Soviet General Staff Academy Lectures
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Last update: 6 January 2019DescriptionLinkMetadata
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Manual on the Conduct of Operations, 1963
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Part II: Ground Forces Operations (Front-Army-Corps)"The document is a translation of the Soviet General Staff authoritative guide for officers serving in command or staff positions at the front, army or corps level. The manual contains an introduction and eight chapters dealing with general principles, political work, principles of ground forces operations, offensive operations, airborne landings, defensive operations, regroupings, and rear services support."
https://www.cia.gov/library/readingroom/document/5196457b993294098d50948f
Document VII-99, Issued by the General Staff of the Armed Forces of the USSR, CIA/DO, Intelligence Information Special Report, 29 September 1977 (DOI, 1963)
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Part III: Combat Operations of the Air Defense (Antimissile Defense) Forces of the Country (District-Army)"The manual consists of an introduction and six chapters dealing with the overall organizational structure and general fundamentals of air and antimissile defense, the organization and planning of air defense operations and combat support, the conduct of combat actions, and the fundamentals of rear services support."
https://drive.google.com/open?id=1Tgtm028DNKw5vH6zukRKN6WwVtuPppj-
Document VII-149. Issued by the General Staff of the Armed Forces of the USSR in 1963, CIA/DO Intelligence Information Special Report, 10 February 1978.
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Part IV: Air Operations of Long-Range Aviation, Combat Operations of Front Aviation, and the Employment of Military Transport Aviation (Air Army-Corps-Division)"The manual contains an introduction and chapters dealing with general fundamentals of air transport operations, preparing and conducting air operations of long-range aviation, combat operations of front aviation, and military transport aviation, all at the air army, corps, and division level."
https://www.cia.gov/library/readingroom/document/5196457b993294098d50946b
Document VII-150. Issued by the General Staff of the Armed Forces of the USSR in 1963, CIA/DO Intelligence Information Special Report, 7 April 1978.
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Part V: Operations of the Navy (Fleet-Flotilla)"The manual is intended as a basic guide for command personnel. It consists of an introduction and seven chapters detailing general principles, political work, principles of naval operations, the preparation and conduct of various naval operations, joint operations with ground forces, and fundamentals of rear services support. It reflects the established Soviet military doctrine under Khrushchev in the early 1960s which posited that war with the West would begin with a massive nuclear strike."
https://www.cia.gov/library/readingroom/document/5196457b993294098d509490
Document VII-217. Issued by the General Staff of the Armed Forces of the USSR, published by the General Staff of the Armed Forces of the USSR in 1963, CIA/DO Intelligence Information Special Report, 25 October 1977.
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General Staff Academy Lectures 1968-1969
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Principles of the Automation and Mechanization of Troop ControlCIA: "The lecture deals with requirements for automating control systems to increase the combat readiness and capabilities of the armed forces while increasing the efficiency of control and reducing the labor expended by command personnel. It provides a summary of possible areas for the application of automation. It specifically examines the use of computers in military districts, particularly in command-staff exercises."
https://www.cia.gov/library/readingroom/document/5166d4f999326091c6a6083d
Document VII-211. Prepared 6 September 1968, published October 1969; CIA/DO Intelligence Information Special Report, 11 November 1976.
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The Combat Employment of Rocket Troops and Artillery in an Offensive Operation of a Front and ArmyCIA: "The lecture is a comprehensive presentation of prevailing views and principles for employing rocket troops and artillery in an offensive theater of military operations. Suntsovyy's main points were bringing rocket troops to full combat readiness, organizing and using rocket troops in a front offensive with an initial nuclear strike, and employing artillery in an operation. The lecture provided details on the role and tasks of rocket troops and artillery in nuclear and conventional operations, their targets, centralization of operational planning, and various deployment and attack procedures."
https://www.cia.gov/library/readingroom/document/5166d4f999326091c6a60840
Document VII-213. Prepared by Maj. Gen. of Artillery A.P. Suntsovyy, CIA/DO Intelligence Information Special Report, 22 December 1976 (DOI, 26 February 1969).
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The Organization of Radioelectronic Warfare in an Offensive Operation of an Army and a FrontCIA: "The lecture is an overview of radioelectronic warfare and countermeasures applied to army and front offensive operations in the Western Theater. It emphasizes the importance of combining jamming with destruction by nuclear and conventional weapons. It provides details on organizing and planning radioelectronic warfare, the units involved, and their capabilities."
https://www.cia.gov/library/readingroom/document/5166d4f999326091c6a60844
Document VII-212. Prepared March 1969, published October 1969; CIA/DO Intelligence Information Special Report, 3 December 1976.
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Organization of Rear Services Support of an Army and a Front in an Offensive OperationCIA: "The lecture deals with organizing the rear services to provide timely and continuous support to front and army combat operations. The author discusses materiel, technical, and medical support procedures and capabilities, the organization of control, and the composition of rear service elements."
https://www.cia.gov/library/readingroom/document/0001197492
Document VII-214. Approved 18 February 1969, CIA/DO Intelligence Information Special Report, 4 March 1977.
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Front (Army) Offensive Operations with Conventional WeaponsCIA: "The lecture deals with preparing and conducting offensive operations without employing nuclear weapons. The lecture also covered general concepts and methods, procedures for planning and support, and organizing control."
https://www.cia.gov/library/readingroom/document/0001197493
Document VII-215. CIA/DO Intelligence Information Special Report, 15 April 1977 [DOI, 4 March 1969].
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The Preparation and Conduct of Front and Army Offensive OperationsCIA: "The document is a translation of a lecture prepared by Col. Gen. I.S. Glebov. Glebov assumes nuclear weapons would be employed in any future war on a limited or an unlimited basis. He addresses the importance of surprise and the need for preemptive nuclear strikes in Soviet planning. He sets forth the objectives, characteristics, and methods of conducting modern-day offensive operations at the front and army level."
https://www.cia.gov/library/readingroom/document/5196457b993294098d50947a
Document VII-221. Prepared by Col. Gen. I.S. Glebov, CIA/DO Intelligence Information Special Report, 28 July 1978 [DOI, 4 March 1969].
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The Defensive Operation of an ArmyCIA: "The lecture covers the fundamentals of an army defensive operation, including the objectives and nature of defense, preparation and planning procedures, and the disposition of a defense."
https://www.cia.gov/library/readingroom/document/5196457b993294098d5094b1
Document VII-216. Prepared by Lt. Gen. A.N. Kolominov, prepared October 1969, CIA/DO Intelligence Information Special Report, 29 August 1977.
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General Staff Academy Lectures 1973-1975Notes of Col Gulam Wardak from Voroshilov which were compiled by U.S. National Defence University into three-volume book series.
