PUBLIC TRANSPORT GOVERNANCE IN THE PHILIPPINES
Beyond centralized franchising
Reforming public transport governance in the Philippines
Varsolo C. Sunio, Kris F. Abrigo, Sandy Mae A. Gaspay, Giselle M. Manuel,
Jose Alvaro E. Pacheco, Ma Flora May M. Cerna
30 September 2026 ·
Executive summary
2
Today’s regime | Road-based public transport runs on a liberal–centralized model: private operators run buses and jeepneys under franchises issued by the national regulator (LTFRB); LGUs play a minimal role. |
Liberal trade-off | Private provision keeps the fiscal burden low and mobilizes entrepreneurs — but produces profit-driven coverage gaps, fragmented networks and weak enforcement. |
Centralized trade-off | National control brings policy stability, uniform standards and clear authority — but is rigid, blind to local context and leaves LGUs with little ownership. |
Proposed regime | A coordinated–devolved regime in which LGUs progressively assume governance functions, grouped into four levels: foundational, developing, established, advanced. |
Graduated pathways | Most LGUs operate at the foundational level today. Targets should differ by context — advanced for metropolitan areas, established for HUCs and near-metro provinces, developing for remote provinces. |
National anchor | Not everything should devolve. DoTr remains the national coordinating authority — setting standards, ensuring interoperability and monitoring performance. |
Contents
3
01
Context and objectives
How road-based public transport is governed today, and what this study sets out to do
02
Conceptual framework
Two dimensions of governance regimes; functions and functional levels
03
Approach
Interviews and surveys across national agencies, LGUs and transport entities
04
Diagnosis
Strengths and failures of the liberal and centralized regimes
05
Design
A coordinated–devolved regime built on graduated functional levels
06
Implications
Matching regimes to context — and the national coordinating role
CONTEXT · FRAMEWORK · APPROACH · DIAGNOSIS · DESIGN · IMPLICATIONS
Road-based public transport in the Philippines is privately provided and nationally franchised, leaving local governments with little role
4
How service reaches passengers today
Private operators
Own and run buses and jeepneys
Certificate of Public Convenience
Franchise applied for by operators
LTFRB
National regulator grants franchise
Local service
Delivered with minimal LGU role
So what: the model suits fiscally constrained contexts, but it strains wherever transport problems are systemic.
1
Fragmented, uneven service
Operators chase profitable routes; low-demand areas see coverage gaps and poor coordination between independent operators.
2
Limited local responsiveness
Franchising authority sits with national agencies (LTFRB), leaving LGUs with little capacity to plan or manage transport in their own jurisdictions.
CONTEXT · FRAMEWORK · APPROACH · DIAGNOSIS · DESIGN · IMPLICATIONS
Jeepneys and buses — run largely by private operators — are the backbone of road-based public transport
Source: Photos — Philstar.com and news media; study team analysis
5
Jeepneys
Privately operated under franchises (CPCs) issued by the LTFRB
Buses
Also privately operated; government’s role is franchising and regulation
Who does what
Operators
Plan, finance and run services
LTFRB / DoTr
Franchise and regulate
LGUs
Minimal role
CONTEXT · FRAMEWORK · APPROACH · DIAGNOSIS · DESIGN · IMPLICATIONS
The study answers three questions — from diagnosing today’s regime to charting how LGUs can take on more
6
01
Diagnose
What are the strengths, limitations and contextual performance of the incumbent liberal–centralized regime?
02
Design
What functional and institutional framework would a coordinated–devolved regime, built on graduated levels of devolution, need?
03
Chart pathways
Which context-sensitive transition pathways let LGUs progressively assume functions based on readiness and scale?
CONTEXT · FRAMEWORK · APPROACH · DIAGNOSIS · DESIGN · IMPLICATIONS
Most research examines regulatory and operational arrangements; this study addresses the higher-level question of how authority is distributed
Source: Literature review; study team analysis
7
Level of analysis | Concept | Analytical focus | Illustrative examples | Primary emphasis |
Macro (political economy) | Degree of state involvement | Mode of coordination between state and market; overarching institutional logic | Liberal vs. coordinated systems | This paper |
Jurisdictional | Degree of devolution | Distribution of authority across levels of government | Centralized (national-led) vs. devolved (local-led) | This paper |
Sectoral (institutional arrangements) | Regulatory regime | Rules and instruments governing service provision | Franchising, service contracting, competitive tendering | Most existing studies |
Operational (service delivery) | Ownership and competition model | Organization of service provision and market structure | Public operation, PPPs, private monopoly, competition for the market | Most existing studies |
Takeaway: this study centers on the macro and jurisdictional dimensions — how governance authority is distributed and coordinated.
