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01/02/2025Muzaffar Ali (Faculty, Islamic University of Science and Technology), Richa Shukla (Faculty, IIT Bhubaneswar), Mansi Rathour (Faculty, Jindal Law School)Absent Women Philosophers from Past to Present in Indian Thought: Ṛṣikās, Sarojini Naidu, and Jaishree OdinThis essay seeks to retrace, retrieve, recover, and reclaim the voices of women thinkers and philosophers throughout the history of Indian philosophy. The aim is to initiate a discussion on the conventional and ‘malestream’ character of established knowledge in philosophy. We focus on a few women thinkers to underline the fact that by acknowledging and elevating their previously erased and marginalized works, an alternative, and enriched, trajectory of the entire philosophical corpus of Indian thought is possible. To create a slice of such an alternate trajectory, we discuss the contributions of Ṛṣikās (women sages), Sarojini Naidu, and Jaishree Odin in the ancient, modern, and contemporary domains of Indian philosophy to argue and underline that these otherwise erased and absent women are thinking-beings actively involved in the give and take of philosophical progress in the Indian context.
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08/02/2025Shivendra Vikram Singh (Post-doctoral Fellow, Panjab University)Bhartrihari on the identity of language and thoughtThis paper explores the philosophical contributions of Indian grammarian Bhartrihari regarding the intrinsic relationship between language and thought, juxtaposing his views with contemporary findings in cognitive science. A recent paper published in Nature by Evelina Fedorenko, Steven T. Piantadosi, and Edward A. F. Gibson (2024) argues that language primarily functions as a tool for communication rather than as a necessity for thought, thereby challenging the notion that cognition is inherently linguistic. This revival of the debate on the distinction and unity between language and thought invites reconsideration of classical perspectives. Bhartrihari, through his seminal work Vākyapadīya, asserts that language (śabda) and thought (citta) are inseparably intertwined, contending that linguistic cognition constitutes an integral part of human consciousness. This paper critically examines Bhartrihari’s non-dualistic view, contrasting it with the communicative model posited by contemporary Western scholars. By engaging with arguments and counterarguments from both Indian and Western philosophical traditions, the paper highlights the limitations of reducing language to a mere instrument of communication. The novel contribution of this study lies in demonstrating how Bhartrihari’s metaphysical insights prefigure and address contemporary cognitive theories, fostering a cross-cultural dialogue between classical Indian linguistic philosophy and modern philosophy of mind. This interdisciplinary analysis not only reaffirms the enduring relevance of Bhartrihari’s thought but also suggests that language, far from being a secondary tool, is essential to conceptualization and articulation. The paper concludes by advocating for further inquiry into the linguistic nature of cognition, offering new perspectives for the intersection of metaphysics and cognitive science.
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15/02/2025Kshitish Sharma (PhD scholar, IITISM, Dhanbad)Panpsychism and Individuation: A Mādhva Gauḍīya Vedānta
Perspective on Consciousness		In the Mādhva Gauḍīya Vedānta, Paramātmā is envisioned as an all-pervading, omniscient
consciousness that underlies and unifies all existence, while Jīvātmā represents individual,
distinct consciousnesses within each sentient being. The tradition asserts that while Paramātmā and Jīvātmā are qualitatively similar, they are quantitatively different—Paramātmā is infinite and all-encompassing, whereas Jīvātmā is finite and localised. This dual consciousness model, supported by scriptural analogies like the “two birds on the same tree” metaphor from the Muṇḍaka Upaniṣad, conceptualises individual consciousness as coexistent with, yet distinct from, universal consciousness. This view, often referred to as “distinct yet dependent,” posits that the Jīvātmā relies on Paramātmā for its existence and sustenance without compromising its individuality.(Dasa 2016).
