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Maj Gen P K Mallick, VSM (Retd)

25 May 2024

Use of Cyber, Information, Electronic Warfare, AI and Relevant Aspects by China

Centre For Eastern and North Eastern Research Studies – Kolkata (CENERS – K)

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Concepts of Warfare

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The Era of Mao Zedong (1927–1976): The Curse of the Final War and Active Defence

The Era of Deng Xiaoping (1976–1989): A Break from the Final War and a Shift to Local War

The Era of Jiang Zemin (1989–2004): Local Wars under High-Tech Conditions

The Era of Hu Jintao (2004–2012): Informatized Local Wars.

The Era of Xi Jinping (2012–Present): Intelligentized Warfare

Changes in China’s Military Strategy

China’s Leaders and Military Strategy

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The concept entails incorporating more artificial intelligence and machine learning into various platforms and systems. Building atop big data and cloud computing, the concept of “intelligence-ization” would seem to focus on allowing more data processing to occur within weapons and platforms, to better handle the huge amounts of data that are now flowing through the various networks

Intelligentized Warfare. The CCP announced in October 2020, that modern warfare is evolving to include intelligentization and incorporated the concept into its 14th Five-Year Plan. China expects that advanced technologies like AI, cloud computing and big data analytics will be changing the future of warfare quickly.

PLA strategists have stated that operationalization of AI will be necessary to improve the speed and quality of information processing by reducing battlefield uncertainty and providing decision making advantage over potential adversaries. The PLA is also exploring next-generation operational concepts like intelligentized warfare, cross-domain mobile warfare, attrition warfare by intelligent swarms, AI-based space confrontation and cognitive control operations.

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China’s Military Organizations after Reforms

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Strategic Support Force (SSF)

Established in 2015, the PLA Strategic Support Force (SSF) centralizes the command and control of space operations and information operations (which include cyber, electronic, and psychological warfare). The SSF also supports the use of these capabilities by the services. PLA Strategic Support Force (PLASSF). This entity brings China’s space, network warfare, and electronic warfare forces under a single structure. The PLASSF’s forces are responsible or achieving space dominance, network dominance and electronic dominance, which are in turn essential to establishing information dominance. in the United States, there is no single service or combatant command that combines space, electronic warfare, and computer network warfare operations. Fielding of space forces is the responsibility of a new service, the United States Space Force (USSF), while the conduct of military space operations is the responsibility of US Space Command (USSPACECOM), a unified combatant command. Computer network operations are the responsibility of Cyber Command (USCYBERCOM), another unified combatant command, drawing upon the various services for cybercapable forces. CYBERCOM shares some tasks with the National Security Agency, an intelligence organization and not a military force. Electronic warfare, meanwhile, is the responsibility of individual services. While the SSF’s most potent cyberwarfare formations, namely technical reconnaissance bureaus with advanced persistent threat (APT) capabilities subordinate to the SSF Network Systems Department, frequently target defense industry, media, telecommunications, and other organizations to support the PRC’s peacetime cyber and economic espionage campaigns,11 they would likely prosecute more sensitive missions against political or infrastructural targets at the sole behest of Xi Jinping through the CMC, in keeping with the desire for tight, centralized control over these capabilities. The PLASSF was established in December 2015. The key reason China created such a specialized unit was to solidify joint operation capabilities, develop the concept of information warfare, satisfy the necessity of information assistance in an expanded area of warfare, and perform effective psychological warfare in an informationalized war.

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Key Departments and Roles of the SSF

Source: http://www.nids.mod.go.jp/publication/chinareport/pdf/china_report_EN_web_2021_A01.pdf

The raising of the PLA Strategic Support Force (PLASSF) Space Systems Department (SSD) is an organisational innovation that places all major components of China’s space program under a unified command structure. The SSF Space Systems Department is responsible for nearly all PLA space operations, including space launch and support; space surveillance; space information support; space telemetry, tracking, and control; and space warfare. The SSD integrates space-related Research, Development and Acquisition, operations and training under a single authority.

The PLASSF Space Systems Department is central to China’s ambitions in space. The PLA has already fielded electro-optical (EO), radar and other space-based sensor platforms that can transmit images of the Earth’s surface to ground stations in near-real-time. China is investing heavily in EO, synthetic aperture radar (SAR) and electronic reconnaissance surveillance capabilities. The SSD has taken over almost every aspect of PLA space operations including space launch and support; space telemetry, tracking, and control, space information support, space attack and space defence.

