No, I would like to continue to the next section

Although I support the plan to recommend to the Board the first 2 ranked mechanisms, for the Board to decide, however I think the report should disclose how much support each of the two most supported mechanisms received so it is clear which one received more support. It is also critically important is that the Board respects/follows the 3 objectives defined by the CCWG for the use of funds without deviation or modification as listed in section 4.4 and the clarifications provided to the last objective; the criteria listed for selection as described in section 4.5 and the recommendations were consensus was reached as well as the guidelines for implementation described in the report. A clear directive from the Board about adhering to the guidelines and criteria will be paramount for a smooth implementation process.

I support the modifications proposed, in particular the establishment of an Independent Project Applications Evaluation Panel.
I also would like to emphasize that although the CCWG didn't reach consensus about the maximum overhead to use for the administration/management of the program it self, as the CCWG didn't have realistic cost estimations, it is crucial that the management of the grants -independent of the mechanism- is conducted efficiently on a maximum of 10 to 15% of the auction proceeds pool, so that at least 85% of the funds in the auction proceeds pool directly benefit the community projects selected. That is really key to make sure no matter what the mechanism selected is, the community benefit remains the most important aspect of funds allocation. That should include staff, operational support, platforms and processes for decision making.

I believe the discussions from the CCWG were comprehensive and provided clear guidance for the implementation of the selected mechanism. It is really important that during the implementation, this report, the deliberations of the CCWG and its recommendations are followed and the implementation team/process does not modify the objectives and follows all guidelines and recommendations.

No, I would like to continue to the next section

This is an individual Submission by Judith Hellerstein.

I appreciate the opportunity to comment on the second report on the gTLD Auction Proceeds. I have been following this issue closely. While I think that Mechanism C, a separate Foundation is the best one, I can understand that it brings extra costs and many of the same advantages are available with Mechanism B. I strongly believe that having an external department working with an internal department within ICANN is the best choice. Selecting an external organization that has been working in the field of grant disbursal is the best option as this group will have much experience in selecting select projects, disbursement of funds, control of the progress of each project and could hit the ground running while an internal department will take time to get set up and go ahead at running speed. In Mechanism B clearly defined roles and responsibilities will be negotiated between ICANN org and the chosen non-profit to ensure how these roles are carried out operationally. These roles and responsibilities will be contractually based and binding. Additionally, once the money has been spent, then the contract with the external group can be terminated. The ICANN staff assigned to this assignment are fewer and are likely to have additional responsibilities already in ICANN so can go back to doing just those responsibilities.

Mechanism B is the most cost-effective solution and leaves to ICANN the responsibilities of supervising financial control and administrative processes. Additionally, once the money has been spent, then the contract with the external group can be terminated. The ICANN staff assigned to this assignment are fewer and are likely to have additional responsibilities already in ICANN so can go back to doing just those responsibilities. If at any time, ICANN is unhappy with the evaluations of this external group, another group could be selected to take over this role.

In Mechanism B, a suitable existing non-profit organization would already have applicable safeguards in place. A legally binding contract with a non-profit will ensure that the independence of the selection and allocation of resources for identified projects is maintained. Furthermore, once the money has been spent, the contract with the external group can be terminated. The process of terminating hired staff is an expensive and time-consuming prospect

Mechanism A would require an internal (not small) organization to disbursement of funds and the possibility of a conflict of interest is very high. It will also come at a cost, which I feel is much higher in the long run than hiring an external organization as envisioned in Mechanism B. In Mechanism A, ICANN Org could use the Auction funds to run their department according to what they determined was the level of expenditure required with no external oversight. While in Mechanism B, there is external oversight.

I think independence from ICANN Org needs to be our primary concern. I feel that under Mechanism A, there are issues of transparency, trust, accountability, and assurance that funds will not be used for purposes other than the chosen projects and any minimal administrative costs the administration of these funds. Mechanism A also could also create a conflict of interest when funds that are earmarked for philanthropic purposes could possibly be used to support ICANN activities, where budgets exceed their original expectations.

I also support the creation of a standing committee -renewable at each round of projects and that projects should not be able to request more than 10-20 % of the available funds in each tranche. This will increase the diversity of the projects that are selected. We feel that this approach will allow for increased transparency and accountability.