The Mādhva Gauḍīya approach, thus, does not attempt to merge individual consciousnesses
into a single, undivided whole, as seen in some monistic traditions; rather, it upholds an eternal plurality where personal and universal consciousnesses coexist within a relational hierarchy. This framework addresses panpsychism’s individuation problem by suggesting that individual subjectivity is an intrinsic, irreducible aspect of existence, eternally distinct from, yet inextricably linked to, the cosmic consciousness of Paramātmā. The implications of this model extend beyond the metaphysics of consciousness, offering a novel approach to the mind-matter relationship and the nature of subjective experience about an ultimate reality.
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22/02/2025Chaitanya Joshi (University of Hyderabad) and Brijesh Chandra Tripathi ( Jyoti Dalal School of Liberal Arts, NMIMS)Early Academic as Incremental Academic: Challenges in Attaining a Thriving
Academic Career in Indian Universities		The Universities in India have been studied primarily at macro level with focus on their constitution, regulation and top-down relation with constituents. This paper tries to fill the void of embedded study of faculty’s engagement in the universities as significant stakeholders by extracting from eight qualitative semi-structured interviews, textual analysis of secondary sources and unstructured conversations with early career academics. We highlight that aspirations of being an academic agent built during PhD days or even prior to this phase are obstructed by several roadblocks in the form of excessive teaching workload, and administrative work. Shrinking institutional spaces for research and publications lead to the moderate growth of agents’ academic careers contrary to their aspirations making them ‘incremental academic’. We argue that agents resist the identity of incremental academic by deploying transformation strategies like stealing time from social and personal space, and prioritising publishing from PhD work to enhance academic capital.
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01/03/2025Ashitha M.S. University of Hyderabad)Mind, Supervenience, and Autonomous Mental Dysfunctions: A Critical AnalysisWhether mental disorders are brain disorders remains a contentious issue despite the growing optimism that contemporary psychiatry places in establishing mental disorders are nothing but brain disorders. Popular arguments defending the position that mental disorders are not brain disorders often make use of an analogy between mind-brain and software-hardware relation. The analogy posits that, just as a software may malfunction in the absence of any malfunctions in the hardware, mind can have dysfunction even in the absence of brain dysfunctions. Recent literature refutes the analogy, showing that mind and brain does not have different functions unlike software and hardware. Since all functions of mind are the naturally selected effects of the brain, mental dysfunctions are necessarily brain dysfunctions. Maintaining the natural dysfunction account of disorders, it follows that mental disorders are brain disorders. While the disanalogy can be granted, the claim that mental disorders are brain disorders needs substantiation that falls outside the scope of what the selection history can explain. I show that the attribution of dysfunction to brain states/processes in cases of mental dysfunctions is not justified solely by the supervenience of mind on brain. In doing so I also argue that the claim that mental disorders are brain disorders, as a metaphysical hypothesis, is trivial.
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15/03/2025Sania Ismaliee (Faculty, BML Munjal University)Lessons from and for the Family Law Reform DebateThe Uniform Civil Code (UCC) debate in India has spanned seventy-seven years with minimal progress. This paper delves into Indian Political Theory (IPT) discourses surrounding the UCC debate, focusing on arguments rooted in secularism and gender justice. At its core, the UCC debate revolves around replacing India's diverse family law regime, based on tribal and religious affiliations, with a single, uniform code applicable to all citizens.
The IPT discourse (Dhagamwar 1989; Bhargava 1998, 2010; Chandhoke 1999, 2017; Agnes 2011, 2017; Menon 2017, 2023; Narain 2007; Parashar 2008) often frames the UCC debate within the context of Muslim Personal Law, juxtaposing concerns about Hindu majoritarianism with those about Muslim "backwardness." Proponents of the UCC argue that a uniform code is vital for promoting national integration, gender justice, and secularism. Conversely, opponents contend that the UCC would erode the rights of Muslim minorities and infringe upon their religious freedom. Furthermore, they argue that the UCC has been coopted by Hindutva nationalists, making it imperative to distance oneself from it.
I contend that existing IPT responses to the UCC debate are marred by a profound methodological flaw. These responses rely on what I call "contingent contextual considerations," such as the political undertones of the UCC, its implications for Muslim minorities, and statements from religious organizations. These considerations have led to a polarized debate, with proponents and opponents engaging in a dialogue of the deaf.