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Volume 1. Issues of Soviet Military StrategyNDU: "A large number of lectures, and all those in this first volume, are essentially full text renditions of the lectures as presented. On rare occasions, Colonel Wardak chose not to transcribe a small portion of a lecture in this category because the topic was not pertinent to his or Afghanistan's needs. (In this volume, a section on a naval topic was omitted, for example.) For those few lectures where this was the case, it will be so noted in the translated text. Virtually all of the strategy lecture series and the major lectures dealing withfront and army offensive and defensive operations fall into the first category."
http://www.dtic.mil/docs/citations/ADA233504
Book published June 1989.
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Volume 2: Issues of Soviet Military StrategyNDU: "As a continuation of the basic overview lectures presented in the first volume, it rounds out those lectures on strategy in a theater of military action. While not a homogenous series, this volume presents valuable data in three areas: two chapters dealing with the basic arms and services and the High Command of the Soviet Armed Forces: two chapters on particular types of combat support operations in strategic theater operations-air defense, and offensive air assault landings: and three general kinds of basic homeland support for theater operations-military uses of space, civil defense, and economic support of the Armed Forces."
http://www.dtic.mil/docs/citations/ADA261858
Book published December 1990.
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Volume 3. Issues of Operational ArtNDU: "The lectures address the definitional framework for operational art and the nature of front offensive and defensive operations in all their dimensions. Separate lectures dealing with front artillery support and rear service support supplement the basic lectures on front offensive and defensive operations. The final three chapters cover the organization and conduct of army offensive and defensive operations in a manner analogous to the coverage of fronts. In addition, one chapter addresses the complex task of army movement and deployment."
http://www.dtic.mil/docs/citations/ADA310980
Book published November 1992.
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General Staff Academy Textbooks 1974
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Front Offensive OperationsCIA: "The following intelligence report is a translation from Russian of a TOP SECRET textbook prepared for students of the General Staff Academy. Nearly 20 officers of the Academy faculty had a hand in its preparation, and it deals systematically with all aspects of an offensive operation that are the direct responsibility of the front command. Oriented chiefly towards the Western Theater of Operations, the manual shows no radical departure from previous doctrine: The offensive is expected to advance at a rate of 40 to 60 kilometers a day, nuclear operations are discussed separately from conventional ones, constant nuclear readiness is stressed, and logistics and control are each subjects of entire chapters. Two items that stand out are some fairly straightforward statements on the offensive use of "special," i.e , chemical or biological, weapons and repeated references to airborne assault units, which are always distinguished from the more familiar airborne landing forces and are associated with helicopter landings."
https://www.cia.gov/library/readingroom/document/5166d4f999326091c6a608b2
CIA/DO Intelligence Information Special Report, 27 September 1979 (DOI, 1974).
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The Principles and the Organization and Conduct of Operational Reconnaissance of a Front Offensive OperationCIA: "The following report is a translation from Russian of a SECRET manual on the principles of operational·reconnaissance produced by the Chief Intelligence Directorate (GRU) of the General Staff of the Soviet Armed Forces in 1974. Intended for use by generals and staff officers of ground forces formations, the manual is a comprehensive study of the theory and practice of reconnaissance and its application to a front offensive operation beginning with conventional weapons and proceeding to the use of nuclear means. Chapter 2 is of particular value for its assessment of the capabilities of the various types of reconnaissance and some of the equipment used. Other chapters deal with indications of enemy preparations for attack, the planning, performance and control of reconnaissance, as well as the targets of interest at different stages of an operation. The problems of reconnaissance in general and also problems specifically encountered on seacoasts, in muntain and desert areas, and in the Far North are treated in the general discussion. The manual also includes a lengthy sample reconnaissance plan and diagrams illustrating the battle formation of radio intercept units. the comnunications and control of reconnaissance, and the sources and processing of infannation."
https://www.cia.gov/library/readingroom/document/0001197516
CIA/DO Intelligence Information Special Report, 19 May 1978 (DOI, 1974).
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General Staff Academy Lectures 1975-1976
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Lectures and Exercises of the General Staff Academy of the Armed Forces of the USSRCIA: "The document is a translation of a notebook of an officer who attended a course at the General Staff Academy. The topics covered include: strategic operations in a theater of military operations; the artillery of a front; TO&E of air defense units of a front; forces and means of the rear of a front; chemical defense troops of a front; ground forces, air forces, and nuclear warheads of the notional First Western Front; Air Defense Forces of the notional First Western Front; forces and operations of the Baltic Fleet in cooperation with the notional First Western Front; premise of war exercises; and defensive operations of an army."
https://drive.google.com/open?id=1wOyk2aGh4fWEiLc2Ngc-CXdDkPxeik1h
Document VII-218. CIA/DO Intelligence Information Special Report, 28 October 1977 [DOI, 1975-76].
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General Staff Academy Lectures 1977CIA: "The first 19 lessons deal with the staff preparation of a front offensive operation with conventional and nuclear weapons; the remaining 10 lessons deal with the conduct of an offensive employing conventional weapons at first with a transition to the use of nuclear weapons."
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Lesson No. 1a: The Making and Critique of the Decision of the Front Commander for an Offensive OperationCIA: "The lesson is the first of a series. It outlines the overall situation, opposing orders of battle, and tasks to be dealt with by a Soviet front commander, his principal staff officers, and air army commander in conducting an offensive operation, with both conventional and nuclear weapons, across the North German plain to the Netherlands and Belgium against the NATO Northern Army Group."
https://www.cia.gov/library/readingroom/document/5166d4f999326091c6a608bc
Document VII-247. CIA/DO, Intelligence Information Special Report, 24 October 1980 [DOI, 1977].
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Lesson No. 1b: The Organization of the Work of the Front Field Headquarters in the Preparation of an Offensive OperationCIA: "The lesson is intended to instruct students about the role of directorate chiefs in front operations, emphasizing the organization, time factors, personnel allocation, and coordination of the planning for a front operation."
https://www.cia.gov/library/readingroom/document/5166d4f999326091c6a608c3
Document VII-235. CIA/DO Intelligence Information Special Report, 25 July1980 [DOI, 1977].
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Lesson No.1c: Preparation and Reporting of Proposals of the Chief of Rocket Troops and Artillery on the Combat Employment of Rocket Troops and Artillery in a Front Offensive Operation"CIA: "The lesson instructs students acting as front chiefs of rocket troops and artillery in planning an initial nuclear strike with 360 nuclear missiles in the area of NATO Northern Army Group. It outlines tasks, NATO targets, the main axes of attack, Soviet missile and artillery strength, and allocation of nuclear missiles. It also outlines tasks, allocations and densities of artillery, and the time factors affecting the movement, deployment, and launch preparations for missiles units."
https://www.cia.gov/library/readingroom/document/5166d4f999326091c6a608da
Document VII-225. CIA/DO Intelligence Information Special Report, 23 April 1980 [DOI, 1977].