CONTEXT · FRAMEWORK · APPROACH · DIAGNOSIS · DESIGN · IMPLICATIONS
Two dimensions define four governance regimes; the proposal moves the Philippines from liberal–centralized to coordinated–devolved
8
Liberal–Devolved
Market-driven; local authority
Coordinated–Devolved
The paper’s proposal
Liberal–Centralized
Incumbent Philippine regime
Coordinated–Centralized
e.g., national rail (DoTr)
Degree of government involvement
Liberal
Coordinated
Degree of devolution to local governments
Local
National
Reading the matrix
Mode of coordination
Liberal ↔ coordinated: how far the state actively manages the system rather than leaving it to the market
Distribution of authority
Centralized ↔ devolved: whether national agencies or local governments hold governance functions
Together they yield four ideal-type regimes.
CONTEXT · FRAMEWORK · APPROACH · DIAGNOSIS · DESIGN · IMPLICATIONS
Three concepts structure the framework: governance functions and levels, devolution, and coordination
9
WHAT IT IS
WHY IT MATTERS HERE
Functions and functional levels
Governance functions are broad categories of public transport activities or responsibilities.
Functional levels group functions by increasing institutional complexity, coordination intensity and governance responsibility.
Devolution
The transfer or decentralization of specific responsibilities from the national government to local governments.
Core devolvable functions — route and network planning, fare-setting and franchising — are traditionally concentrated within DoTr and LTFRB.
Coordination
Implies the assumption of governance functions by government.
In a coordinated regime, government acts as an active “system manager”, taking on functions that require integration across operators, routes and jurisdictions.
CONTEXT · FRAMEWORK · APPROACH · DIAGNOSIS · DESIGN · IMPLICATIONS
ILLUSTRATIVE
Ten governance functions fall into two groups — those that can be devolved and those that require active coordination
10
Devolution-related functions
Authority moves from national agencies to LGUs
01
Route and network planning
02
Franchising and service authorization
03
Fare-setting and fare regulation
Coordination-related functions
Government takes an active system-manager role
04
Centralized fare collection and ticketing
05
Fleet acquisition and modernization
06
Public transport performance monitoring
07
Subsidy administration and financing
08
Service contracting
09
Integrated network management
10
Direct service operation
CONTEXT · FRAMEWORK · APPROACH · DIAGNOSIS · DESIGN · IMPLICATIONS
As governance functions grow more complex, they demand progressively greater devolution and coordination capacity
11
Level 1
Foundational
Basic responsibilities that all LGUs are expected to perform.
Level 2
Developing
Additional responsibilities assumed once foundational functions are performed consistently and effectively.
Level 3
Established
More sustained coordination requiring technical expertise and institutional maturity.
Level 4
Advanced
High-order responsibilities requiring substantial administrative authority, financial resources and governance capacity.
