responsible person

Source - scopusSearch, wosSearch, reference

If reference, what is the source

Treatment (VC, characteristics of the VC)

Sample (characteristics of the sample: number of treated/untreated firms, sector, firm size, other characteristics)

Underlying dataset

Outcome Variables

Empirical Methods

preliminaryNumRating_stage0

VerRating_stage2

Comparison - Final Comment

RespPerson_stage1

RespPerson_stage2

Caselli, S., Gatti, S., Perrini, F.,

European Financial Management

34 VC-backed and 112 non VC-backed firms. VC backed firms used IPO as an exit strategy.

The Italian Association of venture capital and private equity operators for VC, Italian Stock Exchange, Datastream for firm information, Simba and Epo for trademarks and patents

number for registered patents

VC has an insignificant effect on number of patents (innovation), but has a positive and significant effect on sales growth

Firm-level implications of early stage venture capital investment — An empirical investigation☆

Engel, D., Keilbach, M.

Journal of Empirical Finance

142 VC-backed firms, 21 375 non-VC-backed

year effects, area, industry, firm chars. - size, limited partnership, public limited company, gender of founding team

VC selects firms with higher patent numbers before the funding, VC does not significantly increase number of patents after the funding

Government, venture capital and the growth of European high-tech entrepreneurial firms

BE, FI, FR, DE,IT, ES,UK

8370 firms, 759 VC-backed. 538 IVC-backed firms, 239 Gov.VC-backed, 126 cofinanced firms. All firms must have gotten their first round of financing between 1994 and 2004. cca.40% are software

VICO for VC backed, Amadeus for non-vc-Backed

Employment and sales growth

size, age, geo, country, industry, time ctrls

First step PSM matching, then OLS, FE, GMM-SYS

IVC effect only on sales gr., not on emp. gr.. GVC effect on none. Syndicates only mildly effective if led by IVC.

Governmental and independent venture capital investments in Europe: A firm-level performance analysis

Cumming, D.J., Grilli, L., Murtinu, S.

Journal of Corporate Finance

Belgium, Finland, France,Germany, Italy, Spain, UK

IVC, GVC, syndicate VC

8370 companies, out of it 759 VC-backed, all less then 20 y. o., born independednt, high tech firms

VICO, Amadeus, local commercial sources

exit type, successful exit vs. negative exit (liquidation)

country, industry, year, age, bubble (1999-2000 period funding), firm size, time from VC receipt, profit margin, patent stock

multinominal logit model, matching

Syndicates and IVC are more likel to reach positive exit, comparing to GVC, also VC backing does not increase the likelihood of liquidation

No non-VC-backed companies were incorporated in the introduced models

Not Relevant: no counterfactual methods (models only estimated on firms that got IVC, GVC, or syndicate VC)

Not Relevant: only different types of VC-backed firms were taken into account

Growth factors of research-based spin-offs and the role of venture capital investing

Bock, C., Huber, A., Jarchov, S.

The Journal of Technology Transfer

parent research institute investment, VC - equity, noveltechnology, training

98 research-based spin-offs originating from 'Fraunhofer Gesellschaft, founded in 1997-2012, from different industries (31 out of it were VC-backed - 31.63 %)

internal database from Fraunhofer Ventures; survey of 100 startups - 41% response rate

EE and revenue growth rates

age, number of founders, GDP, Sector (if B2B or not), enterpreunership experience of founders, patent dummy, orientation dummy (product or services), high-tech dummy,

OLS, 2 step IV, Probit

RBSO with VC grow significantly faster compared to RBSOs without VC,superior performance is more likely attributable to VC acting as a coach

Only second part of the analysis is focused on VC role in company growth. All sample originates from the same research organisation - existing potential for bias

Partially Relevant, see the comment. Results of VC section probably troublesome endogenous.

Alperovych, Y., Hübner, G., Lobet, F.

Journal of Business Venturing

dummy for VC, GVC, PVC

515 VC-backed +515 non VC-backed firms in knowledge intensive services, manufacturing, HORECA

Factiva, Venture Economics, Capital IQ, and/or Bureau Van Dijk's Zephyr

productivity/efficiency index

age, roa, financial leverage, HH index, industry FE.