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Information Support Force (ISF)

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Information Support Force (ISF)

On 19 April 2024 Chinese President Xi Jinping launched an Information Support Force (ISF), a new wing of the People’s Liberation Army. ISF is revised version of SSF.

ISF will integrate PLA’s joint operation system, carry out Information support operations in a precise and effective manner and facilitate military operations in various directions and fields.

Xi emphasised to accelerate innovation and development, adhere to the fundamental traction of combat needs, strengthen system planning, promote joint construction and sharing, enhance scientific and technological innovation and build a network information system that meets the requirement of modern warfare.

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Why ISF Now

Amalgamation of complex emerging domains like cyber space, EW and information under a single umbrella of SSF was a failed experiment.
Shooting down of the Chinese surveillance balloon by the U.S., corruption investigations into Generals and a failure to achieve synergies across the different divisions within the SSF may have convinced Xi Jin Ping that the existing structure is not yielding the results anticipated.
Modernisation and Reorganisation drive of the PLA had problems. Leaders in China want to strengthen the military in the lead-up to 2027 when the PLA becomes 100 years old.
Relative success of the functions which were moved under the CMC has convinced the political leadership that they will have the control they want
Domains previously under command of SSF have now been placed under direct control of CMC.
CMC will keep a close watch on equipment procurement and management. Restructuring will simplify chain of accountability by removing the SSF commander as a mediator.
CMC focused on cutting out layers of command and enabling top leaders to speak directly to tactical forces in wartime.
Lt Gen Bi Yi who is the deputy commander of SSF will command the newly formed ISF.
Whereabouts of Lt Gen Ju Gansheng, Commander of the SSF are unknown. He was rumoured to be involved in military procurement fraud.

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SSF Split in Three Parts

Space System Department graduates as Aerospace Force.
Network System Department graduates as Cyberspace Force.
Base 311 and other elements elevated as Information Support Force. Possibly information communication bases including information communication brigade could be included into it.

The newly reorganised / introduced branches are as follows:

Four Major Military Branches:

People's Liberation Army Ground Force (PLAGF)
People's Liberation Army Navy (PLAN)
People's Liberation Army Air Force (PLAAF)
People's Liberation Army Rocket Force (PLARF)

Four Independent Arms Branches directly subordinate to the PLA CMC:

People's Liberation Army Aerospace Force (PLASF)
People's Liberation Army Cyberspace Force (PLACF)
People's Liberation Army Information Support Force (PLAISF)
People's Liberation Army Joint Logistics Support Force (PLAJLSF)

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Questions

Has concentration of power and centralisation of decision making enabled breaking through bureaucratic and vested interests to enact changes.

What has been impact of centralisation on flow of information within the system, particularly the top leader.

Has centralisation of power led to greater rigidity in policy thinking and implementation.

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Electronic Warfare

While electronic warfare is nominally aimed at equipment such as radars, communications systems, weapons control and guidance systems, and electronic countermeasures and electronic counter-countermeasures, it is actually about dominating the “electromagnetic space or electromagnetic spectrum, ranging from super low frequencies to ultraviolet, including the visible light spectrum. 26 Because electronics are now integrated into the very function of most weapons, electronic warfare now occupies a much more central role in establishing information dominance. Indeed, electronics have assumed a growing proportion of the cost and sophistication of modern weapons; some of the most expensive elements of modern warships and combat aircraft are the onboard electronics, rather than the metal. As one PLA analysis noted, electronics represent 20% of the cost of a modern warship, 24% of the cost of a modern armored fighting vehicle, 33% of a military aircraft, 45% of a missile, and 66% of a satellite.27

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PLASSF’s Electronic Warfare Capabilities

China’s EW capability almost equivalent to that of developed countries.
EW equipment has been advanced based on land, sea and air.
PLA possesses ground-based EW equipment, a wide spectrum of air-based signals intelligence collection and reconnaissance aircraft, unmanned aircraft and some electronic warfare fighter aircrafts.
Several passive radar operations, synthetic aperture radar satellites and signals intelligence satellites,
Chinese army possesses manned electronic aircraft, which are Y-8 or Y9.
Use of drones to carry EW payload.
The PLA developed 11 types of special air mission flights such as electronic aircraft in which the Army attached electronic warfare equipment into the former Y-8 and Y-9 flight types. The latest one out of 11 types is Y-9JB (Gaoxin-8) electronic intelligence collection, Y-9XZ (Gaoxin-10) electronic/psychological warfare aircraft, and Y-9G (Gaoxin-11) electronic warfare reconnaissance aircraft, all of which are the electronically renovated version of the existing Y-9 flights.