Degree of devolution / coordination
Complexity of governance functions
CONTEXT · FRAMEWORK · APPROACH · DIAGNOSIS · DESIGN · IMPLICATIONS
We interviewed and surveyed 19 respondents across the governance chain — national agencies, LGUs and operators
Source: Stakeholder interviews and LGU survey (n = 19 respondents), January–May 2026; study team analysis
12
19
respondents across national agencies, local governments and transport service entities
National agencies
DoTr · LTFRB · DILG
3
Local government units
Provinces, cities and municipalities
14
Transport service entities
Transport cooperatives
2
How evidence was gathered
12
Semi-structured interviews
3 national agencies, 7 LGUs, 2 transport cooperatives
10
Google Forms survey responses
All from LGUs; 3 LGUs both interviewed and surveyed
3
Study objectives framing all instruments
Thematic analysis combined manual coding with AI-assisted pattern identification
CONTEXT · FRAMEWORK · APPROACH · DIAGNOSIS · DESIGN · IMPLICATIONS
The 14 LGU respondents span all three island groups and every level of local government
Source: LGU interviews and survey, January–May 2026; full respondent list in appendix
13
LGU respondents by type
Provinces
Bataan, Batangas, Mindoro, Cebu, Surigao del Sur
5
Highly urbanized cities
Pasig (metropolitan), Baguio, Iloilo
3
Component / capital cities
Batangas City, Legazpi
2
Municipalities
Presentación, Bautista, Subic, Buhi
4
LGU respondents by island group
Luzon 11
Visayas 2
1
Mindanao: 1
CONTEXT · FRAMEWORK · APPROACH · DIAGNOSIS · DESIGN · IMPLICATIONS
Respondents value the liberal regime mainly for easing the fiscal burden, but flag coverage gaps, fragmentation and weak enforcement
Source: Stakeholder interviews and LGU survey (n = 19 respondents), January–May 2026; study team analysis. n = number of respondents citing the theme
14
Theme
Respondents citing (n)
Illustrative quote
Strength
Weakness
L-S1 Reduces fiscal burden on government / mobilizes private capital
12
“Because operators shoulder the costs of vehicles and day-to-day operations, the state is able to concentrate its resources on regulation, oversight, and policy development...” — LGU-07
L-S2 Standardized, replicable, easy-entry business model
8
“Proven business model, brand recognition, standardized systems and training, economies of scale...” — LGU-05
L-S3 Enables entrepreneurial / livelihood opportunity and market responsiveness
7
“...market responsiveness, entrepreneurial and livelihood opportunities.” — LGU-12
L-S4 Retains basic state oversight (fares, routes, compliance)
5
“...the state is able to concentrate its resources on regulation, oversight, and policy development rather than direct service provision.” — LGU-07
L-W1 Profit-driven allocation → coverage gaps in low-demand / rural areas
6
“Operators prioritize commercially viable routes, leaving low-demand or socially necessary areas underserved.” — LGU-07
L-W2 Fragmentation / lack of route, schedule and fare coordination
6
“Multiple small operators often lead to disorganized and overlapping routes, resulting in inefficiencies and traffic congestion.” — LGU-09
L-W3 Weak monitoring / enforcement capacity — allows deviation or “gaming”
6
“If a local government lacks the data infrastructure to track bus performance, the operators can ‘game the system.’” — LGU-04
L-W4 Poor risk allocation to operators / inadequate crisis-time support
2
“Poor risk allocation. Operators may reduce service, shorten routes.” — LGU-11
CONTEXT · FRAMEWORK · APPROACH · DIAGNOSIS · DESIGN · IMPLICATIONS
The centralized regime is valued most for insulating decisions from local politics; its weaknesses are rigidity and poor local fit
Source: Stakeholder interviews and LGU survey (n = 19 respondents), January–May 2026; study team analysis. n = number of respondents citing the theme
15
Theme
Respondents citing (n)
Illustrative quote
Strength
Weakness
C-S1 Insulates decisions from local political pressure
10
“It's harder to politicize the process when the LGU itself isn't the one granting the franchise... that protects the LGU office from blame.” — LGU-07
C-S2 Uniform national standards / regulatory consistency
3
“Standardized regulatory policies, fare policies — since there is a national oversight.” — LGU-12
C-S3 Concentrated, clear institutional authority
2
“Franchising regime key strength is its power to prescribe and regulate routes of service under Sec. 5(a).” — LGU-02
C-W1 Bureaucratic rigidity / slow, inflexible approval processes
4
“At present, on-demand changes in the PUV route structure remain infeasible due to the absence of clear policies.” — LGU-07
C-W2 Weak responsiveness to local context (“one-size-fits-all”)
3
“One-size-fits-all, not so responsive to the local... for Lingayen/Dagupan, only certain peak hours are viable.” — TSE-02
C-W3 Limited local ownership / accountability; political constraints
2
“Political and governance constraints.” — LGU-02
CONTEXT · FRAMEWORK · APPROACH · DIAGNOSIS · DESIGN · IMPLICATIONS
The liberal regime offers three strengths: low fiscal burden, entrepreneurial capacity and operational simplicity
Source: Stakeholder interviews and LGU survey (n = 19 respondents), January–May 2026; study team analysis
16
1
Low fiscal burden
Fleet acquisition, operations and maintenance costs are borne largely by private operators rather than the state — letting government extend services without significant capital outlays.