In contrast to existing IPT discourses, this paper proposes an abstract, principled approach to the UCC debate. I pose the question: what are the normative justifications for and against a uniform or diverse family law regime? Utilizing Sune Laegaard's (2019) concept of "critical distance," I diagnose IPT discourses on the UCC and transcend the deeply contextualist reasoning that has led to an impasse in the debate. I argue that focusing on contingent facts, such as the ruling government or the situation of Muslim minorities, provides little guidance on fundamental principles. I argue that the question of whether a uniform family law regime is preferable to a diverse one must be resolved through principled reasoning. Further, I argue that certain versions of secularism offer the most compelling principled arguments in favor of the UCC. Additionally, I demonstrate that pro-UCC arguments grounded in gender justice are, in essence, arguments rooted in secularism. Recognizing this helps to shift the conversation beyond the twin poles of Hindutva politics and Muslim personal law. By adopting this perspective, I reframe the starting point of the UCC debate.
By maintaining a “critical distance” from the immediate political context, this research provides a foundation for further examination of the UCC debate on principled grounds. Ultimately, this paper seeks to contribute to a more nuanced understanding of the complex issues surrounding the UCC debate. By providing a framework for further examination of the debate on principled grounds, this research aims to facilitate a more constructive and informed discussion about the UCC, culminating in better policy solutions.
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22/03/2025Sreejith K. K. (Vidyasagar University, West Bengal)A Critique of Greco’s Defense of Virtue EpistemologyVirtue epistemology stands as one of the most influential frameworks in contemporary epistemology, positing that knowledge constitutes a cognitive achievement credited to the epistemic agent. However, this position faces formidable objections. A particularly compelling challenge, advanced by Jennifer Lackey and others, contends that virtue epistemology fails to accommodate testimonial knowledge, thereby rendering it an unduly restrictive and deficient account of knowledge. This paper critically engages with John Greco’s prominent response to this objection, arguing that his defense deviates from the core tenets of virtue epistemology as traditionally conceived. Furthermore, it contends that the 'pragmatic features of knowledge' upon which Greco’s argument relies are not necessary for knowledge. Consequently, the paper concludes that Greco’s response does not succeed in salvaging virtue epistemology from this objection.
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05/04/2025Andrea Raimondi (Faculty, Thapar University)Depressive ThinkingIn this paper, we articulate a cognitive phenomenology of depression. Contemporary phenomenological accounts of psychopathology have overwhelmingly construed depression as a disorder of mood. On this prevailing view, depression is (i) fundamentally a disorder of passivity and (ii) primarily a disturbance of mood rather than cognition–with depressive “states” occurring prior to any cognitive components involved (Ratcliffe 2015:34; inter alia). This status quo has allegedly deep roots (Heidegger, 1962; 1982; Kraepelin, 1883; 1909-15; 1929), and continues to exert considerable influence across phenomenological discourse (see Ratcliff 2015; Fuchs, 2013; inter alia). While this mood-centered framework captures much of the clinical and phenomenological data, it does not capture all of it. We argue that certain first-person experiences of depression resist assimilation into the (i-iii) schema, revealing a cognitive structure that cannot be reduced to mere affective disturbance. We propose a cognitive phenomenology of depression that accounts for these experiences, challenging the assumption that depressive cognition is secondary or derivative. A more precise understanding of depression, we contend, requires recognizing the fundamental role of cognitive experience in shaping the disorder’s phenomenology.