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Psychological Warfare

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Regarding public opinion online, if the right voice does not occupy this space, the wrong voice will spread. In this battlefield without gunpowder smoke, whether we can stand up and win is directly related to national political security, social harmony, and stability.

--- Xi Jinping

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Terminology

Information operation
Psychological operation
Strategic communications
Influence operation
Perception management
Cyber-enable Influence/information warfare and manipulation (IIWAM)
Cognitive operation
Political Warfare
Public information operations
Public field diplomacy
Or other similar terms?
Information advantage

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“What's in a name? That which we call a rose/ By any other name would smell as sweet.”

---- William Shakespeare

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The PRC’s Cyber Actors The PRC relies upon a vast constellation of bureaucracies to carry out its state-sponsored cyber operations. Among the most prominent of these are three civilian and military organizations: the Ministry of Public Security (MPS), the Ministry of State Security (MSS), and the People’s Liberation Army’s Strategic Support Force . The Ministry of Public Security (MPS)’s provincial Network Security Protection Detachments secure the PRC’s domestic network infrastructure by looking for intrusions and investigating internet crimes, the latter of which includes removing what the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) deems “harmful information.”1 The MSS runs cyber-enabled espionage and counter-espionage operations against all manner of foreign government agencies, companies, and dissidents through its provincial departments supported by penetration testers and tool developers housed within the various provincial and functional offshoots of its central-level 13th Bureau, otherwise known as the China Information Technology Evaluation Center

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Main actors implementing Chinese psychological operations

Within the Party.

Propaganda Department, which oversees ideology, controls the entire media spectrum and all the cultural production in the country.
United Front Work Department (UFWD), with its twelve offices reflecting its main targets
International Liaison Department (ILD), which maintains relations with foreign political parties.
610 Office, which has agents across the world acting outside any legal framework.
The Chinese Communist Youth League (CYL) serving as a link toward young people, as an incubator for future Party executives and as a force that can be mobilized when needed

Within the state. Ministry of State Security (MSS), which is the main civilian intelligence agency and Taiwan Affairs Office (TAO), in charge of the propaganda aimed at Taiwan.

Within PLA. Strategic Support Force (SSF) through its Network Systems Department. Base 311, headquartered in Fuzhou, is dedicated to the implementation of the “Three Warfares” strategy. It also operates media companies as civilian covers and a fake hotel to hide a training center.

Public and private companies. Play an important role in collecting the data needed to decide who should be targeted by influence operations, when, and how.

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Main Actors

Diasporas. With the dual objective of controlling them – so that they do not represent a threat for the Chinese power.

Diplomacy

Influence over international organisations and norms. Beijing deploys classic diplomatic resources along with clandestine influence operations.
“Wolf-Warrior” diplomacy. Aggressive postures adopted by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs’ spokespersons and a dozen diplomats. Proven counter-productive.

Economy. Economic coercion takes very different forms: a ban from the Chinese domestic market, embargos, trade sanctions and restrictions on domestic investment, quotas imposed on regions highly dependent on Chinese tourists or mass boycotts. Beijing increasingly imposes censorship as a prerequisite to access its domestic market; many companies end up bowing under pressure.

Politics. With the goal of penetrating target countries to influence public policymaking mechanisms maintaining direct relationships with political parties and influential political figures.

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Social Media Warfare - Borrowing a Boat Out to Sea�

Long-standing Chinese government strategy to exploit foreign media to deliver Chinese propaganda.
Chinese military views social media as a tool for influence and broader information operations at home and abroad.
PLA has a de facto presence on Western platforms through Chinese state-run media accounts on Facebook, Twitter, YouTube, Instagram, and others that relay its messages to unwitting audiences and help the military collect data on its effectiveness.
PLA is developing technologies for subliminal messaging, deep fakes, overt propaganda and public sentiment analysis on Facebook, Twitter, LINE and other platforms

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Cognitive Domain Operations (CDO)