“By placing financial and operational risk primarily on private operators, the framework allows for the extension of network coverage and service availability without requiring the full fiscal burden to be borne by the public sector.”
— LGU-09
2
Entrepreneurial capacity
The regime mobilizes entrepreneurial capacity and livelihoods, drawing in private actors — from small-scale operators to larger firms — with a direct financial stake in service provision.
“By leveraging private sector participation and reducing the financial burden on government, it creates a framework that balances entrepreneurial initiative with regulatory oversight.”
— LGU-07
3
Operational simplicity
Standardized, replicable business models allow easy entry and operation, while the state retains formal authority over routes and fares.
“Franchising regime work[s] more effectively on operational simplicity where operators can be taught with simple processes.”
— LGU-02
CONTEXT · FRAMEWORK · APPROACH · DIAGNOSIS · DESIGN · IMPLICATIONS
But each strength has a flip side: coverage gaps, fragmented networks and weak enforcement
Source: Stakeholder interviews and LGU survey (n = 19 respondents), January–May 2026; study team analysis
17
1
Profit-driven allocation
Operators prioritize commercially viable routes, leaving gaps in coverage and unreliable provision in low-demand or socially necessary areas.
“Operators prioritize commercially viable routes, leaving low-demand or socially necessary areas underserved.”
— LGU-07
“Demand is thin or dispersed in rural or peri-urban areas... public service obligations exceed commercial viability.”
— LGU-12
2
Fragmented coordination
Multiple independent operators function without effective integration, producing overlapping routes and inefficient service patterns.
“We do not have a reliable transportation and route system... no scheduled route, route numbering, or time-scheduled route and many advanced transportation systems.”
— LGU-02
3
Weak enforcement capacity
Operational simplicity is double-edged: weak monitoring, data gaps and enforcement challenges limit the state’s ability to ensure compliance with service standards.
“You can impose ten KPIs, but if you're not providing anything in return, there's no real incentive mechanism to support compliance.”
— NGA-02
CONTEXT · FRAMEWORK · APPROACH · DIAGNOSIS · DESIGN · IMPLICATIONS
In sum, the liberal regime succeeds on fiscal burden and participation but fails on equity, integration and oversight
Source: Stakeholder interviews and LGU survey (n = 19 respondents), January–May 2026; study team analysis
18
Dimension | Definition | Strengths | Failures |
Public fiscal burden | The extent to which government resources are required to finance and operate public transport services. | Low fiscal burden through private provision; minimal need for public capital investment; financial risk shifted to private operators. | Under-provision of socially necessary but unprofitable services; limited public capacity to intervene due to fiscal and policy constraints. |
Economic participation and livelihood | The extent to which the system enables participation of private actors and generates economic opportunities. | Strong mobilization of entrepreneurial capacity; livelihood opportunities; motivated ownership. | Uneven operator capability; income instability; incentives may prioritize profit over service quality; potential oversupply on profitable routes. |
Service equity (access and coverage) | The degree to which services are distributed fairly across geographic areas and population groups. | Service expansion in high-demand areas; broad operator participation increases availability where demand exists. | Profit-driven allocation leaves rural and low-demand areas underserved; service gaps, route abandonment and unreliable service. |
System coordination and integration | The extent to which services function as a coherent and integrated network. | Potential for integration through franchising (route control, fare setting, unified systems). | Fragmented operations; no route rationalization, scheduling or fare integration; oversupply and undersupply across routes. |
Governance simplicity and oversight | The extent to which the system operates through standardized, replicable arrangements with basic regulatory control. | Operational simplicity; ease of entry and replication; standardized business models; basic regulatory oversight. | Weak enforcement and monitoring; limited data systems; operators can “game” the system; planning gaps and institutional constraints. |
CONTEXT · FRAMEWORK · APPROACH · DIAGNOSIS · DESIGN · IMPLICATIONS
Centralization brings policy stability, regulatory consistency and clear institutional authority
Source: Stakeholder interviews and LGU survey (n = 19 respondents), January–May 2026; study team analysis
19
1
Policy stability
A consistent, long-term policy direction insulated from local patronage and short-term political interests — reducing the risk of politically driven route allocation.
