain=day&axis_x=measurement_start_day&test_name=telegram | Ended | 1/10/2025 | 2 | Unknown | No | Unknown | Unknown | Unknown | Yes | Yes | YouTube, TikTok, Viber, Discord, Twitch | No | No | Unknown | No | No | No | No | At least 7 platforms were blocked in Belarus for hours during the night between Jan. 9-10, likely in preparation for blocks during the upcoming election. Google Transparency Report data suggests impacts to traffic to YouTube from around 10:00pm (UTC+3, local time) on Jan. 9 until 4:00am (UTC+3, local time) on Jan. 10. Beltelecom warned about technical work that night causing internet outages, but VPN services and other websites were accessible through the internet. | EECA | |||||||||||||
69 | Actual | 1/10/2025 | Venezuela (Bolivarian Republic of) | It affected locations in more than one state, province, or region | Nationwide | Shutdown | Broadband, Mobile | Service-based | Executive government | Information control | Telegram was blocked in Venezuela following Maduro's inauguration | CSO KIO partners | https://x.com/vesinfiltro/status/1877893483945467914; https://explorer.ooni.org/chart/mat?probe_cc=VE&since=2025-01-01&until=2025-01-31&time_grain=day&axis_x=measurement_start_day&test_name=telegram; https://edition.cnn.com/2025/01/11/americas/nicolas-maduro-venezuela-new-term-analysis-intl | Ended | 1/11/2025 | 2 | Unknown | No | No | No | No | No | Yes | No | No | No | No | No | No | No | Telegram was blocked in Venezuela from Jan. 10-11, immediately following Maduro's inauguration. | LAC | ||||||||||||||
70 | Estimated | 1/11/2025 | Myanmar | It only affected one city, county, or village | Palaw township, Tanintharyi Region | Shutdown | Mobile | Full network | Military | Military junta | Conflict | Internet and phone lines were cut off by the military council in an area of active conflict | CSO KIO partners | https://www.tntynews.com/15/01/2025/43285/ | Unknown | Unknown | No | No | No | No | No | No | Yes | Yes | Unknown | No | Yes | Yes | No | Mobile internet and phone lines were cut off in Palaw township, Tanintharyi Region around Jan. 11 at the time of the arrest of three Tapo villagers by the military council. The military council also burned down a rubber plantation and five houses in the area on the same day. | APAC | |||||||||||||||
71 | Actual | 1/13/2025 | India | It only affected one city, county, or village | Gund and Kangan areas, Ganderbal District, Jammu & Kashmir | Shutdown, Throttle | Mobile | Full network | State government | Government of Jammu & Kashmir, Home Department | Visits by government officials | PM Modi was visiting the immediate area on Jan. 13 to inaugurate the opening of a road tunnel into Sonamarg | CSO KIO partners | https://internetshutdowns.in/media/01TSTSof2025_65ad2e37-17ab-4307-9f02-4836a9a1f309._49b6e400-ddc5-4412-ab09-d6749df3addc..pdf; https://jkhome.nic.in/pdf/01(TSTS)of2025.pdf; https://www.thehindu.com/news/national/prime-minister-narendra-modi-inaugurates-z-morh-tunnel-in-sonamarg-on-janury-13-2025/article69094897.ece | Ended | 1/13/2025 | 1 | Fake news/ Hate speech/ Incendiary content/ Promoting violence | Yes | Yes | Government order | https://drive.google.com/file/d/1ZELEW1HrfWPkqDchixBWjKWkqZfnrKn9/view?usp=drive_link | No | No | No | No | No | No | No | Unknown | No | No | No | No | Mobile internet was suspended for a 20-km radius around (34.22263, 75.01041) in the Gund and Kangan areas, Ganderbal District from 06:00 to 16:30 on Jan. 13. 3G/4G/5G service was suspended, and 2G service was throttled to less than 128 kb/s. The timing and location directly coincided with a visit on Jan. 13 by PM Modi to the Z-Morh tunnel between Gagangir and Sonamarg. | APAC | ||||||||||
72 | Actual | 1/15/2025 | Ukraine | It affected locations in more than one state, province, or region | Multiple Oblasts | Shutdown, Throttle | Broadband, Mobile | Full network | Non-government | Military of the Russian Federation | Conflict | Missile strikes on civilian energy infrastructure | CSO KIO partners | https://ioda.inetintel.cc.gatech.edu/reports/how-russias-recent-attacks-on-ukraines-energy-grid-impacted-its-internet-connectivity-2/; https://ioda.inetintel.cc.gatech.edu/region/4357?from=1736826781&until=1738641181&view=view1; https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2025/1/15/russian-attacks-force-power-cuts-in-ukraine | Ended | 1/24/2025 | 10 | Sabotage/ Third-party Action | No | No | No | No | No | No | Unknown | Unknown | Unknown | No | No | No | No | Air strikes by the Russian military on civilian energy infrastructure across Ukraine led to partial internet disruptions in multiple Oblasts from Jan. 15 until at least Jan. 24. | EECA | |||||||||||||
73 | Actual | 1/16/2025 | Myanmar | It only affected one city, county, or village | Bawmi village, Shwethaungyan town, Pathein township, Ayeyarwady Region | Shutdown | Mobile | Full network | Military | Military junta | Conflict | Electricity, internet, and phone lines were cut off by the military council in an area of active conflict | CSO KIO partners | https://www.bbc.com/burmese/articles/cvgppm26j82o; https://engagemedia.org/2025/myanmar-digital-coup-quarterly-november-2024-january-2025/ | Ended | 1/18/2025 | 3 | Unknown | No | No | No | No | No | No | Yes | Yes | Unknown | No | Yes | Yes | No | Mobile internet, phone lines, and electricity were cut off by the military council in Bawmi village, Shwethaungyan town, Pathein township, Ayeyarwady Region starting Jan. 16 until at least Jan. 18 in the midst of heavy fighting with the Arakan Army. Airstrikes by the regime targeted Bawmi, resulting in civilian casualties. Civilians were fleeing to nearby towns to escape the fighting. | APAC | |||||||||||||
