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Miner / Node Decision Matrix
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OperateDon't Operate
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Mine & Reward 100%-C, (ER)-C-C, 0
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Mine & Reward 50%(.5ER)-C, (.5ER)-C(.5ER)-C, 0
Both red boxes represent the worst case scenario for each individual party.
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Mine & Reward 40%(.6ER)-C, (.4ER)-C(.6ER-C), 0Also, note that I was unsure if zero nodes were run would lead to miners receiving all rewards or if the allotted node amount would be placed on hold until nodes were created - hence the continuation with miner's reward schema in the instance of 0 nodes.
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Mine & Reward 30%(.7ER)-C, (.3ER)-C(.7ER-C), 0
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Mine & Don't Reward(ER-C), -C(ER-C), 0
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Don't Mine0 , 00 , 0
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Notes:
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ER = Expected Returns
C = Costs (Monthly)
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Expected returns can be imagined in its current notation as revenues / estimated revenues. However, this is a simple model. It does not take into account any influence of a "price multiplier" in the form of coins being taken of the market to be placed as collateral in nodes. This however, is obviously important in the decision making of a rational miner. Keep this in mind. The more lucrative nodes are, the more that are likely to be run up to the max number of nodes allowed - until a new one is made every "x" # of new coins introduced into the supply.
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Costs, while in this model are limited to monthly costs for simplicity, do not take into account opportunity cost of running miners for SPR, or investment of SPR/ fiat into SNs. It also doesn't take into account initialy investment in either mining equipment or nodes themselves. These are both important in decision making on either party
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