“It's harder to politicize the process when the LGU itself isn't the one granting the franchise; it stays more technical.”
— LGU-07
“If your ally loses the next election, you could be in trouble — that's what happened in some areas in Cebu.”
— TSE-01
2
Regulatory consistency
Standardized fares, vehicle requirements and compliance mechanisms enable efficient rollout of nationwide programs such as modernization.
“It provides a standard nationwide — LTFRB doesn't just govern one province, it's nationwide.”
— TSE-02
“It's good that there's one regulator, since it creates a standard throughout the country.”
— TSE-02
3
Institutional authority
Authority concentrated in a single institution reduces fragmentation in decision-making and gives a clear mandate over franchising and policy.
“It's easier to hold it accountable through corporate structures rather than political ones.”
— NGA-02
“Mayors are the ones who end up answerable, not LTFRB.”
— LGU-07
CONTEXT · FRAMEWORK · APPROACH · DIAGNOSIS · DESIGN · IMPLICATIONS
Yet the same centralization makes the system rigid, unresponsive to local needs and weak on local ownership
Source: Stakeholder interviews and LGU survey (n = 19 respondents), January–May 2026; study team analysis
20
1
Bureaucratic rigidity
Policies are stable but hard to adapt — changes to fares, routes or regulations need lengthy approvals, limiting responsiveness and constraining reform.
“Fuel prices keep increasing, so you'd only be asking for a one- or two-peso fare increase to recover costs — but it's very difficult to get government approval for that.”
— TSE-01
2
Weak local responsiveness
With minimal LGU participation, national agencies often lack detailed knowledge of local travel patterns, resulting in misaligned routes and outdated franchises.
“It often came down to who applied — without due consideration of local conditions.”
— LGU-12
“Small business transactions shouldn't need approval from a very high or distant office.”
— TSE-02
3
Limited local ownership
LGUs have little incentive or authority to actively manage or improve transport services within their jurisdictions.
“We're a bit puzzled by the idea that LGUs should shoulder this function when there's no clear basis showing it should be the LGU doing it.”
— LGU-12
CONTEXT · FRAMEWORK · APPROACH · DIAGNOSIS · DESIGN · IMPLICATIONS
In sum, the centralized regime delivers stability and consistency at the cost of adaptability and local fit
Source: Stakeholder interviews and LGU survey (n = 19 respondents), January–May 2026; study team analysis
21
Dimension | Definition | Strengths | Failures |
Policy stability | The extent to which transport policies are consistent, predictable and insulated from short-term political influence. | Stable policy direction insulated from local political pressures; continuity in long-term planning; predictable regulatory environment. | Limited local ownership and accountability; reduced adaptability to local political and development priorities. |
Regulatory consistency | The degree to which rules, standards and regulatory practices are applied uniformly across jurisdictions. | Uniform standards in fares, vehicle requirements and compliance; consistent regulatory application across regions. | Weak responsiveness of regulations to local conditions; limited sensitivity to geographic and demand variations. |
Institutional authority and control | The concentration of governance functions and decision-making power within a central authority. | Clear mandate and concentration of authority within a single institution; reduced fragmentation in decision-making. | Bureaucratic rigidity and slow decision-making; lengthy approval processes; limited flexibility for innovation and reform. |
CONTEXT · FRAMEWORK · APPROACH · DIAGNOSIS · DESIGN · IMPLICATIONS
A coordinated–devolved regime can keep central oversight while enabling local responsiveness — we build it in three steps
22
Step 1 · Classify functions
Group each devolution- and coordination-related function into one of four functional levels — foundational, developing, established or advanced.
→ Page 24
Step 2 · Align by jurisdiction
Match functional levels to jurisdiction type — metropolitan areas, highly urbanized cities and provinces — based on scale and capacity.
→ Pages 25–26
Step 3 · Test against evidence
Show how LGU respondents themselves classified each function, grounding the framework in real-world capacity and readiness.