I agree with the CCWG-Auction Proceeds decision on Recommendation #2. I strongly believe that there needs to be an Independent Project Applications Evaluation Panel to review and evaluate all proposals. The Panel’s responsibility will be to evaluate and select project applications. I am also in strong agreement that neither the Board nor Staff will be making decisions on individual applications. Members of the Independent Project Applications Evaluation Panel should not be selected based on their affiliation or representation but instead selected based on their grant-making expertise, ability to demonstrate independence over time, and relevant knowledge.

I also strongly support of Recommendation #3 and agree with how the CCWG-Auction Proceeds has defined the objectives of new gTLD Auction Proceeds fund allocation

• Benefit the development, distribution, evolution and structures/projects that support the Internet's unique identifier systems;
• Benefit capacity building and underserved populations, or;
• Benefit the open and interoperable Internet (see Annex C of the report for the complete definition of this statement

I also support recommendations 4 through 6 and recommendations 9-12.

On Recommendation 8, I do not believe that ICANN ORG should be able to participate in Auction Proceeds but I am not as clear on whether one of the representative bodies within one of the ICANN Constituencies, if they are legal entities in their own right, or whether an ALS which exists in its own right as a legal entity can submit a request provided that all applications meet the stipulated conditions and requirements, including legal and fiduciary requirements.

No, I wish to continue to the next section

Centrabit doo and Centrabit AG

No, I would like to continue to the next section

a) The interests of the internet users are not met by ICANN exaggerated taxing of users. Positivt technical development will occur with or without 20 MUSD in to your organization.
b) The fact that the proposition does not even primarily serve ICANN but the monetary interests of a few monopolist corporations imply corruption. It should be your first priority to avoid behaviour that implies corruption.

Yes, they do not recitify the above-mentioned two problems.

No, I wish to continue to the next section

No, I would like to continue to the next section

No, I believe that there's no cause to raise prices, and it will only serve to hurt everyday people.

I believe that raising the price of .com domain registration will adversely affect people like me who want to own their own place on the internet, but can't afford exorbitant fees.

Without competition, there's no alternative I can turn to to register my .com domain.

No, I wish to continue to the next section

Sam Demetriou (RySG Vice Chair, Policy)

gTLD Registries Stakeholder Group (RySG)

Comments submitted on behalf of the gTLD Registries Stakeholder Group (RySG). In the interest of time, we did not conduct a vote on these comments. We did discuss them on our mailing list and during a biweekly conference call, and no member opposed their submission.
Please feel free to contact me with any questions or concerns.

No, I would like to continue to the next section

In our comments on the CCWG’s Initial Report, the RySG did not express a preference for an individual mechanism, but rather offered some suggestions for the principles that the chosen mechanism should follow. We were encouraged to see that some of those recommendations were reflected in Recommendations #5 and #6 of the Final Report, which describe conflict of interest provisions and auditing requirements, respectively. At this point, the RySG still does not have a strong preference for the specific mechanism, and therefore does not oppose the CCWG’s Recommendation #1.

The RySG does not have concerns about the updates the CCWG has made. We appreciate the additional detail and information around each of the mechanisms in sections 4 and 5, and support the inclusion of the recommendation around establishing an Independent Project Applications Evaluation Panel. The latter accords with our earlier comments on the CCWG’s Initial Reports.

Regarding Recommendation #8, the RySG believes that the disbursement of auction proceeds should not exclude ICANN Org or its constituent parts as a potential beneficiary. There are a number of initiatives that ICANN Org or its constituent groups may wish to pursue that meet all of the stated criteria, and therefore should not be barred wholesale from submitting proposals.

No, I wish to continue to the next section

The RySG would like to reiterate the following comment that it submitted in response to the CCWG’s Initial Report:
“Lastly, we think that the CCWG should be implemented in such a way that permits continued and efficient allocation of funds that become available in the future. This would support ICANN’s commitment to transparency and consistency.”

ICANN Business Constituency (BC)

ICANN Business Constituency (BC)

No, I would like to continue to the next section

The BC recommends that the final report be amended to require an independent feasibility study to compare the costs of mechanisms A and B and to ensure that the empowered community retains oversight of the disbursement of the auction proceeds.