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10/04/2025Priya Sharma (Faculty, TAPMI Bengaluru)Whose Ethos? A Case of Indian Surrogacy Law and Its Moral BedrockThis paper reflects on the moral underpinnings of the Indian government’s decision to regulate “ethical altruistic surrogacy” and ban the “exploitative commercial surrogacy” through The Surrogacy (Regulation) Act, 2021. Under this law only Indian (and Indian origin) married infertile heterosexual couples and widowed and divorced women, with certain further eligibility criteria, can avail of altruistic gestational surrogacy. Traversing this law’s journey through the parliament, this chapter aims to answer two primary questions: Is altruistic surrogacy, in principle, an ethical alternative to commercial surrogacy, and whose ethos eventually reflect in the law? It undertakes both a conceptual and empirical analysis and unpacks how the justification of altruistic surrogacy and its ethicality in the law relies on carving a specific moral identity of a surrogate mother and then compares it with the moral identity that the surrogate mothers themselves identify with. The chapter then briefly explores the support to the ban on commercial surrogacy and engages with varied ways in which the reproductive justice framework has featured in this debate. The ethical analysis presented in this chapter sheds light on whose ethos are ultimately reflected through this law and reveals the unethical and unjust assumptions behind, and ramifications of, this law.
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26/04/2025Michael Hatcher (FLAME University, Pune)Prayer in the PeripheryPaul tells us to “pray without ceasing” (1 Th. 5:17). The verse has inspired many. But it is also puzzling. Given our limitations and responsibilities, it does not seem possible to pray without ceasing, at least not without flouting sufficiently weighty reasons to do otherwise.

In previous work, I argued prayer is either speaking to God or listening for him. In this paper, I explore whether it is possible to listen for God without ceasing in the periphery of consciousness while also doing everything else needful and desirable. In particular, I develop a reply to a dilemma arising from the fact that the periphery can be divided into the context, which impacts how the central object of attention (the center) is experienced, and the margin, which does not. (Aron Gurwitsch appears to be the origin of the distinction; it is also advanced by Sven Arvidson.) The dilemma is this: Since the margin has no impact on how the center appears, it is unclear how marginal activity could promote one’s noticing God’s voice. On the other hand, a contextual activity could promote this, but such activities are too cognitively demanding to be feasible to do without ceasing.
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Semester Break
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30/08/2025Danish Hamid (Independent Scholar, PhD from IIT Bombay)Ambedkar, Huxley and the Reconstruction of Natural RightThis paper reconstructs B.R. Ambedkar’s moral philosophy through the lens of Classical Natural Right, emphasizing his unique engagement with manuski or human dignity. It argues that against the dehumanizing caste system and authoritarian ideologies of his time, Ambedkar advanced an ethical rationalism that rejected both cultural relativism and divine command theories. Drawing on Thomas H. Huxley’s Evolution and Ethics (1893), Ambedkar adopts a model of the psychically divided individual to reject both caste-bound moralities and evolutionary ethics that conflate fitness and survival with moral worth. Through close readings of Ambedkar’s published and unpublished writings, the paper contrasts his view with what has been called Darwinian Natural Right (notably Arnhart 1998), while also differentiating the nature of Ambedkar’s ethics from classical natural right and natural law. “Huxleyan Natural Right” provides Ambedkar with a secular, evolutionary basis for human dignity, where reason retrains instinct and affirms obligations toward the weak and vulnerable, portraying morality as an artificial cultural achievement that counters nature’s “cosmic process.”. Ambedkar’s critique of caste, his defense of Dalit rights, and his reconstruction of Buddhism are all interpreted as exemplifying this moral framework. In insisting that justice requires the protection of the least advantaged, Ambedkar seeks to universalize the struggle for Dalit dignity into a broader humanist ethic. His philosophy thus represents a modern recovery of Natural Right while eschewing untenable metaphysical categories like teleology.