Emerging technology such as artificial intelligence and big data are key to creating profound advancements in CDO.
Next evolution of warfare will be cognitive warfare.
Defeat the enemy by employing the method of “mind superiority.”
CDO actions integrate military, political, economic, public opinion, psychology, legal theory and other means to achieve strategic national security goals that affect a target’s cognition, decision making, and behaviour.
Seizing mind dominance in the cognitive domain and subduing the enemy without fighting is the highest realm of warfare.
Shortcomings the PLA is facing: not enough high-level planning, not enough joint integration across the other domains and not enough innovation. PLA has little research on the technology and equipment for cognitive domain operations on mainstream social networking platforms. It needs to improve its big data, natural language processing, and deep learning capabilities.
PLA should use artificial intelligence (AI) to run its bot network on social media, which would be able to create content based on human guidance, select the appropriate time to post on social media and be able to coordinate between these “sockpuppet” accounts.

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Cyber Warfare

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Defensive Cyber Operations

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There is no national security without cybersecurity

-- President Xi Jinping, February 2014

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Espionage Operations

China hosts some of the world’s most vibrant and successful technology companies. It also remains a major victim of cybercrime.
Chinese hackers have done cyber espionage at emerging high-technology advanced manufacturing companies of industries, like semiconductors, biotechnology and aerospace in the U.S., Japan, Europe and Southeast Asia.
Keith Alexander, a former NSA Director, said that the Chinese operations enabled the “greatest transfer of wealth in history.”

Volt Typhoon is a campaign, by Chinese state agents actively gaining access to industrial control systems and other critical national infrastructure,“ It doesn't just pose a threat to the U.S. It poses a threat to anybody in the CNI [Critical National Infrastructure] world. On February 7, the U.S. government's cybersecurity agency released a statement blaming the Chinese government for Volt Typhoon and said it was designed to bringdown U.S. computer systems in the event of a war or open hostility between the two counties. Volt Typhoon is diffi cult to defeat because it uses "living off the land“ technology. unlike traditional malware attacks, living off the land hacking systems do not use any of their own fi les. That means they do not require an attacker to install any code or scripts within the target system. Instead, it uses tools that are already present in the computer system, such as Windows Management, which makes detection much more diffi cult and allows hackers to stay unnoticed within a computer system for months or even years. "The U.S. authoring agencies have confirmed that Volt Typhoon has compromised the IT environments of multiple critical infrastructure organizations—primarily in Communications, Energy, Transportation Systems, and Water and Waste water Systems Sectors—in the continental and non-continental United States and its territories, including Guam,"

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Offensive Operations

Ciaran Martin, Ex Chief Executive of National Cyber Security Centre, UK said, China, unlike Russia, had no history of disruptive cyber operations. They are now moving like Russia. By infiltrating critical infrastructure including energy and communication networks.
In March 2024 UK confirmed that China backed hackers where responsible for a cyber attack targeting UK elections watchdog and a surveillance operation on British politicians.
Christopher Wray, Director of the FBI said on 19 April 2024, Chinese government-linked hackers have infiltrated critical US infrastructure and are waiting for just the right moment to deal a devastating blow. An ongoing Chinese hacking campaign known as Volt Typhoon has successfully gained access to numerous American companies in telecommunications, energy, water and other critical sectors.
Guam

Volt Typhoon is a campaign, by Chinese state agents actively gaining access to industrial control systems and other critical national infrastructure,“ It doesn't just pose a threat to the U.S. It poses a threat to anybody in the CNI [Critical National Infrastructure] world. On February 7, the U.S. government's cybersecurity agency released a statement blaming the Chinese government for Volt Typhoon and said it was designed to bringdown U.S. computer systems in the event of a war or open hostility between the two counties. Volt Typhoon is diffi cult to defeat because it uses "living off the land“ technology. unlike traditional malware attacks, living off the land hacking systems do not use any of their own fi les. That means they do not require an attacker to install any code or scripts within the target system. Instead, it uses tools that are already present in the computer system, such as Windows Management, which makes detection much more diffi cult and allows hackers to stay unnoticed within a computer system for months or even years. "The U.S. authoring agencies have confirmed that Volt Typhoon has compromised the IT environments of multiple critical infrastructure organizations—primarily in Communications, Energy, Transportation Systems, and Water and Waste water Systems Sectors—in the continental and non-continental United States and its territories, including Guam,"

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Cyber Exploitation Activities

Chinese hackers have done cyber espionage at emerging high-technology advanced manufacturing companies of industries, like semiconductors, biotechnology and aerospace in the U.S., Japan, Europe and Southeast Asia. They were interested in the financial information and negotiation strategies of companies in the banking, energy, law and pharmaceutical sectors. Keith Alexander, a former NSA Director, said that the Chinese operations enabled the “greatest transfer of wealth in history.”