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Lesson No.1d: Operational Calculations with the Use of an Electronic Computer to Determine the Capabilities of the Air Defense Forces and Means of the Front to Repel Massed Enemy Air AttacksCIA: "The lesson provides instructions in the use of the MINSK-32 computer to calculate air defense capabilities needed to repel a mass air strike from two different axes."
https://www.cia.gov/library/readingroom/document/5166d4f999326091c6a608db
Document VII-239. CIA/DO Intelligence Information Special Report, 22 August 1980 [DOI, 1977].
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Lesson No. 1e: Decision-Making and Critique of the Front Commander's Decision for the Offensive OperationCIA: "The lesson involves the decision-making, planning, and instructions of a front commander for a front offensive operation with both conventional and nuclear weapons across the north German plain to the Netherlands and Belgium."
https://www.cia.gov/library/readingroom/document/5166d4f999326091c6a608cc
Document VII-242. CIA/DO Intelligence Information Special Report, 19 September 1980 [DOI, 1977].
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Lesson No. 1f: Work of the Nuclear Planning Group Using the Calculations Performed on Electronic Computers to Substantiate the Decision to Be Adopted by the Commander on Employing Nuclear Weapons in an OperationCIA: "It presents a General Staff Academy lesson about the task of the nuclear planning group of a front staff to process computerized calculations and prepare and submit the conclusions and proposals needed by a commander to decide how to use nuclear weapons."
https://www.cia.gov/library/readingroom/document/5166d4f999326091c6a608e6
Document VII-226. CIA/DO Intelligence Information Special Report, 1 May 1980 [DOI, 1977].
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Supplementary Material for Lesson No. 1: Report of the Chief of the Operations Directorate of the Coastal FrontCIA: "The lesson contains seven short reports by the commander of the Coastal Front and his principal staff officers on initiating an offensive operation with both conventional and nuclear weapons against NATO's Northern Army Group."
https://www.cia.gov/library/readingroom/document/5166d4f999326091c6a6095d
Document VII-273. CIA/DO Intelligence Information Special Report, 5 February 1982 [DOI, 1977].
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Supplementary Material for Lesson No. 1: Reports by the Commander and Chief of Staff of the Combined Baltic FleetCIA: "The lesson contains two reports by a Soviet naval commander and the chief of staff of the Warsaw Pact's Combined Baltic Fleet on proposed actions for the fleet in the North and Baltic Seas in support of the Coastal Front's ground forces offensive operation in northern Germany."
https://www.cia.gov/library/readingroom/document/5166d4f999326091c6a6095e
Document VII-274. CIA/DO Intelligence Information Special Report, 8 February 1982 [DOI, 1977].
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Supplementary Material for Lesson: Reconnaissance in Front Offensive OperationsCIA: "The document contains reference materials used by students in planning and organizing reconnaissance in front offensive operations against the NATO Northern Army Group."
https://www.cia.gov/library/readingroom/document/5166d4f999326091c6a608ba
Document VII-250. CIA/DO Intelligence Information Special Report, 31 October 1980 [DOI, 1977].
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Table of Contents and Lesson No. 2: The Preparation and Critique of the Plan of the Initial Nuclear StrikeCIA: "The lesson is for instruction of students acting as front chiefs of staff in planning an initial nuclear strike with 376 nuclear warheads in the area of NATO Northern Army Group."
https://www.cia.gov/library/readingroom/document/5166d4f999326091c6a608d8
Document VII-224. CIA/DO Intelligence Information Special Report, 18 April 1980 [DOI, 1977].
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Lesson No. 3: The Preparation and Critique of the Front Operational Directive for an Offensive OperationCIA: "The lesson is on the role of front chiefs of staff in preparing and developing the operational directive for an offensive operation. It outlines the study references, the content of the directive, and the function of the lesson director."
https://www.cia.gov/library/readingroom/document/5166d4f999326091c6a608d9
Document VII-227. CIA/DO Intelligence Information Special Report, 9 May 1980 [DOI, 1977].
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Lesson No. 4, The Making and Critique of the Decision of the Commander of the Air Army on Combat Actions in a Front Offensive OperationCIA: "The lesson involves the planning by the commander of the front air army for the initial nuclear strike, first massed conventional strike, and support for ground forces during a front offensive operation in the northern area of West Germany."
https://www.cia.gov/library/readingroom/document/5166d4f999326091c6a608b8
Document VII-228. CIA/DO Intelligence Information Special Report, 23 May 1980 [DOI, 1977].
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Lesson No. 5: Study and Critique of The Decision of the Commander of the Combined Baltic Fleet on the Combat Actions of the Fleet's Forces in the Front Offensive OperationCIA: "The lesson broadly addresses, in the context of a front offensive operation, the overall mission; the strength in submarine, surface, and naval aviation in those areas; the specific tasks and NATO targets; the allocation and targeting of nuclear munitions; and the location of fleet control posts. The students acted as commanders of the Combined Baltic Fleet in an offensive in the Baltic and North Seas in cooperation with the Coastal Front."
https://www.cia.gov/library/readingroom/document/5166d4f999326091c6a608c5
Document VII-236. CIA/DO Intelligence Information Special Report, 7 August 1980 [DOI, 1977].
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Lesson No. 6: Study of the Basic Diagram of the Mathematical Model of a Front Offensive OperationCIA: "The lesson deals in general terms with the formulation, development, content, electronic computer processing, evaluation, and employment of the mathematical model of a front offensive operation in its nonnuclear and nuclear stages."
https://www.cia.gov/library/readingroom/document/5166d4f999326091c6a608dc
Document VII-232. CIA/DO Intelligence Information Special Report, 20 June 1980 [DOI, 1977].
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Lesson No. 7a: Preparation and Critique of the Plan of the Combat Employment of the Rocket Troops and Artillery in a Front Offensive OperationCIA: "The lesson is a group exercise by students acting as front chiefs of rocket troops and artillery. They planned, including preparation and time factors, for initial and subsequent nuclear strikes in the northern area of West Germany."
https://www.cia.gov/library/readingroom/document/5166d4f999326091c6a608cd
Document VII-229. CIA/DO Intelligence Information Special Report, 6 June 1980 [DOI, 1977].