The BC is concerned that mechanism A will result in increased costs to ICANN. This concern stems from the requirement in mechanism A that ICANN org build internal resources to choose the grant recipients, in addition to administering the grant making process. We believe that CCWG recommendation #9 supports the proposition that the solution chosen should be cost effective. The BC also notes that on page 12 of the Final Report, ICANN org has provided input that mechanism A (and C) will require increased staffing. Further, the Board’s input, as set out in paragraph 4.6 on page 16 of the Final Report emphasizes the need for an “efficient…mechanism” and “[p]reservation of resources, both of which support, at a minimum, the independent feasibility study proposed by the BC.

The BC’s recommendation is based on the following financial and operational considerations in mechanism B:

• Mechanism B leverages the knowledge of experts in the grant making process, and does not require that expertise to be developed, or acquired, by ICANN org.
• Mechanism B provides ICANN with greater flexibility since it can be scaled up and scaled down quickly. This benefit is important since auction proceeds are limited. Because of this, there will not be a continuing need to have internal staff dedicated to the administration of the disbursal of auction proceeds. Current ICANN staff have the expertise to administer the organizational aspects of Mechanism B.
• Mechanism B provides greater organizational distance between ICANN this helps mitigate risk of an arm-in-arm transaction.

The BC is also concerned that the final recommendation does not contain sufficient detail to ensure that the empowered community retains the ability to oversee ICANNs proposed budget and the disbursement of the auction proceeds. In particular, the Empowered Community should retain its ability to enforce accountability mechanisms related to items in the ICANN budget that are proposed to be allocated to grant making activity. The Final Report should also clarify that any changes to the bylaws needed to implement the report are not intended to strip the Empowered Community of its budgetary authority.

The BC is pleased to comment on the Proposed Final Report of the new gTLD Auction Proceeds CCWG and hereby commend the Working Group for the dedication put into the work leading to the production of the proposed Final Report. The BC notes that the CCWG has already recognized that ByLaws must be amended to eliminate Request for Reconsideration and Independent Review Panel from the available remedies to challenge grants. These are amendments to Fundamental By-Laws and which should require Empowered Community approval.

We believe sending the grant money to a third party professional grant-making organization reflects a much better arm’s length practice in terms of risk management. We also note that ICANN has made it clear that
(a) it does not abrogate oversight responsibility within its limited mission and
(b) it will only be releasing portions of the Auction Proceeds in “tranches” over time.

With respect to risk management, we note in the report as recommended that the funds, which are to be dispersed using an Independent Expert Panel as evaluators, may not be used for matters currently covered in the ICANN budget.

Whichever mechanism is chosen, ICANN Org should ensure that the mechanism is maintained so it can be re-activated if and when additional proceeds need to be allocated.

No, I wish to continue to the next section

No, I would like to continue to the next section

The RrSG prefers mechanism A as set forth in Recommendation #1 and offers specific comments regarding the following proposed mechanisms and other CCWG Recommendations.

Proposed Mechanisms A-C

1. Mechanism A (Internal ICANN Department) and Mechanism B (ICANN + External
Organization)

Both Mechanisms A and B would require the creation of a new department within ICANN
Org to perform work that is clearly outside the scope of ICANN Org’s mission. ICANN’s
mission is clear: “to ensure the stable and secure operation of the Internet's unique
identifier systems.” The RrSG fails to see how grant management falls within that
mission.

Further, ICANN Org’s expertise does not lend itself to grant management. While the
CCWG points to ICANN Staff’s ability to support public relations, external content, audit,
legal, and investment activities, the RrSG suggests that this may be a significant
assumption in at least some areas, as the (for example) legal and investment issues
ICANN Org must address today are substantially different from that of a grant funding
organization. The synergies that could be created by using Mechanism A or B in no way
override the fact that these activities are not within ICANN Org’s mission.

The RrSG would also like to point out that ICANN Org’s current mission requires
significant work effort from the ICANN Board, ICANN Org, and the entire ICANN
community - a work effort that is already strained to maximum capacity and requires
continued focus.

