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THE BATTLE OF GETTYSBURG

BATTLE ANALYSIS

STAFF RIDE BOOK

THE UNIVERSITY OF TOLEDO

SPRING 2019

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III

III

(Hancock)

(Reynolds)

(Sickles)

(Sykes)

(Sedgwick)

(Howard)

(Slocum)

(Pleasonton)

x 2-3

x 5-6

x 10

x 2-3

FORCE ORGANIZATION

(LongStreet)

x 4

x 3-6

x 10

x 3

(Ewell)

(Hill)

(Stuart)

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DAY 1 (01JUL63)

On the morning of the 1st, Union cavalry in the Div. of BG Buford were awaiting the approach of Confederate infantry forces from the NW. Confederate forces from the BDE of BG Pettigrew had briefly clashed with Union forces the day before but believed they were Penn. militia, not the regular army cavalry that was screening the approach of the Army of the Potomac (AoP).

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BG Buford recognized the importance of the high ground directly to the south of Gettysburg. He knew that if the Confederates could gain control of the heights, Meade's army would have a hard time dislodging them. He decided to utilize three ridges west of Gettysburg: Herr Ridge [1], McPherson Ridge [2], and Seminary Ridge [3]. Early that morning, Reynolds, who was commanding the Left Wing of the Army of the Potomac, ordered his corps to march to Buford's location, with the XI Corps to follow closely behind.

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MG Heth's division, from LTG Hill's III Corps, advanced towards Gettysburg. Heth deployed no cavalry and led, unconventionally, with the artillery battalion of MAJ Pegram. Two infantry brigades followed, commanded by BGs Archer and Davis, proceeding easterly in columns along the Chambersburg Pike [4]. Eventually, they reached dismounted troopers from COL Gamble's cavalry brigade. Buford's 2,748 troopers would soon be faced with 7,600 Confederate infantrymen, deploying from columns into line of battle.

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Gamble's men mounted strong resistance and delaying tactics from behind fence posts with rapid fire from their breech-loading carbines. By 1020, the Confederates had reached Herr Ridge [1] and had pushed the Federal cavalrymen east to McPherson Ridge [2], when the vanguard of the I Corps finally arrived, the division of MG Wadsworth. The troops were led by Gen. Reynolds, who conferred briefly with Buford and hurried back to bring more men forward.

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That morning infantry fighting occurred on either side of the Chambersburg Pike [1], mostly on McPherson Ridge [2]. To the north, an unfinished railroad bed [3] opened three shallow cuts in the ridges. To the south, the dominant features were Willoughby Run [4] and Herbst Woods [5] (sometimes called McPherson Woods, but they were the property of John Herbst). BG Lysander Cutler's Union brigade opposed Davis's BDE; three of Cutler's regiments were north of the Pike, two to the south. To the left of Cutler, BG Meredith's Iron Brigade opposed Archer.

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Gen. Reynolds directed both brigades into position and placed guns from the Maine battery of CPT James A. Hall where Calef's had stood earlier. While the general rode his horse along the east end of Herbst Woods, shouting "Forward men! Forward for God's sake, and drive those fellows out of the woods," he fell from his horse, killed instantly by a bullet striking him behind the ear. (Some historians believe Reynolds was felled by a sharpshooter, but it is more likely that he was killed by random shot in a volley of rifle fire directed at the 2nd Wisconsin.) MG Abner Doubleday assumed command of the I Corps.

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On the right of the Union line, three regiments of Cutler's brigade were fired on by Davis's brigade before they could get into position on the ridge. Davis's line overlapped the right of Cutler's [6], making the Union position untenable, and Wadsworth ordered Cutler's regiments back to Seminary Ridge. The commander of the 147th New York, LTC Francis C. Miller, was shot before he could inform his troops of the withdrawal, and they remained to fight under heavy pressure until a second order came. In under 30 minutes, 45% of Gen. Cutler's 1,007 men became casualties, with the 147th losing 207 of its 380 officers and men. Some of Davis's victorious men turned toward the Union positions south of the railroad bed while others drove east toward Seminary Ridge. This defocused the Confederate effort north of the pike.

0700-1000 – Defense by Buford's Cavalry

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1000-1045 – Davis vs. Cutler

1045-1100 – Archer vs. Meredith

South of the pike [1], Archer's men were expecting an easy fight against dismounted cavalrymen and were astonished to recognize the black Hardee hats worn by the men facing them through the woods: the famous Iron Brigade, formed from regiments in the Western states of Indiana, Michigan, and Wisconsin, had a reputation as fierce, tenacious fighters. As the Confederates crossed Willoughby Run [2] and climbed the slope into Herbst Woods [3], they were enveloped on their right [4] by the longer Union line, the reverse of the situation north of the pike.