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Lesson No. 7b: Preparation and Critique of the Plan of the Combat Employment of the Rocket Troops and Artillery in the Front Offensive Operation: Planning the Combat Employment of ArtilleryCIA: "The lesson lays out the tasks of the artillery during the repulse of a NATO breakthrough of defensive lines and a subsequent deep offensive into the operational depth of NATO forces. It provides details about Warsaw Pact artillery densities and which NATO areas and combat units to attack."
https://www.cia.gov/library/readingroom/document/5166d4f999326091c6a608e1
Document VII-238. CIA/DO Intelligence Information Special Report, 14 August 1980 [DOI, 1977].
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Lesson No. 8: Study and Critique of the Plan of the Amphibious Landing OperationCIA: "The lesson deals with the content of a plan for an amphibious assault to be included in a front operation."
https://www.cia.gov/library/readingroom/document/5166d4f999326091c6a608e7
Document VII-237. Disseminated 14 August 1980 [DOI, on 1977].
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Lesson No. 9: Preparation and Critique of the Plan for Reconnaissance in the Front Offensive OperationCIA: "The lesson is a combination of individual study and a group exercise, the substance of which was the planning for reconnaissance in support of the front offensive against the NATO Northern Army Group."
https://www.cia.gov/library/readingroom/document/5166d4f999326091c6a608cb
Document VII-234. CIA/DO Intelligence Information Special Report, 25 July 1980 [DOI, 1977].
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Lesson No. 10: Preparation and Critique of the Plan of Air Defense in the Front Offensive OperationCIA: "The lesson outlines the steps to be followed by the front chief of air defense troops in planning and organizing the air defense of the front troops in an offensive operation in the northern area of West Germany."
https://www.cia.gov/library/readingroom/document/5166d4f999326091c6a608d2
Document VII-240. CIA/DO Intelligence Information Special Report, 22 August 1980 [DOI, 1977].
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Lesson No. 11: Critique of the Plan of Operational Cover and Deployment of the Front's Troops and Their Occupation of the Departure Position for the OffensiveCIA: "The lesson covers an assessment of NATO nuclear, ground, air, air defense and naval forces; Warsaw Pact covering forces and their functions; the role of the Combined Baltic Fleet; radioelectronic warfare; engineer preparation of the terrain; bridging and roads; air, air defense, and antitank forces and actions; movement and readiness time factors; camouflage; and force control measures."
https://www.cia.gov/library/readingroom/document/5166d4f999326091c6a608be
Document VII-231. CIA/DO Intelligence Information Special Report, 12 June 1980 [DOI, 1977].
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Lesson No. 12: Study of the Radioelectronic Warfare Plan in the Front Offensive OperationCIA: "The lesson involves planning for the electronic neutralization of NATO reconnaissance, communications, and control systems during a front offensive against the NATO Northern Army Group. It provides the types of electronic warfare targets that would be selected for nuclear attack and for electronic neutralization."
https://www.cia.gov/library/readingroom/document/5166d4f999326091c6a608d6
Document VII-230. CIA/DO Intelligence Information Special Report, 12 June 1980 [DOI, 1977].
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Lesson No. 13: Preparation and Critique of the Plan of Protection of the Troops and Rear Services against Weapons of Mass Destruction in the Offensive OperationCIA: "The lesson outlines the measures to be considered by a front operations directorate chief and chief of chemical troops in organizing and implementing the radiation, chemical and biological protection of the troops in a front offensive across the northern area of West Germany and into the Netherlands."
https://www.cia.gov/library/readingroom/document/5166d4f999326091c6a608bd
Document VII-251. CIA/DO Intelligence Information Special Report, 7 November 1980 [DOI, 1977].
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Lesson No. 14: Planning the Engineer Support for an Offensive Operation of the Coastal FrontCIA: "The lesson sets forth the various tasks to be accomplished by front engineer troops: for example, the preparation of routes, river crossings, troop and firing positions, obstacles, and radar deception and camouflage measures in a front offensive operation across the northern area of West Germany."
https://www.cia.gov/library/readingroom/document/5166d4f999326091c6a608d4
Document VII-254. CIA/DO Intelligence Information Special Report, 21 November 1980 [DOI, 1977].
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Lesson No. 15: Organizing the Control of Front Troops in an Offensive OperationCIA: "The lesson involves students acting as the chief of a front's operations directorate in planning and organizing troop control in a front offensive operation with conventional and nuclear weapons against NATO forces."
https://www.cia.gov/library/readingroom/document/5166d4f999326091c6a608d3
Document VII-255. CIA/DO, Intelligence Information Special Report, 28 November 1980 [DOI, 1977].
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Lesson No. 16: Preparing the Plan and Organizing Cooperation of the Front Troops in an Offensive OperationCIA: "The lesson lays out the steps taken by a front commander; his chiefs of rocket troops, artillery and air defense troops; and air and ground army commanders in coordinating their actions, both nuclear and nonnuclear, in repulsing a NATO invasion, preempting a NATO nuclear strike, breaking through the defense of NATO's Northern Army Group, and committing a second-echelon army to battle."
https://www.cia.gov/library/readingroom/document/5166d4f999326091c6a607e3
Document VII-265. CIA/DO, Intelligence Information Special Report, 1 May 1981 [DOI, 1977].
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Lesson No. 17, Organizing Communications in a Front Offensive OperationCIA: "The lesson provides details of the organization of the command and control organization of the command and control communications facilities, units, and the equipment used by a front headquarters to control its major subordinate elements in a front offensive operation across the North German Plain to Belgium."
https://www.cia.gov/library/readingroom/document/5166d4f999326091c6a608c8
Document VII-256. CIA/DO Intelligence Information Special Report, 19 December 1980 [DOI, 1977].
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Lesson No. 18: Development and Critique of the Plan of the Organization of Rear Services Support of Front Troops in an Offensive OperationCIA: "The lesson outlines the steps and factors involved in organizing the logistic support of a front in an offensive operation, including its materiel and fuel requirements, estimated combat casualties, and tank and vehicle repair and evacuation capabilities."
https://www.cia.gov/library/readingroom/document/5166d4f999326091c6a607eb
Document VII-258. CIA/DO Intelligence Information Special Report, 30 January 1981 [DOI, 1977].
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Lesson No. 19: Preparation and Critique of the Plan for the Front Offensive OperationCIA: "The lesson addresses overall planning by a front chief of staff for an offensive in the area of the NATO Northern Army Group."
https://www.cia.gov/library/readingroom/document/5166d4f999326091c6a608d5
Document VII-233. CIA/DO Intelligence Information Special Report, 3 July 1980 [DOI, 1977].