Although the RrSG has some reservations about creating another department within ICANN org (and the resulting concerns over inefficiencies or mission creep), if it is done so in a planned and time-limited manner with direct community oversight, Mechanism A is the preferred option of the RrSG. For the reasons detailed below for Mechanism C, the RrSG does not support Mechanism B.

2. Mechanism C (ICANN Foundation)

While Mechanism C would involve creation of a new charitable structure separate from
ICANN and additional upfront costs, this option, above all others, most lends itself to
protections against self-dealing and will ensure measures are taken to avoid conflict of
interest. The very separate mission of this grant management work requires separate
governance. Additionally, given the temporary nature of the auction proceeds, having a
separate structure will make closing down the structure a more simple process. For
example, part of the structure of this separate entity could be that employees are
contracted for X period of time and must have expertise in Y. Employees of the new
structure should not be current or prior ICANN employees.

The RrSG, however, has concerns that Mechanism C could become a permanent institution, running the risk that it could be subject to capture, bloat, and waste. It should not be a permanent institution, and any recommendation for this should ensure proper safeguards to avoid these undesirable outcomes.

The Registrar Stakeholder Group (RrSG) is pleased to comment on the Proposed Final Report of the new gTLD Auction Proceeds Cross Community Working Group. However, the RrSG notes that the changes between the initial report and the proposed final report do not incorporate the feedback the RrSG provided in December 2018. The comments from the RrSG provided at that time still apply.

The RrSG would like to reiterate its remarks from its previous comment:

The RrSG generally supports CCWG Recommendation #2, but with the qualifiers addressed below regarding CCWG Recommendation #8. The RrSG supports CCWG Recommendations # 3, 4, 6, 9, and 10.

Community Involvement

The role of the community in the disposition of new gTLD proceeds is only implied in this
document and is a significant missing element. We strongly believe that a representative
group from the ICANN community should be the group responsible for reviewing and
approving grants under this program and should also play a significant role in the
follow-up review of the program.

Further, the role of ICANN Org in any of the approaches should be limited to oversight of
the grant-making process in order to ensure compliance with laws and with ICANN’s
mission.

Our view on which of mechanisms A-C should be employed is fully informed by the above
belief and our comments below, preferring mechanism AC should be read in that light.
Mechanism A could be structured to accommodate the appropriate role of the
community, but it would create more risk of ICANN Org controlling, rather than
overseeing, the process.

CCWG Recommendation #5

While the CCWG has not yet come to agreement on whether ICANN Org or a constituent
part thereof should be a beneficiary of some of the auction proceeds, the RrSG strongly
discourages the CCWG from allowing use of any auction proceeds for ICANN Org or a
constituent part thereof.

CCWG Recommendation #8

While we understand and support the notion of capacity building and supporting
underserved populations, we do not feel it is appropriate for ICANN Org or a constituent
part to make determinations regarding which underserved populations are in need, or
where they think capacity building is needed. Rather, representatives of underserved
populations should approach the ICANN Foundation regarding a request for funds and/or
the need for capacity building.

Need for the CCWG to ensure the role of the community

We view the CCWG charter as necessarily dealing with who should be reviewing grants
and who should be choosing which projects to fund. As noted above, this is implied, but
not express, in the initial report.

We feel strongly that this should be the ICANN community.

This is a significant omission in the initial report. We believe this should either be made
clear in a subsequent draft or, if there is not clarity on this point, then the existing CCWG
should reconstitute for a brief period, we suggest no less than three and no
more than six months, to settle this matter. It is the most important element of the
whole project in our view.

No, I wish to continue to the next section

The RrSG does not have a specific comment on the remainder of the content of the proposed final report.

IPC Member, CSG-appointed Voting Member to the CCWG- Auction Proceeds

Public comment is provided on behalf of the Intellectual Property Constituency. The IPC appreciates the opportunity to comment.

