| A | B | C | D | E | F | G | H | I | J | K | L | M | N | O | P | Q | R | S | T | U | V | W | X | Y | Z | AA | AB | AC | AD | AE | AF | AG | AH | AI | AJ | AK | AL | AM | AN | AO | AP | AQ | AR | AS | AT | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
1 | start_date_type | start_date | country | geo_scope | area_name | shutdown_type | affected_network | shutdown_extent | ordered_by | decision_maker | actual_cause | actual_cause_details | info_source | info_source_link | shutdown_status | end_date | duration | gov_justification | gov_just_details | gov_ack | legal_just | legal_method | gov_ack_source | gov_ack_quote | facebook_affected | twitter_affected | whatsapp_affected | instagram_affected | telegram_affected | other_affected | sms_affected | phonecall_affected | telcos_involved | telco_ack | telco_ack_source | telco_ack_quote | election | violence | hr_abuse_reported | users_targeted | users_target_detail | users_notified | econ_impact | event | an_link | region |
2 | Actual | 9/11/2013 | Turkey | It affected locations in more than one state, province, or region | Nationwide | Shutdown | Broadband, Mobile | Service-based | Executive government | Turkey's Directorate of Telecommunication following Istanbul's Criminal Court of Peace | Information control | CSO KIO partners | https://explorer.ooni.org/chart/mat?probe_cc=TR&since=2023-01-01&until=2023-12-31&time_grain=day&axis_x=measurement_start_day&test_name=web_connectivity&domain=www.grindr.com; https://ooni.org/post/2023-jordan-blocks-grindr/#conclusion; https://kaosgl.org/en/single-news/grindr-ban-in-turkey-taken-to-constitutional-court; https://explorer.ooni.org/chart/mat?probe_cc=TR&since=2024-01-19&until=2025-02-19&time_grain=day&axis_x=measurement_start_day&test_name=web_connectivity&domain=www.grindr.com | Ongoing | Other | "Protective measure" | Yes | Yes | https://www.independent.co.uk/tech/gay-hookup-app-grindr-fights-back-against-turkish-ban-with-threat-of-legal-action-8829360.html | No | No | No | No | No | Grindr | No | No | No | No | No | No | LGBTQ groups | No | Grindr has been blocked in Turkey since Sep. 11, 2013, and is ongoing into 2025. The block was in place at the start of our STOP documentation on Jan. 1, 2016. | MENA | |||||||||||
3 | Actual | 9/15/2016 | Indonesia | It affected locations in more than one state, province, or region | Nationwide | Shutdown | Broadband, Mobile | Service-based | Executive government | Communications Ministry following a request from police | Information control | CSO KIO partners | https://explorer.ooni.org/chart/mat?test_name=web_connectivity&axis_x=measurement_start_day&since=2023-09-20&until=2024-09-21&time_grain=day&probe_cc=ID&domain=www.grindr.com; https://ooni.org/post/2023-jordan-blocks-grindr/#conclusion; https://time.com/4496531/indonesia-lgbt-grinder/; https://explorer.ooni.org/chart/mat?probe_cc=ID&since=2024-05-20&until=2025-02-20&time_grain=day&axis_x=measurement_start_day&test_name=web_connectivity&domain=www.grindr.com | Ongoing | Other | Authorities were targeting services that promoted "sexual deviancy" | Yes | No | https://tribune.com.pk/story/1182120/indonesia-blocks-gay-apps-sexual-deviancy/ | No | No | No | No | No | Grindr, Blued, BoyAhoy | No | No | No | No | No | No | LGBTQ groups | No | Grindr and at least two other apps have been blocked in Indonesia since Sep. 15, 2016, and are ongoing into Feb. 2025. | APAC | |||||||||||
4 | Estimated | 10/28/2016 | United Arab Emirates | It affected locations in more than one state, province, or region | Nationwide | Shutdown | Broadband, Mobile | Service-based | Unknown | Information control | CSO KIO partners | https://explorer.ooni.org/chart/mat?probe_cc=AE&since=2016-01-01&until=2016-12-31&time_grain=day&axis_x=measurement_start_day&test_name=web_connectivity&domain=www.grindr.com; https://ooni.org/post/2023-jordan-blocks-grindr/#conclusion; https://explorer.ooni.org/chart/mat?probe_cc=AE&since=2023-01-01&until=2024-04-01&time_grain=day&axis_x=measurement_start_day&test_name=web_connectivity&domain=www.grindr.com; https://explorer.ooni.org/chart/mat?probe_cc=AE&since=2024-01-19&until=2025-02-19&time_grain=day&axis_x=measurement_start_day&test_name=web_connectivity&domain=www.grindr.com | Ongoing | Unknown | No | No | No | No | No | No | No | Grindr | No | No | No | No | No | No | LGBTQ groups | No | Grindr has been blocked in the United Arab Emirates since at least Oct. 28, 2016, and the block is ongoing into 2025. The blocking is currently implemented by means of TLS interference. | MENA | ||||||||||||||
5 | Estimated | 2/9/2017 | Saudi Arabia | It affected locations in more than one state, province, or region | Nationwide | Shutdown | Broadband, Mobile | Service-based | Unknown | Information control | CSO KIO partners | https://explorer.ooni.org/chart/mat?probe_cc=SA&since=2017-01-01&until=2017-12-31&time_grain=day&axis_x=measurement_start_day&test_name=web_connectivity&domain=www.grindr.com; https://ooni.org/post/2023-jordan-blocks-grindr/#conclusion; https://explorer.ooni.org/chart/mat?probe_cc=SA&since=2023-01-01&until=2024-04-01&time_grain=day&axis_x=measurement_start_day&test_name=web_connectivity&domain=www.grindr.com; https://explorer.ooni.org/chart/mat?probe_cc=SA&since=2024-01-19&until=2025-02-19&time_grain=day&axis_x=measurement_start_day&test_name=web_connectivity&domain=www.grindr.com | Ongoing | Unknown | No | No | No | No | No | No | No | Grindr | No | No | No | No | No | No | LGBTQ groups | No | Grindr has been blocked in Saudi Arabia since at least Feb. 9, 2017, and the block is ongoing into 2025. The blocking is currently implemented by means of TLS interference. | MENA | ||||||||||||||
6 | Estimated | 5/12/2017 | Iran (Islamic Republic of) | It affected locations in more than one state, province, or region | Nationwide | Shutdown | Broadband, Mobile | Service-based | Unknown | Information control | CSO KIO partners | https://explorer.ooni.org/chart/mat?probe_cc=IR&since=2017-01-01&until=2017-12-31&time_grain=day&axis_x=measurement_start_day&test_name=web_connectivity&domain=www.grindr.com; https://ooni.org/post/2023-jordan-blocks-grindr/#conclusion; https://explorer.ooni.org/chart/mat?probe_cc=IR&since=2023-01-01&until=2024-04-01&time_grain=day&axis_x=measurement_start_day&test_name=web_connectivity&domain=www.grindr.com; https://explorer.ooni.org/chart/mat?probe_cc=IR&since=2024-01-19&until=2025-02-19&time_grain=day&axis_x=measurement_start_day&test_name=web_connectivity&domain=www.grindr.com | Ongoing | Unknown | No | No | No | No | No | No | Grindr | No | No | No | No | No | No | LGBTQ groups | No | Grindr has been blocked in Iran since at least May 12, 2017, and is ongoing into 2025. | MENA | |||||||||||||||
7 | Actual | 5/24/2019 | Lebanon | It affected locations in more than one state, province, or region | Nationwide | Shutdown | Broadband, Mobile | Service-based | Executive government | Telecommunications Ministry citing an order from the public prosecutor's office | Information control | CSO KIO partners | https://ooni.org/post/2023-jordan-blocks-grindr/#conclusion; https://explorer.ooni.org/chart/mat?probe_cc=LB&since=2023-01-01&until=2024-04-01&time_grain=day&axis_x=measurement_start_day&test_name=web_connectivity&domain=www.grindr.com; https://www.independent.co.uk/news/world/middle-east/grindr-lebanon-ban-lgbt-rights-dating-app-gay-a8933556.html; https://www.middleeasteye.net/news/activists-slam-lebanons-telecoms-ministry-after-it-bans-grindr-app; https://explorer.ooni.org/chart/mat?probe_cc=LB&since=2024-01-01&until=2024-11-23&time_grain=day&axis_x=measurement_start_day&test_name=web_connectivity&domain=www.grindr.com | Ongoing | Unknown | No | No | No | No | No | No | No | Grindr | No | No | No | No | No | No | LGBTQ groups | No | Grindr has been blocked in Lebanon since May 24, 2019, and the block is ongoing into 2025 according to partners. The blocking is currently implemented by means of TLS interference. | MENA | |||||||||||||
8 | Estimated | 5/31/2019 | Pakistan | It affected locations in more than one state, province, or region | Nationwide | Shutdown | Broadband, Mobile | Service-based | Executive government | Pakistan Telecommunications Authority | Information control | CSO KIO partners | https://explorer.ooni.org/chart/mat?probe_cc=PK&since=2019-01-01&until=2019-12-31&time_grain=day&axis_x=measurement_start_day&test_name=web_connectivity&domain=www.grindr.com; https://ooni.org/post/2023-jordan-blocks-grindr/#conclusion; https://explorer.ooni.org/chart/mat?probe_cc=PK&since=2023-01-01&until=2024-04-01&time_grain=day&axis_x=measurement_start_day&test_name=web_connectivity&domain=www.grindr.com; https://explorer.ooni.org/chart/mat?probe_cc=PK&since=2023-12-01&until=2024-09-26&time_grain=day&axis_x=measurement_start_day&test_name=web_connectivity&domain=www.grindr.com; https://explorer.ooni.org/chart/mat?probe_cc=PK&since=2024-05-20&until=2025-02-20&time_grain=day&axis_x=measurement_start_day&test_name=web_connectivity&domain=www.grindr.com | Ongoing | Other | "...keeping in view the negative effects of immoral/indecent content streaming." | Yes | No | https://www.reuters.com/article/idUSKBN25T086/ | No | No | No | No | No | Grindr | No | No | No | No | No | No | LGBTQ groups | No | Grindr has been blocked in Pakistan since at least May 31, 2019, and the block is ongoing into Feb. 2025. There was an order sent by the Pakistani government on Sep. 1, 2020 blocking Grindr and other dating apps, but measurement data shows confirmed blockings since May 2019. The blocking is currently implemented by means of TLS interference. | APAC | |||||||||||
9 | Estimated | 1/1/2020 | Qatar | It affected locations in more than one state, province, or region | Nationwide | Shutdown | Broadband, Mobile | Service-based | Unknown | Information control | CSO KIO partners | https://explorer.ooni.org/chart/mat?probe_cc=QA&since=2020-01-01&until=2020-12-31&time_grain=day&axis_x=measurement_start_day&test_name=web_connectivity&domain=www.grindr.com; https://ooni.org/post/2023-jordan-blocks-grindr/#conclusion; https://explorer.ooni.org/chart/mat?probe_cc=QA&since=2023-01-01&until=2024-04-01&time_grain=day&axis_x=measurement_start_day&test_name=web_connectivity&domain=www.grindr.com; https://explorer.ooni.org/chart/mat?probe_cc=QA&since=2024-01-19&until=2025-02-19&time_grain=day&axis_x=measurement_start_day&test_name=web_connectivity&domain=www.grindr.com; https://help.grindr.com/hc/en-us/articles/1500010811581-Censored-countries-regions | Ongoing | Unknown | No | No | No | No | No | No | No | Grindr | No | No | No | No | No | No | LGBTQ groups | No | Grindr has been blocked in Qatar since at least Jan. 1, 2020, and the block is ongoing into 2025. The blocking is currently implemented by means of TLS interference. | MENA | ||||||||||||||
10 | Actual | 6/29/2020 | India | It affected locations in more than one state, province, or region | Nationwide | Shutdown | Broadband, Mobile | Service-based | Executive government | Ministry of Electronics and Information Technology | Conflict | Clash between Indian and Chinese troops in a disputed region led to the ban of TikTok and 58 other Chinese created apps in India | CSO KIO partners | https://www.nytimes.com/2020/06/29/world/asia/tik-tok-banned-india-china.html; https://explorer.ooni.org/chart/mat?probe_cc=IN&since=2020-03-29&until=2021-03-30&time_grain=day&axis_x=measurement_start_day&test_name=web_connectivity&domain=www.tiktok.com; https://explorer.ooni.org/chart/mat?probe_cc=IN&since=2023-03-29&until=2024-03-30&time_grain=day&axis_x=measurement_start_day&test_name=web_connectivity&domain=www.tiktok.com; https://explorer.ooni.org/chart/mat?probe_cc=IN&since=2024-01-20&until=2025-02-20&time_grain=day&axis_x=measurement_start_day&test_name=web_connectivity&domain=www.tiktok.com%2Cs20.tiktokcdn.com%2Cp77-va.tiktokcdn.com%2Cp77-sign-va.tiktokcdn.com%2Cp77-sign-sg-lite.tiktokcdn.com%2Cp19-sign.tiktokcdn-us.com%2Cp19-sign.tiktokcdn-us.com%2Cmcs-va.tiktok.com%2Clf16-tiktok-web.ttwstatic.com%2Clf16-tiktok-common.ibytedtos.com%2Cm.tiktok.com%2Cwww.tiktok.com | Ongoing | National security/ Counter-terrorism | Yes | No | Section 69A of the Information Technology Act, 2000; Information Technology (Procedure and Safeguards for Blocking of Access of Information by Public) Rules 2009 (https://pib.gov.in/PressReleseDetailm.aspx?PRID=1635206®=3&lang=1) | https://www.bbc.com/news/technology-53225720 | They said the apps were "prejudicial to the sovereignty and integrity of India, defence of India, security of state, and public order." | No | No | No | No | No | TikTok, WeChat, and 57 other Chinese-made apps | No | No | Unknown | No | Yes | Unknown | No | TikTok, WeChat, and 57 other Chinese-made apps were banned in India beginning Jun. 29, 2020 with blocks remaining to this day following military clashes between Indian and Chinese troops in disputed territory. | APAC | ||||||||||
11 | Actual | 11/4/2020 | Ethiopia | It affected locations in more than one state, province, or region | Tigray | Shutdown | Broadband, Mobile | Full network | Unknown | Conflict | Civil war | News media article | https://youtu.be/uEoa-7J6zpY, https://www.business-humanrights.org/en/latest-news/ethiopia-jakenn-publishing-urges-govt-says-current-internet-shutdown-threats-access-to-information-on-ongoing-conflict-in-tigray-region/, https://twitter.com/accessnow/status/1323964706382643200, https://cpj.org/2021/05/journalists-shutdowns-myanmar-ethiopia-kashmir/ | Ongoing | Sabotage/ Third-party Action | https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=uEoa-7J6zpY | Yes | No | No | No | No | No | No | No | No | Yes | No | Yes | Yes | No | This full shutdown happened at the start of the conflict and the government blamed the Tigray military forces for destruction of infrastructure. Nevertheless, after promises of restoration of services by the National Government, the internet services remain largely inaccessible in Tigray, amid various reports of human rights abuses. As of early 2025, connectivity remains constrained and below pre-war levels across Tigray, with availability, reliability, and speed varying widely across urban and rural areas. | https://www.accessnow.org/two-years-internet-shutdowns-tigray/ | Africa | |||||||||||||
12 | Actual | 1/12/2021 | Uganda | It affected locations in more than one state, province, or region | Nationwide | Shutdown | Broadband, Mobile | Service-based | Executive government | Elections | News media article | https://transparency.fb.com/data/internet-disruptions/country/UG/, https://www.nytimes.com/2021/01/13/world/africa/uganda-facebook-ban-elections.html; https://techjaja.com/govt-lifts-social-media-ban-but-there-is-a-catch/; https://nilepost.co.ug/uncategorized/201292/facebook-ban-in-uganda-continues-as-govt-cites-security-concerns; https://explorer.ooni.org/chart/mat?probe_cc=UG&since=2024-01-19&until=2025-02-19&time_grain=day&axis_x=measurement_start_day&test_name=web_connectivity&domain=www.facebook.com | Ongoing | Fake news/ Hate speech/ Incendiary content/ Promoting violence | Museveni claimed that Facebook was taking sides during the election. | Yes | Unknown | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes | YouTube, Signal | No | No | Yes | Yes | No | Unknown | No | Facebook remains blocked through the end of 2023, beginning Jan. 12, 2021 preceding national elections in Uganda. Other platforms were restored in 2021. The blocked remained into 2025 as well, with authorities in 2024 citing continued national security concerns and incitement to violence and unrest as reasoning for the continued ban. | https://www.accessnow.org/the-world-is-watching-uganda-elections/ | Africa | |||||||||||||
13 | Actual | 1/25/2021 | Iran (Islamic Republic of) | It affected locations in more than one state, province, or region | Nationwide | Shutdown | Broadband, Mobile | Service-based | Unknown | Unknown | CSO KIO partners | https://explorer.ooni.org/chart/mat?probe_cc=IR&test_name=signal&since=2022-01-31&until=2023-01-31&axis_x=measurement_start_day; https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2021/1/26/iran-blocks-signal-messaging-app-after-whatsapp-exodus; https://explorer.ooni.org/chart/mat?probe_cc=IR&since=2023-01-01&until=2024-01-01&time_grain=day&axis_x=measurement_start_day&test_name=signal; https://explorer.ooni.org/chart/mat?probe_cc=IR&since=2024-01-01&until=2024-11-23&time_grain=day&axis_x=measurement_start_day&test_name=signal; https://explorer.ooni.org/chart/mat?probe_cc=IR&since=2024-01-19&until=2025-02-19&time_grain=day&axis_x=measurement_start_day&test_name=signal | Ongoing | Unknown | No | No | No | No | No | No | Signal | No | No | No | No | No | No | No | Signal has been blocked in Iran since Jan. 25, 2021. The block is ongoing into 2025. | MENA | ||||||||||||||||