74 | Actual | 1/16/2025 | Chad | It only affected one city, county, or village | Abu Tanqi and Maji refugee camps | Shutdown | Broadband, Mobile | Full network | Executive government | Other | Authorities in Chad shut down Starlink internet for two refugee camps after abruptly requiring new permit fees | Other | https://dnhr.org/2025/01/22/internet-access-chad-refugee-camps-restoration/ | Ended | 1/19/2025 | 4 | Other | Applying permit fees for use of Starlink | No | No | No | No | No | No | Starlink | No | No | Unknown | No | No | No | No | Authorities in Chad shut down Starlink internet for Abu Tanqi and Maji refugee camps from Jan. 16 to Jan. 19 by abruptly imposing permit fees. Starlink was the only available internet service for the camps for people to communicate with the outside world. The camp associations ultimately covered the costs to restore service. | Africa | ||||||||||||
75 | Actual | 1/18/2025 | United States of America | It affected locations in more than one state, province, or region | Nationwide | Shutdown | Broadband, Mobile | Service-based | Executive government | Information control | TikTok and other ByteDance apps were blocked in the US following a law signed by President Biden which was upheld by the US Supreme Court | CSO KIO partners | https://blog.cloudflare.com/the-fall-and-rise-of-tiktok-traffic/?utm_campaign=cf_blog&utm_content=20250121&utm_medium=organic_social&utm_source=twitter/; https://nitter.net/DougMadory/status/1880961744115482780#m; https://www.wired.com/story/bytedance-tiktok-ban-lemon8-capcut-gauthai-app-stores/; https://www.wired.com/story/biden-sign-tiktok-ban/; https://x.com/TikTokPolicy/status/1880424906820608180; https://x.com/TikTokPolicy/status/1881030712188346459; https://nitter.net/DougMadory/status/1881861719695536176#m; https://www.wsj.com/business/tiktok-deal-us-china-framework-5f406292 | Ended | 1/19/2025 | 2 | National security/ Counter-terrorism | The US attempted to force TikTok to divest from ByteDance, its Chinese owner, or face a ban due to alleged data collection and influence operations by the PRC | Yes | Yes | Protecting Americans from Foreign Adversary Controlled Applications Act | https://www.congress.gov/118/plaws/publ50/PLAW-118publ50.pdf | No | No | No | No | No | TikTok, Other ByteDance apps | No | No | No | No | No | No | Yes | TikTok and other ByteDance apps were blocked in the US from 22:30 (UTC-5, US Eastern Standard Time) on Jan. 18 until 12:30 (UTC-5, US Eastern Standard Time) on Jan. 19. Ahead of a mandated ban on Jan. 19 as upheld by the US Supreme Court due to the lack of a sale of TikTok to US ownership, TikTok disabled the service and major providers like Apple and Google removed all relevant apps from their app stores in compliance. President-elect Trump indicated he would grant an extension to TikTok's required sale, causing the block to be lifted. Normal traffic did not fully return on TikTok until at least Jan. 22, and the app didn't return to the Apple app store until Feb. 13, meaning only users who had existing downloads of the app could use it. The app is still legally under a de jure nationwide ban as of Dec. 2025, but the Trump administration has repeatedly halted enforcement of the ban as they negotiate with the Chinese over the app's ownership with US investors. This is the first shutdown recorded for the US. | North America | |||||||||
76 | Actual | 1/20/2025 | Myanmar | It affected more than one city in the same state, province, or region | Chaung Tha, Hainggyi Island, Kyone Pyaw, Labutta, Ngapudaw, Ngayokaung, Ngwe Saung, Pathein, Shwe Thaung Yan, Thabaung, and Yeygi townships, Ayeyarwady Region | Shutdown | Mobile | Full network | Military | Military junta | Conflict | Internet and phone lines were cut off by the military council in an area of active conflict | CSO KIO partners | https://burmese.dvb.no/post/688719; https://athanmyanmar.org/myanmar-communication-blackout-2021-to-present/ | Ended | 2/1/2025 | 13 | Unknown | No | No | No | No | No | No | Yes | Yes | Unknown | No | Yes | Unknown | No | Mobile internet and phone lines were cut off by the military council in 11 townships in Ayeyarwady Region from Jan. 20 until at least Feb. 1 during clashes with the Arakan Army. | APAC | |||||||||||||
77 | Estimated | 1/21/2025 | Palestine, State of | It only affected one city, county, or village | Jenin, West Bank | Shutdown | Broadband, Mobile | Full network | Non-government | Military of the State of Israel | Conflict | The internet was suspended in Jenin alongside a military operation by Israeli security forces | Other | https://x.com/Global__Intel/status/1881851691215323564; https://www.reuters.com/world/middle-east/israeli-military-begins-operation-west-bank-city-jenin-2025-01-21/ | Unknown | Sabotage/ Third-party Action | No | No | No | No | No | No | Unknown | Unknown | Unknown | No | Yes | Yes | No | Internet services were cut off for Jenin, West Bank on Jan. 21 in the midst of an Israeli military operation which killed at least 9 Palestinians. | MENA | |||||||||||||||