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BG Archer was captured in the fighting, the first general officer in Robert E. Lee's army to suffer that fate. Archer was most likely positioned around the 14th Tennessee when he was captured by Private Patrick Moloney of Company G., 2nd Wisconsin, "a brave patriotic and fervent young Irishman." Archer resisted capture, but Moloney overpowered him. Moloney was killed later that day, but he received the Medal of Honor for his exploit. When Archer was taken to the rear, he encountered his former Army colleague Gen. Doubleday, who greeted him good-naturedly, "Good morning, Archer! How are you? I am glad to see you!" Archer replied, "Well, I am not glad to see you by a damn sight!"

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Black Hardee hat worm by the Iron BDE

Sharps Carbine used by Union Cavalry

BG John Buford

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DAY 1 (01JUL63)

At around 1100, Doubleday sent his reserve regiment, the 6th Wisconsin, an Iron Brigade regiment, commanded by Lt. Col. Rufus R. Dawes, north [1] in the direction of Davis's disorganized brigade. The Wisconsin men paused at the fence along the pike [1] and fired, which halted Davis's attack on Cutler's men and caused many of them to seek cover in the unfinished railroad cut. The 6th joined the 95th New York and the 84th New York, a "demi-brigade" commanded by Col. E.B. Fowler, along the pike. The three regiments charged to the railroad cut, where Davis's men were seeking cover. The majority of the 600-foot (180 m) cut was too deep to be an effective firing position (15’). Making the situation more difficult was the absence of GEN Davis, whose location was unknown.

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As the Union line neared the Confederates, its flanks became folded back and it took on the appearance of an inverted V. When the Union men reached the railroad cut, hand-to-hand and bayonet fighting broke out. They were able to pour enfilading fire from both ends of the cut. Colonel Dawes took the initiative by shouting "Where is the colonel of this regiment?" MAJ John Blair of the 2nd Mississippi stood up and responded, "Who are you?" Dawes replied, "I command this regiment. Surrender or I will fire." Dawes later described what happened next:

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“The officer replied not a word, but promptly handed me his sword, and his men, who still held them, threw down their muskets. The coolness, self possession, and discipline which held back our men from pouring a general volley saved a hundred lives of the enemy, and as my mind goes back to the fearful excitement of the moment, I marvel at it.”

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Despite this surrender, leaving Dawes standing awkwardly holding seven swords, the fighting continued and numerous Confederates were able to escape back to Herr Ridge. The three Union regiments lost 390–440 of 1,184 engaged, but they had blunted Davis's attack, prevented them from striking the rear of the Iron Brigade. The Confederate losses were about 500 killed and wounded and over 200 prisoners out of 1,707 engaged.

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1100-1230 – Railroad Cut

1230 – Midday lull

1400-1600 - Afternoon

GEN Heth faced an embarrassing situation. He had been under orders from GEN Lee to avoid a general engagement until the full AoNV had concentrated in the area. But his excursion to Gettysburg, ostensibly to find shoes, was essentially a reconnaissance in force conducted by a full infantry DIV. Heth was on the losing side so far. By 1230, his remaining two brigades, under BG Pettigrew, COL Brockenbrough, and MG Pender had arrived on the scene.

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More Confederate forces were on the way. Two DIV of the II Corps (Ewell), were approaching Gettysburg from the N. The five brigades of MG Rodes marched down the Carlisle Road but left it before reaching town to advance down the wooded crest of Oak Ridge, where they could link up with the left flank of Hill's Corps. The four brigades under MG Early approached on the Harrisburg Road. Union cavalry outposts north of the town detected both movements.

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On the Union side, more units of the I Corps arrived. First was the Corps Artillery under COL Wainwright, followed by two brigades which were placed on either end of the line. The XI Corps arrived from the south before noon, moving up the Taneytown and Emmitsburg Roads. MG Howard was surveying the area from the roof of a store downtown at about 1130 when he heard that Reynolds had been killed and that he was now in command of all Union forces on the field.

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Howard immediately sent messengers to summon reinforcements from the III Corps (Sickles) and the XII Corps (Slocum). Howard's first XI Corps division to arrive, under MG Schurz, was sent north to take a position on Oak Ridge [1] and link up with the right of the I Corps. The division of BG Barlow was placed on Schurz's right to support him. The third division to arrive, under BG Steinwehr, was placed on Cemetery Hill [2] along with two batteries of artillery to hold the hill as a rallying point; this placement on the hill corresponded with orders sent earlier in the day to Howard by Reynolds before he was killed. However, Rodes beat Schurz to Oak Hill [1], so the XI Corps DIV was forced to take up positions in the broad plain north of the town [3], below and to the east of Oak Hill. Howard's defensive line was not strong one in the north. He was outnumbered, and the terrain in the north was poorly selected for defense.