14 | Actual | 3/10/2021 | Russian Federation | It affected locations in more than one state, province, or region | Nationwide | Throttle | Broadband, Mobile | Full network, Service-based | Executive government | Roskomnadzor | Other | Pressure Twitter to comply with Government take down orders. | News media article | https://rkn.gov.ru/news/rsoc/news73464.htm; https://www.accessnow.org/russia-throttled-twitter/; https://censoredplanet.org/throttling | Ongoing | Illegal content | Roskomnadzor announced that it would slow down Twitter on “100 percent of mobile services and 50 percent desktop services" claiming that the social media company did not delete over 3,000 materials the authorities deemed unlawful. | Yes | Yes | https://rkn.gov.ru/news/rsoc/news73464.htm | No | Yes | No | No | No | No | No | Unknown | No | No | No | Yes | Roskomnadzor announced that it would slow down Twitter on “100 percent of mobile services and 50 percent desktop services" claiming that the social media company did not delete over 3,000 materials the authorities deemed unlawful. On May 17, Russia announced that it would not block Twitter entirely because the company complied with deleting more than 91% of flagged content. | https://www.accessnow.org/russia-throttled-twitter/ | EECA | |||||||||||
15 | Actual | 3/14/2021 | Oman | It affected locations in more than one state, province, or region | Nationwide | Shutdown | Broadband, Mobile | Service-based | Executive government | Oman’s Telecommunications Regulatory Authority (TRA) | Information control | Quoting Al Jazeera, "The chatrooms of Clubhouse, a sort of town square for unfettered discussions of politics and social issues, have provided a window through the censorship. Recent free-flowing exchanges in the region have featured activists from Egypt’s 2011 uprising, feminists in Kuwait, government officials in Libya and even a transgender woman in Saudi Arabia." | Confidential | https://www.aljazeera.com/economy/2021/3/15/oman-blocks-clubhouse-app-fueling-regional-censorship-fears | Ongoing | Other | Authorities blocked the social media audio chat platform Clubhouse "on the grounds of not being licensed to operate" | Yes | Unknown | No | No | No | No | No | Clubhouse | No | No | No | No | No | No | Clubhouse is still blocked across Oman in early 2025. | https://www.accessnow.org/clubhouse/ | MENA | ||||||||||||
16 | Actual | 3/15/2021 | Jordan | It affected locations in more than one state, province, or region | Nationwide | Shutdown | Broadband, Mobile | Service-based | Executive government | Jordanian officials | Protests | CSO KIO partners | https://jordanopensource.org/blog/78/blocking-clubhouse-in-jordan-a-quick-analysis-of-internet-censorship-methods-in-use; https://jordanopensource.org/blog/74/josa-in-light-of-the-latest-internet-shutdowns-the-right-to-internet-access-without-restrictions-must-be-ensured | Ongoing | Unknown | No | Yes | No | No | No | No | Clubhouse, Facebook Live | No | No | Jordan: Zain, Orange, VTel and DAMAMAX | Unknown | No | Yes | Yes | No | On Mar. 15, 2021, following an anti-lockdown protest, Jordanian officials blocked Clubhouse, an audio-only social media app, on a number of major internet service providers (ISPs). It remained blocked as of early 2024, in addition to multiple VPN servers. It is still blocked in early 2025. | https://www.accessnow.org/jordanprotests/ | MENA | |||||||||||||
17 | Actual | 3/16/2021 | China | It affected locations in more than one state, province, or region | Nationwide except for HK SAR | Shutdown | Broadband, Mobile | Service-based | Executive government | Information control | News media article | https://techcrunch.com/2021/03/15/signal-is-down-in-china/?guccounter=1; https://explorer.ooni.org/chart/mat?probe_cc=CN&since=2023-09-20&until=2024-09-21&time_grain=day&axis_x=measurement_start_day&test_name=signal; https://explorer.ooni.org/chart/mat?probe_cc=CN&since=2024-05-20&until=2025-02-20&time_grain=day&axis_x=measurement_start_day&test_name=signal | Ongoing | Unknown | No | No | No | No | No | No | Signal | No | No | China Telecom, China Unicom, China Mobile | No | No | No | No | Signal app was shutdown in China after a surge in downloads in February and March 2021. It remains blocked as of Feb. 2025. | APAC | ||||||||||||||||
18 | Actual | 8/20/2021 | Myanmar | It affected locations in more than one state, province, or region | Kachin's Hpakant, Sagaing | Shutdown | Broadband, Mobile | Full network | Military | Military junta | Conflict | CSO KIO partners | https://www.irrawaddy.com/news/burma/myanmar-junta-cuts-internet-access-in-hpakant.html; https://progressivevoicemyanmar.org/wp-content/uploads/2022/06/Internet-Shutdown-Athan-May-2022-Eng.pdf; https://myanmar-now.org/mm/news/13653; https://t.me/witnessdaily/286479%20https://www.facebook.com/508784185946254/posts/pfbid02mgdifK2uRjVzMArz73qdswYEKxLYAfeqY6D2LiUSgun4cm1MA3iRUDYGYCkgiUZ1l/?mibextid=Nif5oz; https://mpapress.com/သတင်း/50723/; https://www.myitkyinanewsjournal.com/although-the-atom-telenor-phone-line-has-been-restored-in-phakant-it-is-still-difficult-to-communicate/ | Ongoing | Unknown | No | No | No | No | No | No | Yes | Yes | Telecom operators said that they did not know why internet services were blocked or when they would resume, according to locals. | No | Unknown | Unknown | Unknown | Myanmar’s military regime has cut off internet access in Hpakant, Kachin State since Friday, August 20, 2021. Mobile internet services were blocked around 8.30pm on Friday, followed by a shutdown of wifi internet hours later, said residents. On Jan. 4, 2023, service returned on Mytel and Atom SIM cards to townships in Kachin (Hpakant township) and Sagaing (Myemu, Sal Lingyi, Ertao, Ima Pin, Minking, Kant Balu, Katha, Kolin, Butalin, Ye Oo, Depeyin, Khin Oo, Intaw, Kyung Hla townships). However, on Jan. 5, 2023, the internet was cutoff again with no warning. On Oct. 20, 2023, many parts of Sagaing had internet restored with Atom SIM cards, with Taze township using MPT SIM cards. Hpakant, Kachin State was still under a shutdown as of Aug. 6, 2024, according to reports. Atom mobile connections were restored in some areas of Hpakant on Aug. 30. | APAC | ||||||||||||||||
19 | Actual | 9/14/2021 | Myanmar | It affected locations in more than one state, province, or region | Sagaing’s Pale, Yinmarbin, Kani, Budalin, Ayadaw, Taze, and Ye-U townships, Mandalay’s Mogyoke and Myingyan townships, and Magway's Taungdwingyi townships | Shutdown | Broadband, Mobile | Full network | Military | Military junta | Conflict | Mobile internet and some types of Wi-Fi have been down in several townships. | CSO KIO partners | https://www.myanmar-now.org/en/news/internet-blackout-hits-parts-of-sagaing-and-mandalay-regions; https://www.rfa.org/english/news/myanmar/internet-09162021205144.html; https://progressivevoicemyanmar.org/wp-content/uploads/2022/06/Internet-Shutdown-Athan-May-2022-Eng.pdf; https://myanmar-now.org/mm/news/13653; https://t.me/witnessdaily/286479%20https://www.facebook.com/508784185946254/posts/pfbid02mgdifK2uRjVzMArz73qdswYEKxLYAfeqY6D2LiUSgun4cm1MA3iRUDYGYCkgiUZ1l/?mibextid=Nif5oz | Ongoing | Unknown | No | No | No | No | No | No | Unknown | Unknown | Myanmar: Telenor, Ooredoo, MPT | Unknown | No | Yes | Yes | Unknown | As of Feb. 2022, the shutdowns in Mogok and Myingyan townships in Mandalay region are ongoing. On Jan. 4, 2023, service returned on Mytel and Atom SIM cards to townships in Kachin (Hpakant township) and Sagaing (Myemu, Sal Lingyi, Ertao, Ima Pin, Minking, Kant Balu, Katha, Kolin, Butalin, Ye Oo, Depeyin, Khin Oo, Intaw, Kyung Hla townships). However, on Jan. 5, 2023, the internet was cutoff again with no warning. On Oct. 20, 2023, many parts of Sagaing had internet restored with Atom SIM cards, with Taze township using MPT SIM cards. | APAC | ||||||||||||||
20 | Actual | 9/23/2021 | Myanmar | It affected locations in more than one state, province, or region | Chin state’s Matupi, Tonzang, Paletwa, Falam, Kanpetlet, Thantlang, Tedim, Mindat townships, Magway's Myaing, Gangaw, and Tilin townships | Shutdown | Broadband, Mobile | Full network | Military | Military junta | Conflict | Deliberate infrastructure attacks or targeted disruptions in an active conflict zone | News media article | https://www.myanmar-now.org/en/news/military-cuts-off-internet-connection-in-11-more-townships-in-northwestern-myanmar; https://www.rfa.org/english/news/myanmar/internet-09242021190423.html; https://www.rfa.org/english/news/myanmar/surge-10042021193211.html; https://www.reuters.com/world/asia-pacific/myanmar-air-strikes-reported-battle-internet-cut-more-areas-2021-09-27/; https://progressivevoicemyanmar.org/wp-content/uploads/2022/06/Internet-Shutdown-Athan-May-2022-Eng.pdf; https://www.facebook.com/100064542350311/posts/pfbid0sFcF87FRh7SnEoef3XczkAifnfVYZpFnQDjNPXKLFqewXekKjxwv5wMhhBt5CWEsl/?mibextid=CDWPTG; https://www.facebook.com/zalen.info/posts/pfbid0QsguCXCnPyHnXdbD38h63znbxfgjwWPUkbp5EvEGKwT5jsnShu5pSkZAuvqc682cl; https://www.facebook.com/rfaburmese/videos/977235016601804/; https://www.rfa.org/english/news/myanmar/magway-torture-deaths-02082024183109.html; https://engagemedia.org/2024/myanmar-digital-coup-quarterly-may-2024-july-2024/; https://athanmyanmar.org/myanmar-communication-blackout-2021-to-present/; https://bur.mizzima.com/2024/06/25/25415; https://voiceofmyanmarnews.com/news/2024/09/08/%E1%80%81%E1%80%BB%E1%80%84%E1%80%BA%E1%80%B8%E1%80%95%E1%80%BC%E1%80%8A%E1%80%BA%E1%80%94%E1%80%9A%E1%80%BA%E1%80%80-%E1%80%99%E1%80%BC%E1%80%AD%E1%80%AF%E1%80%B7-%E1%80%9B%E1%80%BE%E1%80%85%E1%80%BA/ | Ongoing | Unknown | No | No | No | No | No | No | Unknown | Yes | No | Yes | Yes | No | The internet was shutdown with few exceptions throughout all of 2022 in townships across the Chin state and Magway region since Sept. 2021. The shutdown was ongoing as of Apr. 3, 2023 in multiple townships of Chin State. The ongoing shutdown had a disastrous effect during Cyclone Mocha in May 2023, exacerbating the effects of the storm. On Sept. 26, 2023, the internet had been restored in Mindat township, Chin State. On Oct. 4, 2023, the internet had been restored in Tedim township, Chin State. Atrocities against resistance fighters on Nov. 7, 2023 in Myauk Khin Yan, Gantkaw township, Magway region confirmed that the internet was still shut off in that township. Continued fighting on Jun. 15, 2024 confirmed that the internet and phone lines were still cut off in Matupi, Chin State. The internet was confirmed to still be shut down in Myaing township, Magway Region as of Jun. 24, 2024. As of Sep. 8, 2024, internet and phone services were still reported to be disconnected across Chin State except for Haka. | APAC | ||||||||||||||||
21 | Actual | 9/26/2021 | Myanmar | It affected locations in more than one state, province, or region | Sagaing's Pinlebu, Wuntho, Kawlin, Salingyi, Mingin, Kalay townships, Chin's Haka township | Shutdown | Mobile | Full network | Military | Military junta | Conflict | Deliberate infrastructure attacks or targeted disruptions in an active conflict zone | Other | https://freedomhouse.org/country/myanmar/freedom-net/2021; https://progressivevoicemyanmar.org/wp-content/uploads/2022/06/Internet-Shutdown-Athan-May-2022-Eng.pdf; https://myanmar-now.org/mm/news/13653; https://t.me/witnessdaily/286479%20https://www.facebook.com/508784185946254/posts/pfbid02mgdifK2uRjVzMArz73qdswYEKxLYAfeqY6D2LiUSgun4cm1MA3iRUDYGYCkgiUZ1l/?mibextid=Nif5oz; https://t.me/SggScoutNetwork/50514; https://voiceofmyanmarnews.com/news/2024/09/08/%E1%80%81%E1%80%BB%E1%80%84%E1%80%BA%E1%80%B8%E1%80%95%E1%80%BC%E1%80%8A%E1%80%BA%E1%80%94%E1%80%9A%E1%80%BA%E1%80%80-%E1%80%99%E1%80%BC%E1%80%AD%E1%80%AF%E1%80%B7-%E1%80%9B%E1%80%BE%E1%80%85%E1%80%BA/ | Ongoing | Unknown | Unknown | No | No | No | No | No | Unknown | Unknown | Unknown | No | Yes | Yes | Activists, protesters, and Myanmar's People Defense Forces | No | In the Sagaing region, 8 townships have experienced a near-constant blackout since Sep. 26, 2021, with 30 additional townships being shutdown (with only 2G service) since Mar. 4, 2022. On Jan. 4, 2023, service returned on Mytel and Atom SIM cards to townships in Kachin (Hpakant township) and Sagaing (Myemu, Sal Lingyi, Ertao, Ima Pin, Minking, Kant Balu, Katha, Kolin, Butalin, Ye Oo, Depeyin, Khin Oo, Intaw, Kyung Hla townships). However, on Jan. 5, 2023, the internet was cutoff again with no warning. On Oct. 20, 2023, many parts of Sagaing had internet restored with Atom SIM cards, with Taze township using MPT SIM cards. On Jan. 9, 2024, it was reported that service on MPT and Atom was restored in parts of Kalay, Sagaing Region. On Sep. 8, 2024, it was reported the Haka township had internet and cell service on MPT and Atom. | APAC | ||||||||||||||
22 | Estimated | 10/20/2021 | Turkmenistan | It affected locations in more than one state, province, or region | Nationwide | Shutdown | Broadband, Mobile | Service-based | Executive government | Information control | Originally to control information about COVID-19, but continued as part of an ongoing censorship effort | Confidential | https://explorer.ooni.org/chart/mat?probe_cc=TM&since=2024-01-01&until=2024-11-24&time_grain=day&axis_x=measurement_start_day&test_name=facebook_messenger; https://explorer.ooni.org/chart/mat?probe_cc=TM&since=2024-01-01&until=2024-11-24&time_grain=day&axis_x=measurement_start_day&test_name=signal | Ongoing | Unknown | Yes | Unknown | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes | YouTube, VPN services | No | No | Unknown | No | No | Unknown | No | Social media blocks are ongoing from late 2021 into early 2025. Also, in April 2022, the authorities blocked most VPN services and subnets of the world's largest hosting providers in the country. The average connection speed dropped to 22.4 KB/s. | https://www.accessnow.org/turkmenistan-internet-shutdowns/ | EECA | |||||||||||||
23 | Estimated | 12/3/2021 | China | It affected locations in more than one state, province, or region | Nationwide | Shutdown | Broadband, Mobile | Service-based | Executive government | Information control | CSO KIO partners | https://explorer.ooni.org/chart/mat?probe_cc=CN&since=2021-01-01&until=2021-12-31&time_grain=day&axis_x=measurement_start_day&test_name=web_connectivity&domain=www.grindr.com; https://ooni.org/post/2023-jordan-blocks-grindr/#conclusion; https://explorer.ooni.org/chart/mat?probe_cc=CN&since=2023-01-01&until=2024-04-01&time_grain=day&axis_x=measurement_start_day&test_name=web_connectivity&domain=www.grindr.com; https://explorer.ooni.org/chart/mat?probe_cc=CN&since=2023-09-20&until=2024-09-21&time_grain=day&axis_x=measurement_start_day&test_name=web_connectivity&domain=www.grindr.com; https://www.them.us/story/grindr-removed-china-app-stores-privacy; https://explorer.ooni.org/chart/mat?probe_cc=CN&since=2024-05-20&until=2025-02-20&time_grain=day&axis_x=measurement_start_day&test_name=web_connectivity&domain=www.grindr.com | Ongoing | Unknown | No | No | No | No | No | No | No | Grindr | No | No | No | No | No | No | LGBTQ groups | No | Grindr has been blocked in China since approximately Dec. 3, 2021, and the block is ongoing into Feb. 2025. The app was reportedly removed from Apple and Android app stores in early 2022. The blocking is currently implemented by means of DNS injection. | APAC | ||||||||||||||
24 | Actual | 1/6/2022 | Myanmar | It affected more than one city in the same state, province, or region | Loikaw, Demoso, Bawlakhe, Hpasawng, and Mese townships in Kayah State | Shutdown | Mobile | Full network | Military | Military junta | Conflict | Deliberate infrastructure attacks or targeted disruptions in an active conflict zone | CSO KIO partners | https://progressivevoicemyanmar.org/wp-content/uploads/2022/06/Internet-Shutdown-Athan-May-2022-Eng.pdf | Ongoing | Unknown | No | No | No | No | No | No | Unknown | Unknown | Unknown | No | Yes | Yes | No | Mobile internet has been virtually inaccessible for most of 2022 in Kayah State since Jan. 6 for Loikaw and Feb. 1 for at least 4 other townships. The shutdowns are ongoing. | APAC | |||||||||||||||