→ Page 23
Design principle: devolution is graduated — LGUs assume functions progressively as readiness and scale allow, not all at once.
CONTEXT · FRAMEWORK · APPROACH · DIAGNOSIS · DESIGN · IMPLICATIONS
LGUs see planning as foundational, while direct operation, subsidies, fleet procurement and full contracting are advanced
Source: LGU survey (14 LGUs; not all answered every item). n = LGUs classifying the function; modal = most frequent response
23
Function | Foundational | Developing | Established | Advanced | n | Modal classification |
Transport planning | 8 | 1 | 0 | 0 | 9 | Foundational |
Land-use planning | 9 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 9 | Foundational |
Fare-setting | 2 | 5 | 1 | 1 | 9 | Developing |
Network-wide monitoring of PUV performance | 2 | 3 | 2 | 2 | 9 | Developing |
Partial contracting | 0 | 4 | 2 | 2 | 8 | Developing |
Franchising | 2 | 2 | 4 | 1 | 9 | Established |
Centralized fare collection | 0 | 4 | 4 | 1 | 9 | Established |
PUV fleet procurement and renewal (leasing) | 0 | 1 | 2 | 5 | 8 | Advanced |
Subsidy provision | 1 | 0 | 3 | 5 | 9 | Advanced |
Direct operation | 0 | 0 | 0 | 8 | 8 | Advanced |
Full network-wide service contracting | 0 | 0 | 2 | 6 | 8 | Advanced |
Darker cells = more respondents choosing that level. Rows ordered by modal classification.
CONTEXT · FRAMEWORK · APPROACH · DIAGNOSIS · DESIGN · IMPLICATIONS
Ten functions map onto four functional levels, each building on the capabilities of the one below
24
Level | Function | Rationale for classification |
Foundational | Transport and land-use planning | Core statutory responsibility of LGUs; already institutionalized through LPTRP requirements and necessary for all higher-order functions. |
Network-wide monitoring of PUV performance | Technically accessible using existing tools (e.g., GPS); supports evidence-based planning and regulation. | |
Subsidy provision | Can be mobilized during emergencies or service gaps; requires limited institutional complexity but fiscal flexibility. | |
Developing | Fare-setting and adjustment | Requires analytical capacity (cost structures, demand) and regulatory judgment; builds on planning and monitoring functions. |
Partial service contracting | Introduces contractual governance on selected routes; requires procurement, performance monitoring and enforcement capabilities. | |
Established | Franchising authority or delegated franchising | Entails regulatory control over market entry and service design; requires legal authority, institutional maturity and enforcement capacity. |
Direct service operation | Involves asset ownership and operational management; feasible only for resource-capable LGUs. | |
Centralized fare collection | Requires system integration across operators through automatic fare collection systems (AFCS); involves institutional and technical complexity (e.g., clearinghouses). | |
Advanced | Full network-wide service contracting (gross contracts) | System-level transformation requiring sustained funding, strong contract management and integrated planning. |
Fleet procurement and leasing | Capital-intensive function involving financial structuring, asset management and long-term risk allocation. |
CONTEXT · FRAMEWORK · APPROACH · DIAGNOSIS · DESIGN · IMPLICATIONS
Metropolitan LGUs aim for advanced functions, HUCs for established and provinces for developing — and “realistic” tracks “ideal” closely
Source: LGU survey; n = 13 of 14 LGU respondents answered this item. Ideal = level an LGU should aim for; realistic = achievable given current capacity
25
Key takeaways
10 of 13
see advanced as the ideal for metropolitan areas
7 of 13
see established as realistic for HUCs
7 of 13
see developing as the ideal for provinces
CONTEXT · FRAMEWORK · APPROACH · DIAGNOSIS · DESIGN · IMPLICATIONS
AUTHORS’ ASSESSMENT
Most LGUs sit at the foundational level today, but the right target level differs sharply by context
Source: Study team analysis based on LGU survey and interviews; see methodological note on next page
26
Foundational
Developing
Established
Advanced
Levels to climb
Province far from metro area
+1
Province near metro area
+2
Highly urbanized city
+2
Metropolitan area
+3
Current level
Target level
CONTEXT · FRAMEWORK · APPROACH · DIAGNOSIS · DESIGN · IMPLICATIONS
Methodological note: three clarifications on how current and target levels were derived
27
1
Current levels are the authors’ interpretation
The current functional level for each jurisdiction type (filled circles) reflects the authors’ interpretive assessment of prevailing practice — not a direct empirical finding. Respondents were not asked to characterize their own LGU’s present level in these terms.