VC financing has a negative effect on producitivity/efficiency, mainly due to GVC. PVC has a positive effect on productivity/efficiency in years following investment. GVC, in particular sub-regional funds, has a negative efffect on prod/efficiency

DV is an index of productivity/efficiency that is not widely used

Not sure: compares impact of different types of VC providers in terms of productivity

How venture capitalists spur invention in Spain: Evidence from patent trajectories

VC-funding dummy + dummies indicating number of years since receiving VC funding

233 VC-financed firms, high-tech, focused on innovation + 91381 control firms

BvD’s Zephyr, BvD’s SABI, VentureXpert and Capital&Corporate, OEPM and FreePatentsOnline.com

propensity to patent, number of patents

patent stock, time,region, industry FE, age, size, export status, liquidity ratio, ratio of total debt to total equity

DiD, probit, poisson

VC funding has a positive effect on prob. of patenting and on number of patents. This effect is largest in the first two years after receiving VC

Relevant: VC positively affects the number of successful patent applications and the probability of filing at least one successful patent application, but tend to spur innnovations in time

On growth drivers of high-tech start-ups: Exploring the role of founders' human capital and venture capital

Colombo, M., Grilli, L.

Journal of Business Venturing

VC and human capital

RITA, AIFI (for variables VCsector and VCarea, see p. 617)

firm size (measured by log of number of employees and sales)

[p. 617] age, number of founders, length (= average number of years) of education of founders, scientific/technical education length of founders, length of technical work experience of founders, length of commercial work experience of founders in the same sector as their own firm, length of work experience of founders in other sectors; Dummy variables (Manager, Innovative technology as the main purpose for the creation of firm, incubated, parent company, academic start-up), VCsector, VCarea

a) to prevent from survivorship bias: Heckman two-step procedure [see p. 615 for detailed describtion]; b) OLS without controls for endogeneity

greater human capital = higher attaction for VC investments; if VC investors act as a "couch" (= they help to extend resources and capabilities, they provide consultancy services) it has smaller explanatory power of growth for VC-backed firms than non-VC backed firms (the advent of VC investor weakens the link between founders' and firms' capabilities --> it leads to the reconfiguration of firms' capabilities and opens access to external resources); if VC investors act as a "scout" (= they identify NTBFs with great prospects and provide them financing, VC investor actively involves in the running of portfolio), it has greater effect on VC-backed firms than on non-VC-backed firms; VC investors are less exposed than other investors to the "adverse selection" and "moral hazard" problems; VC financing accounts for an estimated 275 % increase in the number of employees [result from p. 619]

The effect of venture capital financing on the sensitivity to cash flow of firm's investments

Bertoni F., Colombo, M.G., Croce, A.

European Financial Management

379 NTBFsб 52 out of it VC-backed - 13.7 %

level of investments I/K

Euler equation, GMM

after receiving VC NTBFs invest more, also IVC-backed firms' investments are not sensitive to internal cashflow, whereas CVC-backed shown high sensitivity

Distinguish the effects of VC financing according to the type of investor - IVC (independent), CVC (corporate), only one control variable.

1996-2004 and for some specifications 2002-2005

84 VC-backed and 154 non VC-backed firms, mainly in knowledge intensive services and machinery and equipment.

KSV firm database, survey carried out by the authors

sales revenue and empl growth, ratio sales from innovation/total sales

The impact of venture capital on the productivity growth of European entrepreneurial firms: 'Screening' or 'value added' effect?

Croce, A., Marti, J., Murtinu, S.

Journal of Business Venturing

Belgium, Finland, France, Italy, Spain, UK

VC - funding, screening and value added

696 firms (267 VC-backed - 38.36 %), less then 20 y. o., independent at foundation, operate in medium and high tech industries

VICO for VC backed, Amadeus

TFP growth, partial (L and K)productivity growth (sales to inputs ratio)

cccctry dummies, industry dummies, year dummies, firm size, firm age,

OLS, GMM-SYS, matching

The role of domestic and cross-border venture capital investors in the growth of portfolio companies

Devigne, D., Vanacker, M., Manigart, S.,Paeleman, I.

Small Business Economics

BE, FI, FR, DE,IT, ES,UK

Cross-border VC vs domestic VC

761 VC-backed companies active in high-tech inds.

VICO for startups, Amadeus and local dbs for financial data. Patent data from PATSTAT

Growth of sales, total assets, payroll expenses

intangible assets ratio, bank/uni/gov/corp investor, inds.,cuntry, portfolio company chars.