25 | Estimated | 2/6/2022 | Pakistan | It only affected one city, county, or village | Panjgur, Balochistan | Shutdown | Broadband, Mobile | Full network | Unknown | Conflict | Originally due to fighting between the Pakistani army and Baloch separatist troops | News media article | https://www.indianarrative.com/world-news/pakistan-launches-information-war-against-baloch-nationalists-blocks-internet-after-heavy-fighting-in-pak-military-camps-31534.html; https://www.pakistanpressfoundation.org/internet-access-in-panjgur/; https://thebalochistanpost.net/2023/03/protest-against-a-year-long-internet-shutdown-in-panjgur/; https://tribune.com.pk/letter/2254764/panjgur-without-internet; https://www.eurasiareview.com/10032024-balochistan-path-to-harmony-and-prosperty-in-panjgur-district-analysis/; https://tribune.com.pk/letter/2255714/internet-and-panjgur; https://dailyintekhab.pk/archives/506203; https://www.urdunews.com/node/881682; https://thebalochistanpost.net/2024/11/internet-shutdown-expands-to-kech-gwadar-and-khuzdar-following-panjgur/ | Ongoing | Unknown | No | No | No | No | No | No | Unknown | Unknown | Unknown | No | Yes | Unknown | No | The internet was shut down in Panjgur, Balochistan since at least Feb. 2022, and it is ongoing into late 2024 and likely early 2025. The Balochistan Liberation Army (BLA) engaged Pakistan's Frontier Corps (FC) in early Feb. 2022, leading to high military casualties on both sides and the suspension of mobile internet indefinitely for the city. | APAC | ||||||||||||||||
26 | Estimated | 2/11/2022 | Oman | It affected locations in more than one state, province, or region | Nationwide | Shutdown | Broadband, Mobile | Service-based | Executive government | Information control | CSO KIO partners | https://explorer.ooni.org/chart/mat?probe_cc=OM&since=2022-01-01&until=2022-12-31&time_grain=day&axis_x=measurement_start_day&test_name=web_connectivity&domain=www.grindr.com; https://ooni.org/post/2023-jordan-blocks-grindr/#conclusion; https://explorer.ooni.org/chart/mat?probe_cc=OM&since=2024-01-19&until=2025-02-19&time_grain=day&axis_x=measurement_start_day&test_name=web_connectivity&domain=www.grindr.com | Ongoing | Unknown | No | No | No | No | No | No | No | Grindr | No | No | No | No | No | No | LGBTQ groups | No | Grindr has been blocked in Oman since at least Feb. 11, 2022, and the block is ongoing into 2025. The blocking is currently implemented by means of TLS interference. | MENA | ||||||||||||||
27 | Actual | 2/26/2022 | Russian Federation | It affected locations in more than one state, province, or region | Nationwide | Shutdown, Throttle | Broadband, Mobile | Service-based | Executive government | Information control | Platform blocks began just as Russia invaded Ukraine | CSO KIO partners | https://ooni.org/post/2022-russia-blocks-amid-ru-ua-conflict/, https://www.businessinsider.com/what-happens-social-media-and-news-go-dark-in-russia-2022-3, https://www.theverge.com/2022/3/14/22976603/russia-bans-instagram-facebook-meta-call-to-violence, https://explorer.ooni.org/chart/mat?probe_cc=RU&test_name=facebook_messenger&since=2022-01-01&until=2022-12-31&axis_x=measurement_start_day; https://explorer.ooni.org/chart/mat?probe_cc=RU&since=2024-01-19&until=2025-02-19&time_grain=day&axis_x=measurement_start_day&test_name=web_connectivity&domain=twitter.com; https://explorer.ooni.org/chart/mat?probe_cc=RU&since=2024-01-19&until=2025-02-19&time_grain=day&axis_x=measurement_start_day&test_name=web_connectivity&domain=www.facebook.com; https://explorer.ooni.org/chart/mat?probe_cc=RU&since=2024-01-19&until=2025-02-19&time_grain=day&axis_x=measurement_start_day&test_name=web_connectivity&domain=www.instagram.com | Ongoing | Unknown | No | Yes | Yes | No | Yes | No | No | No | No | No | Yes | Yes | No | Russia implemented platform blocks started with a centralized throttling of Twitter on Feb. 26 and expanded to ordering ISPs to fully block Facebook, Twitter, and Instagram on Mar. 4. These shutdowns endeavored to suppress dissenting opinions about the invasion of Ukraine. All three platforms were blocked throughout 2024 into 2025. | https://www.accessnow.org/digital-rights-ukraine-russia-conflict/ | EECA | |||||||||||||||
28 | Actual | 5/24/2022 | Myanmar | It affected more than one city in the same state, province, or region | Dawei, Launglong, and Thayetchaung townships, Tanintharyi Region | Shutdown | Mobile | Full network | Military | Military junta | Conflict | Deliberate infrastructure attacks or targeted disruptions in an active conflict zone | CSO KIO partners | https://www.bnionline.net/en/news/mobile-network-and-internet-cut-some-townships-tanintharyi; https://athanmyanmar.org/my-mm/%E1%81%82%E1%81%80%E1%81%82%E1%81%84-%E1%80%81%E1%80%AF%E1%80%94%E1%80%BE%E1%80%85%E1%80%BA%E1%81%8A-%E1%80%96%E1%80%B1%E1%80%96%E1%80%B1%E1%80%AC%E1%80%BA%E1%80%9D%E1%80%AB%E1%80%9B%E1%80%AE%E1%80%9C/ | Ongoing | Unknown | No | No | No | No | No | No | Unknown | Yes | Unknown | No | Yes | Unknown | No | Mobile internet and phone lines were disconnected by the junta in multiple townships in Tanintharyi Region starting May 24, 2022 alongside severe fighting. The shutdowns are ongoing as of Mar. 2024. | APAC | |||||||||||||||
29 | Actual | 9/21/2022 | Iran (Islamic Republic of) | It affected locations in more than one state, province, or region | Nationwide | Shutdown | Broadband, Mobile | Service-based | Unknown | Protests | Growing protests following the death in police custody of Mahsa Amini | CSO KIO partners | https://ooni.org/post/2022-iran-technical-multistakeholder-report/#blocking-of-whatsapp-instagram-skype-viber-and-linkedin; https://explorer.ooni.org/chart/mat?probe_cc=IR&since=2023-01-01&until=2024-01-01&time_grain=day&axis_x=measurement_start_day&test_name=whatsapp; https://explorer.ooni.org/chart/mat?probe_cc=IR&since=2024-01-01&until=2024-11-24&time_grain=day&axis_x=measurement_start_day&test_name=whatsapp; https://apnews.com/article/iran-social-media-whatsapp-google-d886b47c427f33f96fb85e7c78d0b831; https://explorer.ooni.org/chart/mat?probe_cc=IR&since=2024-01-19&until=2025-02-19&time_grain=day&axis_x=measurement_start_day&test_name=whatsapp; https://explorer.ooni.org/chart/mat?probe_cc=IR&since=2024-01-19&until=2025-02-19&time_grain=day&axis_x=measurement_start_day&test_name=web_connectivity&domain=www.instagram.com | Ongoing | Unknown | No | No | No | Yes | Yes | No | Skype, Viber, LinkedIn | No | No | Iran: MCI (TCI), Iran: MTN Irancell, Iran: Rightel (Tamin Telecom) | No | No | Yes | Yes | No | Starting Sep. 21, WhatsApp and Instagram were blocked by ISPs across the country, with Skype, LinkedIn, and Viber soon to follow. WhatsApp and Google Play were restored in 2024 on Dec. 24, but the rest were ongoing into 2025. | MENA | ||||||||||||||
30 | Actual | 12/16/2022 | Jordan | It affected locations in more than one state, province, or region | Nationwide | Shutdown | Broadband, Mobile | Service-based | Executive government | Protests | Mass protests over fuel prices in Maan led to the death of a senior police officer, prompting the Jordanian authorities to "temporarily" ban TikTok | News media article | https://apnews.com/article/jordan-amman-dfee2613c4f45e12faf5874b0c473628, https://twitter.com/jo_osa/status/1603769860584099840 | Ongoing | Fake news/ Hate speech/ Incendiary content/ Promoting violence | Yes | No | https://apnews.com/article/jordan-amman-dfee2613c4f45e12faf5874b0c473628 | The platform was banned “after its misuse and failing to deal with publications inciting violence and disorder.” - Jordan’s Public Security Directorate | No | No | No | No | No | TikTok | No | No | Unknown | No | Yes | Unknown | No | TikTok was banned in Jordan beginning Dec. 16 after a police officer was killed in Maan during massive protests. It remains blocked as of early 2025 according to partners. | MENA | ||||||||||||
31 | Actual | 3/21/2023 | Tanzania, United Republic of | It affected locations in more than one state, province, or region | Nationwide | Shutdown | Broadband, Mobile | Service-based | Executive government | Information control | CSO KIO partners | https://explorer.ooni.org/findings/203466718601; https://ooni.org/post/2024-tanzania-lgbtiq-censorship-and-other-targeted-blocks/#lgbtiq-social-networks | Ongoing | Unknown | No | No | No | No | No | No | Grindr, Hornet, PlanetRomeo (ROMEO) | No | No | No | No | No | No | LGBTQ groups | No | Grindr was blocked in Tanzania starting Mar. 21. The block is ongoing as of early 2025 according to partners, and includes two other LGBTQ+ dating apps. | Africa | |||||||||||||||
32 | Estimated | 5/1/2023 | India | It affected more than one city in the same state, province, or region | Jammu & Kashmir | Shutdown | Broadband, Mobile | Service-based | Executive government | Government of India, Ministry of Electronics and Information Technology | Information control | CSO KIO partners | https://timesofindia.indiatimes.com/india/government-bans-14-messaging-apps-used-by-jk-terrorists/articleshow/99917838.cms; https://www.moneycontrol.com/technology/delhi-hc-directs-centre-to-furnish-blocking-order-for-briar-messaging-app-article-12808201.html; https://drive.google.com/file/d/13IMaJDEpPtTaBe5RLKN6AFUVYVdSRr2R/view?usp=drive_link; https://indianexpress.com/article/india/national-security-matter-delhi-hc-upholds-order-blocking-briar-app-9441255/ | Ongoing | National security/ Counter-terrorism | "Agencies keep track of channels used by Overground workers (OGWs) and terrorists to communicate among themselves. While tracking down one of the communication, agencies found that the mobile application does not have representatives in India and it is difficult to track down activities happening on the app," said an official. | Yes | Yes | Section 69A of the Information Technology Act, 2000 | https://risingkashmir.com/centre-blocks-14-apps-in-jammu-and-kashmir-for-spreading-terror | No | No | No | No | No | Crypviser, Enigma, Safeswiss, Wickrme, Mediafire, Briar, BChat, Nandbox, Conion, IMO, Element, Second line, Zangi, Threema | No | No | Unknown | No | No | No | No | 14 messaging apps were blocked across all of India starting in early May 2023. Later court proceedings confirmed that the blocks were in fact limited to Jammu & Kashmir. The Delhi HC upheld the Briar ban largely because it was limited to J&K. | APAC | |||||||||||
33 | Actual | 8/2/2023 | Ethiopia | It affected more than one city in the same state, province, or region | Amhara region | Shutdown | Broadband, Mobile | Full network, Service-based | Executive government | Conflict | Escalation of conflict between federal military forces and Amhara Fano fighters | CSO KIO partners | https://ehrc.org/amhara-region-concerning-human-rights-violations-in-the-context-of-the-armed-conflict/; https://twitter.com/CloudflareRadar/status/1696160808407839068; https://twitter.com/CARDEthiopia/status/1687027063046221824?s=20 | Ongoing | Unknown | No | Yes | Yes | Yes | No | No | Unknown | Unknown | No | No | Yes | Yes | No | Starting at 18:00 UTC Aug. 2, mobile and broadband internet plus multiple social media platforms were shut down across Amhara, Ethiopia in the midst of escalating conflict between federal and regional militaries. Numerous atrocities and war crimes were documented in the midst of the ongoing shutdown, which is still mostly in place despite some some returns to limited connectivity as of early 2025. | https://www.accessnow.org/press-release/open-statement-internet-shutdown-amhara/; https://twitter.com/accessnow/status/1762387557512290493; https://www.accessnow.org/keepiton-in-conflict-the-human-impact-of-internet-shutdowns-in-amhara-region-ethiopia/ | Africa | |||||||||||||||
34 | Actual | 8/2/2023 | Senegal | It affected locations in more than one state, province, or region | Nationwide | Shutdown | Broadband, Mobile | Service-based | Executive government | Protests | CSO KIO partners | https://www.reuters.com/world/africa/senegal-suspends-tiktok-saying-it-was-threatening-stability-2023-08-02/; https://explorer.ooni.org/chart/mat?probe_cc=SN&since=2023-07-31&until=2023-08-30&time_grain=day&axis_x=measurement_start_day&test_name=web_connectivity&domain=www.tiktok.com; https://explorer.ooni.org/findings/144156914701 | Ended | 2/17/2024 | Fake news/ Hate speech/ Incendiary content/ Promoting violence | Yes | https://www.reuters.com/world/africa/senegal-suspends-tiktok-saying-it-was-threatening-stability-2023-08-02/ | "'The TikTok application is the social network favoured by people with bad intentions to spread hateful and subversive messages,' Moussa Bocar Thiam said in a statement on Wednesday." | No | No | No | No | No | TikTok | No | No | Senegal: Sonatel | No | No | Yes | Unknown | No | TikTok was blocked in Senegal starting Aug. 2 (2023) until around Aug. 9 during ongoing protests. Following further investigation, it was found that TikTok remained blocked primarily on Sonatel until Feb. 17, 2024. The block was implemented by means of TLS interference. | https://www.accessnow.org/press-release/internet-shutdowns-senegal/ | Africa | |||||||||||
35 | Actual | 8/8/2023 | Jordan | It affected locations in more than one state, province, or region | Nationwide | Shutdown | Broadband, Mobile | Service-based | Executive government | Information control | CSO KIO partners | https://explorer.ooni.org/findings/179818906201; https://ooni.org/post/2023-jordan-blocks-grindr/ | Ongoing | Unknown | No | No | No | No | No | No | Grindr | No | No | No | No | No | No | LGBTQ groups | No | Grindr was blocked in Jordan starting Aug. 8. The block is ongoing as of early 2025 according to partners. | MENA | |||||||||||||||
36 | Actual | 8/13/2023 | Tanzania, United Republic of | It affected locations in more than one state, province, or region | Nationwide | Shutdown | Broadband, Mobile | Service-based | Executive government | Information control | CSO KIO partners | https://explorer.ooni.org/findings/185407756401; https://explorer.ooni.org/chart/mat?probe_cc=TZ&since=2023-11-01&until=2024-11-24&time_grain=day&axis_x=measurement_start_day&test_name=web_connectivity&domain=www.clubhouse.com; https://explorer.ooni.org/chart/mat?probe_cc=TZ&since=2024-01-19&until=2025-02-19&time_grain=day&axis_x=measurement_start_day&test_name=web_connectivity&domain=www.clubhouse.com | Ongoing | Unknown | No | No | No | No | No | No | Clubhouse | No | No | No | No | No | No | No | Clubhouse was blocked in Tanzania starting Aug. 13. The block is ongoing as of early 2025. | Africa | ||||||||||||||||
37 | Actual | 10/9/2023 | Palestine, State of | It affected locations in more than one state, province, or region | Gaza Strip | Shutdown | Broadband, Mobile | Full network | Non-government | Military of the State of Israel | Conflict | Combination of targeted bombings of network installations, disabling of 2 out of 3 primary mobile communication lines for all of the Gaza Strip, and targeted airstrikes on ISP offices and infrastructure | CSO KIO partners | https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2023/10/9/israel-announces-total-blockade-on-gaza; https://www.ochaopt.org/content/hostilities-gaza-strip-and-israel-flash-update-4; https://twitter.com/muhammadshehad2/status/1711408136806969624; https://twitter.com/SaulStaniforth/status/1711647388241207374; https://www.accessnow.org/publication/palestine-unplugged/#NewStarMax | Ongoing | Sabotage/ Third-party Action | No | No | No | No | No | No | Yes | Yes | Palestine: AjyalFi, Palestine: AlfaNet, Palestine: CityNet, Palestine: DCC, Palestine: DCC Khan Younis, Palestine: DCC North, Palestine: DCC Rafah, Palestine: Fusion, Palestine: JetNet, Palestine: NewStarMax, Palestine: PalWifi, Palestine: SpeedClick, Palestine: TechHub-HiNet | Yes | https://www.facebook.com/HiNet.Gaza/posts/pfbid02YKcy7r9ywaiqLYMZr5KEEWZDPvd3yoPUMKKzzNrFuDnApsMQhST2Q8nQBDuTV5Msl | On October 9, TechHub-HiNet posted on its Facebook page the following message: “We no longer have anything to offer to ensure the continuity of internet service due to the attacks and destruction our internet servers have suffered, leading to a complete service interruption.” | No | Yes | Yes | No | An escalation of bombings of the Gaza Strip by the Israeli military included targeted shutdowns of 13 ISPs between the hours of 12:00pm UTC to 4:30pm UTC on Oct. 9. Many of these providers had already dealt with significant network damage and disruptions since Oct. 7, but went fully offline on Oct. 9. This impacted ~411,000 people and ~37.2% of the total market share of ISPs at the time. AjyalFi slowly came back online starting Oct. 20. NewStarMax came back partially online around 12:00pm UTC on Oct. 19 but experienced many shutdowns afterwards. The remaining 11 ISPs are still completely offline as of Dec. 31 (the total becomes 12 with NetStream's shutdown from Oct. 26). See https://accessnow.org/palestine-unplugged for further references, measurement data, and analysis. Update, January 2025: Of the 12 ISPs that were offline at the start of 2024, only 4 (AlfaNet, Netstream, Speedclick, and TechHub-HiNet) came back into service and showed a return of traffic (between June and October, 2024). | https://www.accessnow.org/publication/palestine-unplugged/ | MENA | |||||||||||