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Lesson No. 20a: The Conduct of the Air Engagement and Delivery of the Initial Massed Strike in the Air OperationCIA: "The lesson is the first of a new collection of 29 lectures, classified top secret, for use in the Soviet General Staff Academy. This lecture is the first of 19 dealing with the staff preparation of a front offensive operation with conventional and nuclear weapons. It instructs students acting as air army commanders in the transition to offensive operations using conventional ordnance after preemptive NATO air strikes in East Germany. The scenarios include the target areas notionally struck by NATO and the main targets to be attacked by the Warsaw Pact air army. The lesson specifies the German airfields to be used by the air army and lists the hypothetical air army squadrons, regiments, groups and divisions of aircraft."
https://www.cia.gov/library/readingroom/document/5166d4f999326091c6a608c9
Document VII-153. CIA/DO Intelligence Information Special Report, 31 July 1980 [DOI, 1977].
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Lesson No. 20b: The Transition of Front Troops to the Offensive with the Simultaneous Repulse of the Enemy InvasionCIA: "The lesson describes a conventionally armed NATO air strike and ground invasion of East Germany and the actions taken and proposals made by a Soviet front commander, his army commanders, and important staff officers to repulse the invasion and initiate offensive actions in the northern part of West Germany."
https://www.cia.gov/library/readingroom/document/5166d4f999326091c6a608b9
Document VII-241. CIA/DO Intelligence Information Special Report, 29 August 1980 [DOI, 1977].
55
Lesson No. 21a: The Breakthrough by Front Troops of the Prepared Enemy Defense: Organizing the Breakthrough of the Enemy DefenseCIA: "The lesson outlines the decisions a front commander would make after hearing the reports of key staff officers on the order of battle of NATO and Warsaw Pact forces."
https://www.cia.gov/library/readingroom/document/5166d4f999326091c6a607f4
Document VII-261. CIA/DO Intelligence Information Special Report, 6 March 1981 [DOI, 1997].
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Lesson No. 21b: Organizing the Combat Actions of the Front Rocket Troops and Artillery in the Breakthrough of the Enemy DefenseCIA: "The lesson deals with the preparation, organization, tasking, and quantitative data needed for the employment of conventional artillery in the breakthrough by a front of a NATO defense line in the northern area of Germany."
https://www.cia.gov/library/readingroom/document/5166d4f999326091c6a607e6
Document VII-269. CIA/DO Intelligence Information Special Report, 31 July 1981 [DOI, 1977].
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Lesson No. 21c: Combat Actions of Front and Army Aviation in the Breakthrough of the Enemy DefenseCIA: "The lesson outlines the steps to be taken by an air army commander for the nonnuclear air preparation and support of a breakthrough of NATO defenses during a front offensive operation in West Germany."
https://www.cia.gov/library/readingroom/document/5166d4f999326091c6a608bb
Document VII-252. CIA/DO Intelligence Information Special Report, 7 November 1980 [DOI, 1977].
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Lesson No. 21: The Breakthrough by Front Troops of the Prepared Enemy Defense: Supplementary MaterialCIA: "The lesson is one of a new collection of 29 lectures, classified top secret, for use in the Soviet General Staff Academy. It is the first of 10 of those lessons dealing with conducting an initial offensive employing only conventional weapons, with a transition to the use of nuclear weapons. The lesson provides supplementary material used to instruct students acting as a front commander, his chiefs of intelligence, operations, and air defense troops, and his air army commander in presenting reports covering data on the enemy's situation and probable actions."
https://www.cia.gov/library/readingroom/document/5166d4f999326091c6a607f0
Document VII-271. CIA/DO Intelligence Information Special Report, 14 August 1981 [DOI, 1977].
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Lesson No. 22a: Developing an Offensive Operation with the Commitment to Battle of the Front's Second EchelonCIA: "The lesson outlines the points covered by a front chief of staff and front commander in estimating a situation, drawing up balances of forces, submitting proposals for the commitment to battle of the second echelon to encircle and destroy a major grouping of NATO ground forces, and in allocating conventional fire and air support for these combat actions in northern Germany."
https://www.cia.gov/library/readingroom/document/5166d4f999326091c6a608c7
Document VII-260. CIA/DO Intelligence Information Special Report, 6 March 1981 [DOI, 1977].
60
Lesson No. 22a: Supplementary Material: Developing an Offensive Operation with the Commitment to Battle of the Front's Second EchelonCIA: "The lesson provides supplementary material for the lesson concerning the development of an offensive to encircle and destroy NATO ground forces in the northern area of West Germany."
https://www.cia.gov/library/readingroom/document/5166d4f999326091c6a607e8
Document VII-270. CIA/DO, Intelligence Information Special Report, 5 August 1981 [DOI, 1977].
61
Lesson No. 22b: Combat Actions of Front and Army Aviation when Developing an Offensive Operation with the Commitment of the Front's Second Echelon to BattleCIA: "The lesson outlines the tasks and resources of a front air army in supporting the first two days of battle in an operation against NATO's invading Northern Army Group. The main tasks were to reconnoiter for and destroy NATO's missile and nuclear means and to support and cover front ground forces."
https://www.cia.gov/library/readingroom/document/5166d4f999326091c6a608e5
Document VII-253. CIA/DO Intelligence Information Special Report, 14 November 1980 [DOI, 1977].
62
Lesson No. 23: Relocation of Control Posts in the Course of a Front Offensive Operation. Work of the Airborne Control PostCIA: "The lesson describes the procedures, time and distance factors, and aircraft and motor vehicles used in relocating a front's command, alternate command post, and rear control post during a front offensive operation in West Germany."
https://www.cia.gov/library/readingroom/document/5166d4f999326091c6a607e9
Document VII-259. CIA/DO Intelligence Information Special Report, 27 February 1981 [DOI, 1977].
63
Lesson No. 24a, The Transition of Front Troops to the Conduct of Combat Actions under Conditions of the Employment of Nuclear Weapons by the SidesCIA: "The lesson provides details about the conditions prompting the delivery of a front's initial nuclear strike, the proposals of the front chief of staff, and the front commander's modifications and amplifications of these proposals as they pertain to the allocation of nuclear missiles and bombs, the targets for the initial nuclear strike, and protective measures to be taken by front troops to lessen or counteract the effects of NATO's possible use of nuclear weapons in an offensive operation across the northern area of West Germany."
https://www.cia.gov/library/readingroom/document/0001197576
Document VII-257. CIA/DO Intelligence Information Special Report, 23 January 1981 [DOI, 1977].
64
Lesson No. 24b: Control of Rocket Troops and Artillery during Preparation and Delivery of the Initial Nuclear Strike in the Course of an Offensive OperationCIA: "The lesson provides details about the organization and content of a front's initial nuclear strike with 167 missiles in the first launch against NATO forces in an offensive in northern West Germany."
https://www.cia.gov/library/readingroom/document/5166d4f999326091c6a607e7
Document VII-262. CIA/DO Intelligence Information Special Report, 20 March 1981 [DOI, 1977].