78 | Actual | 1/22/2025 | Myanmar | It only affected one city, county, or village | Kyeikdon town, Kawkareik township, Kayin State | Shutdown | Broadband, Mobile | Full network | Military | Military junta | Conflict | Internet and phone lines were cut off by the military council | CSO KIO partners | https://burmese.thanlwintimes.com/2025/01/22/%E1%80%80%E1%80%BB%E1%80%AD%E1%80%AF%E1%80%80%E1%80%BA%E1%80%92%E1%80%AF%E1%80%B6%E1%80%99%E1%80%BC%E1%80%AD%E1%80%AF%E1%80%B7%E1%80%99%E1%80%BE%E1%80%AC-%E1%80%85%E1%80%85%E1%80%BA%E1%80%80%E1%80%B1/; https://engagemedia.org/2025/myanmar-digital-coup-quarterly-november-2024-january-2025/; https://athanmyanmar.org/myanmar-communication-blackout-2021-to-present/ | Unknown | Unknown | No | No | No | No | No | No | Yes | Yes | Unknown | No | Yes | Yes | No | Internet service and phones lines were cut off by the military council in Kyeikdon town, Kawkareik township, Kayin State on Jan. 22. The regime dropped a bomb on the fire department office in Ward 5 in Kyeikdon on the morning of Jan. 22, killing one woman. There was no active fighting in the area and no KNLA troops in the fire department office. | APAC | |||||||||||||||
79 | Actual | 1/22/2025 | South Sudan | It affected locations in more than one state, province, or region | Nationwide | Shutdown | Broadband, Mobile | Service-based | Executive government | National Communication Authority (NCA) | Protests | South Sudan ordered a sweeping ban of social media platforms for a maximum of 90 days in response to violent content circulating on social media | CSO KIO partners | https://x.com/larrymadowo/status/1882124272174530934; https://peacerep.org/2025/01/21/the-first-violent-spillover-sudans-war-ignites-violence-in-south-sudan/; https://www.okayafrica.com/south-sudan-lifts-social-media-ban/270480 | Ended | 1/27/2025 | 6 | Fake news/ Hate speech/ Incendiary content/ Promoting violence | Yes | Government order | https://drive.google.com/file/d/1jhUzfoJXM59aUx4OIty_d6U-IM9DLs-O/view?usp=drive_link; https://drive.google.com/file/d/16pHHRY2AD5JznuIA-2RZMHbvyhixHdG_/view?usp=drive_link | Yes | Unknown | Unknown | Unknown | Unknown | TikTok | No | No | South Sudan: MTN, South Sudan: Zain | Yes | https://drive.google.com/file/d/1sxnf1WfXrx-3nWv8yQwwFQI0lwHOfRfp/view?usp=drive_link; https://drive.google.com/file/d/1AOjdMkRLFVaReMPczBLyAnILjluVZe0L/view?usp=drive_link | No | Unknown | Unknown | Yes | South Sudan ordered a sweeping ban of social media platforms in response to violent content being circulated, with effect from 0:00 (local time) on Jan. 22 with original orders to last a maximum of 90 days. MTN and Zain both released statements stating that Facebook and TikTok (web and app versions) would be affected. After civil society pressure, authorities rescinded the order, effective 0:00 (local time) on Jan. 27. The ban followed deadly protests and the spread of violent content on platforms. | https://www.accessnow.org/press-release/keepiton-in-south-sudan-restore-social-media/ | Africa | |||||||
80 | Actual | 1/23/2025 | Pakistan | It only affected one city, county, or village | Chagai, Dalbandin, and Noshki, Balochistan | Shutdown | Mobile | Full network | State government | Government of Balochistan | Protests | Ahead of Baloch Genocide Remembrance Day and a rally by the Baloch Yakjehti Committee (BYC) in Dalbandin, state authorities cut off mobile internet to at least three cities in Balochistan province | Other | https://www.tribuneindia.com/news/baloch-genocide-remembrance-day/internet-shutdown-attempts-to-silence-voices-ahead-of-baloch-genocide-remembrance-day-mahrang-baloch; https://tribune.com.pk/story/2524519/byc-holds-rally-amid-internet-mobile-blackout | Ended | 1/26/2025 | 4 | National security/ Counter-terrorism | Yes | https://tribune.com.pk/story/2524519/byc-holds-rally-amid-internet-mobile-blackout | "The Balochistan government spokesman, Shahid Rind, told The Express Tribune via telephone that while the right to assemble is constitutionally guaranteed, the rally was conducted despite restrictions in place under Section 144 which prohibit rallies. He noted that local authorities are responsible for granting or denying permissions for such gatherings. 'Mobile networks have been suspended in Dalbandin to maintain security and prevent any unfortunate terrorism incident,' Rind explained." | No | No | No | No | No | No | No | Unknown | No | Unknown | Unknown | No | Mobile internet services were suspended in the cities of Chagai, Dalbandin, and Noshki, Balochistan from Jan. 23 until at least Jan. 26. | APAC | |||||||||||