The Washington Post reported that Chinese hackers stole critical files relating to missile defence, including “the advanced Patriot missile system, … an Army system for shooting down ballistic missiles, … and the Navy’s Aegis ballistic missile defence system.” The hackers also gathered information on planes, helicopters, and ships, including “the F/A-18 fighter jet, the V-22 Osprey, the Black Hawk helicopter and the Navy’s new Littoral Combat Ship, which is designed to patrol waters close to shore.” These were the weapons on which the United States would rely in a fight with China.

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Since 2020, India has faced multiple malware attacks against seaports, ten distinct Indian power sector organisations (including four of the five Regional Load Despatch Centres (RLDC) responsible for the operation of the power grid through balancing electricity supply and demand) and oil and gas facilities of Power System Operation Corporation (POSOCO), National Thermal Power Corporation (NTPC) Kudgi and Telangana State Transco. Suspected APTs behind these attacks include the notorious Chinese hacking group identified by the FBI as 'Barium' (or APT 41).
It is unclear whether a cyber intrusion facilitated an October 2020 power outage in Mumbai. Indian government authorities have offered conflicting root cause assessments for this incident.
In April 2022, American cybersecurity company Recorded Future informed that Indian power grid institutions were attacked by ShadowPad malware attributed to conduct espionage activities in the Ladakh region of India.
In March 2021. cyber-intelligence company Cyfirma reported that two major Indian vaccine and pharmaceutical manufacturers, Serum Institute of India and Bharat Biotech, experienced hacking attempts against their IT systems from China-based APT 'Stone Panda'. This ATP works with the Chinese Ministry of State Security's Tianjin State Security Bureau.
Some of the victims of malicious cyber attacks are: Air India, Nucleus Software, Dominos and UpStox, SII and Bharat Biotech, Mobikwik, Airtel - J&K (Airtel Denied.) JusPay, Bigbasket, Dr Reddy Laboratories, Tata Power – Mumbai, Indian Railways, Unacademy, Kudankulam Nuclear Power Plant, ISRO, Healthcare Data Leakages.
In November 2020, cyber attack using DDoS, IP hijacking, and phishing originating in Chengdu targeting critical infrastructure, banking, and information sectors. Western Theater Command of the PLA is responsible for executing the kinetic aspects of the standoff with India and has a joint operations command center in Chengdu.

China’s Cyber Operations against India

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PLA and Emerging Technologies

PRC is pursuing potential military applications of some emerging technologies include :

AI and Advanced Robotics: enhanced data exploitation, decision support, manufacturing, unmanned systems, and command, control, communications, computers, intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (C4ISR).
Semiconductors and Advanced Computing: enhanced cyber operations and weapons design, and shortened R&D cycles.
Quantum Technologies: secure global communications, enhanced computing and decryption capabilities, undersea target detection, and enhanced submarine navigation.
Biotechnology: enhanced warfighter selection and performance, advanced human-machine teaming.
Hypersonic and Directed Energy Weapons: global strike and defeat of missile defense systems, anti- satellite (ASAT)/missile/ unmanned aircraft system capabilities.
Advanced Materials and Alternative Energy: improved military equipment and weapon systems.

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��PLA is seeking to use AI in four main areas�

Autonomy of unmanned weapons, including development of swarms of numerous drones. China aims to conduct highly autonomous integrated operations with a variety of unmanned systems and unmanned weapons.

Processing large amounts of information through machine learning. A new form of electronic warfare that uses artificial intelligence to analyze received radio waves and optimise jamming.

Speed up military decision-making.

Use AI to create social media content that could be used to manipulate public opinion.

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Conclusion

War in Ukraine revealed that cognitive warfare and cyber warfare conducted in non-physical domains — do not alone provide strategic advantages.
Neither Sun Tzu, who idealised subduing the enemy without fighting nor British strategist B.H. Liddell Hart, who advocated the indirect approach strategy, gave specific advice on how to put it into practice.
In the long history of warfare, it has been physical battles that subdued the enemy’s will.

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Thank You