2
Provincial subtypes are an analytical refinement
The survey and interview data behind the expected (ideal) level treated “province” as a single category. The near-metro / far-from-metro split is the authors’ refinement to capture variation in system complexity — not a distinction respondents were asked to draw.
3
Near-metro province figures are an extension, not a finding
Survey- and interview-derived expectations correspond to the “province far from a metropolitan area” case. The near-metro case extends that finding using the same logic, but was not independently tested against respondent data.
CONTEXT · FRAMEWORK · APPROACH · DIAGNOSIS · DESIGN · IMPLICATIONS
Not everything should devolve: one country can run several regimes, matched to each context’s size and complexity
28
CONTEXT
RECOMMENDED REGIME
Metropolitan areas
Metro Manila, Cebu, Davao
Coordinated–Devolved
Highly urbanized cities
Coordinated–Devolved
Provinces near metro areas
Coordinated–Devolved
Provinces, low density
Liberal–Devolved
Inter-provincial / regional corridors
Liberal–Centralized
National rail and strategic infrastructure
Coordinated–Centralized
Across all regimes, a national coordinating authority (DoTr) still sets standards, ensures interoperability and coordinates.
CONTEXT · FRAMEWORK · APPROACH · DIAGNOSIS · DESIGN · IMPLICATIONS
Devolution needs a national anchor: DoTr retains five system-manager roles even in a devolved system
29
DoTr
National coordinating authority
Department of Transportation
1
Sets national policies, standards and guidelines
2
Defines roles and allocation of authority
3
Ensures coherence, interoperability and system integration
4
Monitors and evaluates system performance
5
Coordinates across levels of government and regimes
Thank you
Questions and discussion
Varsolo C. Sunio, Kris F. Abrigo, Sandy Mae A. Gaspay, Giselle M. Manuel,
Jose Alvaro E. Pacheco, Ma Flora May M. Cerna
“Beyond Centralized Franchising: Reforming Public Transport Governance in the Philippines”
Appendix: respondents by sector and mode of participation (n = 19)
Source: Stakeholder interviews and LGU survey (n = 19 respondents), January–May 2026; study team analysis
31
Sector | Respondent | Interview | Survey response |
National government agencies | Department of Transportation (DoTr) | Feb 12, 2026 | – |
Land Transportation Franchising and Regulatory Board (LTFRB) | Jan 20, 2026 | – | |
Department of the Interior and Local Government (DILG) | May 18, 2026 | – | |
Local government units | Bataan Province | Feb 3, 2026 | ✓ |
Batangas Province | Mar 5, 2026 | – | |
Mindoro Province | – | Feb 12, 2026 | |
Cebu Province | Jan 13, 2026 | – | |
Surigao del Sur Province | Feb 20, 2026 | – | |
Pasig City (metropolitan HUC) | Mar 6, 2026 | ✓ | |
Baguio City (non-metropolitan HUC) | Mar 16, 2026 | ✓ | |
Iloilo City (non-metropolitan HUC) | Jan 29, 2026 | – | |
Batangas City (capital city / non-HUC) | – | Mar 1, 2026 | |
Legazpi, Albay (capital city) | – | Mar 5, 2026 | |
Presentación, Camarines Sur (municipality) | – | Mar 4, 2026 | |
Bautista, Pangasinan (municipality) | – | Mar 4, 2026 | |
Subic, Zambales (municipality) | – | Mar 5, 2026 | |
Buhi, Camarines Sur (municipality) | – | Mar 3, 2026 | |
Transport service entities | South Metro Transport Cooperative | Apr 15, 2026 | – |
Lingayen-Dagupan Transport Cooperative | Apr 28, 2026 | – |
✓ = survey submitted alongside interview; dates shown for interview or standalone survey submission