No, I would like to continue to the next section

The Proposed Final Report Recommendation #1 states that the CCWG is expected to recommend that the Board select a mechanism from the two “ultimately” top ranked mechanisms determined by the CCWG. An informal poll of the CCWG resulted in the two mechanisms being Mechanism A (An internal department within ICANN that disburses funds in accordance with the CCWG recommendations regarding an Independent Evaluation Panel) and Mechanism B (An internal department within ICANN contracting with an existing non-profit organization administering the grant-making as determined by the recommended Independent Evaluation Panel.) As between these two mechanisms, the IPC favors Mechanism B in that this structure will provide easier start-up costs, more expertise in grant-making (expert non-profit organization), ease of “sunsetting” the grant-making process when the capital in the Auction Proceeds Fund is depleted, and far less need to hire additional staff for grant-making purposes, which is likely the single largest expense associated with this effort. Mechanism B provides the opportunity for competitive bidding to supply the grant-making administration services and does not require ICANN to develop this expertise in-house.

The IPC notes that the community has been extremely busy with other matters during the period between the last public comment on the CCWG Auction Proceeds work and this proposed Final Report. The IPC would encourage the CCWG to review the Proposed Final Report with the public at ICANN67 in Cancun in order to obtain further public input from members of the community and the public generally before finalizing the Report.

The IPC notes that on page 12 of the Proposed Final Report, the CCWG has referred to an expectation that the ICANN Board may conduct a feasibility study which will provide further detail comparing the Mechanisms. In this regard, the IPC believes that the CCWG Auction Proceeds should either (a) obtain authorization to conduct the feasibility study itself with active participation from CCWG members or (b) elevate this idea to the level of Implementation Guidance since the feasibility study would provide cost information regarding each of the Mechanisms, and especially the projected cost and availability of administrative services from Mechanism B expert non-profit organizations. The IPC understands that this information was not developed by the CCWG during its deliberations. The IPC also notes from page 17 of the report, third paragraph of Section 4.7, that only 14 of the 23 members appointed by the Chartering Organizations participated in the poll designed to express a preference for one of the Mechanisms. If more cost and feasibility information were available, voting members would be in a better position to indicate a preference before the Report is finalized. In this regard, the IPC recommends that the feasibility study be conducted with deliverables that take specific note of industry best practices in grant-making. This general principle is contemplated by the “Guidance for the Implementation Phase” on page 7 of the Proposed Final Report and should be a specific deliverable in connection with the recommended feasibility study.

No, I wish to continue to the next section

Regarding CCWG Recommendation #7 on page 5 of the proposed Final Report, the IPC agrees that grants should be final and should not be subject to being overturned via appeals mechanisms. Understanding that this will require a change to ICANN’s Fundamental ByLaws, the IPC recommends that the language of Recommendation 7 be revised to clarify that the appeal mechanisms should not apply to applications for grants which are “approved” in addition to stating that they will not apply to a grant application that is “not approved”. The concern is that persons other than grant applicants may have standing to object to making a particular grant, e.g. on Human Rights or other grounds contained in ICANN’s ByLaws or Core Values. This risk may be higher where grant-making administration is maintained inside the ICANN organization as contemplated by Mechanism A. Finally, the IPC believes this Recommendation should be express in stating that nothing in the Recommendation is intended to modify the rights of the Empowered Community in relation to the overall Budget with respect to the proposed line item for Auction Proceeds grants.

Separately, many thanks for all the hard work by this CCWG to date and especially to Leadership and ICANN staff. Respectfully submitted, Anne Aikman-Scalese on behalf of the Intellectual Property Constituency. /Anne Aikman-Scalese/

submitting on behalf of NCSG

No, I would like to continue to the next section

NCSG comments on the initial report, indicated that mechanism C - A new charitable structure, ICANN Foundation be created which is functionally separate from ICANN org for autonomy purposes, which would be responsible for the allocation of auction proceeds, was a more preferable but for purposes of respecting the consultative processes that led to the final report, NCSG now supports Mechanism B - An internal department dedicated to the allocation of auction proceeds is created within the ICANN organization which collaborates with an existing non-profit. We would further recommend that the selected organisation must be as neutral as possible with experience working with global projects and diverse communities.

NCSG has no other concerns regarding the updates made by the CCWG.

There needs to be representation diversity in decision making involved with the appointment of an existing organisation as in Mechanism C or Mechanism B.

No, I wish to continue to the next section

NCGS would like to thank you for the opportunity to contribute to this discussion. We hope you will find our contributions and recommendations helpful and we are open to further discussions regarding the final report on the New gTLD Auction Proceeds CCWG final report if needed.