65
Lesson No. 25a: Restoring the Combat Effectiveness of the Troops, Eliminating the Aftereffects of the Employment of Weapons of Mass Destruction by the Enemy, and Developing the OperationCIA: "The lesson describes the losses sustained by a front and by one of its armies after a NATO nuclear and toxic chemical agent strike, and the losses of NATO's Northern Army Group after the front's initial and follow-up nuclear strikes."
https://www.cia.gov/library/readingroom/document/5166d4f999326091c6a607e5
Document VII-263. CIA/DO, Intelligence Information Special Report, 24 April 1981 [DOI, 1977].
66
Lesson No. 25b: Refining the Decision on the Development of the Offensive OperationCIA: "The lesson describes a front commander's orders to his chief of staff, principal troop commanders, and the logistic, engineer, and chemical chiefs on the development of a nuclear-supported offensive against NATO's Northern Army Group and on the elimination of the aftereffects of a massed NATO nuclear strike."
https://www.cia.gov/library/readingroom/document/5166d4f999326091c6a607ef
Document VII-267. CIA/DO, Intelligence Information Special Report, 22 May 1981 [DOI, 1977].
67
Lesson No. 26a: Organizing the Commitment of the Front's Second Echelon to BattleCIA: "The lesson outlines the activities and contributions of a front commander, his key staff officers, and his air army and tank army commanders to develop an offensive operation for the second-echelon tank army when it is committed to battle across the northern area of West Germany."
https://www.cia.gov/library/readingroom/document/5166d4f999326091c6a608e3
Document VII-246. CIA/DO Intelligence Information Special Report, 3 October 1980 [DOI, 1977].
68
Lesson No. 26b: Organizing the Combat Employment of the Rocket Troops and Artillery when Committing the Front's Second Echelon to BattleCIA: "The lesson provides details of a typical rocket troop and artillery order of battle for a front and the nuclear and fire destruction tasks to be accomplished when a second-echelon army is committed to battle in a front offensive across the northern area of West Germany."
https://www.cia.gov/library/readingroom/document/5166d4f999326091c6a608e8
Document VII-248. CIA/DO Intelligence Information Special Report, 31 October 1980 [DOI, 1977].
69
Lesson No. 26c: Organizing Air Defense when Committing the Front's Second Echelon to BattleCIA: "The lesson outlines the material covered by the chief of the front air defense troops in planning and organizing the employment of air defense troops when the front second echelon is to be committed to battle in an offensive operation against the NATO Northern Army Group."
https://www.cia.gov/library/readingroom/document/5166d4f999326091c6a608c4
Document VII-244. CIA/DO Intelligence Information Special Report, 26 September 1980 [DOI, 1977].
70
Lesson No. 26d: Controlling Front Troops during the Commitment to Battle of the Front's Second EchelonCIA: "The lesson describes the condition and disposition of front forces in an offensive operation in the northern part of West Germany at the time of the commitment of the front second echelon to the battle. It focuses on the composition and use of forward and airborne control posts to control the commitment."
https://www.cia.gov/library/readingroom/document/5166d4f999326091c6a608e0
Document VII-243. CIA/DO Intelligence Information Special Report, 19 September 1980 [DOI, 1997].
71
Lesson No. 26e: Engineer Support of the Movement Forward and Commitment to Battle of the Front's Second Echelon Involving the Crossing of Nuclear Minefields and DemolitionsCIA: "The lesson outlines the tasks to be accomplished by engineer troops in support of the movement forward and commitment to battle of the tank army constituting a front second echelon in an offensive in the northern area of West Germany."
https://www.cia.gov/library/readingroom/document/5166d4f999326091c6a608b7
Document VII-245. CIA/DO Intelligence Information Special Report, 26 September 1980 [DOI, 1977].
72
Lesson No. 26f: Rear Services Support of Troops in the Course of an Offensive Operation when Committing the Front's Second Echelon to BattleCIA: "The lesson involves a front deputy commander for the rear and his rear chief of staff in planning and organizing the transportation of supplies, treatment and evacuation of wounded and sick, movement forward of supply bases, and the ammunition, fuel, and food stuffs required to support the commitment to battle of a second-echelon tank army in the development of a front offensive across the northern part of West Germany."
https://www.cia.gov/library/readingroom/document/5166d4f999326091c6a608c0
Document VII-249. CIA/DO Intelligence Information Special Report, 31 October 1980 [DOI, 1977].
73
Lesson No. 27a: Making the Decision for the Assault Crossing of a Wide Water Obstacle from the MarchCIA: "The lesson provides an estimate of the situation and the tasking of a front's major ground and air elements, electronic neutralization units, and engineer troop units in an offensive drive against NATO's Northern Army Group, an assault crossing of the Rhine and Ijssel rivers in or close to the Netherlands, and the capture of the North Sea coast and northern Ruhr industrial area."
https://www.cia.gov/library/readingroom/document/5166d4f999326091c6a607ee
Document VII-268. CIA/DO, Intelligence Information Special Report, 12 June 1981 [DOI, 1977].
74
Lesson No. 27b: Engineer Support for the Front Troops' Assault Crossing of Water Obstacles from the MarchCIA: "The lesson is a translation describing the tasking and allocation of front and army engineer units for reconnaissance, route preparation, and assault crossing of the Rhine, Maas, and Ijssel rivers for an offensive drive into The Netherlands. Of interest is the stress placed on the neutralization of NATO's radio control over nuclear and land mine detonations by front radioelectronic warfare units and jamming helicopters. Also worthy of note is the measure to prepare 13 dummy bridges, indicative of the importance of deception."
https://www.cia.gov/library/readingroom/document/5166d4f999326091c6a607f2
Document VII-266. CIA/DO, Intelligence Information Special Report, 15 May 1981 [DOI, 1977].
75
Lesson No. 28: Development of the Offensive on the Opposite Bank of a Wide Water Obstacle with the Simultaneous Repulse of an Enemy CounterthrustCIA: "The lesson describes a Soviet front's assessment of the NATO enemy, front objectives, balance of forces, air army missions, and tasking of the front's five ground armies, one army corps, and air army in the final phase of an offensive drive into the Netherlands and Belgium."
https://www.cia.gov/library/readingroom/document/5166d4f999326091c6a607f3
Document VII-264. CIA/DO, Intelligence Information Special Report, 24 April 1981 [DOI, 1977].