81 | Actual | 1/23/2025 | Congo (Democratic Republic of the) | It only affected one city, county, or village | Goma, North Kivu | Shutdown | Broadband, Mobile | Full network | Executive government | Conflict | Authorities reportedly shut down the internet in and around Goma as M23 forces advanced toward the city | CSO KIO partners | https://lesvolcansnews.net/2025/01/24/la-connexion-internet-et-des-reseaux-sociaux-retablis-a-goma-apres-plus-de-18-heures-de-coupure/; https://radar.cloudflare.com/routing/as37447?dateStart=2025-01-21&dateEnd=2025-01-31; https://ioda.inetintel.cc.gatech.edu/region/689?from=1737575639&until=1738439639&view=view1; https://ioda.inetintel.cc.gatech.edu/region/698?from=1737575615&until=1738439615&view=view1; https://ioda.inetintel.cc.gatech.edu/asn/37447?from=1737575554&until=1738439554&view=view1; https://pulse.internetsociety.org/en/shutdowns/internet-shutdown-and-service-blocking-in-drc/; https://7sur7.cd/2025/02/02/carnage-goma-773-morts-et-2880-blesses-recenses-gouvernement | Ended | 1/24/2025 | 2 | Unknown | No | No | No | No | No | No | Unknown | Unknown | No | No | Yes | Yes | No | Authorities ordered a shutdown of the internet between around 5:00pm (UTC+0) on Jan. 23 until around 12:30pm (UTC+0) on Jan. 24 in and around Goma, North Kivu in the midst of a M23 offensive into the city. Additional reports indicated that Goma experienced more connectivity issues between Jan. 27 and Jan. 31. Hundreds of people were killed and thousands injured during the recent escalation of the conflict, with active fighting, massive civilian displacement, and a humanitarian crisis ongoing during the shutdown. | https://www.accessnow.org/press-release/keepiton-drc-goma/ | Africa | |||||||||||||
82 | Actual | 1/25/2025 | Belarus | It affected locations in more than one state, province, or region | Nationwide | Shutdown, Throttle | Broadband, Mobile | Service-based | Executive government | Elections | CSO KIO partners | https://news.zerkalo.io/life/89461.html?tg=4; https://ex-press.live/rubrics/obshhestvo/2025/01/25/vlasti-na-tri-dnya-zablokirovali-chast-belarusskix-sajtov-dlya-ostalnogo-mira; https://hoster.by/clients/news/16829/ | Ended | 1/27/2025 | 3 | Unknown | No | Unknown | Unknown | Unknown | Unknown | Yes | Reddit, Twitch, VPN services | No | No | Unknown | Yes | No | No | No | Before and during the Jan. 26 election, platforms like Telegram, Reddit, and Twitch were blocked or throttled in Belarus, as well as numerous VPN services. People outside Belarus were also blocked from accessing multiple sites on the .by domain. | https://x.com/accessnow/status/1883820669697204704 | EECA | |||||||||||||
83 | Actual | 1/28/2025 | Myanmar | It only affected one city, county, or village | Kyaukme city, Shan State | Shutdown | Broadband, Mobile | Full network | Military | Ta'ang National Liberation Army (TNLA) | Conflict | Internet and phone lines were cut off by the TNLA in an area of active conflict | CSO KIO partners | https://t.me/mekongnewsmm/33524; https://engagemedia.org/2025/myanmar-digital-coup-quarterly-november-2024-january-2025/; https://www.facebook.com/theirrawaddy/posts/junta-bombs-tnla-controlled-kyaukme-againjanuary-28-2025the-military-regime-agai/1044882391000251/ | Unknown | National security/ Counter-terrorism | Yes | https://t.me/mekongnewsmm/33524 | [Google Translate] "The Kyaukme town administration has temporarily restricted phone and internet access in Kyaukme town, a TNLA-controlled area in northern Shan State, to protect against airstrikes by the military council." | No | No | No | No | No | Yes | Yes | Unknown | No | Yes | Unknown | No | Internet service and phones lines were cut off by the TNLA in Kyaukme city, Shan State on Jan. 28 in the midst of daily bombing by the military council. | APAC | |||||||||||||
84 | Actual | 1/29/2025 | Myanmar | It only affected one city, county, or village | Gangaw town, Magway Division | Shutdown | Mobile | Full network | Military | Military junta | Conflict | Internet and phone lines were cut off by the military council in an area of active conflict | CSO KIO partners | https://burmese.dvb.no/post/688531; https://engagemedia.org/2025/myanmar-digital-coup-quarterly-november-2024-january-2025/ | Unknown | Unknown | Yes | https://burmese.dvb.no/post/688531 | [Google Translate] "The military council said that all telephone lines in Gangaung Township were down because the military council bombed the micro tower." | No | No | No | No | No | Yes | Yes | Unknown | No | Yes | Unknown | No | Mobile internet and phone lines were cut off by the military council in Gangaw town, Magway Division sometime between 9:00pm and 11:59pm on Jan. 29 due to airstrikes on cell towers. | APAC | |||||||||||||
85 | Estimated | 1/29/2025 | Myanmar | It only affected one city, county, or village | Tamu township, Sagaing Division | Shutdown | Broadband, Mobile | Full network | Military | Military junta | Conflict | Internet and phone lines were cut off by the military council in an area of active conflict | CSO KIO partners | https://nitter.net/dvbburmese/status/1884520570848694781; https://engagemedia.org/2025/myanmar-digital-coup-quarterly-november-2024-january-2025/; https://athanmyanmar.org/myanmar-communication-blackout-2021-to-present/; https://www.rfa.org/english/myanmar/2025/01/30/myanmar-fierce-fight-india-border/ | Unknown | Unknown | No | No | No | No | No | No | Yes | Yes | Unknown | No | Yes | Yes | No | Internet service and phones lines were cut off by the military council in Tamu township, Sagaing Division by at least Jan. 29, with other repeated shutdowns reported in the month in places like nearby Khampat town and Ka Nan village under NUG control where the junta was conducting airstrikes and killing civilians. According to one aid worker (RFA article): "'Everyone is on high alert, constantly watching the sky with fright and exhaustion,' said the aid worker, who also declined to be named. 'We also keep our eyes on our mobile phone connections — the moment the signal drops, we immediately take cover in underground shelters. We’ve come to understand that a loss of communication signals an impending airstrike.'" | APAC | |||||||||||||||