Rodes sent 3 BDEs against Union troops from E to W, BG Doles, COL O'Neal, and BG Iverson [1]. Doles's BDE stood guarding the flank. Both attacks fared poorly against the six regiments of BG Baxter. O'Neal's men were sent forward without coordinating with Iverson and fell back [2]. Iverson failed to perform rudimentary reconnaissance and went forward blindly. More of Baxter's men were concealed in woods behind a stone wall and rose to fire withering volleys. (Iverson’s Pits)

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Baxter's BDE was out of ammunition. At 1500 he withdrew and was replaced with BG Paul’s BDE. Rodes then committed his two reserve BDE: BG Daniel and Ramseur. Ramseur attacked first, but Paul's BDE held its crucial position. Daniel's NC brigade then attempted to break the I Corps line to the SW along the Pike [3]. They ran into COL Stone's "Bucktail Brigade." GEN Lee arrived at 1430, as Rodes's men were in mid-attack and lifted his restriction. Pettigrew's Brigade was deployed in a line that extended south [4]. Enveloping the left flank of the 19th IN [5], Pettigrew's NC, the largest BDE in the army, drove back the IB. The IB was pushed out and fell back toward the Seminary [6]. To the left of the IB was the BDE of COL Biddle, defending open ground on McPherson Ridge and were decimated. To the right, Stone's BDE was attacked by Brockenbrough and Daniel.

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Barlow advanced occupying a 50-foot hill Barlow's Knoll [7]. The position on the knoll created a salient. Krzyżanowski's BDE went forward to assist but they arrived too late. Early’s BDE, swept down the Harrisburg Road, deployed in a battle line. Early started with an artillery bombardment. Gordon’s BDE was then directed for a frontal attack against Barlow's Knoll, while the BDEs of BG Hays and COL Avery swung around their exposed flank. At the same time Doles’ BDE launched a synchronized assault with Gordon. Both Union BDEs conducted a disorderly retreat to the S.

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On the left flank of the XI Corps, the attack focused on GEN Schimmelfennig's DIV. They were subjected to a deadly artillery crossfire from Rodes' and Early's batteries, and as they deployed they were attacked by Doles' infantry. Early's troops were able to employ a flanking attack and roll up the division from the right, and they fell back in confusion toward the town. GEN Howard, sent forward an artillery battery and an IN BDE, under COL Coster but was overwhelmed by Hays and Avery. He provided valuable cover for the retreating soldiers, but at a high price.

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DAY 1 (01JUL63)

Rodes's original faulty attack at 1400 had stalled, but he launched his reserve BDE, under Ramseur, against Paul's BDE in the salient [1] on the Mummasburg Road, with Doles's BDE against the left flank of the XI Corps. Daniel's BDE resumed its attack, to the east against Baxter on Oak Ridge [2]. This time Rodes was more successful, because Early coordinated an attack on his flank.

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In the west, the Union troops had fallen back to the Seminary and built hasty breastworks running 550 m north-south before the western face of Schmucker Hall [3], bolstered by 20 guns of Wainwright's BN. Pender's DIV stepped through the exhausted lines of Heth's men at about 1600 to finish off the I Corps survivors. His five regiments of 1,400 NC were virtually annihilated in one of the fiercest artillery barrages of the war, rivaling Pickett's Charge to come. Twenty guns spaced 4.6 m apart fired spherical case, explosive shells, canister, and double canister rounds into the approaching BDE, which emerged from the fight with only 500 men and a single LT in command.

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The attack continued in the southern-central area, where COL Perrin ordered his SC BDE to advance rapidly without pausing to fire. Perrin was on horseback leading his men but miraculously was untouched. He directed his men to a weak point in the breastworks on the Union left, a 46 m gap [4] between Biddle's left-hand regiment, the 121st PA, and Gamble's cavalrymen, attempting to guard the flank. They broke through, enveloping the Union line and rolling it up to the north as Scales's men continued to pin the right flank. By 1630, the Union position was untenable, and the men could see the XI Corps retreating from the northern battle, pursued by masses of Confederates. Doubleday ordered a withdrawal east to Cemetery Hill [5].

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On the southern flank, the NC BDE of BG Lane contributed little to the assault; he was kept busy by a clash with Union cavalry on the Hagerstown Road. BG Thomas's GA BDE was in reserve well to the rear, not summoned by Pender or Hill to assist or exploit the breakthrough.