76
Lesson No. 29: The Preparation and Critique of the Operational Summary (SITREP) of the Front StaffCIA: "This is the second of ten lessons dealing with conducting an initial offensive employing only conventional weapons, with a transition to the use of nuclear weapons. This lesson was intended to instruct students acting as senior officers of a front operations directorate and as chiefs of the intelligence directorate in the preparation of the front's air operational summary."
https://www.cia.gov/library/readingroom/document/5166d4f999326091c6a607ea
Document VII-272. CIA/DO Intelligence Information Special Report, 21 August 1981 [DOI, 1977].
77
General Staff Academy Lectures 1985
78
Spetsnaz Forces and Means in a Front Offensive OperationCIA: "The following report is a translation from Russian of the first in a series of lectures given at the Voroshilov General Staff Academy in 1985. The lecture provides a brief history of the Spetsnaz forces, outlines their mission, capabilities, organization, and planning, and describes some of their latest weapons and equipment, including the strong and weak points of this equipment as demonstrated by recent experience in Afghanistan."
https://www.archives.gov/files/declassification/iscap/pdf/2012-026-doc1.pdf
CIA/DO Intelligence Information Special Report, 12 June 1987 [DOI, 1985].
79
Soviet Strategic Rocket ForcesCIA: "The following report is a translation from Russian of the text of a lecture given at the Voroshilov General Staff Academy in 1985. The topic of the lecture is the Strategic Rocket Forces. The text is not in very good condition, but there is a brief historical introduction, some words about development, and discussion of theoretical questions such as the mission of the SRF in a conventional warfare context. There is also information on the structure of the SRF and some statistics about overall strength, but these appear to be taken from a western unclassified source."
https://www.archives.gov/files/declassification/iscap/pdf/2012-026-doc2.pdf
CIA/DO Intelligence Information Special Report, 24 June 1987 [DOI, 1985].
80
Ground ForcesCIA: "The following report is a translation froa Russian of the text of a lecture given at the Voroshilov General Staff Academy in 1985. The report discusses in rather general terms the role and mission of ground forces today and then devotes a few paragraphs each to the various branch arms, indicating what they do and bringing in a bit about changes over the years and in a couple of cases also speculates about future developments."
https://www.archives.gov/files/declassification/iscap/pdf/2012-026-doc3.pdf
CIA/DO Intelligence Information Special Report, 23 October 1987 [DOI, 1985].
81
Military Use of SpaceCIA: "The following intelligence report is a translation from Russian of one of a series of lectures presented at the General Staff Academy. It is devoted to a general discussion of military applications of space, and the information it contains is at a very basic level. It defines three missions of military space systems and gives some of the basic concepts of how space systems operate. The development of the theme is rather anecdotal and general; a large portion of the details appear to be based on open western sources. There are several gaps in the text where entire passages are illegible."
https://www.archives.gov/files/declassification/iscap/pdf/2012-026-doc4.pdf
CIA/DO Intelligence Information Special Report, 11 December 1987 [DOI, 1985].
82
Reconnaissance in Operations and Combat Actions of Formations in the NavyCIA: "The following intelligence report is a translation from Russian of one of a series a lectures presented at the General Staff Academy. It discusses reconnaissance in a strictly naval context. Under the rubric "Purpose and Tasks," it stresses the importance of a "constantly operating reconnaissance system" and briefly describes 5 categories of reconnaissance available to the Navy. The second part of the paper gives a sketch of the planning of reconnaissance and lists the type of information to be gathered in representative naval operations."
https://www.archives.gov/files/declassification/iscap/pdf/2012-026-doc5.pdf
CIA/DO Intelligence Information Special Report, 24 December 1987 [DOI, 1985].
83
Operational ReconnaissanceCIA: "The attached intelligence report ls a translation from Russian of the text of a lecture at the Voroshilov General Staff Academy on the subject of operational reconnaissance. It is a basic academic treatment of the topic, arranged into three sections: categories, tasks, and control of reconnaissance. It gives a fair rundown on resources, particularly OSHAZ and SPETSNAZ, available to the front. The text is a bit vague on the following points, but it appears twice to allude to high-level studies in progress that are expected to result in some reorganization and growth or reconnaissance capabilities in the near future (pages 14, 16) as well as to some data on what appears to be a computerized battle-management system (page 9)."
https://www.archives.gov/files/declassification/iscap/pdf/2012-026-doc6.pdf
CIA/DO Intelligence Information Special Report, 11 March 1988 [DOI, 1985].
84
Agent Reconnaissance in Front Offensive OperationsCIA: "The attached intelligence report is a translation from Russian of the text of a lecture at the Voroshilov General Staff Academy on the subject of agent reconnaissance in support of military operations. The organization of the paper is rather loose and the treatment is somewhat anecdotal. Points are sometimes introduced without being developed. The lecture first mentions briefly some new developments in the field. including an "improvement of TO&E" and an increase in size of reconnaissance units. This is followed by a list of the tasks for which agent reconnaissance is useful. and finally a discussion of planning and organization. Touches on various problems this type of reconnaissance faces and provides a very sober estimate of how effective it can be expected to operate."
https://www.archives.gov/files/declassification/iscap/pdf/2012-026-doc7.pdf
CIA/DO Intelligence Information Special Report, 25 March 1988 [DOI, 1985].
85
Reconnaissance on Behalf of a Front Offensive OperationCIA: "The attached intelligence report is a translation from Russian of the text of a lecture at the Voroshilov General Staff Academy on the subject of reconnaissance in support of front operations. The subject is divided into three main sections: (1) Objectives, tasks, and capabilities, (2) Planning and organization, and {3) Conduct of reconnaissance. Host of the lecture deals with the first section, the other two being addressed In rather more general terms with only a few concrete details."
https://www.archives.gov/files/declassification/iscap/pdf/2012-026-doc8.pdf
CIA/DO Intelligence Information Special Report, 25 March 1988 [DOI, 1985].
86
Aerial Reconnaissance in a Front Offensive OperationCIA: "The following report is a translation from Russian ·or the text of a lecture given at the Voroshilov General Staff Academy on the subject of aerial reconnaissance in a front offensive operation. After enumerating the tasks of reconnaissance, the paper describes in some detail the numbers of aircraft and drones available and the number of reconnaissance sorties they can make. The remaining sections, one on organization and planning, and the other on actual conduct of reconnaissance are somewhat more general."
https://www.archives.gov/files/declassification/iscap/pdf/2012-026-doc9.pdf
CIA/DO Intelligence Information Special Report, 13 May 1988 [DOI, 1985].