86 | Estimated | 2/1/2025 | Congo (Democratic Republic of the) | It affected locations in more than one state, province, or region | Nationwide | Shutdown | Broadband, Mobile | Service-based | Executive government | Conflict | Authorities reportedly blocked X and TikTok in the midst of active conflict in the country | CSO KIO partners | https://explorer.ooni.org/chart/mat?probe_cc=CD&since=2025-01-01&until=2025-03-01&time_grain=day&axis_x=measurement_start_day&test_name=web_connectivity&domain=x.com%2Ctwitter.com; https://explorer.ooni.org/chart/mat?probe_cc=CD&since=2025-01-01&until=2025-03-01&time_grain=day&axis_x=measurement_start_day&test_name=web_connectivity&domain=www.tiktok.com%2Cs20.tiktokcdn.com%2Cp77-va.tiktokcdn.com%2Cp77-sign-va.tiktokcdn.com%2Cp77-sign-sg-lite.tiktokcdn.com%2Cp19-sign.tiktokcdn-us.com%2Cp19-sign.tiktokcdn-us.com%2Cmcs-va.tiktok.com%2Clf16-tiktok-web.ttwstatic.com%2Clf16-tiktok-common.ibytedtos.com%2Cm.tiktok.com%2Cwww.tiktok.com; https://pulse.internetsociety.org/en/shutdowns/service-blocking-in-drc-january-2025/; https://mbote.cd/actualites/perturbations-dacces-a-tik-tok-et-x-twitter-en-rdc/178765/; https://7sur7.cd/2025/02/02/carnage-goma-773-morts-et-2880-blesses-recenses-gouvernement | Ended | 2/12/2025 | 12 | Unknown | No | No | Yes | No | No | No | TikTok | No | No | No | No | Yes | Yes | No | Authorities reportedly blocked X and TikTok in the DRC from around Feb. 1 until Feb. 12 in the midst of escalated fighting and the ongoing humanitarian crisis in the country. | https://www.accessnow.org/press-release/keepiton-drc-goma/ | Africa | ||||||||||||
87 | Actual | 2/4/2025 | Myanmar | It affected locations in more than one state, province, or region | 5 areas across Myawaddy and Kyain Seikgyi townships, Kayin State and Tachileik township, Shan State | Shutdown | Broadband, Mobile | Full network | Non-government | Thailand Prime Minister Paetongtarn Shinawatra | Other | Thai authorities cut off internet and electricity used across the border coming through multiple points into Myanmar in Kayin and Shan States | CSO KIO partners | https://engagemedia.org/2025/myanmar-digital-coup-quarterly-february-2025-april-2025/; https://www.rfa.org/burmese/program_2/thailand-electric-cut-myawaddy-02042025131858.html; https://www.facebook.com/rfaburmese/posts/%E1%80%99%E1%80%BC%E1%80%9D%E1%80%90%E1%80%AE%E1%80%80%E1%80%AD%E1%80%AF-%E1%80%9C%E1%80%BB%E1%80%BE%E1%80%95%E1%80%BA%E1%80%85%E1%80%85%E1%80%BA%E1%80%A1%E1%80%95%E1%80%AB%E1%80%A1%E1%80%9D%E1%80%84%E1%80%BA-%E1%80%A1%E1%80%91%E1%80%B1%E1%80%AC%E1%80%80%E1%80%BA%E1%80%A1%E1%80%95%E1%80%B6%E1%80%B7%E1%80%90%E1%80%BD%E1%80%B1-%E1%80%86%E1%80%80%E1%80%BA%E1%80%9C%E1%80%80%E1%80%BA%E1%80%96%E1%80%BC%E1%80%90%E1%80%BA%E1%80%90%E1%80%B1%E1%80%AC%E1%80%80%E1%80%BA%E1%80%96%E1%80%AD%E1%80%AF%E1%80%B7-%E1%80%91%E1%80%AD%E1%80%AF%E1%80%84%E1%80%BA%E1%80%B8%E1%80%80%E1%80%AD%E1%80%AF-%E1%80%90%E1%80%9B%E1%80%AF%E1%80%90%E1%80%BA%E1%80%90%E1%80%AD%E1%80%AF%E1%80%80%E1%80%BA%E1%80%90/1058478832980185/; https://bur.mizzima.com/2025/03/02/48126; https://burmese.monnews.org/2025/04/08/%E1%80%98%E1%80%AF%E1%80%9B%E1%80%AC%E1%80%B8%E1%80%9E%E1%80%AF%E1%80%B6%E1%80%B8%E1%80%86%E1%80%B0%E1%80%99%E1%80%BC%E1%80%AD%E1%80%AF%E1%80%B7%E1%80%95%E1%80%B1%E1%80%AB%E1%80%BA%E1%80%90%E1%80%BD-2/; https://asia.nikkei.com/Spotlight/Society/Crime/Myanmar-scammers-boost-Starlink-connections-to-stay-in-business; https://www.thaiexaminer.com/thai-news-foreigners/2026/01/30/mae-sot-police-raid-and-smash-covert-internet-transmission-facilities-busy-beaming-signals-into-myawaddy/ | Ongoing | Other | To curb online fraud and money laundering activities | Yes | https://www.rfa.org/burmese/program_2/thailand-electric-cut-myawaddy-02042025131858.html | No | No | No | No | No | Unknown | Unknown | Unknown | No | Unknown | Unknown | Karen ethnic groups | Local people, IDPs, and refugees are disproportionately affected | Yes | Thai officials, on behalf of the Prime Minister, ordered internet, electricity, and fuel distribution to be cut off in 5 areas across Myawaddy and Kyain Seikgyi townships, Kayin State and Tachileik township, Shan State beginning at 9:00am (local time) on Feb. 5 to curb online fraud operations. Myit Shwe Thaung Rin Company, owned by Karen Border Guard Force (BGF) Major Saw Tin Win, which is supplying electricity to some scammers in Myawaddy through an agent in Thailand, preemptively cut off electricity at 7:00pm on Feb. 4 after the decision from Thai authorities was announced. On Feb. 18, authorities in Myanmar reportedly asked for the cuts to be suspended since hospitals in Myawaddy had insufficient electricity for surgeries. The shutdown in Payathonzu (Kyain Seikgyi township) was ongoing as of Apr. 8 with reports of widespread Starlink usage. The shutdown in Myawaddy was active as of at least Jul. 2025, with disproportionate effects on local communities, IDPs, and refugees living in camps near the border, with the scam operators using generators (from which they sell electricity to local residents at huge markups) and Starlink internet to bypass the restrictions. | APAC | |||||||||||