Random-coefficient model, FE for controls

Comps. backed by domestic VC grow initially at a higher rate than comps. backed by cross-border VC/ In later years, comps. backed by cross-border exhibit higher growth/

Venture capital financing and the growth of high-tech start-ups: Disentangling treatment from selection effects

Bertoni, F., Colombo, M.G., Grilli. L.,

538 high-tech firms, 58% VC-backed

Likelihood of receiving VC, effect of VC on employees and sales

incubation, alliance at foundation, stockpatent, public subsidy, eco/tech educ, area

GMM, Heckmann selection

Selection not significant, treatment of VC high positive efect on growth in sales and employees

Relevant: shows effects of VC with correction for selection effection

Venture capital investor type and the growth mode of new technology-based firms

Bertoni, F., Colombo, M.G., Grilli, L.

Small Business Economics

IVC (independent VC) + CVC (corporate VC)

531 in manufacturing and services NTBFs firms of which are 47 IVC or CVC backed firms [p. 528] --> 23 IVC + 24 CVC [p. 534]; CVC more common among NTBFs than among other firms;

RITA directory (consists of AIFI to identify population of Italian VC backed firms + VentureXpert database...), questionnaire

growth of sales + growth of employment

[p. 535]: firm size (= log [EmployeesNumber]), dummy variables: incubated, alliance with another firm in foundation, created by academic founders, public subsidy received, number of patents; other variables: human capital of the founding team, technical/scientific education, years of work-experience

[see p. 538] - Gibrat-law dynamic panel data model (with stress on differenciation between SR and LR effects); to conserve endogeneity, they used GMM-system estimates;

Relevant for comparison between IVC and CVC

The different roles played by venture capital and private equity investors on the investment activity of their portfolio firms

Bertoni,. F., Ferrer, M.A.,Martí, J.

Small Business Economics

low and medium tech firms in buyout (246) and expansion stage (78) , early stage firms excluded

I/K ratio - sensitivity of investment to cash flow

time,Firm fe, lagged I, sales, debt, cash flow

SYS-GMM, diff-GMM, FE, Hausmann-Taylor regression

VC reduces dependency (sensitivity) on internal cashflow to make investments = VC alleviates financial constrain on growth, results of PE are opposite = tigther governance with generating a lot of debt

Venture capital financing and the financial distress risk of portfolio firms: How independent and bank-affiliated investors differ

Croce, A.,D’Adda, D., Ughetto. E.

Small Business Economics

BE, FI, FR, DE, IT, ES, UK

VC, BVC and IVC dummies

Matched sample: s 51 BVC-backed firms, 332 non-VC backed firms matched to BVC-backed firms, 77 IVC-backed firms, and 402 non-VC backed firms matched to IVC-backed. All firms are in high tech sectors.

financial distres risk (the default probability) and debt exposure ( financial debt over total sales)

country, industry and time FE.

BVC select firms with lower distress risks, but BVC does not significnatly reduces this risk after investment. IVC is not significantly related to distress risk. BVC has a positive effect on debt in the post investment period.

The role of private versus governmental venture capital in fostering job creation during the crisis

Croce, A., Martí, J., Reverte, C.

Small Business Economics

384 VC-backed firms, 211 PVC-backed, 173 GOVC-backed, 888 control group non-vc-backed

amount financed, industry, geo, year

GVC has higher impact on emp. growth than PVC. During the crisis PVC grow higher than GVC

High-tech entrepreneurial firms’ innovation in different institutional settings. Do venture capital and private equity have complementary or substitute effects?

Corsi, Ch., Prencipe, A.

Industry and Innovation

Industry and Innovation

12 EU countries (Belgium, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Italy, Luxembourg, Norway, Portugal, Spain, Sweden, UK)

326 firms (103 firms with VC/PE ownership; 223 without VC/PE ownership) in high-tech industry

frequency of patenting (PATENTS - dependent variable);

firm size, firm age, ROA (as performance), firm liquidity (var: CURRENT RATIO), country's regulatory quality, country's ease of doing business, sectorial dummies based on the Eurostat classification

perhaps: Poisson quasi-likelihood model + instrumental variables approach (see p. 16)

VC/PE play a stronger role in firm innovation in countries with less-developed capital markets; the effects of VC/PE on firm innovation is greater in countries with low entrepreneurial culture; the level of IPR protection in a country has no influence on the effects of VC/PE firms' innovation;

Venture capitalists at work: A diff-in-diff approach at late-stages of the screening process

Bronzini, R., Caramellino, G., Magri S.