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1600 – Rodes and Pender break through

Lee’s Battle Plan

By the morning of July 2, six of the seven corps of the AoP had arrived on the battlefield. The I Corps and the XI Corps had fought hard on the first day, and they were joined that evening by the yet-unengaged troops of the XII Corps, III Corps, and II Corps, and on the morning of July 2 by the V Corps. They assumed positions in a fish hook shape [1] about 5 km long, from Culp's Hill, around to Cemetery Hill, and down the spine of Cemetery Ridge [2]. The Army of Northern Virginia line was roughly parallel to the Union's, on Seminary Ridge and on an arc NW, N, and NE of the town of Gettysburg. All of the Second Corps and Third Corps were present, and the First Corps was arriving from Cashtown.

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Lee had several choices to consider for his next move. His order of the previous evening that Ewell occupy Culp's Hill or Cemetery Hill "if practicable" was not realized, and the Union army was now in strong defensive positions with compact interior lines. His senior subordinate, Longstreet, counseled a strategic move—the Army should leave its current position, swing around the Union left flank, and interpose itself on Meade's lines of communication, inviting an attack by Meade that could be received on advantageous ground. Longstreet argued that this was the entire point of the Gettysburg campaign, to move strategically into enemy territory but fight only defensive battles there. Lee rejected this argument because he was concerned about the morale of his soldiers having to give up the ground for which they fought so hard the day before. He wanted to retain the initiative and had a high degree of confidence in the ability of his army to succeed in any endeavor, an opinion bolstered by their spectacular victories the previous day and at Chancellorsville.

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Lee wanted to seize the high ground south of Gettysburg, primarily Cemetery Hill, which dominated the town, the Union supply lines, and the road to Washington, D.C., and he believed an attack up the Emmitsburg Road would be the best approach. He desired an early-morning assault by Longstreet's Corps, reinforced by Ewell, who would move his Corps from its current location north of town to join Longstreet. Ewell protested this arrangement, claiming his men would be demoralized if forced to move from the ground they had captured. And Longstreet protested that his DIV commanded by J.B. Hood had not arrived completely and that Pickett's division had not arrived at all.  Lee compromised with his subordinates. Ewell would remain in place and conduct a demonstration against Culp's Hill, pinning down the right flank of the Union defenders so that they could not reinforce their left, where Longstreet would launch the primary attack as soon as he was ready. Ewell's demonstration would be turned into a full-scale assault if the opportunity presented itself.

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Lee ordered Longstreet to launch a surprise attack with two DIV guiding on the Emmitsburg Road.  Hood's division would move up the eastern side of the road, McLaws's the western side, each perpendicular to it. The objective was to strike the Union Army in an oblique attack, rolling up their left flank, collapsing the line of Union corps onto each other, and seizing Cemetery Hill. The Third Corps division of Anderson would join the attack against the center of the Union line on Cemetery Ridge at the appropriate time. This plan was based on faulty intelligence because of the absence of J.E.B. Stuart and his cavalry, leaving Lee with an incomplete understanding of the position of his enemy. He believed that the left flank of the Union army was adjacent to the Emmitsburg Road hanging "in the air", and an early morning scouting expedition seemed to confirm that.  In reality, by dawn of July 2 the Union line stretched the length of Cemetery Ridge and anchored at the foot of the imposing Little Round Top.

DAY 2 (02JUL63)

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Longstreet's attack commenced with a 30-minute artillery barrage by 36 guns that was particularly punishing to the Union infantry in the Peach Orchard [1] and the troops and batteries on Houck's Ridge [2]. At 1630, Hood stood in his stirrups at the front of the Texas BDE and shouted, "Fix bayonets, my brave Texans! Forward and take those heights!" It is unclear to which heights he was referring. His orders were to cross the Emmitsburg Road and wheel left, moving north with his left flank guiding on the road. This discrepancy became a problem when, minutes later on Slyder's Lane [3], Hood was felled by an artillery shell bursting overhead, severely wounding his left arm and putting him out of action. His DIV moved ahead to the east, no longer under control.

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There were four probable reasons for the deviation in the DIVs direction: first, REGs from the III Corps were unexpectedly in the Devil's Den area and they would threaten Hood's right flank if they were not dealt with; second, fire from the 2nd U.S. Sharpshooters at Slyder's farm [4] drew the attention of lead elements of Law's BDE, moving in pursuit and drawing his BDE to the right; third, the terrain was rough and units naturally lost their parade-ground alignments; finally, Hood's senior subordinate, GEN Law, was unaware that he was now in command of the DIV, so he could not exercise control. The two lead BDEs split their advances into two directions, although not on BDE boundaries. The 1st TX and 3rd AR of Robertson's BDE and the 44th and 48th AL of Law's BDE headed in the direction of Devil's Den, while Law directed the remaining five REGs toward the Round Tops.