88 | Actual | 2/5/2025 | India | It only affected one city, county, or village | Billawar, Malhar, and Bani areas, Kathua District, Jammu & Kashmir | Shutdown | Mobile | Full network | State government | Government of Jammu & Kashmir, Home Department | Unknown | CSO KIO partners | https://internetshutdowns.in/media/02TSTSof2025_23372f65-c304-489e-aeae-1922d4c946aa._8702d6b5-3b83-407f-8c31-24b99a56462c..pdf; https://jkhome.nic.in/pdf/02(TSTS)of2025.pdf | Ended | 2/6/2025 | 2 | Public safety/ Quell unrest/ Restore public order | Yes | Yes | Government order | https://drive.google.com/file/d/1rZRyW6LU5VXT79FCvKzw83pyGuogLg04/view?usp=drive_link | No | No | No | No | No | No | No | Unknown | No | Unknown | Unknown | No | Mobile internet was suspended for the Billawar, Malhar, and Bani areas, Kathua District from 23:00 on Feb. 5 to 23:00 on Feb. 6. 2G/3G/4G/5G and public Wi-Fi services were all suspended. | APAC | |||||||||||
89 | Estimated | 2/5/2025 | Myanmar | It only affected one city, county, or village | Coastal villages in Launglon township, Dawei district, Tanintharyi Region | Shutdown | Broadband, Mobile | Full network | Military | Military junta | Conflict | Internet and phone lines were cut off by the military council in an area of active conflict | CSO KIO partners | https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=G_qTkIB0yC0; https://engagemedia.org/2025/myanmar-digital-coup-quarterly-february-2025-april-2025/; https://athanmyanmar.org/myanmar-communication-blackout-2021-to-present/ | Unknown | Unknown | No | No | No | No | No | No | Yes | Yes | Unknown | No | Unknown | Unknown | No | Internet service and phones lines were cut off by the military council in coastal villages of Launglon township, Dawei district, Tanintharyi Region as of Feb. 5. | APAC | |||||||||||||||
90 | Estimated | 2/6/2025 | Myanmar | It only affected one city, county, or village | Htone Makha and Thabaw-Lake villages, Tanintharyi township, Tanintharyi Region | Shutdown | Mobile | Full network | Military | Military junta | Conflict | Internet and phone lines were cut off by the military council in an area of active conflict | CSO KIO partners | https://engagemedia.org/2025/myanmar-digital-coup-quarterly-february-2025-april-2025/; https://www.instagram.com/dawei_watch/p/DF7a-nGSFnp/; https://athanmyanmar.org/myanmar-communication-blackout-2021-to-present/ | Ended | 2/10/2025 | 5 | Unknown | No | No | No | No | No | No | Yes | Yes | Unknown | No | Yes | Yes | No | Mobile internet and phone lines were cut off by the military council in Htone Makha and Thabaw-Lake villages, Tanintharyi township, Tanintharyi Region from at least Feb. 6 to Feb. 10 in the midst of heavy fighting with resistance forces. During this period, villages were targeted by airstrikes, and junta troops burned down 8 homes in Htone Makha. | APAC | |||||||||||||
91 | Estimated | 2/7/2025 | Syrian Arab Republic | It only affected one city, county, or village | Damascus area | Shutdown | Broadband, Mobile | Full network | Executive government | Syrian Ministry of Communications and Information Technology | Other | Syrian authorities confiscated Starlink devices in the Damascus area | CSO KIO partners | https://smex.org/syria-authorities-threaten-social-media-users-and-confiscate-starlink-devices/; https://sana.sy/governorates/reef-dimashak/2193873/ | Unknown | Other | Authorities claimed Starlink usage threatened the "national revenue" of the (Communications and Information Technology) ministry and caused "damage to the frequency spectrum of the Syrian Telecommunications" | Yes | https://www.sytpra.gov.sy/pages/%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%A3%D8%AE%D8%A8%D8%A7%D8%B1/%D8%AA%D8%B9%D9%85%D9%8A%D9%85-%D8%A8%D8%AE%D8%B5%D9%88%D8%B5-%D9%85%D9%86%D8%B9-%D8%AD%D9%8A%D8%A7%D8%B2%D8%A9-%D9%85%D8%AD%D8%B7%D8%A7%D8%AA-%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%A7%D8%AA%D8%B5%D8%A7%D9%84-%D8%A7%D9%84%D9%81%D8%B6%D8%A7%D8%A6%D9%8A-%D8%AF%D9%88%D9%86-%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%AD%D8%B5%D9%88%D9%84-%D8%B9%D9%84%D9%89-%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%AA%D8%B1%D8%A7%D8%AE%D9%8A%D8%B5-%D8%A7%D9%84%D9%84%D8%A7%D8%B2%D9%85%D8%A9 | No | No | No | No | No | Starlink | No | No | Unknown | No | No | No | No | Syrian authorities confiscated Starlink devices in the Damascus area in early Feb., impacting at least 5,000 people. The authority also issued an official order prohibiting the use and possession of satellite internet devices without prior licensing from the telecommunications regulatory authority. | MENA | ||||||||||||
92 | Actual | 2/16/2025 | India | It only affected one city, county, or village | Jamui District, Bihar | Shutdown | Broadband, Mobile | Service-based | State government | Government of Bihar, Home Department | Communal violence | Stone-pelting during a religious procession led to two groups clashing and an internet shutdown | CSO KIO partners | https://internetshutdowns.in/media/Gj-DojMaoAABJ0c_f6d2687f-362b-4fca-bcce-dbf27c250210._5604bdab-6d10-45c6-a23d-e31a8809f0ec..pdf; https://home.bihar.gov.in/CMS/notice.aspx; https://pulse.internetsociety.org/en/shutdowns/internet-suspended-in-jamui-india-february-2025/; https://indianexpress.com/article/india/bihar-village-clash-during-religious-procession-arrest-internet-suspended-9841065/; https://www.thehindu.com/news/national/bihar/clash-breaks-out-over-religious-procession-in-bihar-internet-services-suspended-in-jamui/article69229598.ece#goog_rewarded | Ended | 2/18/2025 | 3 | Fake news/ Hate speech/ Incendiary content/ Promoting violence | Yes | Yes | Government order | https://drive.google.com/file/d/109mPQ-vbYYtnrcENhicf_LfJG9rZVWyD/view?usp=drive_link | Yes | Yes | Yes | Unknown | Yes | QQ, WeChat, Ozone, Tumblr, Google+, Baidu, Skype, Viber, Line, Snapchat, Pinterest, Reddit, Snaptish, YouTube, Vinc, Xanga, Buaanet, Flickr, "other social networking sites meant for mass messaging" | No | No | Unknown | No | Yes | Unknown | Unknown | 23 social media and messaging platforms were blocked in Jamui District, Bihar from 23:30 on Feb. 16 to 23:30 on Feb. 18. The order excludes government internet and intranet services, including banking. | APAC | |||||||||