38 | Estimated | 11/13/2023 | Nepal | It affected locations in more than one state, province, or region | Nationwide | Shutdown | Broadband, Mobile | Service-based | Executive government | Purushottam Khanal, chair of the Telecommunications Authority, on behalf of the cabinet | Information control | CSO KIO partners | https://explorer.ooni.org/findings/112092297601; https://edition.cnn.com/2023/11/14/tech/nepal-tiktok-ban-hnk-intl/index.html; https://nepaltvonline.com/2023/11/83237/; https://kathmandupost.com/national/2024/08/23/nepal-lifts-its-ban-on-tiktok; https://explorer.ooni.org/chart/mat?probe_cc=NP&since=2023-09-20&until=2024-09-21&time_grain=day&axis_x=measurement_start_day&test_name=web_connectivity&domain=www.tiktok.com; https://explorer.ooni.org/chart/mat?probe_cc=NP&since=2024-01-20&until=2025-02-20&time_grain=day&axis_x=measurement_start_day&test_name=web_connectivity&domain=www.tiktok.com%2Cs20.tiktokcdn.com%2Cp77-va.tiktokcdn.com%2Cp77-sign-va.tiktokcdn.com%2Cp77-sign-sg-lite.tiktokcdn.com%2Cp19-sign.tiktokcdn-us.com%2Cp19-sign.tiktokcdn-us.com%2Cmcs-va.tiktok.com%2Clf16-tiktok-web.ttwstatic.com%2Clf16-tiktok-common.ibytedtos.com%2Cm.tiktok.com%2Cwww.tiktok.com | Ended | 8/22/2024 | Fake news/ Hate speech/ Incendiary content/ Promoting violence | Authorities cited concerns over the app's alleged impact on "social harmony" and "family and social structures" | Yes | https://edition.cnn.com/2023/11/14/tech/nepal-tiktok-ban-hnk-intl/index.html | “Considering how TikTok is disrupting our social harmony, and the impact it’s having on our family and social structures, the cabinet has decided to ban TikTok for the moment,” Rekha Sharma, Nepal’s minister of communication and information technology, told a press conference on Monday. ... On Tuesday, Nepali Prime Minister Pushpa Kamal Dahal defended the decision at an event in city of Bhaktapur. “After a long discussion on how to control the tendency to spread disharmony, disorder, and chaos in the society … a consensus was reached among all political parties, including both the ruling party and the opposition,” he said. | No | No | No | No | No | TikTok | No | No | Nepal: Ncell, Nepal: WorldLink Communications | No | No | No | No | Unknown | TikTok was ordered to be blocked by authorities in Nepal on Nov. 13, 2023, with measurement evidence confirming the block between Nov. 23 to Nov. 28 on at least two major providers. Subsequent measurements from OONI showed that the block remained in effect for the following 9 months, and the ban wasn't official lifted until Aug. 22, 2024. The acting government which lifted the ban gave ByteDance 3 months to register with the Ministry of Communication and Information Technology, appoint a point-of-contact in Nepal, and follow other conditions put forth by the government. This was Nepal's first recorded shutdown. | APAC | ||||||||||
39 | Actual | 11/24/2023 | Guinea | It affected locations in more than one state, province, or region | Nationwide | Shutdown | Broadband, Mobile | Service-based | Executive government | Information control | Repression of critical journalist voices amidst political instability | CSO KIO partners | https://explorer.ooni.org/findings/296303006301; https://guineenews.org/guinee-les-reseaux-sociaux-sont-perturbes-a-conakry/; https://cpj.org/2023/12/guinean-radio-and-tv-broadcasters-and-social-media-sites-blocked/; https://crisis24.garda.com/alerts/2023/11/guinea-heightened-security-in-response-to-escape-of-high-profile-prisoner-in-conakry-nov-4-update-1; https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2024/2/20/military-leaders-dissolve-government-in-guinea | Ended | 2/23/2024 | Unknown | No | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes | YouTube | No | No | No | No | Unknown | Unknown | No | Multiple social media platforms were blocked in Guinea between Nov. 24, 2023 until Feb. 23, 2024. No acknowledgment or justification was given by authorities, but the shutdowns came in the wake of heightened political instability, the escape of high-profile prisoners weeks prior, and blocks of multiple TV and radio broadcasters who were critical of the junta government. The shutdown ended within days of military leaders announcing they would dissolve the government. | Africa | ||||||||||||||
40 | Actual | 12/18/2023 | India | It affected more than one city in the same state, province, or region | 7 targeted zones across district boundaries, Manipur | Shutdown | Mobile | Full network | State government | Government of Manipur, Home Department | Communal violence | Persistent clashes, protests, gender-based attacks, deadly violence, and atrocities between ethnic groups in Manipur were accompanied by a virtually uninterrupted series of short shutdowns through the end of 2023 | Other | https://manipur.gov.in/wp-content/uploads/2024/01/Internet-ban-extension-order-dated-18-12-2023.pdf | Ended | 1/2/2024 | 16 | Fake news/ Hate speech/ Incendiary content/ Promoting violence | Yes | Yes | Government order | https://manipur.gov.in/wp-content/uploads/2024/01/Internet-ban-extension-order-dated-18-12-2023.pdf | No | No | No | No | No | No | No | India: Airtel (Bharti Airtel), India: BSNL, India: Reliance Jio (Reliance Industries), India: Vodafone Idea | Unknown | No | Yes | Unknown | No | Mobile internet was suspended for a limited 2km radius in 7 zones across districts in Manipur from Dec. 18 to 19:45 on Jan. 2 (2024). | https://www.accessnow.org/press-release/india-internet-shutdowns-women/ | APAC | ||||||||
41 | Estimated | 1/1/2024 | Myanmar | It only affected one city, county, or village | 20 villages in Yaychaungphyar area, Ye township, Mon State | Shutdown, Throttle | Broadband, Mobile | Full network | Military | Military junta | Conflict | Internet and phone lines were cut off by the military council in an area of active conflict | CSO KIO partners | https://engagemedia.org/2024/myanmar-digital-coup-quarterly-february-2024-april-2024/; https://burmese.monnews.org/2024/03/01/%E1%80%9B%E1%80%B1%E1%80%B8%E1%80%81%E1%80%BB%E1%80%B1%E1%80%AC%E1%80%84%E1%80%BA%E1%80%B8%E1%80%96%E1%80%BB%E1%80%AC%E1%80%B8%E1%80%92%E1%80%B1%E1%80%9E%E1%80%90%E1%80%BD%E1%80%84%E1%80%BA-%E1%81%82/; https://www.facebook.com/story.php/?story_fbid=800913538722238&id=100064107965259 | Unknown | Unknown | No | No | No | No | No | No | Yes | Yes | Unknown | No | Yes | Unknown | No | Internet services and phone lines were cut off in 20 villages in the Yaychaungphyar area of Ye Township, Mon State in January and February 2024 by the military council as fighting ramped up between revolutionary forces and the junta. The shutdown was active as of Mar. 1. Local residents reported persistent throttling with periods of full shutdown as the sound of gunfire began. | APAC | |||||||||||||||
42 | Estimated | 1/1/2024 | Sudan | It affected more than one city in the same state, province, or region | Darfur region | Shutdown | Broadband, Mobile | Full network | Military | Sudanase Armed Forces (SAF) | Conflict | During the ongoing civil war, reports indicated that SAF had shut down internet in Darfur | CSO KIO partners | https://www.lemonde.fr/en/international/article/2024/01/23/up-to-15-000-dead-in-war-plagued-darfur-town-un-experts-say_6456987_4.html | Unknown | Unknown | No | No | No | No | No | No | Unknown | Unknown | Unknown | No | Yes | Yes | No | The internet was cutoff in Darfur by the SAF sometime in January 2024. By early February 2024, the RSF reportedly threatened to cutoff the internet at data centers in Khartoum for the rest of the country in retaliation, and followed through by shutting down three main providers between Feb. 2 and Feb. 6. | MENA | |||||||||||||||
43 | Estimated | 1/1/2024 | Yemen | It affected locations in more than one state, province, or region | Nationwide | Shutdown | Broadband, Mobile | Service-based | Unknown | Information control | Signal was likely blocked in the beginning of 2024 in Yemen | CSO KIO partners | https://explorer.ooni.org/chart/mat?probe_cc=YE&since=2024-01-01&until=2025-02-17&time_grain=day&axis_x=measurement_start_day&test_name=signal | Ended | 8/31/2024 | Unknown | No | No | No | No | No | No | Signal | No | No | Unknown | No | Unknown | Unknown | No | Signal was likely blocked in Yemen in the beginning of 2024 until sometime in April, with another increase in anomalies and failures (OONI measurements) starting in August. | MENA | ||||||||||||||
44 | Actual | 1/3/2024 | Myanmar | It only affected one city, county, or village | Kutkai, Shan State | Shutdown | Mobile | Full network | Military | Military junta | Conflict | Internet and phone lines were cut off by the military council in an area of active conflict | CSO KIO partners | https://www.facebook.com/MeKongNewsMM/posts/pfbid02CnwSDwVKj26hchM4HpvkqYZiBjPpkjJSUtvB2tMdRMvqYJUov6qh6r39HzmawdyLl; https://www.facebook.com/shwepheemyaynews/posts/pfbid0xarq2fKii1uDLAQghEJFpiS56Q3kErdRDS8sEai8aQfF3gDjXF3HYFpS1pXEwhUil; https://engagemedia.org/2024/myanmar-digital-coup-quarterly-november-2023-january-2024/; https://athanmyanmar.org/myanmar-communication-blackout-2021-to-present/ | Ended | 2/8/2024 | Unknown | No | No | No | No | No | No | Yes | Yes | Unknown | No | Yes | Unknown | No | Mobile internet and phone service were cut off in Kutkai, Shan State from Jan. 3 to the evening of Feb. 8 by the military council in the midst of heavy fighting between junta troops and the Ta'ang National Liberation Army (TNLA). | APAC | ||||||||||||||
45 | Estimated | 1/5/2024 | Myanmar | It only affected one city, county, or village | Pathein, Ayeyarwady Region | Shutdown | Mobile | Full network | Military | Military junta | Conflict | Internet and phone lines were cut off by the military council in an area of active conflict | CSO KIO partners | https://ayartimes.com/?p=30643; https://engagemedia.org/2024/myanmar-digital-coup-quarterly-november-2023-january-2024/; https://athanmyanmar.org/myanmar-communication-blackout-2021-to-present/ | Unknown | Unknown | No | No | No | No | No | No | Yes | Yes | Unknown | No | Unknown | Unknown | No | Mobile internet and phone service were cut off intermittently in Pathein, Ayeyarwady Region since at least Jan. 5 after the military installed jammers near the regional military council office to reportedly protect against drone strikes by revolutionary forces. | APAC | |||||||||||||||
46 | Actual | 1/7/2024 | India | It affected more than one city in the same state, province, or region | Jaipur, Jodhpur, and Kota Districts, Rajasthan | Shutdown | Mobile | Full network, Service-based | State government | Divisional Commissioner Aarushi Malik | Exam cheating | Rajasthan Public Service Commision (RPSC) examinations | CSO KIO partners | https://english.pardaphash.com/internet-services-suspended-in-rajasthan-districts-for-rpsc-examination/; https://x.com/news4rajasthan/status/1743844622219288915 | Ended | 1/7/2024 | School exams | Yes | Yes | Government order | https://x.com/news4rajasthan/status/1743844622219288915 | Yes | Yes | Yes | Unknown | Unknown | Yes | No | Unknown | No | No | No | Yes | Mobile internet, SMS/MMS, and multiple social media services were suspended in Jaipur District during RPSC exams on Jan. 7 from 11:00 to 14:00. At least Jodhpur and Kota Districts were also reportedly affected during exam hours. | APAC | |||||||||||
47 | Estimated | 1/8/2024 | Myanmar | It affected more than one city in the same state, province, or region | Buthidaung, Maungdaw, Pauktaw townships, Rakhine State | Shutdown | Broadband, Mobile | Full network | Military | Military junta | Conflict | Internet and phone lines were cut off by the military council in an area of active conflict | CSO KIO partners | https://www.facebook.com/rfaburmese/videos/395070416411336/; https://engagemedia.org/2024/myanmar-digital-coup-quarterly-november-2023-january-2024/; https://www.narinjara.com/news/detail/65a02805bc6caa2ece2462ad; https://athanmyanmar.org/myanmar-communication-blackout-2021-to-present/ | Unknown | Unknown | No | No | No | No | No | No | Yes | Yes | Unknown | No | Yes | Yes | No | Internet services and phone lines (with the exception of MPT) were cut off in Buthidaung, Maungdaw, Pauktaw townships, Rakhine State by the military starting around Jan. 8. This coincided with renewed clashes between the Arakan Army and junta. There were reports on Jan. 11 of arson and drone strikes by junta navy personnel on Taung Phu village, Pauktaw township. | APAC | |||||||||||||||
48 | Actual | 1/8/2024 | Myanmar | It only affected one city, county, or village | Gangaw, Magway Division | Shutdown | Mobile | Full network | Military | Military junta | Conflict | Internet and phone lines were cut off by the military council in an area of active conflict | CSO KIO partners | https://www.facebook.com/permalink.php?story_fbid=pfbid02txB4RP2yMF2ZLybtfQJX5gLhkMunKhgmUj8pvA2N9MbeRBEvgZ1BZmiXEnbuEdg9l&id=100095339473871; https://www.facebook.com/permalink.php?story_fbid=pfbid0VUsVEMAQeqyv2nWKcCpw9VcbG8CnrJQmNnoKzXHrNTUJppCDtpxSgjNSqEk6X3xUl&id=100095339473871; https://engagemedia.org/2024/myanmar-digital-coup-quarterly-november-2023-january-2024/ | Unknown | Unknown | No | No | No | No | No | No | Yes | Yes | Myanmar: MPT | Unknown | No | Yes | Unknown | No | Mobile internet and phone services were cut off in Gangaw, Magway Division starting the evening of Jan. 8 around 20:00 by the military council. The military began firing weapons from a checkpoint shortly thereafter. A fiber cut from a nearby area is suspected, but there are also reports of the use of jammers in Gangaw since 2023, used to deter revolutionary forces' drones, which have caused previous disruptions. | APAC | ||||||||||||||
49 | Actual | 1/10/2024 | Chad | It affected locations in more than one state, province, or region | Nationwide | Shutdown | Broadband, Mobile | Full network | Non-government | Anonymous Sudan | Conflict | Cyberattack | CSO KIO partners | https://x.com/isoc_pulse/status/1745613397432086614; https://pulse.internetsociety.org/blog/attack-on-chads-internet-infrastructure-highlights-need-for-more-resilience; https://radar.cloudflare.com/td?dateStart=2024-01-10&dateEnd=2024-01-11; https://ioda.inetintel.cc.gatech.edu/asn/328594?from=1704787979&until=1706775179; https://ioda.inetintel.cc.gatech.edu/country/TD?from=1704787979&until=1706775179; https://radar.cloudflare.com/as328594?dateStart=2024-01-10&dateEnd=2024-01-11 | Ended | 1/11/2024 | Sabotage/ Third-party Action | Anonymous Sudan reportedly targeted Sudatchad given Chad's support of RSF | Yes | No | No | No | No | No | No | No | Chad: Sudatchad | No | No | No | No | No | Anonymous Sudan targeted the Sudatchad network in Chad with a cyberattack allegedly due to Chad's support of RSF, with the intent of shutting down internet and telecommunications. The shutdown had nationwide impacts and lasted between 1:00pm (UTC+0) on Jan. 10 until around 6:00am (UTC+0) on Jan. 11. | Africa | ||||||||||||