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13/09/2025Joshua Fernandes (RV University, Bengaluru)Coordinated bodily movements: A Nyāya perspective on action theoryIn his Tattvacintāmaṇi, the Nyāya philosopher Gaṅgeśa (14th century CE) presents a debate with a rationally constructed Mīmāṃsa opponent on the dimension of the manas (internal sense organ). For the Mīmāṃsaka, the manas is ubiquitous (vibhu), whereas for the Naiyāyika, it is atomic (aṇu). Both atomic and ubiquitous substances are partless. Atomic substances move, whereas ubiquitous substances do not. The Mīmāmsaka poses an action-related query: if the manas is atomic, then the body's activities would be absurdly limited to an atomic corporeal region. Alternatively, if it permeates every portion of the body, components that aren't meant to be acted upon would also act. They enquire as to how we manage to simultaneously move all of our fingers and toes. The first of Gaṅgeśa's two related responses introduces desire (cikīrṣa) as the regulator of the body's movement. Second, he asserts that the location of the physical action's consequence limits effort. According to Phillips and Tatacharya (2009), Gaṅgeśa's responses are inadequate since he transitions from manas to desire, suggesting that he is not confident about his own views. In this paper, I argue that the atomic manas still plays a role in bodily acts, based on a criticism made by Uddyotakara (6th century CE) of Pakṣilasvāmin Vātsyāyana (4th century CE) in his reading of Nyāya Sūtra 3.1.8-11 regarding whether the visual sense faculties are one or two. Vātsyāyana contends that there are two visual sense faculties, but Uddyotakara maintains that there is only one as an atomic manas cannot simultaneously connect two sense faculties. By demonstrating how the two arguments relate to one another, I extend Gaṅgeśa's thesis and present how the conceptual reconstruction addresses some of the Mīmāmsaka's concerns.
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27/09/2025Amit Anurag (Flame University, Bengaluru)Are Events Fiction?Both events and processes are occurrents- they occur or take place. However, they are metaphysically distinct. Events are completed occurrences: they are seen in their entirety, and are therefore conceptually extended in time. Processes are ongoing occurrences and they are not extended temporally (Stout, 2016). The talk presupposes a three-dimensionalist account of time and defends a monist view of persistence, i.e., different concrete entities cannot have different modes of persistence- either everything is extended in time or nothing is extended in time (Merricks, 1995). Since three-dimensionalism is presupposed in the talk, nothing is extended in time. Therefore, if events are conceptually extended in time, they cannot be real. Nevertheless, event talks are useful, so they are ineliminable. Fictionalism is a strategy often applied to a problematic domain of discourse, where one does not try to establish the truth of the content of the discourse but instead treats it as akin to fiction. The strategy has been applied in mathematics, modality, religion, morality, and more recently in philosophy of time. However, fictionalism about events is a novel proposal. The talk argues that if time and space are not extensionally analogous, then events-as distinguished from processes-are best understood as some sort of fiction. It concludes with the proposal that all event talks are assertions of processes.
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11/10/2025Ankita Jha (Faculty, IISER Bhopal) and Abhishek Yadav (Faculty, IIT Indore)Enhanced Saliency View: A Simpler Solution to Shifted ReferenceThere have been many attempts to present a comprehensive account of the phenomena of reference-shifting of indexicals. The phenomena of reference-shifting of indexicals is seen as a major problem for the Kaplanian semantics among other philosophical issues. Most of the proposed solutions to explain reference-shifting of indexicals try to uphold some of the traditional assumptions of the Kaplanian framework of indexicals. Atkin (2006) proposes a few counter-examples where pure indexicals refer to a different aspect traditionally (in Kaplanian Semantics) not tied to them. These counter-examples present a critique for all such proposed accounts. However, Atkin's criticism has largely gone unnoticed in the available philosophical literature on reference-shifting. In this paper, we attempt to do the following. We highlight the issues raised by Atkin vis-à-vis one of the leading semantic accounts of reference-shifting of indexicals by Briciu (2018, 2024). We present some further counter-examples to show why the criticisms raised by Atkin are significant and still apply to the major referential theories of indexical semantics. We propose, what we call the Enhanced Saliency View (henceforth ESV) that can be obtained by modifying Mount's (2015) convergence of perspectives approach, as a comprehensive solution to the phenomena of the reference-shifting of indexicals like 'l', 'here' and 'now'. The ESV as a solution to shifted reference provides us with an understanding of the semantics and logic of indexicals in the context of how conversations involving indexical use actually occur.
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