93 | Actual | 2/18/2025 | Iraq | It affected more than one city in the same state, province, or region | Kurdistan | Shutdown | Broadband, Mobile | Full network | Executive government | Iraqi Communications and Media Commission (CMC) | Other | Iraqi authorities abruptly suspended internet services provided by Korek Telecom in Kurdistan due to alleged political reasons | CSO KIO partners | https://x.com/CloudflareRadar/status/1892301166530199951; https://radar.cloudflare.com/explorer?dataSet=bgp.ips&loc=&asn=as59625&filters=ipVersion%253DIPv4&timeCompare=2025-02-17&dt=2026-02-17_2026-02-21&compAsn=as59625; https://radar.cloudflare.com/traffic/as59625?dateStart=2025-02-18&dateEnd=2025-02-21; https://ioda.inetintel.cc.gatech.edu/asn/59625?from=1740859596&until=1747512396&view=view1; https://x.com/RudawEnglish/status/1892109257325125938; https://shafaq.com/en/Kurdistan/CMC-cuts-Korek-Telecom-s-internet-access-sparking-outrage-in-Kurdistan/ | Ongoing | Other | Authorities cited unpaid debts and regulatory violations | Yes | https://shafaq.com/en/Kurdistan/CMC-cuts-Korek-Telecom-s-internet-access-sparking-outrage-in-Kurdistan/ | "The decision was based on the telecom company’s 'failure to settle its outstanding debts and the company’s continued violations,' according to a statement from the commission." | No | No | No | No | No | No | No | Iraq: Korek Telecom | Unknown | No | No | No | No | Iraqi authorities ordered the immediate suspension of internet services from Korek Telecom in the Kurdistan Region beginning Feb. 18, alleging unpaid debts and regulatory concerns, with critics decrying the move as politically motivated. The ongoing disruption was visible into March 2026 as evident by data from IODA and Cloudflare Radar. | MENA | |||||||||||
94 | Actual | 2/19/2025 | Myanmar | It only affected one city, county, or village | Paukkaung township, Bago Region | Shutdown | Broadband, Mobile | Full network | Military | Military junta | Conflict | Internet and phone lines were cut off by the military council in an area of active conflict | CSO KIO partners | https://www.rfa.org/burmese/news/paramotor-airstrike-paukkhaung-02202025005416.html; https://engagemedia.org/2025/myanmar-digital-coup-quarterly-february-2025-april-2025/; https://athanmyanmar.org/myanmar-communication-blackout-2021-to-present/ | Unknown | Unknown | No | No | No | No | No | No | Unknown | Unknown | Unknown | No | Yes | Yes | No | Internet service was cut off by the military council in Paukkaung township, Bago Region starting Feb. 19 during intense fighting where the junta bombed multiple villages in the area, forcing thousands of civilians to flee and killing at least one person in Aizaw village. The junta had also restricted entry and exit from Paukkaung township. | APAC | |||||||||||||||
95 | Actual | 2/19/2025 | Yemen | It affected more than one city in the same state, province, or region | Hays and Al-Khawkhah Districts, Al-Hudaydah Governorate | Shutdown | Broadband, Mobile | Full network | Non-government | Houthi militia | Visits by government officials | Houthi militants imposed a communications and internet blackout for two districts in Al-Hudaydah Governorate during a visit by a UN delegation to the city of Al-Khawkhah | CSO KIO partners | https://shutdowns.yodet.org/2025; https://yemenfuture.net/news/29566 | Ended | 3/2/2025 | 12 | Unknown | No | No | No | No | No | No | Yes | Yes | Unknown | No | Unknown | Unknown | No | Houthi militants reportedly destroyed a cable in the southern part of Al-Jarrahi District on Feb. 19, leading to a communications and internet blackout until Mar. 2 for Hays and Al-Khawkhah Districts, Al-Hudaydah Governorate. The shutdown coincided with a visit by a high-level UN delegation to Al-Khawkhah city. | MENA | |||||||||||||
96 | Actual | 2/21/2025 | Myanmar | It only affected one city, county, or village | Payanthonzu, Kyain Seikgyi township, Kayin State | Shutdown | Mobile | Full network | Non-government | Thailand authorities | Other | Thai authorities cut off mobile and internet connections on AIS SIM cards used in Payathonzu | CSO KIO partners | https://news-eleven.com/article/300503; https://engagemedia.org/2025/myanmar-digital-coup-quarterly-february-2025-april-2025/; https://burmese.monnews.org/2025/04/08/%E1%80%98%E1%80%AF%E1%80%9B%E1%80%AC%E1%80%B8%E1%80%9E%E1%80%AF%E1%80%B6%E1%80%B8%E1%80%86%E1%80%B0%E1%80%99%E1%80%BC%E1%80%AD%E1%80%AF%E1%80%B7%E1%80%95%E1%80%B1%E1%80%AB%E1%80%BA%E1%80%90%E1%80%BD-2/; https://www.thaiexaminer.com/thai-news-foreigners/2026/01/30/mae-sot-police-raid-and-smash-covert-internet-transmission-facilities-busy-beaming-signals-into-myawaddy/ | Ongoing | Other | To curb online fraud and money laundering activities | Yes | https://news-eleven.com/article/300503; https://www.rfa.org/burmese/program_2/thailand-electric-cut-myawaddy-02042025131858.html | No | No | No | No | No | Yes | Yes | Thailand: AIS | Unknown | No | Unknown | Unknown | No | Mobile internet and phone lines through AIS (a Thai mobile provider) SIM cards were disabled in Payanthonzu, Kyain Seikgyi township, Kayin State by Thai authorities beginning the morning of Feb. 21. The shutdown in Payathonzu (Kyain Seikgyi township) was ongoing as of Apr. 8 with reports of widespread Starlink usage. | APAC | ||||||||||||