50 | Actual | 1/12/2024 | Palestine, State of | It affected locations in more than one state, province, or region | Gaza Strip | Shutdown | Broadband, Mobile | Full network | Non-government | Military of the State of Israel | Conflict | Ongoing aggression by Israeli forces and deliberate tampering with infrastructure connecting Gaza to the outside world | CSO KIO partners | https://x.com/cloudflareradar/status/1748434385286651990; https://x.com/DougMadory/status/1747254574191403286; https://x.com/DougMadory/status/1749193575143813576; https://x.com/JawwalPal/status/1746218633221591108; https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2024/1/12/israels-war-on-gaza-list-of-key-events-day-98; https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2024/1/11/day-one-of-the-icj-genocide-hearing-against-israel-key-takeaways; https://english.wafa.ps/Pages/Details/140675; https://www.reuters.com/world/middle-east/fierce-fighting-gaza-war-hits-100-days-2024-01-14/; https://blog.cloudflare.com/q1-2024-internet-disruption-summary/#gaza-strip; https://www.reuters.com/world/middle-east/israels-military-keeps-focus-southern-gazas-khan-younis-spokesperson-2024-01-29/ | Ended | 1/19/2024 | Sabotage/ Third-party Action | No | No | No | No | No | No | Yes | Yes | Palestine: PalTel | Yes | https://x.com/Paltelco/status/1748415439686824283 | "We announce the gradual return of communications services in different areas of the Gaza Strip, as our technical teams have worked over the past few days to repair many of the major malfunctions caused by the ongoing aggression on the Strip." | No | Yes | Yes | No | Internet and mobile communications were shutdown across the Gaza Strip from 13:45 (UTC+0) on Jan. 12 until 18:30 (UTC+0) on Jan. 19, the longest full blackout since Oct. 7, 2023. Deir al-Balah, Khan Younis, and Rafah governorates were all offline while Gaza governorate was severly impacted, which geographically matches where Israel was focusing military efforts in the south of the Gaza Strip. The shutdown coincided with continuous bombardments on civilian populations with hundreds killed, including two workers from Jawwal who were killed by an Israeli missile targeting their car as they attempted to repair telco infrastructure in Khan Younis. The shutdown also aligned with day two of the ICJ genocide hearing against Israel on Jan. 12. | https://www.accessnow.org/press-release/gaza-a-week-in-the-dark/ | MENA | ||||||||||
51 | Estimated | 1/13/2024 | Russian Federation | It affected locations in more than one state, province, or region | At least 16 regions across Russia | Throttle | Broadband, Mobile | Service-based | Executive government | Roskomnadzor | Information control | YouTube was throttled across the country as an exercise of future blockings | CSO KIO partners | https://t.me/moscowtimes_ru/18466; https://timeline-ru.net/timeline | Unknown | Unknown | No | No | No | No | No | No | YouTube | No | No | Russia: Beeline (VEON) | Unknown | No | No | No | No | YouTube was throttled in at least 16 regions across Russia starting around Jan. 13 as an exercise for future blockings. | EECA | |||||||||||||
52 | Actual | 1/16/2024 | Myanmar | It affected locations in more than one state, province, or region | Sittwe city and Buthidaung, Gwa, Kyauktaw, Maungdaw, Minbya, Mrauk U, Myaypon, Pauktaw, Ponnakyun, and Rathidaung townships, Rakhine State | Shutdown | Broadband, Mobile | Full network | Military | Military junta | Conflict | Internet and phone lines were cut off by the military council in an area of active conflict | CSO KIO partners | https://www.facebook.com/100063883071441/posts/pfbid0Y3WWi4UUt5fjWx1d6wLjbhekNaMjAoRDxFwZHtUK1p1YfXZ66kCLGUvCy42JEVKml/?mibextid=Nif5oz; https://athanmyanmar.org/myanmar-communication-blackout-2021-to-present/; https://engagemedia.org/2024/myanmar-digital-coup-quarterly-november-2023-january-2024/; https://www.irrawaddy.com/news/burma/myanmar-junta-shells-civilians-cuts-internet-as-aa-advances-in-rakhine.html; https://www.rfa.org/burmese/program_2/weapon-rohingya-dead-01262024115201.html; https://www.hrw.org/news/2024/02/09/myanmar-rohingya-risk-rakhine-fighting; https://www.dvb.no/post/638349 | Unknown | Unknown | No | No | No | No | No | No | Yes | Yes | Myanmar: Atom, Myanmar: MPT, Myanmar: Ooredoo | Yes | https://www.facebook.com/100063883071441/posts/pfbid0Y3WWi4UUt5fjWx1d6wLjbhekNaMjAoRDxFwZHtUK1p1YfXZ66kCLGUvCy42JEVKml/?mibextid=Nif5oz | (Translated) An official from an office of the Fiber Internet Service Organization in Sittwe said that the internet line was cut off due to a heavy weapon hitting the communication lines in Sittwe Township. "Early yesterday morning, phone lines and internet lines on the high island side of Sittwe Township were cut off due to heavy weapons damage. Our employees are trying their best to connect cables and repair equipment," he said. | No | Yes | Yes | No | Internet services and phone lines (with the exception of Mytel) were cut off by the military council throughout Rakhine State beginning early morning on Jan. 16. The shutdown was reportedly started by the military junta destroying fiber internet and phone lines in Sittwe. In the midst of the shutdown, there were reports of multiple battalions of the junta firing on and burning multiple villages, including areas without a presence of the Arakan Army. This has led to high civilian casualties including displaced Rohingya. The shutdown was active as of Feb. 11 in the midst of continuing human rights abuses such as the blocking of humanitarian aid and indiscriminate bombings of villages. | APAC | ||||||||||||
53 | Estimated | 1/16/2024 | Russian Federation | It only affected one city, county, or village | Baimak | Shutdown | Broadband, Mobile | Full network | Unknown | Protests | The internet was restricted in the town of Baimak during protests after a local activist was arrested | CSO KIO partners | https://www.rferl.org/a/32778008.html; https://ioda.inetintel.cc.gatech.edu/asn/15673?from=1705403252&until=1706008052 | Ended | 1/17/2024 | Unknown | No | No | No | No | No | No | Unknown | Unknown | No | No | Yes | Yes | No | Internet access was reportedly cutoff in the town of Baimak on Jan. 17 during protests against the arrest of a local activist. Police fired tear gas and stun grenades against protestors, resulting in at least 22 injuries. The police also detained dozens of protestors. There was also an outage for an hour on the previous day (Jan. 16) of the Teleseti network, which operates in the region of Bashkortostan where Baimak is - the same day in which police detained activists to try to stop the protests from taking place. | EECA | |||||||||||||||
54 | Actual | 1/17/2024 | Comoros | It affected locations in more than one state, province, or region | Nationwide | Shutdown | Broadband, Mobile | Full network | Executive government | Protests | Authorities in Comoros disrupted internet access during post-election protests | CSO KIO partners | https://x.com/IODA_live/status/1748345156175007949; https://x.com/CloudflareRadar/status/1748326986936635764; https://radar.cloudflare.com/traffic/as36939?dateStart=2024-01-15&dateEnd=2024-01-27; https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2024/1/18/comoros-announces-curfew-after-presidents-fourth-term-win-sparks-protests; https://www.reuters.com/world/africa/night-curfew-imposed-comoros-after-presidents-re-election-sparks-protests-2024-01-18/#:~:text=Africa-,One%20dead%2C%20at%20least%2025%20injured%20in,protests%20over%20president's%20re%2Delection&text=MORONI%2C%20Jan%2018%20(Reuters),health%20official%20said%20on%20Thursday. | Ended | 1/19/2024 | Unknown | No | No | No | No | No | No | Unknown | Unknown | Comoros: Huri (Comores Telecom) | Unknown | Yes | Yes | No | No | Authorities in Comoros disrupted internet access from 9:00 UTC+0 on Jan. 17 to 14:30 UTC+0 on Jan. 19. This shutdown was an attempt to quell post-election protests against the re-election of President Azali Assoumani, and was accompanied by violence where one person died and at least 25 were injured. This was the first recorded shutdown for Comoros. | https://www.accessnow.org/press-release/comoros-must-not-blackout-the-internet/ | Africa | |||||||||||||
55 | Actual | 1/17/2024 | Myanmar | It only affected one city, county, or village | Paletwa township, Chin State | Shutdown | Broadband, Mobile | Full network | Military | Military junta | Conflict | Internet and phone lines were cut off by the military council in an area of active conflict | CSO KIO partners | https://www.irrawaddy.com/news/burma/myanmar-junta-shells-civilians-cuts-internet-as-aa-advances-in-rakhine.html; https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2024/1/16/arakan-army-fighters-claim-control-of-key-city-in-northwestern-myanmar; https://www.irrawaddy.com/opinion/analysis/myanmar-junta-grip-on-chin-state-hangs-by-thread.html; https://www.irrawaddy.com/news/burma/arakan-army-captures-myanmar-junta-brigade-general-in-chin-state-rout-report.html | Unknown | Unknown | No | No | No | No | No | No | Yes | Yes | Unknown | No | Unknown | Unknown | No | Internet service and phone lines were cut off by the military council in Paletwa township, Chin State on Jan. 17. The Arakan Army (AA) had just captured Paletwa on Jan. 15 and fighting was ongoing nearby in Rakhine State where there was also a shutdown. | APAC | |||||||||||||||
56 | Actual | 1/22/2024 | Myanmar | It affected more than one city in the same state, province, or region | Mabein and Mongmit townships, Shan State | Shutdown | Broadband, Mobile | Full network | Military | Military junta | Conflict | Internet and phone lines were cut off by the military council in an area of active conflict | CSO KIO partners | https://www.rfa.org/burmese/news/internet-shut-down-mongmit-01222024041348.html; https://engagemedia.org/2024/myanmar-digital-coup-quarterly-november-2023-january-2024/; https://athanmyanmar.org/myanmar-communication-blackout-2021-to-present/ | Unknown | Unknown | No | No | No | No | No | No | Yes | Yes | Unknown | No | Yes | Yes | No | Internet services and phone lines were cut off by the military council in Mongmit, Shan State on the morning of Jan. 22. This followed the Kachin Independence Army fighting the junta troops starting Jan. 18. There were reports of at least 10 civilian casualties from being trapped in the fighting. Nearby Mabein township was also reported to have been experiencing a shutdown. | APAC | |||||||||||||||
57 | Actual | 1/22/2024 | Palestine, State of | It affected locations in more than one state, province, or region | Gaza Strip | Shutdown | Broadband, Mobile | Full network | Non-government | Military of the State of Israel | Conflict | Ongoing aggression by Israeli forces and deliberate tampering with infrastructure connecting Gaza to the outside world | CSO KIO partners | https://x.com/CloudflareRadar/status/1749488365634826295; https://x.com/DougMadory/status/1749480305595986270; https://blog.cloudflare.com/q1-2024-internet-disruption-summary/#gaza-strip; https://www.saba.ye/en/news3298580.htm; https://www.aljazeera.com/news/liveblog/2024/1/23/israels-war-on-gaza-ground-shaking-in-hospital-amid-israeli-attacks; https://www.reuters.com/world/middle-east/israels-military-keeps-focus-southern-gazas-khan-younis-spokesperson-2024-01-29/ | Ended | 1/24/2024 | Sabotage/ Third-party Action | No | No | No | No | No | No | Yes | Yes | Palestine: PalTel | Yes | https://www.saba.ye/en/news3298580.htm | The company said in a post: "We regret to announce the interruption of communications services with the Gaza Strip for the tenth time since October 7, due to the continuation and escalation of the aggression against various regions of the beloved Strip." | No | Yes | Yes | No | Internet and mobile communications were shutdown across the Gaza Strip from 15:30 (UTC+0) on Jan. 22 until around the same time on Jan. 24. Deir al-Balah, Khan Younis, and Rafah governorates were all offline while Gaza governorate was severly impacted, which geographically matches where Israel was focusing military efforts in the south of the Gaza Strip. The shutdown coincided with continuous bombardments on civilian populations with dozens killed, including 40 people in Khan Younis on Jan. 23 alone where internet and communications were cutoff. | MENA | |||||||||||
58 | Actual | 1/25/2024 | Russian Federation | It affected locations in more than one state, province, or region | Leningrad, Novgorod, and Pskov | Shutdown | Mobile | Full network | Unknown | Other | CSO KIO partners | https://t.me/meduzalive/98996; https://timeline-ru.net/timeline | Ended | 1/30/2024 | Other | Maintenance to "reconfigure broadcast frequencies" | Yes | According to the Governor of the Pskov Region, Mikhail Vedernikov, from January 25 to 30, at night (from 23:00 to 06:00) for technical reasons mobile Internet of the LTE standard of all telecom operators will not work in the region. In addition, the Ministry of Digital Development of the Novgorod Region announced that on the same dates, 4G LTE mobile Internet will be turned off throughout the region at night. The authorities explained this decision by "carrying out technical work to reconfigure broadcast frequencies." | No | No | No | No | No | No | No | No | No | No | No | Yes | Mobile internet was reportedly cut off nightly in the regions of Leningrad, Novgorod, and Pskov between Jan. 25 and Jan. 30. Authorities claimed the disruptions were due to planned maintenance, but partners believe they were either planning for regional shutdowns during elections or were unable to keep up equipment properly due to sanctions. | EECA | ||||||||||||||
59 | Actual | 1/29/2024 | Myanmar | It only affected one city, county, or village | Gangaw, Magway Division | Shutdown | Mobile | Full network | Military | Military junta | Conflict | Internet and phone lines were cut off by the military council in an area of active conflict | CSO KIO partners | https://t.me/MagwayRegionalScoutNetwork/21215 | Unknown | Unknown | No | No | No | No | No | No | Yes | Yes | Myanmar: Atom | Unknown | No | Yes | Unknown | No | Mobile internet and phone services were cut off in Gangaw, Magway Division starting the evening of Jan. 29 by the military council. Gunshots were heard throughout the city during the night. | APAC | ||||||||||||||
60 | Actual | 2/1/2024 | India | It affected more than one city in the same state, province, or region | 7 targeted zones across district boundaries, Manipur | Shutdown | Mobile | Full network | State government | Government of Manipur, Home Department | Communal violence | Continuing clashes between ethnic groups and security forces led to a shutdown | Other | https://manipur.gov.in/wp-content/uploads/2024/04/16feb.pdf | Ended | 2/16/2024 | Fake news/ Hate speech/ Incendiary content/ Promoting violence | Yes | Yes | Government order | https://manipur.gov.in/wp-content/uploads/2024/04/16feb.pdf | No | No | No | No | No | No | No | India: Airtel (Bharti Airtel), India: BSNL, India: Reliance Jio (Reliance Industries), India: Vodafone Idea | Unknown | No | Yes | Unknown | No | According to an order dated Feb. 16, the home department had issued an order on Feb. 1 lasting until the continuation on Feb. 16 which targeted 7 zones previously under shutdown from late 2023 to early 2024. | APAC | ||||||||||
61 | Actual | 2/2/2024 | Sudan | It affected locations in more than one state, province, or region | Nationwide | Shutdown | Broadband, Mobile | Full network | Non-government | Rapid Support Forces (RSF) | Conflict | During the ongoing civil war, reports indicated that RSF had taken over data centers for ISPs, leading to a shutdown | CSO KIO partners | https://blog.cloudflare.com/q1-2024-internet-disruption-summary/#militaryaction; https://x.com/drlab_sudan/status/1754134933772128326?s=46&t=qCRo1oJSpnRBSAHsFzDNoA; https://x.com/CloudflareRadar/status/1754151170656928058; https://x.com/IODA_live/status/1757059004579140061; https://x.com/FelAnthonio/status/1793933551085187536?cn=ZmxleGlibGVfcmVjcw%3D%3D; https://radar.cloudflare.com/as36972?dateStart=2024-05-16&dateEnd=2024-05-31; https://radar.cloudflare.com/as15706?dateStart=2024-02-01&dateEnd=2024-02-29; https://sudanscoop.com/sudan/sudani-network-back-in-service/ | Ended | 5/25/2024 | Sabotage/ Third-party Action | No | No | No | No | No | No | Unknown | Unknown | Sudan: MTN, Sudan: Sudani (Sudatel) | Yes | https://x.com/MTNSudan1/status/1753528636949274956 | "We regret the interruption of all services due to circumstances beyond our control. While we apologize for the inconvenience caused by this interruption, we assure you of our endeavor to restore the service as soon as possible, and you will be notified of the return of the service." | No | Yes | Yes | No | The internet was cutoff for most of Sudan on MTN and Sudatel beginning 2:15pm (UTC+0) on Feb. 2 as RSF took over data centers of ISPs. Although there were partial returns to connectivity and mobile service in select cities through repair efforts and the building of new data centers in Port Sudan, MTN was offline until May 25 at 3:30pm (UTC+0). Sudatel started to return by Feb. 12, but it took weeks to return to normal levels of traffic nationwide. | https://www.accessnow.org/press-release/keepiton-sudan-shutdown/; https://www.accessnow.org/the-sudan-conflict-how-internet-shutdowns-deepen-a-humanitarian-crisis/ | MENA | ||||||||||
