Convention and Morality

Fair Play

• Last time we talked about fair play and it’s relation to the rules. Papineau understands fair play as the code of expectations that athletes in a sport have of each other.
• Fair play determined the `unwritten rules’ about how competitors should act. These unwritten rules can be very different from the written rules. They can come apart from each other in both directions.
• Further, these unwritten rules – the norms of fair play – are very different between different sports.

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Cricket and Baseball

• Papineau uses the example of trapping a ball just as it bounces. In baseball the convention is to pretend that you caught it. It’s part of `fair play’ to attempt to trick the umpire in this way.
• In cricket doing the same thing is against the conventions. It would be taken to be wrong. So it’s not part of `fair play’ to trick the umpire in this way.
• But how is it the case that the same action – attempting to trick the umpire about whether you caught the ball – is fair in one sport but not another?

It seems what is morally acceptable is changing depending upon the context.

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Moral Relativism

• There is a very deep question about the nature of morality: Is morality absolute and unchanging? Or is it relative?
• The most common form of moral relativism says that morality is relative to cultures. So, the moral principles that are true relative to the modern USA are different from those that are true relative to, for example, India in the late 19^th century.
• For example, certain moral principles about the caste system were true relative to late 19^th century India, but not relative to the modern USA.

Truth and Belief

• It’s very important to note that moral relativism is a claim about what principles are true, not just about what principles people believe or have evidence for.
• Distinguish epistemic from metaphysical issues.
• Epistemic issues are about our knowledge of the world: What we believe, what we have evidence for, what we know etc..
• Metaphysical issues are not about our relation to be world they are just about what the world is like -- about what is true

One way to see the difference – there seem to be facts about the world that no one has any knowledge of.

Relativism and Truth

• Moral relativism is not the claim that people in India believe different moral principles to people in the US. Nor is it the claim that people in India have evidence for different moral principles.
• Rather, it’s the claim that the true moral principles are different in India than in the US.
• Imagine a type of relativism that is about the basic physical laws, and not about morality. The idea is that the physics really is different in different cultures.

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Baseball culture and Cricket culture.

Is that what’s going on in the case of deceiving the umpire? That there are different moral principles governing the culture of cricket and the culture of baseball?

Is this a type of moral relativism?

Papineau says no. He wants to accept that morality is absolute.

He doesn’t say why but what problems are there with the view that morality is relative. In particular, consider the view that what’s morally right is just determined by what your society thinks is acceptable. What problems does this have?

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Morality and Convention

But how can deceiving the umpire be ok in baseball but not ok in cricket if morality is absolute?

Well, can we think of other examples where it’s totally morally fine to do something in one culture, but not morally acceptable to do it in another culture?

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Morality and Convention

Papineau points to the distinction between morality and convention. Some principles of how we should act are conventions. And conventions are rather different from basic moral principles.

For example, in the UK you should drive on the left side of the road. That’s just a convention – there’s nothing special about the left, and nothing wrong with countries that drive on the right.

Similarly, norms of politeness and etiquette are conventions. They are to do with the agreement of society.

The conventions surrounding baseball and cricket are different.

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Why do conventions matter?

But what do conventions have to do with morality? And how does it help to make sense of the idea that there is absolute morality?

Papineau’s idea is that the basic moral principles are absolute, but the conventions help us see how they should be applied in any specific situation.

For example, it might be an absolute moral principle that we should show respect to other people (if they deserve it) and what that means in the US is that we should shake hands. And in Japan it means we should bow. The convention affects how we implement the moral principle.

Similarly with which side of the road we drive on. It’s a convention, but it matters for implementing an absolute moral principle.

Convention and sports

• The convention to not deceive the umpire in cricket means that you are implicitly making a promise not to do so. You are not making such a promise in baseball.
• So there is an underlying moral principle – which is keep your promises, don’t renege on your commitments. And that is implemented differently in cricket and baseball.
• That’s why it’s morally wrong to deceive the umpire in cricket but not baseball.
• (A potential problem: What about if you explicitly deny that you are making such a promise? Is deceiving the umpire then ok?)

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Comparing Conventions

So, Papineau thinks, there is nothing morally better about cricket. Just as there is nothing morally better about driving on the left – both following the same moral rules but just implemented differently.

But are all conventions acceptable then? What about these cases?

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Comparing Conventions

So, Papineau thinks, there is nothing morally better about cricket. Just as there is nothing morally better about driving on the left – both following the same moral rules but just implemented differently.

But are all conventions acceptable then? What about these cases?

There are reasonable conventions that allow all sorts of rule breaking and deceiving the officials (as well as other seemingly immoral things).

But Papineau thinks that some conventions are unacceptable. (Consider, the conventions of PED use in cycling.) But it’s hard to draw the line between conventions that are acceptable an those that are not.

Perhaps the view we should take here is particularist. That is, we should deny general moral principles, relying on moral judgement or intuition in particular cases.

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