87
Rocket Troops and Artillery in a Front Offensive OperationCIA: "The following report is a translation from Russian of the text of a lecture at the Voroshilov General Staff Academy on the subject of rocket troops and artillery. It is a very organized, textbook presentation in four sections: mission, strength, use, and planning. The principal innovation appears to be the considerable space devoted to the Soviet counterpart of precision location strike systems, which are in one place termed coaparable to low-yield nuclear weapons. Several specific battlefield systems are mentioned briefly with their most salient characteristics; most of these facts are already known from other sources, but there appear to be a few new details on some systems."
https://www.archives.gov/files/declassification/iscap/pdf/2012-026-doc10.pdf
CIA/DO Intelligence Information Special Report, 24 May 1988 [DOI, 1985].
88
Troop Control in Front Offensive OperationsCIA: "The attached intelligence report is a translation from Russian of the text of a lecture at the Voroshilov General Staff Academy on the subject of command and control. The text is relatively short and the development of the topic lacks balance; some points are presented in considerable detail while others are ·mentioned almost in passing. While it has some fresh illustrative facts and figures, the content is basically the standard treatment of troop control."
https://www.archives.gov/files/declassification/iscap/pdf/2012-026-doc11.pdf
CIA/DO Intelligence Information Special Report, 24 June 1988 [DOI, 1985].
89
Current Status and Forms of Operational-Strategic Employment of the Navy in Ocean and Sea Theaters of Military OperationsCIA: "The following report is a translation from Russian of the text of a lecture at the Voroshilov General Staff Academy on the subject of the Soviet Navy. The text is fragmentary and poorly legible, but the first part does contain some inforamation on current naval systems and capabilities as wel l as some anticipated developments over the next few years in the areas of submarine running depth and naval missile systems. Unfortunately, the major omissions seem to be in the area of the current inventory of submarine and surface forces, although naval aviation inventory is covered. The lecture concludes with a textbook-style treatment of some basic concepts of operational doctrine and organization in the operations."
https://www.archives.gov/files/declassification/iscap/pdf/2012-026-doc12.pdf
CIA/DO Intelligence Information Special Report, 24 June 1988 [DOI, 1985].
90
Strategic Operations in a Ocean Theater of Military OperationsCIA: "The following intelligence report is a translation from Russian of the text of a lecture at the Voroshilov General Staff Academy on the subject of strategic operations in an ocean theater of military operations. The lecture opens with an assessment of US and NATO naval capabilities, with particular attention to ASW forces and means. This is followed by a general definition of a strategic operation in an ocean theater of military operations, its objectives, content, scale, and duration and a broad outline of the principles of preparing and conducting the operation. The paper concludes with a brief enumeration of the future directions of development of strategic operations in ocean theaters of military operations."
https://www.archives.gov/files/declassification/iscap/pdf/2012-026-doc13.pdf
CIA/DO Intelligence Information Special Report, 24 June 1988 [DOI, 1985].
91
Principles of Preparation and Conduct of a Front Defensive OperationCIA: "The attached intelligence report is a translation from Russian of the text of a lecture at the Voroshilov General Staff Academy on the subject of defensive operations. It starts off with the statement that defense is generally underrated and, consequently, too little study and training is devoted to it. The topic is developed under three main headings: the circumstances (the situation and objectives) of assuming a defense, the options for structuring it, and the principles of preparation and conduct of the actual defensive operation. The paper is illustrated with numerous examples from World War II, which serve more to justify defensive actions and prove their importance and necessity than to demonstrate the brilliance with which they can be executed."
https://www.archives.gov/files/declassification/iscap/pdf/2012-026-doc14.pdf
CIA/DO Intelligence Information Special Report, 30 June 1988 [DOI, 1985].
92
The Soviet Air ForcesCIA: "The following intelligence report is a translation from Russian of a fragment of the text of a lecture at, the Voroshilov General Staff Academy on the subject of the Soviet Air Forces. The text covers in brief outline form the mission, tasks and organization of the Soviet Air Forces. Interspersed with this are a few facts and figures, such as tha scale of participation of airborne landing forces in the exercise ZAPAD-81, and some suprsisingly candid comments, particularly on the BACKFIRE bomber."
https://www.archives.gov/files/declassification/iscap/pdf/2012-026-doc15.pdf
CIA/DO Intelligence Information Special Report, 18 July 1988 [DOI, 1985].
93
Organizational Structure of the Soviet Armed ForcesCIA: "The following intelligence report is a translation from Russian of the text of a lecture at the Voroshilov General Staff Academy on the organizational structure of the Soviet Armed Forces. This is apparently the introductory lecture in a series on the Soviet lirmed Forces, Soviet operational art, and the role of reconnaissance in operations. In brief survey form it covers the nature and role of Soviet military doctrine, the organization of the five branches of the Armed Forces and their branch arms, and the basic hierarchy of organizational entities. Of particular interest are references to current organizational and doctrinal issues and controversies, including a reference to Marshal Ogarkov's 1984 article in "Military Thought" in which he rejects of the idea of a limited nuclear war [redacted]."
https://www.archives.gov/files/declassification/iscap/pdf/2012-026-doc16.pdf
CIA/DO Intelligence Information Special Report, 29 July 1988 [DOI, 1985].
94
Soviet Operational ArtCIA: "The following intelligence report is a translation from Russian of the text of a lecture at the Voroshilov General Staff Academy on Soviet operational art. The text is a fairly well organized standard textbook treatment which touches on a few of the themes of current interest in Soviet operational art, such as integrated planning of nuclear and nonnuclear scenarios In operations and the effect of the introduction or precision-guided weapons on the preparation and conduct of operations . The paper opens with a brief history of Soviet operational art, followed by a discussion of the role, tasks, and general principles of, the theory of Soviet operational art, the principles of the preparation and conduct of operations, and the problems of their application in the present-day context."
https://www.archives.gov/files/declassification/iscap/pdf/2012-026-doc17.pdf
CIA/DO Intelligence Information Special Report, 29 July 1988 [DOI, 1985].
95
Strategic Rocket Forces and Air Defense ForcesCIA: "The following report is a cranslation from Russian of the text of a lecture given at the Voroshilov General Staff Academy in 1985. The topic of the lecture is the Strategic Rocket Forces and Air Defense Forces. The text is not in very good condition, but there is a historical introduction followed by a discussion of each branch: its mission, organization, and some very sketchy information on strength and types of armament."
"This report is an amended version ot ~ document previously issued undr the title Soviet Strategic Rocket Forces. Additional material recovered includes the introduction and beginning of the historical background, a section on the Soviet Air Defense Forces, and a few lines and words within the text. Sorne corrections have also been made in the text."
https://www.archives.gov/files/declassification/iscap/pdf/2012-026-doc18.pdf
CIA/DO Intelligence Information Special Report, 24 July 1989 [DOI, 1985].
96
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