62 | Actual | 2/4/2024 | Senegal | It affected locations in more than one state, province, or region | Nationwide | Shutdown | Mobile | Full network | Executive government | Ministry of Communication | Protests | Authorities imposed a mobile shutdown amidst protests against the postponement of elections | CSO KIO partners | https://x.com/CloudflareRadar/status/1755203474294276225; https://radar.cloudflare.com/as37649?dateStart=2024-02-05&dateEnd=2024-02-07; https://radar.cloudflare.com/as37196?dateStart=2024-02-04&dateEnd=2024-02-07; https://x.com/samirasawlani/status/1754453336894415340?s=46&t=zccuaKOQupV6udiNaWfQcA; https://www.france24.com/en/africa/20240204-senegal-opposition-backlash-president-macky-sall-postpones-presidential-vote | Ended | 2/7/2024 | Public safety/ Quell unrest / Restore public order | The Ministry of Communications, Telecommunications and Digital Economy, in a public statement, indicated that the mobile internet shutdown was necessary to curb the spread of “hateful and subversive messages” on social media, which could potentially threaten public order. | Yes | Yes | Government order | https://kewoulo.info/gouvernement-confirme-coupure-de-linternet-mobile-communique/; https://x.com/samirasawlani/status/1754453336894415340?s=46&t=zccuaKOQupV6udiNaWfQcA | “The Ministry of Communication, Telecommunications and Digital informs the public that’due to the dissemination of several hateful and subversive messages relayed on social networks in a context of threats of disorder to public order, the’internet of mobile data is suspended provisionally from Sunday, February 04 at 22 hours. Telephone operators are required to comply with the “ notified requisitions, Minister Moussa Bocar Thiam said in a statement. | No | No | No | No | No | No | No | Senegal: Free/Tigo, Senegal: Sudatel Senegal | No | No | Yes | Unknown | No | In the midst of protests against the postponement of the election, Senegalese authorities issued a mobile shutdown order with effect from 22:00 on Feb. 4. Traffic on Sudatel dropped at the specified time on Feb. 4 and was offline for most of the period until 7:30 on Feb. 7. Traffic on Tigo dropped at 9:30 on Feb. 5 and was severely disrupted until 0:00 on Feb. 7. Sonatel showed no change from normal traffic, so the provider likely did not follow the shutdown order. All times UTC+0 which is also local time. | https://www.accessnow.org/press-release/keepiton-senegalese-authorities-access-to-all/ | Africa | |||||||
63 | Actual | 2/6/2024 | Sudan | It affected locations in more than one state, province, or region | Nationwide | Shutdown | Broadband, Mobile | Full network | Non-government | Rapid Support Forces (RSF) | Conflict | During the ongoing civil war, reports indicated that RSF had taken over data centers for ISPs, leading to a shutdown | CSO KIO partners | https://blog.cloudflare.com/q1-2024-internet-disruption-summary/#militaryaction; https://x.com/CloudflareRadar/status/1755200653729661014; https://ioda.inetintel.cc.gatech.edu/asn/36998?from=1707115043&until=1714113443; https://radar.cloudflare.com/as36998?dateStart=2024-03-30&dateEnd=2024-04-05; https://ioda.inetintel.cc.gatech.edu/asn/36998?from=1709620643&until=1716705443; https://radar.cloudflare.com/as36998?dateStart=2024-03-15&dateEnd=2024-03-31; https://radar.cloudflare.com/as36998?dateStart=2024-03-01&dateEnd=2024-03-15 | Ended | 5/2/2024 | Sabotage/ Third-party Action | No | No | No | No | No | No | Unknown | Unknown | Sudan: Zain | Yes | https://x.com/ZainSudan/status/1754487740102533170; https://x.com/ZainSudan/status/1764217865530376300 | "Zain Sudan has been constantly striving to maintain communication and Internet service to serve its valued subscribers, and we would like to point out that the current network outage is due to circumstances beyond its control, with our hopes that safety will prevail, and that service will be restored as soon as possible." (Feb. 5) ... "Zain network is gradually returning to work and allows its subscribers to communicate for free for a limited time. Zain promises to continue working to restore its network in the rest of the states." (Mar. 3) | No | Yes | Yes | No | Following another shutdown days prior on other providers, the internet was shutdown across most of Sudan for Zain beginning Feb. 2 at 11:00pm (UTC+0). There was a return to service on the network on Mar. 2, but traffic fell abruptly again on Mar. 19. Traffic on Cloudflare showed a full return to normal by Mar. 31, but signals from IODA showed continued low connectivity of the BGP signal and likely impacts on broadband connections until May 2. | https://www.accessnow.org/press-release/keepiton-sudan-shutdown/; https://www.accessnow.org/the-sudan-conflict-how-internet-shutdowns-deepen-a-humanitarian-crisis/ | MENA | ||||||||||
64 | Actual | 2/6/2024 | Azerbaijan | It affected locations in more than one state, province, or region | Baku, Fuzuli | Shutdown, Throttle | Mobile | Full network | Executive government | Elections | Mobile internet was cutoff and then likely throttled in parts of Baku and Fuzuli before and during election day | News media article | https://www.meydan.tv/en/article/internet-restrictions-during-azerbaijan-elections-prompt-concerns-over-freedom-of-communication/; https://www.meydan.tv/az/article/azerbaycanda-secki-gunu-internetde-problemlerin-yarandigi-bildirilir/ | Ended | 2/8/2024 | None | No | https://www.meydan.tv/az/article/azerbaycanda-secki-gunu-internetde-problemlerin-yarandigi-bildirilir/ | "Shahin Asadli, head of the Media and Public Relations Department of the Central Election Commission (CEC), told TV that he had not received any complaints about interference in the Internet. 'I contacted schools 310 and 80. They said that there is no problem in providing the Internet. In general, such a problem is not possible', – CEC spokesman said." | No | No | No | No | No | No | No | Azerbaijan: Bakcell, Azerbaijan: Nar (Azerfon) | No | Yes | No | No | No | The internet was cut off at multiple polling locations in Baku and in parts of Fuzuli in the west of the country before and during the election day of Feb. 7. Bakcell and Nar were reportedly not working at all in Fuzuli, and then were very difficult to use thereafter. A spokesperson for the Central Election Commission (CEC) denied the shutdown. Mobile operators and the Ministry of Digital Development and Transport did not provide any comment. | https://www.accessnow.org/press-release/azerbaijani-government-telcos-keepiton-during-elections/ | EECA | |||||||||||
65 | Actual | 2/7/2024 | India | It affected more than one city in the same state, province, or region | Rajouri and Poonch Districts, Jammu & Kashmir | Shutdown | Mobile | Full network | State government | Government of Jammu & Kashmir, Home Department | Protests | The Indian parliament introduced a reservation bill impacting the Gujjar and Bakarwal community, prompting protests, the deployment of armed forces, and multiple internet shutdowns | CSO KIO partners | https://jkhome.nic.in/pdf/01(TSTS)of2024.pdf; https://thekashmiriyat.co.uk/internet-suspended-in-poonch-and-rajouri-districts-of-jammu-kashmir/; https://freepresskashmir.news/2024/02/07/internet-shut-down-in-poonch-rajouri-after-goi-grants-st-status-to-brahmins-and-paharis-in-jk/; https://kashmirobserver.net/2024/02/07/st-status-to-pahari-community-internet-suspended-in-poonch-rajouri/ | Ended | 2/7/2024 | Public safety/ Quell unrest / Restore public order | Yes | Yes | Government order | https://jkhome.nic.in/pdf/01(TSTS)of2024.pdf | No | No | No | No | No | No | No | Unknown | No | No | Unknown | No | Mobile internet was suspended for the Rajouri and Poonch Districts from 00:10 on Feb. 7 to 23:30 on Feb. 7. 2G/3G/4G/5G and public Wi-Fi services were all suspended. | APAC | |||||||||||
66 | Actual | 2/8/2024 | India | It affected more than one city in the same state, province, or region | Rajouri and Poonch Districts, Jammu & Kashmir | Shutdown, Throttle | Mobile | Full network | State government | Government of Jammu & Kashmir, Home Department | Protests | The Indian parliament introduced a reservation bill impacting the Gujjar and Bakarwal community, prompting protests, the deployment of armed forces, and multiple internet shutdowns | Other | https://jkhome.nic.in/pdf/02(TSTS)of2024.pdf | Ended | 2/8/2024 | Public safety/ Quell unrest / Restore public order | Yes | Yes | Government order | https://jkhome.nic.in/pdf/02(TSTS)of2024.pdf | No | No | No | No | No | No | No | Unknown | No | No | Unknown | Yes | Mobile internet was suspended for the Rajouri and Poonch Districts from 00:10 on Feb. 8 to 23:30 on Feb. 8. 3G/4G/5G and public Wi-Fi services were all suspended, and 2G service was throttled to less than 128 kb/s. | APAC | |||||||||||
67 | Actual | 2/8/2024 | India | It only affected one city, county, or village | Haldwani, Uttarakhand | Shutdown | Unknown | Full network | Unknown | Protests | Violent clashes between protestors and police over the demolition of a mosque led to curfew orders and an internet shutdown over multiple days | CSO KIO partners | https://www.ndtv.com/india-news/4-dead-over-250-injured-in-violence-over-uttarakhand-madrasa-demolition-5022568; https://indianexpress.com/article/india/haldwani-violence-uttarakhand-central-forces-shops-reopen-9155607/; https://pulse.internetsociety.org/shutdowns/internet-services-suspended-in-uttarakhand-india-february-2024; https://www.hindustantimes.com/india-news/haldwani-violence-curfew-partially-lifted-6-rioters-killed-5-arrested-top-updates-101707544614424.html | Ended | 2/11/2024 | Unknown | Unknown | No | No | No | No | No | Unknown | Unknown | Unknown | No | Yes | Yes | No | Internet services were suspended in Haldwani, Uttarakhand from Feb. 8 to Feb. 11. Shoot-on-sight orders were authorized by police, and six people were killed. | APAC | |||||||||||||||
68 | Actual | 2/8/2024 | Pakistan | It affected locations in more than one state, province, or region | Nationwide | Shutdown | Mobile | Full network | Executive government | Pakistan Interior Ministry | Elections | Mobile shutdown across Pakistan on election day | CSO KIO partners | https://x.com/CloudflareRadar/status/1755435530873888990; https://www.accessnow.org/press-release/keepiton-pakistan-2024-elections/; https://pulse.internetsociety.org/shutdowns/no-mobile-data-during-elections-in-pakistan; https://www.aljazeera.com/news/liveblog/2024/2/8/pakistan-election-2024-live-polls-take-place-today-imran-khan-in-jail?update=2689649; https://www.reuters.com/world/asia-pacific/pakistan-votes-amid-polarisation-militant-attacks-economic-crisis-2024-02-07/; https://www.accessnow.org/campaign/2024-elections-and-internet-shutdowns-watch/#Pakistan; https://www.pakistantoday.com.pk/2024/02/07/pta-to-provide-uninterrupted-internet-services-on-election-day/; https://www.thenews.com.pk/latest/1153922-ecp-rules-out-possibility-of-internet-blackout-on-election-day | Ended | 2/8/2024 | Public safety/ Quell unrest / Restore public order | Yes | No | https://aje.io/sj5svz?update=2689649; https://en.wenews.pk/pakistans-minister-defends-internet-shutdowns-on-election-day/; https://tribune.com.pk/story/2456022/govt-asserts-neutrality-dismissing-allegations; https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=GWjxgJptmGQ | Pakistan authorities have suspended mobile phone services nationwide, the Interior Ministry has said, citing the need to "maintain law and order". "It has been decided to temporarily suspend the mobile service across the country," a ministry spokesman said in a statement. The spokesman said "precious lives have been lost" in recent armed attacks in Pakistan and "security measures are essential to maintain law and order … and to deal with potential threats". | No | No | No | No | No | Yes | Yes | Pakistan: Jazz, Pakistan: Telenor, Pakistan: Zong | Unknown | Yes | Yes | Unknown | No | Mobile internet was suspended on election day nationwide in Pakistan, Feb. 8, from 02:00 UTC+0 until 15:00 UTC+0 after polls had closed. The Pakistan Telecommunications Authority and Election Commission had both publicly committed to #KeepItOn in the week leading up to the election. | https://www.accessnow.org/press-release/keepiton-restore-internet-pakistan-elections-2024/ | APAC | |||||||||
69 | Actual | 2/9/2024 | India | It affected more than one city in the same state, province, or region | Rajouri and Poonch Districts, Jammu & Kashmir | Shutdown, Throttle | Mobile | Full network | State government | Government of Jammu & Kashmir, Home Department | Protests | The Indian parliament introduced a reservation bill impacting the Gujjar and Bakarwal community, prompting protests, the deployment of armed forces, and multiple internet shutdowns | Other | https://jkhome.nic.in/pdf/03(TSTS)of2024.pdf | Ended | 2/9/2024 | Public safety/ Quell unrest / Restore public order | Yes | Yes | Government order | https://jkhome.nic.in/pdf/03(TSTS)of2024.pdf | No | No | No | No | No | No | No | Unknown | No | No | Unknown | Yes | Mobile internet was suspended for the Rajouri and Poonch Districts from 00:10 on Feb. 9 to 18:00 on Feb. 9. 3G/4G/5G and public Wi-Fi services were all suspended, and 2G service was throttled to less than 128 kb/s. | APAC | |||||||||||
70 | Actual | 2/9/2024 | India | It only affected one city, county, or village | Sandeshkhali and Hingalganj areas, North 24 Parganas District, West Bengal | Shutdown | Unknown | Full network | State government | Protests | Authorities imposed Section 144 orders and an internet shutdown following protests against local politicians | CSO KIO partners | https://pulse.internetsociety.org/shutdowns/internet-shutdown-in-sandeshkhali-and-hingalganj-india-february-2024; https://timesofindia.indiatimes.com/t10-february-14-2024/how-sandeshkhali-became-the-new-flashpoint-in-bengal/articleshow/107669635.cms; https://www.deccanchronicle.com/nation/section-144-imposed-internet-suspended-in-sandeshkhali-881731; https://indianexpress.com/article/cities/kolkata/police-lathi-charge-protesters-in-sandeshkhali-bjp-demonstration-9159288/; https://pulse.internetsociety.org/shutdowns/internet-shutdown-extended-to-hingalganj-west-bengal-india-february-2024; https://pune.news/nation/sandeshkhali-violence-internet-ban-extended-to-hingalganj-135962/ | Ended | 2/13/2024 | Unknown | Unknown | No | No | No | No | No | Unknown | Unknown | Unknown | No | Yes | Unknown | No | Internet services were suspended in Sandeshkhali on Feb. 9 and extended to the nearby village of Hingalganj on Feb. 12. A judge of the Calcutta High Court quashed the Section 144 order on Feb. 13, likely ending the shutdown. | APAC | |||||||||||||||
71 | Estimated | 2/9/2024 | Myanmar | It only affected one city, county, or village | Kawlin township, Sagaing Division | Shutdown | Broadband, Mobile | Full network | Military | Military junta | Conflict | Internet and phone lines were cut off by the military council in an area of active conflict | CSO KIO partners | https://engagemedia.org/2024/myanmar-digital-coup-quarterly-february-2024-april-2024/; https://www.facebook.com/story.php?story_fbid=749522357275373&id=100066528465996&mibextid=oFDknk; https://athanmyanmar.org/myanmar-communication-blackout-2021-to-present/ | Unknown | Unknown | No | No | No | No | No | No | Yes | Yes | Unknown | No | Yes | Unknown | No | Internet services and phone lines were cut off by the military council in Kawlin township, Sagaing Division since around Feb. 9 in the midst of heavy fighting with revolutionary forces. | APAC | |||||||||||||||