Journal of Business Ventures

Getting VC at the late stage of screening process, indep. VC and captive VC

101 VC-backed firms (70% are private, 11% corp. spin-offs, 17% uni spinoffs), ctrl group is 258 firms

assets, labor costs, sales, employees, monthly wage, ebitda/assets, ROE, patent app. dummy/number, survival rate, leverage, fin.debts, equity, bank/fin.debts, bank short/bank, interest rate

year, firm FE, init.age/sector/area*post,

VC in post treatment increases total assets, labour costs. Innovation activity in 2/3 years after VC financing: increasing prob. and number of patent application. No positive effect of VC on sales growth and profitability - in first 5 years the effect is negative and sign.. After 5 years, sales increase for VC backed firms so the profitabilty is driven by focus on the innovation. Equity, interest rate growth. Employees growth after VC in t+1. Average 5-year survival rate is not different.. Positive VC effects on size and innovation are exclusively driven by independent VC investors, captive VC is not significant

Does governmental venture capital spur invention and innovation? Evidence from young European biotech companies

Bertoni, F., Tykvová, T.

BE, FI, FR, DE, IT, ES, UK

GVC and IVC dummies

665 European biotechnology start-ups and young companies, of which 125 are VC-backed

patent stock and citation weighted patent stock

size ofthe syndicate, age and age squared, lagged stock of patents, time and firm FE

What money cannot buy: a new approach to measure venture capital ability to add non-financial resources

Quas, A., Martí, J., Reverte, C.

Small Business Economics

VC, participative loan

915 VC firms, 1551 participative loans firms

employees, total assets, sales

amount, age, intangibles, cash, in/experienced VC

diff-in-diff, to check the robustness of diff-in-diff assumptions: FE, RE, Coarsened exact matching, PSM

VC firms grew more than Part. loans in emp., total assets, sales both by non-financial and financial resources (financial resources have lower impact in terms of margin over part. loans than non-financial resources.). Only VC firms that have broad experience contribute to the growth of firms.

Government as fund-of-fund and VC fund sponsors: effect on employment in portfolio companies

Standaert, M., Manigart, S.

Small Business Economics

impact of independent/captive/government hybrid VC funds on job creation

108 companies backed by ARKimedes government FoF program in Flanders

Bureau van Dijk's Bel-first database, Bureau van Dijk's Zephyr database, Belgian Law Gazette, PATSTAT, PMV website, VC fund company websites

employment in companies (dependent); independent dummies (hybrid IVC, hybrid CVC, hybrid GVC)

VC investor age, size of hybrid VC fund, company age at first investment, num of patents, intangibla assets ratio, industry dummies, investment amount, syndicate presence, finacing round, lead investor, year dummies

Random Coefficient Modeling

companies backed by hybrid IVC funds create more jobs compared to hybrid CVC and hybrid GVC

interesting facts (governments became the most important early stage investors in Europe - 35 % of total fundraising in 2014 [InvestEurope, here in p.358]; the whole study indicates that hybrid IVC is the most effective form for creating jobs even though it's not its main goal (as GVC's is); study also observes firm growth and VC investment

Bertoni, F., Croce, A., Guerini, M.

Journal of Corporate Finance

Bertoni, D'adda, Grilli (2016)

BE, FI, FR, DE, IT, ES, UK

VC dummy, VC x CF/K

128 VC-backed, 233 non-vc-backed, high-tech, younger than 10 years. 51% of companies only get one round of financing

lagged investment, sales growth, CF/K, firm year FE

Investment curve of young companeis is U-shaped. Financial constraints (dependy of investment on cash-flow_ disappears only after a follow-up round of financing. 51% of firms in the sample get only one round of financing.

Private equity, investment and financial constraints: firm-level evidence for France and the United Kingdom

Engel, D., Stiebale, J.

Small Business Economics

private equity, private equity dummy

18 085 companies in UK and 7543 companies in FR, both private equity and non-private equity-backed

Investment ratio to kapital, secondary growth of sales, employment and labour productivity,

lagged tangible and intangible fixed assets, lagged value of long-term debt, 1-year change in the logarithm of sales, cash flow

dynamic version of a sales accelerator model, generalized method of moments (GMM) estimator

PE financing is associated with significant reductions in financial constraints; The overall effect of PEFs declines with increasing change in the cash flow to capital ratio. Expansion financing clearly spurs investment and reduces ICF sensitivities, for buyouts results are mixed

"private equity investors such as venture capital companies" - authors equate VC and PE in this case, so we can talk about PE effects as including VC effects.