97 | Estimated | 2/25/2025 | Myanmar | It only affected one city, county, or village | Namtaw town, Homalin township, Sagaing Division | Shutdown | Mobile | Full network | Military | Military junta | Conflict | Internet and phone lines were cut off by the military council in an area of active conflict | CSO KIO partners | https://www.shannivoice.com/%E1%80%94%E1%80%99%E1%80%B7%E1%80%BA%E1%80%90%E1%80%B1%E1%80%AC%E1%80%92%E1%80%B1%E1%80%9E%E1%80%90%E1%80%BD%E1%80%84%E1%80%BA-%E1%80%96%E1%80%AF%E1%80%94%E1%80%BA%E1%80%B8%E1%80%9C%E1%80%AD%E1%80%AF/; https://engagemedia.org/2025/myanmar-digital-coup-quarterly-february-2025-april-2025/; https://www.bnionline.net/en/news/network-outages-homalin-township | Ended | 3/5/2025 | 9 | Unknown | No | No | No | No | No | No | Yes | Yes | Myanmar: MPT | Unknown | No | Unknown | Unknown | No | Mobile internet and phone lines through MPT were cut off by the military council in Namtaw town, Homalin township, Sagaing Division around Feb. 25. Mobile money services became virtually unusable for residents. The shutdown was active until at least Mar. 5. | APAC | ||||||||||||
98 | Actual | 3/2/2025 | Myanmar | It only affected one city, county, or village | Yesagyo township, Magway Division | Shutdown | Mobile | Full network | Military | Military junta | Conflict | Internet and phone lines were cut off by the military council in an area of active conflict | CSO KIO partners | https://yktnews.com/2025/03/205988/; https://yktnews.com/2025/03/208563/; https://engagemedia.org/2025/myanmar-digital-coup-quarterly-february-2025-april-2025/; https://athanmyanmar.org/myanmar-communication-blackout-2021-to-present/ | Ended | 3/23/2025 | 22 | Unknown | No | No | No | No | No | No | Yes | Yes | Unknown | No | Yes | Yes | No | Mobile internet and phone lines were cut off by the military council in Yesagyo township, Magway Division from the morning of Mar. 2 until at least Mar. 23. During this shutdown period, according to reports, junta troops launched an offensive on multiple villages. They burned down villages across the township, causing thousands of locals to flee, and killing at least 18 civilians in public housing (the majority of whom were elderly). They abducted dozens of people throughout the area and used them as human shields as they continued their advance. | APAC | |||||||||||||
99 | Actual | 3/3/2025 | Myanmar | It only affected one city, county, or village | Myaing township, Magway Division | Shutdown | Broadband, Mobile | Full network | Military | Myaing People's Defense Force (PDF) | Conflict | The PDF ordered the temporary closure of Starlink cafes | CSO KIO partners | https://mpapress.com/%E1%80%94%E1%80%AD%E1%80%AF%E1%80%84%E1%80%BA%E1%80%84%E1%80%B6%E1%80%9B%E1%80%B1%E1%80%B8/59645/; https://engagemedia.org/2025/myanmar-digital-coup-quarterly-february-2025-april-2025/; https://eng.mizzima.com/2025/03/06/19790 | Unknown | National security/ Counter-terrorism | To control information leaks regarding airstrike target intelligence | Yes | https://mpapress.com/%E1%80%94%E1%80%AD%E1%80%AF%E1%80%84%E1%80%BA%E1%80%84%E1%80%B6%E1%80%9B%E1%80%B1%E1%80%B8/59645/ | No | No | No | No | No | Starlink | No | No | Unknown | No | Yes | Yes | No | Starlink internet cafes were ordered temporarily closed by the PDF in Myaing township, Magway Division starting Mar. 3, reportedly in an attempt to control information leaks around airstrikes by the junta. In this period, including on Mar. 3 and 4 alone, junta fighter jets targeted numerous villages, including monastaries, resulting in at least 15 deaths and 20 injuries, with dozens more civilian injuries and casualties reported around the township since late February. Traditional telecommunications networks had been shut down in Myaing for years at this point by the junta. | APAC | ||||||||||||
100 | Estimated | 3/7/2025 | Russian Federation | It affected more than one city in the same state, province, or region | Republic of Dagestan | Shutdown | Broadband, Mobile | Service-based | Executive government | Information control | Telegram was confirmed by regional authorities to be blocked in Dagestan by early March due to a "security issue" | News media article | https://www.dw.com/ru/v-dagestane-priznali-blokirovku-telegram/a-71867241 | Unknown | National security/ Counter-terrorism | Yes | https://www.dw.com/ru/v-dagestane-priznali-blokirovku-telegram/a-71867241 | No | No | No | No | Yes | No | No | Unknown | No | No | No | No | Telegram was confirmed to be blocked in the Republic of Dagestan by Mar. 7. There were additional reports of the app being blocked in Chechnya and Ingushetia since Oct. 2024. | EECA |