72 | Actual | 2/11/2024 | India | It affected more than one city in the same state, province, or region | Ambala, Fatehabad, Hisar, Jind, Kaithal, Kurukshetra, and Sirsa Districts, Haryana | Shutdown | Mobile | Full network | State government | Government of Haryana, Department of Home Affairs | Protests | Haryana officials imposed Section 144 and planned a shutdown across 7 districts in anticipation of the Delhi Chalo march | CSO KIO partners | https://news.abplive.com/news/india/haryana-police-prepares-to-seal-punjab-haryana-borders-farmers-delhi-chalo-march-traffic-advisory-internet-shutdown-1663480; https://x.com/GamanGarg/status/1756341261433479361/photo/1; https://pulse.internetsociety.org/shutdowns/internet-suspended-in-haryana-district-india-february-2024; https://x.com/ANI/status/1757045332486049835; https://www.hrw.org/news/2024/02/29/india-protect-farmers-right-peaceful-protest | Ended | 2/13/2024 | Fake news/ Hate speech/ Incendiary content/ Promoting violence | Yes | Yes | Government order | https://x.com/GamanGarg/status/1756341261433479361/photo/1 | No | No | No | No | No | Yes | No | Unknown | No | Yes | Yes | Yes | Mobile internet and bulk SMS services were suspended in 7 districts across Haryana from 06:00 on Feb. 11 to 23:59 on Feb. 13. | APAC | |||||||||||
73 | Actual | 2/11/2024 | India | It affected more than one city in the same state, province, or region | 9 police jurisdictions across Bathinda, Mansa, Patiala, SAS Nagar, and Sri Muktsar Sahib Districts, Punjab | Shutdown | Broadband, Mobile | Full network | Executive government | Government of India, Ministry of Home Affairs | Protests | In light of the ongoing farmers' protests and anticipated Delhi Chalo march, officials in the central government imposed a shutdown in nearby districts of Punjab | CSO KIO partners | https://x.com/NetShutdowns/status/1758416160691814436; https://www.thehindu.com/news/national/centre-used-british-era-act-to-block-internet-in-punjab-ahead-of-the-farmers-march/article67846087.ece | Ended | 2/16/2024 | Public safety/ Quell unrest / Restore public order | Yes | Yes | Government order | https://x.com/NetShutdowns/status/1758416160691814436/photo/1 | No | No | No | No | No | No | No | Unknown | No | Unknown | Unknown | Yes | Internet services were suspended in 9 police jurisdictions across Bathinda, Mansa, Patiala, SAS Nagar, and Sri Muktsar Sahib Districts in Punjab from 0:00 on Feb. 11 to 23:59 on Feb. 16. | APAC | |||||||||||
74 | Actual | 2/11/2024 | Myanmar | It only affected one city, county, or village | Sittwe city, Rakhine State | Shutdown | Broadband, Mobile | Full network | Military | Military junta | Conflict | Internet and phone lines were cut off by the military council in an area of active conflict | CSO KIO partners | https://www.dvb.no/post/638349 | Unknown | Unknown | No | No | No | No | No | No | Yes | Yes | Unknown | No | Yes | Yes | No | Internet service and phone lines were cut off by the military council in Sittwe city, Rakhine State on Feb. 11. This shutdown occured the same day that the regime detonated a bridge which cut off the city from the rest of the state. There was heavy fighting going on as the military council cut off humanitarian aid and targeted civilian homes, hospitals, schools, and more throughout Rakhine. There were also reports of arrests and interrogations of civilians in Sittwe. | APAC | |||||||||||||||
75 | Actual | 2/12/2024 | India | It affected more than one city in the same state, province, or region | Anupgarh, Ganganagar, and Hanumangarh Districts, Bikaner Division, Rajasthan | Shutdown | Mobile | Full network, Service-based | State government | Divisional Commissioner Urmila Rajoria | Protests | In light of the ongoing farmers' protests and anticipated Delhi Chalo march, officials in Rajasthan imposed a shutdown in nearby districts of the Punjab-Haryana border | CSO KIO partners | https://navbharattimes.indiatimes.com/state/rajasthan/jaipur/internet-shutdown-in-three-districts-of-rajasthan-amid-farmer-protests/articleshow/107648529.cms; https://x.com/NetShutdowns/status/1757314593276244353; https://sflc.in/a-runthrough-on-the-ongoing-internet-shutdowns-and-content-blocking-during-the-farmers-protest/ | Ended | 2/13/2024 | Public safety/ Quell unrest / Restore public order | Yes | Yes | Government order | https://navbharattimes.indiatimes.com/state/rajasthan/jaipur/internet-shutdown-in-three-districts-of-rajasthan-amid-farmer-protests/articleshow/107648529.cms | Yes | Yes | Yes | Unknown | Unknown | Yes | No | Unknown | No | Unknown | Unknown | No | Mobile internet, SMS/MMS, and multiple social media services were suspended in Anupgarh, Ganganagar, and Hanumangarh Districts, Bikaner Division from 0:00 on Feb. 12 to 0:00 on Feb. 13. | APAC | |||||||||||
76 | Actual | 2/12/2024 | India | It affected more than one city in the same state, province, or region | 11 police jurisdictions across Fatehgarh Sahib, Patiala, and Sangrur Districts, Punjab | Shutdown | Broadband, Mobile | Full network | Executive government | Government of India, Ministry of Home Affairs | Protests | In light of the ongoing farmers' protests and anticipated Delhi Chalo march, officials in the central government imposed a shutdown in nearby districts of Punjab | CSO KIO partners | https://x.com/NetShutdowns/status/1758416160691814436; https://www.thehindu.com/news/national/centre-used-british-era-act-to-block-internet-in-punjab-ahead-of-the-farmers-march/article67846087.ece | Ended | 2/16/2024 | Public safety/ Quell unrest / Restore public order | Yes | Yes | Government order | https://x.com/NetShutdowns/status/1758416160691814436/photo/2 | No | No | No | No | No | No | No | Unknown | No | Unknown | Unknown | Yes | Internet services were suspended in 11 police jurisdictions across Fatehgarh Sahib, Patiala, and Sangrur Districts in Punjab from 18:00 on Feb. 12 to 23:59 on Feb. 16. | APAC | |||||||||||
77 | Actual | 2/13/2024 | India | It affected more than one city in the same state, province, or region | Ambala, Fatehabad, Hisar, Jind, Kaithal, Kurukshetra, and Sirsa Districts, Haryana | Shutdown | Mobile | Full network | State government | Government of Haryana, Department of Home Affairs | Protests | Haryana officials extended a shutdown across 7 districts during the ongoing farmers' protest | CSO KIO partners | https://www.hindustantimes.com/cities/chandigarh-news/suspension-of-net-services-extended-for-48-hours-in-7-haryana-districts-101707845767708.html; https://thewire.in/rights/farmers-internet-haryana-twitter-accounts; https://pulse.internetsociety.org/shutdowns/internet-suspended-in-haryana-district-india-february-2024; https://x.com/watchthestate/status/1758051967497375856; https://www.hrw.org/news/2024/02/29/india-protect-farmers-right-peaceful-protest | Ended | 2/15/2024 | Fake news/ Hate speech/ Incendiary content/ Promoting violence | Yes | Yes | Government order | https://x.com/NetShutdowns/status/1757718671298810225/photo/1 | No | No | No | No | No | Yes | No | Unknown | No | Yes | Yes | No | Mobile internet and bulk SMS services were suspended in 7 districts across Haryana for another 48 hours until 23:59 on Feb. 15. | APAC | |||||||||||
78 | Actual | 2/13/2024 | Senegal | It affected locations in more than one state, province, or region | Nationwide | Shutdown | Mobile | Full network | Executive government | Ministry of Communication | Protests | Authorities imposed a mobile shutdown amidst planned protests against the postponement of elections | CSO KIO partners | https://x.com/CloudflareRadar/status/1757393945246523843; https://kewoulo.info/senegal-moussa-bocar-thiam-coupe-de-nouveau-linternet-mobile/; https://radar.cloudflare.com/as37649?dateStart=2024-02-12&dateEnd=2024-02-14; https://crisis24.garda.com/alerts/2024/02/senegal-civil-society-organizations-announce-nationwide-protests-feb-13-following-postponement-of-presidential-election-to-late-2024-update-5 | Ended | 2/13/2024 | Fake news/ Hate speech/ Incendiary content/ Promoting violence | Yes | Yes | Government order | https://kewoulo.info/senegal-moussa-bocar-thiam-coupe-de-nouveau-linternet-mobile/ | In a statement received at the drafting, the minister justifies his decision “ (..) due to the dissemination on social networks of several hateful and subversive messages that have already caused violent demonstrations with deaths and significant material damage, the’internet of mobile data is suspended on Tuesday, February 13, 2024 according to certain time slots.” | No | No | No | No | No | No | No | Senegal: Free/Tigo | No | No | No | Unknown | No | In the midst of continued protests against the postponement of the election, Senegalese authorities issued another mobile shutdown order on Feb. 13. Tigo was the only network that showed evidence of following the order, and traffic on Tigo was disrupted from 10:15 to 19:45 on Feb. 13. All times UTC+0 which is also local time. | https://www.accessnow.org/press-release/keepiton-senegalese-authorities-access-to-all/ | Africa | ||||||||
79 | Actual | 2/15/2024 | India | It affected more than one city in the same state, province, or region | Ambala, Fatehabad, Hisar, Jind, Kaithal, Kurukshetra, and Sirsa Districts, Haryana | Shutdown | Mobile | Full network | State government | Government of Haryana, Department of Home Affairs | Protests | Haryana officials extended a shutdown across 7 districts during the ongoing farmers' protest | CSO KIO partners | https://x.com/NetShutdowns/status/1758378864122745092 | Ended | 2/17/2024 | Fake news/ Hate speech/ Incendiary content/ Promoting violence | Yes | Yes | Government order | https://x.com/NetShutdowns/status/1758378864122745092/photo/1 | No | No | No | No | No | Yes | No | Unknown | No | Unknown | Unknown | No | Mobile internet and bulk SMS services were suspended in 7 districts across Haryana for another 48 hours until 23:59 on Feb. 17. | APAC | |||||||||||
80 | Actual | 2/16/2024 | India | It only affected one city, county, or village | Churachandpur District, Manipur | Shutdown | Broadband, Mobile | Full network | State government | Government of Manipur, Home Department | Communal violence | Clashes between ethnic groups and security forces, including hundreds storming district police offices, led to an internet shutdown for the district | CSO KIO partners | https://x.com/NetShutdowns/status/1758804085602680988; https://manipur.gov.in/wp-content/uploads/2024/04/16feb_2.pdf; https://manipur.gov.in/wp-content/uploads/2024/04/16febCS.pdf; https://economictimes.indiatimes.com/news/india/manipur-govt-extends-internet-ban-in-churachandpur-district-till-march-2/articleshow/108019426.cms?from=mdr; https://crisis24.garda.com/alerts/2024/02/india-tight-security-recurring-internet-restrictions-likely-in-parts-of-manipur-state-through-at-least-end-february-amid-ongoing-tensions-update-22 | Ended | 2/21/2024 | Fake news/ Hate speech/ Incendiary content/ Promoting violence | Yes | Yes | Government order | https://manipur.gov.in/wp-content/uploads/2024/04/16feb_2.pdf; https://manipur.gov.in/wp-content/uploads/2024/04/16febCS.pdf | No | No | No | No | No | VPNs | No | No | India: Airtel (Bharti Airtel), India: BSNL, India: Reliance Jio (Reliance Industries), India: Vodafone Idea | Unknown | No | Yes | Unknown | No | Internet services were suspended in Churachandpur District from 01:40 on Feb. 16 to 01:40 on Feb. 21. | APAC | |||||||||
81 | Actual | 2/16/2024 | India | It affected more than one city in the same state, province, or region | 7 targeted zones across district boundaries, Manipur | Shutdown | Mobile | Full network | State government | Government of Manipur, Home Department | Communal violence | Continuing clashes between ethnic groups and security forces led to an extended shutdown | Other | https://manipur.gov.in/wp-content/uploads/2024/04/16feb.pdf; https://manipur.gov.in/wp-content/uploads/2024/04/17feb.pdf | Ended | 3/2/2024 | Fake news/ Hate speech/ Incendiary content/ Promoting violence | Yes | Yes | Government order | https://manipur.gov.in/wp-content/uploads/2024/04/16feb.pdf; https://manipur.gov.in/wp-content/uploads/2024/04/17feb.pdf | No | No | No | No | No | No | No | India: Airtel (Bharti Airtel), India: BSNL, India: Reliance Jio (Reliance Industries), India: Vodafone Idea | Unknown | No | Yes | Unknown | No | Mobile internet was suspended for a limited 2km radius in 7 zones across districts in Manipur from Feb. 16 to 19:45 on Mar. 2. | APAC | ||||||||||
82 | Actual | 2/17/2024 | India | It affected more than one city in the same state, province, or region | Ambala, Fatehabad, Hisar, Jind, Kaithal, Kurukshetra, and Sirsa Districts, Haryana | Shutdown | Mobile | Full network | State government | Government of Haryana, Department of Home Affairs | Protests | Haryana officials extended a shutdown across 7 districts during the ongoing farmers' protest | CSO KIO partners | https://x.com/NetShutdowns/status/1759119546911203723; https://www.hindustantimes.com/cities/chandigarh-news/mobile-internet-shutdown-extended-till-february-19-midnight-in-7-haryana-districts-101708195730659.html | Ended | 2/19/2024 | Fake news/ Hate speech/ Incendiary content/ Promoting violence | Yes | Yes | No | No | No | No | No | Yes | No | Unknown | No | Unknown | Unknown | No | Mobile internet and bulk SMS services were suspended in 7 districts across Haryana for another 48 hours until 23:59 on Feb. 19. | APAC | |||||||||||||
83 | Actual | 2/17/2024 | India | It only affected one city, county, or village | Darbhanga District, Bihar | Shutdown | Broadband, Mobile | Service-based | State government | Government of Bihar, Home Department | Communal violence | Two groups clashed in Darbhanga during a religious procession, leading officials to impose a shutdown | Other | https://home.bihar.gov.in/CMS/notice.aspx; https://www.aninews.in/news/national/general-news/bihar-clash-breaks-out-between-two-communities-in-darbhanga-over-idol-immersion20240217020811/; https://www.newindianexpress.com/nation/2024/Feb/17/social-media-sites-suspended-in-bihars-darbhanga-after-communal-flare-up | Ended | 2/19/2024 | Fake news/ Hate speech/ Incendiary content/ Promoting violence | Yes | Yes | Government order | https://drive.google.com/file/d/1PhdaiY7tyTbwmm67tfdNfpGvV_kOdaaE/view?usp=drive_link | Yes | Yes | Yes | Unknown | Yes | QQ, WeChat, Ozone, Tumblr, Google+, Baidu, Skype, Viber, Line, Snapchat, Pinterest, Reddit, Snaptish, YouTube, Vinc, Xanga, Buaanet, Flickr, "other social networking sites meant for mass messaging" | No | No | Unknown | No | Yes | No | Yes | 23 social media and messaging platforms were blocked in Darbhanga District, Bihar from 14:00 on Feb. 17 to 14:00 on Feb. 19. The order excludes government internet and intranet services, including banking. | APAC | ||||||||||
84 | Actual | 2/17/2024 | India | It affected more than one city in the same state, province, or region | 20 police jurisdictions across Bathinda, Fatehgarh Sahib, Mansa, Patiala, Sangrur, SAS Nagar, and Sri Muktsar Sahib Districts, Punjab | Shutdown | Broadband, Mobile | Full network | Executive government | Government of India, Ministry of Home Affairs | Protests | Central government officials extended a shutdown across 7 districts in Punjab during the ongoing farmers' protest | CSO KIO partners | https://www.mha.gov.in/sites/default/files/Shutdown_16022024.pdf | Ended | 2/24/2024 | Public safety/ Quell unrest / Restore public order | Yes | Yes | Government order | https://www.mha.gov.in/sites/default/files/Shutdown_16022024.pdf | No | No | No | No | No | No | No | Unknown | No | Unknown | Unknown | Yes | Internet services were suspended in 20 police jurisdictions across Bathinda, Fatehgarh Sahib, Mansa, Patiala, Sangrur, SAS Nagar, and Sri Muktsar Sahib Districts in Punjab from 0:00 on Feb. 17 to 23:59 on Feb. 24. | APAC | |||||||||||
85 | Actual | 2/17/2024 | Myanmar | It only affected one city, county, or village | Sittwe city, Rakhine State | Shutdown | Broadband, Mobile | Full network | Military | Military junta | Conflict | Internet and phone lines were cut off by the military council in an area of active conflict | CSO KIO partners | https://engagemedia.org/2024/myanmar-digital-coup-quarterly-february-2024-april-2024/; https://www.tachileik.net/mm/news/35102; https://athanmyanmar.org/myanmar-communication-blackout-2021-to-present/ | Unknown | Unknown | No | No | No | No | No | No | Yes | Yes | Unknown | No | Yes | Unknown | No | Internet services and phone lines were cut off by the military council in Sittwe city, Rakhine State on Feb. 17 in the midst of heavy fighting between the Arakan Army and the junta. After an extended shutdown in January and another on Feb. 11, some service was available on Feb. 16. | APAC | |||||||||||||||
86 | Actual | 2/17/2024 | Pakistan | It affected locations in more than one state, province, or region | Nationwide | Shutdown | Broadband, Mobile | Service-based | Executive government | Ministry of Interior | Information control | X/Twitter was blocked throughout Pakistan | CSO KIO partners | https://explorer.ooni.org/chart/mat?probe_cc=PK&since=2023-09-24&until=2024-09-25&time_grain=day&axis_x=measurement_start_day&test_name=web_connectivity&domain=twitter.com; https://explorer.ooni.org/search?since=2024-02-17&until=2024-02-18&probe_cc=PK&test_name=web_connectivity&domain=twitter.com&failure=true; https://www.nation.com.pk/19-Mar-2024/information-minister-takes-u-turn-admits-x-twitter-services-suspended-in-pakistan; https://x.com/DRM_News/status/1780529965370405077; https://explorer.ooni.org/chart/mat?probe_cc=PK&since=2024-05-20&until=2025-02-20&time_grain=day&axis_x=measurement_start_day&test_name=web_connectivity&domain=twitter.com | Ongoing | National security/ Counter-terrorism | Yes | No | https://www.reuters.com/world/asia-pacific/pakistan-blocked-social-media-platform-x-over-national-security-ministry-says-2024-04-17/ | No | Yes | No | No | No | No | No | Unknown | No | Unknown | Unknown | No | X/Twitter was blocked across Pakistan 9 days after the Feb. 8 election on Feb. 17. Initially, on Mar. 13 the Information Minister Atta Tara denied any issues with X, but later, he admitted it was suspended from before they came into power from the election. On Apr. 17, the Sindh High Court directed the Ministry of Interior to rescind its letter to the Pakistan Telecommunication Authority (PTA) to block the platform. However, measurement data shows the block was active nationwide as of Feb. 2025. | APAC | |||||||||||||
87 | Actual | 2/19/2024 | India | It affected more than one city in the same state, province, or region | Ambala, Fatehabad, Hisar, Jind, Kaithal, Kurukshetra, and Sirsa Districts, Haryana | Shutdown | Mobile | Full network | State government | Government of Haryana, Department of Home Affairs | Protests | Haryana officials extended a shutdown across 7 districts during the ongoing farmers' protest | CSO KIO partners | https://x.com/NetShutdowns/status/1759791140667072982; https://legal.economictimes.indiatimes.com/news/law-policy/shutdown-of-mobile-internet-services-in-7-districts-of-haryana-till-february-20/107890441 | Ended | 2/20/2024 | Fake news/ Hate speech/ Incendiary content/ Promoting violence | Yes | Yes | No | No | No | No | No | Yes | No | Unknown | No | Unknown | Unknown | No | Mobile internet and bulk SMS services were suspended in 7 districts across Haryana for another 24 hours until 23:59 on Feb. 20. | APAC | |||||||||||||
88 | Actual | 2/20/2024 | India | It affected more than one city in the same state, province, or region | Ambala, Fatehabad, Hisar, Jind, Kaithal, Kurukshetra, and Sirsa Districts, Haryana | Shutdown | Mobile | Full network | State government | Government of Haryana, Department of Home Affairs | Protests | Haryana officials extended a shutdown across 7 districts during the ongoing farmers' protest | CSO KIO partners | https://x.com/NetShutdowns/status/1760236762587189610; https://economictimes.indiatimes.com/news/newsblogs/farmers-protest-live-news-today-20-february-msp-law-talks-meeting-update-punjab-delhi-border-live-delhi-chalo-march-latest-news/liveblog/107834993.cms; https://www.independent.co.uk/asia/india/india-farmers-protest-tear-gas-police-b2499834.html; https://www.hrw.org/news/2024/02/29/india-protect-farmers-right-peaceful-protest; https://www.amnesty.org/en/latest/news/2024/02/india-the-price-of-protest-must-not-be-death/ | Ended | 2/21/2024 | Fake news/ Hate speech/ Incendiary content/ Promoting violence | Yes | Yes | No | No | No | No | No | Yes | No | Unknown | No | Yes | Yes | No | Mobile internet and bulk SMS services were suspended in 7 districts across Haryana for another 24 hours until 23:59 on Feb. 21. | APAC | |||||||||||||
89 | Actual | 2/20/2024 | Israel | It affected locations in more than one state, province, or region | Nationwide | Shutdown | Broadband, Mobile | Full network | Non-government | Anonymous Sudan | Conflict | Cyberattack | CSO KIO partners | https://blog.cloudflare.com/q1-2024-internet-disruption-summary/#cyberattacks; https://x.com/DarkWebDispatch/status/1760227609542365329; https://x.com/CloudflareRadar/status/1760250281101525120 | Ended | 2/20/2024 | Sabotage/ Third-party Action | Yes | No | No | No | No | No | No | No | Israel: Hot-Net | No | No | No | No | No | Anonymous Sudan targeted the Hot-Net network in Israel with a cyberattack with the intent of shutting down the internet. The group cited Israel's war on Gaza as the reason for the attack. The shutdown had nationwide impacts and lasted between 8:45pm (UTC+0) until 10:45pm (UTC+0) on Feb. 20. | MENA | |||||||||||||
90 | Actual | 2/21/2024 | India | It affected more than one city in the same state, province, or region | Ambala, Fatehabad, Hisar, Jind, Kaithal, Kurukshetra, and Sirsa Districts, Haryana | Shutdown | Mobile | Full network | State government | Government of Haryana, Department of Home Affairs | Protests | Haryana officials extended a shutdown across 7 districts during the ongoing farmers' protest | CSO KIO partners | https://x.com/NetShutdowns/status/1760548275927843031 | Ended | 2/23/2024 | Fake news/ Hate speech/ Incendiary content/ Promoting violence | Yes | Yes | Government order | https://x.com/NetShutdowns/status/1760548275927843031/photo/1 | No | No | No | No | No | Yes | No | Unknown | No | Unknown | Unknown | No | Mobile internet and bulk SMS services were suspended in 7 districts across Haryana for another 48 hours until 23:59 on Feb. 23. | APAC | |||||||||||
91 | Actual | 2/21/2024 | India | It only affected one city, county, or village | Churachandpur District, Manipur | Shutdown | Broadband, Mobile | Full network | State government | Government of Manipur, Home Department | Communal violence | Clashes between ethnic groups and security forces, including hundreds storming district police offices, led to a continuation of an internet shutdown for the district | CSO KIO partners | https://www.business-standard.com/india-news/manipur-govt-extends-internet-suspension-in-churachandpur-till-feb-26-124022100305_1.html | Ended | 2/26/2024 | Fake news/ Hate speech/ Incendiary content/ Promoting violence | Yes | https://www.business-standard.com/india-news/manipur-govt-extends-internet-suspension-in-churachandpur-till-feb-26-124022100305_1.html | A home department order, issued by Chief Secretary Vineet Joshi, said, "The state government after reviewing the prevailing law and order situation in Churachandpur district decided to continue suspension of internet services and services through VPN throughout the whole revenue jurisdiction of Churachandpur district." | No | No | No | No | No | VPNs | No | No | India: Airtel (Bharti Airtel), India: BSNL, India: Reliance Jio (Reliance Industries), India: Vodafone Idea | Unknown | No | Yes | Unknown | No | Internet services were suspended in Churachandpur District from Feb. 21 to Feb. 26. | APAC | ||||||||||
92 | Actual | 2/21/2024 | Myanmar | It only affected one city, county, or village | Kalay township, Sagaing Division | Shutdown | Mobile | Full network | Military | Military junta | Conflict | Internet and phone lines were cut off by the military council in an area of active conflict | CSO KIO partners | https://engagemedia.org/2024/myanmar-digital-coup-quarterly-february-2024-april-2024/; https://t.me/SggScoutNetwork/52870; https://athanmyanmar.org/myanmar-communication-blackout-2021-to-present/; https://t.me/SggScoutNetwork/53532 | Unknown | Unknown | No | No | No | No | No | No | Yes | Yes | Unknown | No | Unknown | Unknown | No | Mobile internet and phone services were cut off by the military council in southern parts of Kalay township, Sagaing Division on Feb. 21. This continued until at least Mar. 4. | APAC | |||||||||||||||
93 | Estimated | 2/24/2024 | Yemen | It affected locations in more than one state, province, or region | Parts of Lajh and Taiz governorates | Shutdown | Mobile | Full network | Unknown | Unknown | CSO KIO partners | https://almushahid.net/121928/; https://shutdowns.yodet.org/2024 | Unknown | Unknown | No | No | No | No | No | No | Unknown | Unknown | Yemen: Yemen Mobile | Unknown | No | Unknown | Unknown | No | Yemen Mobile was cut off in large areas of Lahj and Taiz governorates in Yemen between Feb. 2024 and at least Apr. 2024. There were reports of US-UK airstrikes in the area in the midst of fighting with the Houthis, but the perpetrator and intent behind the disruption is unclear as there are also many regular cable cuts/sabotages of infrastructure in the country from unknown sources - including at the same time period in 2024 - which could also be the cause. | MENA | ||||||||||||||||
94 | Actual | 2/25/2024 | India | It affected more than one city in the same state, province, or region | 20 police jurisdictions across Bathinda, Fatehgarh Sahib, Mansa, Patiala, Sangrur, SAS Nagar, and Sri Muktsar Sahib Districts, Punjab | Shutdown | Broadband, Mobile | Full network | Executive government | Government of India, Ministry of Home Affairs | Protests | Central government officials extended a shutdown across 7 districts in Punjab during the ongoing farmers' protest | CSO KIO partners | https://www.mha.gov.in/sites/default/files/Internetshutdown_25022024.pdf | Ended | 2/26/2024 | Public safety/ Quell unrest / Restore public order | Yes | Yes | Government order | https://www.mha.gov.in/sites/default/files/Internetshutdown_25022024.pdf | No | No | No | No | No | No | No | Unknown | No | Unknown | Unknown | Yes | Internet services were suspended in 20 police jurisdictions across Bathinda, Fatehgarh Sahib, Mansa, Patiala, Sangrur, SAS Nagar, and Sri Muktsar Sahib Districts in Punjab from 0:00 on Feb. 25 to 23:59 on Feb. 26. | APAC | |||||||||||
95 | Actual | 2/26/2024 | India | It affected more than one city in the same state, province, or region | Beed, Chhatrapati Sambhajinagar, and Jalna Districts, Maharashtra | Shutdown | Unknown | Full network | State government | Protests | Officials suspended internet access in 3 districts preemptively during ongoing protests regarding the Maratha quota | CSO KIO partners | https://x.com/NetShutdowns/status/1762369546772709424; https://theprint.in/india/maratha-quota-agitation-internet-services-suspended-in-3-districts-of-maharashtra/1978880/ | Ended | 2/26/2024 | Unknown | Unknown | No | No | No | No | No | Unknown | Unknown | Unknown | No | No | No | No | Internet services were suspended in Beed, Chhatrapati Sambhajinagar, and Jalna Districts in Maharashtra from 06:00 to 16:00 on Feb. 26. | APAC | |||||||||||||||
96 | Actual | 2/26/2024 | India | It only affected one city, county, or village | Churachandpur District, Manipur | Shutdown | Broadband, Mobile | Full network | State government | Government of Manipur, Home Department | Communal violence | Clashes between ethnic groups and security forces, including hundreds storming district police offices, led to a continuation of an internet shutdown for the district | CSO KIO partners | https://x.com/NetShutdowns/status/1762741287864918077; https://www.msn.com/en-in/news/India/manipur-govt-extends-internet-suspension-in-churachandpur-district-for-another-five-days/ar-BB1iU3U5; https://manipur.gov.in/wp-content/uploads/2024/04/25feb.pdf; https://manipur.gov.in/wp-content/uploads/2024/04/28feb.pdf | Ended | 2/27/2024 | Fake news/ Hate speech/ Incendiary content/ Promoting violence | Yes | Yes | Government order | https://manipur.gov.in/wp-content/uploads/2024/04/25feb.pdf; https://manipur.gov.in/wp-content/uploads/2024/04/28feb.pdf | No | No | No | No | No | VPNs | No | No | India: Airtel (Bharti Airtel), India: BSNL, India: Reliance Jio (Reliance Industries), India: Vodafone Idea | Unknown | No | Yes | Unknown | No | Internet services were suspended in Churachandpur District from 01:40 on Feb. 26 until Feb. 27. The original order called for a shutdown until Mar. 2, but another order shortened the duration. | APAC | |||||||||
97 | Actual | 2/28/2024 | India | It only affected one city, county, or village | Sadar Ambala, Panjokhera, Naggal police jurisdictions, Ambala District, Haryana | Shutdown | Mobile | Full network | State government | Government of Haryana, Department of Home Affairs | Protests | Haryana officials imposed another shutdown in parts of Ambala during the ongoing farmers' protest | CSO KIO partners | https://x.com/NetShutdowns/status/1762721259887247795; https://www.livemint.com/news/india/internet-suspended-in-parts-of-haryana-on-february-28-29-amid-farmers-protest-11709037496538.html | Ended | 2/29/2024 | Fake news/ Hate speech/ Incendiary content/ Promoting violence | Yes | Yes | Government order | https://x.com/NetShutdowns/status/1762721259887247795/photo/1 | No | No | No | No | No | Yes | No | Unknown | No | Unknown | Unknown | Yes | Mobile internet and bulk SMS services were suspended in multiple police jurisdictions of Ambala from 00:01 on Feb. 28 to 23:59 on Feb. 29. | APAC | |||||||||||
98 | Actual | 2/28/2024 | India | It affected more than one city in the same state, province, or region | 4 police jurisdictions across Patiala and Sangrur Districts, Punjab | Shutdown | Broadband, Mobile | Full network | Executive government | Government of India, Ministry of Home Affairs | Protests | Central government officials extended a shutdown across 2 districts in Punjab during the ongoing farmers' protest | CSO KIO partners | https://www.mha.gov.in/sites/default/files/InternetShutdown_27022024.pdf | Ended | 3/1/2024 | Public safety/ Quell unrest / Restore public order | Yes | Yes | Government order | https://www.mha.gov.in/sites/default/files/InternetShutdown_27022024.pdf | No | No | No | No | No | No | No | Unknown | No | Unknown | Unknown | Yes | Internet services were suspended in 4 police jurisdictions across Patiala and Sangrur Districts in Punjab from 0:00 on Feb. 28 to 23:59 on Mar. 1. | APAC | |||||||||||
99 | Actual | 2/28/2024 | Chad | It affected locations in more than one state, province, or region | Nationwide | Shutdown | Broadband, Mobile | Full network | Executive government | Political instability | The internet was shut down across the country multiple times as tensions and violence rose between political parties ahead of planned elections | CSO KIO partners | https://x.com/CloudflareRadar/status/1763605292481179944; https://radar.cloudflare.com/traffic/td?dateStart=2024-02-27&dateEnd=2024-03-08; https://x.com/IODA_live/status/1763226686487679026; https://pulse.internetsociety.org/shutdowns/internet-connectivity-disrupted-in-chad-amidst-unrest; https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2024/2/28/chad-announces-several-deaths-after-foiled-intelligence-office-attack; https://www.hrw.org/news/2024/03/01/chad-prominent-opposition-leader-killed | Ended | 3/7/2024 | Unknown | No | No | No | No | No | No | Unknown | Yes | Chad: Airtel (Bharti Airtel), Chad: Societe-Digital, Chad: Sudatchad, Chad: Tigo (Millicom) | Unknown | No | Yes | Unknown | No | The internet was shutdown across Chad four times between Feb. 28 and Mar. 7 in the midst of violence between political parties and a security force deployment in N'Djamena. A prominent opposition leader, Yaya Dillo, was also killed during an exchange of gunfire, during which the internet and telephone lines were cut off. The first disruption was from 9:45 on Feb. 28 until 17:00 on Mar. 1, the second disruption was from 1:00 to 2:00 on Mar. 3, the third disruption was from 23:45 on Mar. 3 to 6:45 on Mar. 4, and the fourth disruption was from 1:30 to 7:00 on Mar. 7 (all times UTC+0). | Africa | ||||||||||||||
100 | Actual | 3/1/2024 | Myanmar | It affected more than one city in the same state, province, or region | Kachin State | Shutdown | Broadband, Mobile | Full network | Military | Military junta | Conflict | Internet and phone lines were cut off by the military council in an area of active conflict | CSO KIO partners | https://burmese.voanews.com/a/no-phone-service-in-kachin-cities/7509705.html; https://athanmyanmar.org/myanmar-communication-blackout-2021-to-present/; https://engagemedia.org/2024/myanmar-digital-coup-quarterly-february-2024-april-2024/ | Unknown | Unknown | No | No | No | No | No | No | Yes | Yes | Myanmar: MPT, Myanmar: Mytel, Myanmar: Ooredoo | Unknown | No | Yes | Unknown | No | Internet services and phone lines were cut off throughout Kachin State by the military council beginning around 11:00 to 12:00 local time on Mar. 1. This shutdown occurred in the midst of escalating clashes between Kachin Independence Army and junta forces. | APAC |