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Devil’s Den [5]

Devil's Den was located at the extreme left of the III Corps line, manned by the large BDE (six REG and two CO of sharpshooters, 2,200 men in all) of BG Ward, in MG Birney's DIV. It was the S end of Houck's Ridge [2], a modest elevation on the NW side of Plum Run Valley [6], made distinctive by piles of huge boulders. These boulders were not the direct avenue of approach used by the Confederates. The 3rd AR and the

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Sickels Repositions / Longstreet Delayed

Hood’s Assault

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DAY 2 (02JUL63)

When Sickles arrived with his III Corps, General Meade instructed him to take up a position on Cemetery Ridge [1] that linked up with the II Corps on his right and anchored his left on Little Round Top [2]. Sickles originally did so, but after noon he became concerned about a slightly higher piece of ground 0.7 miles (1,100 m) to his front, a peach orchard [3] owned by the Sherfy family. He undoubtedly recalled the debacle at Chancellorsville, where the high ground ("Hazel Grove") he was forced to give up was used against him as a deadly Confederate artillery platform. Acting without authorization from Meade, Sickles marched his corps to occupy the peach orchard [3]. This had two significant negative consequences: his position now took the form of a salient, which could be attacked from multiple sides; and he was forced to occupy lines that were much longer than his two-division corps could defend. Meade was furious about this insubordination, but it was too late to do anything about it, the Confederate attack was imminent.

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Longstreet's attack was delayed, however, because he first had to wait for his final brigade to arrive, and then he was forced to march on a long, circuitous route that could not be seen by Union Army Signal Corps observers on Little Round Top. It was 4 p.m. by the time his two divisions reached their jumping off points, and then he and his generals were astonished to find the III Corps planted directly in front of them on the Emmitsburg Road. Hood argued with Longstreet that this new situation demanded a change in tactics; he wanted to swing around, below and behind, Round Top and hit the Union Army in the rear. Longstreet, however, refused to consider such a modification to Lee's order.

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Even so, and partly because of Sickles's unexpected location, Longstreet's assault did not proceed according to Lee's plan. Instead of wheeling left to join a simultaneous two-division push on either side of the Emmitsburg Road, Hood's division attacked in a more easterly direction than intended, and McLaws's and Anderson's divisions deployed brigade by brigade, in an en echelon style of attack, also heading more to the east than the intended northeast.

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1st TX drove through Rose Woods [7] and hit Ward's line head-on. His troops had lacked the time or inclination to erect breastworks, and for over an hour both sides participated in a standup fight of unusual ferocity. In the first 30 min, the 20th IN lost more than half of its men. Its COL, John Wheeler, was killed and its LTC wounded.

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Meanwhile, the two REG from Law's BDE that had split [8] from the column advancing to the Round Tops pushed up Plum Run Valley and threatened to turn Ward's flank. Their target was the 4th ME and the 124th NY, defending the 4th NY Independent artillery battery commanded by CPT Smith, whose fire was causing considerable disruption in Law's BDE’s advance. The pressure grew great enough that Ward needed to call the 99th PA from his far right to reinforce his left. The commander of the 124th NY, COL Ellis, and his MAJ, James Cromwell, decided to counterattack. They mounted their horses despite the protests of soldiers who urged them to lead more safely on foot. MAJ Cromwell said, "The men must see us today." They led the charge of their "Orange Blossoms" regiment to the W, down the slope of Houck's Ridge [2] through a triangular field surrounded by a low stone fence, sending the 1st TX reeling back 180 m. Both COL Ellis and MAJ Cromwell were shot dead as the Texans rallied with a massed volley; and the NYs retreated to their starting point, with only 100 survivors from the 283 they started with. As reinforcements from the 99th PA arrived, Ward's BDE retook the crest.

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The second wave of Hood's assault was the BDEs of Henry Benning and George "Tige" Anderson. They detected a gap [9] in Birney's DIV line: to Ward's right, there was a considerable gap before the BDE of De Trobriand began. Anderson's line smashed into Trobriand and the gap at the southern edge of the Wheatfield. Trobriand wrote that the Confederates "converged on me like an avalanche, but we piled all the dead and wounded men in our front." The Union defense was fierce, and Anderson's BDE pulled back; its commander was wounded in the leg and was carried from the battle. Two of Benning's Confederate REGs, the 2nd and 17th GA, moved down Plum Run Valley [6] around Ward's flank. They received murderous fire from the 99th PA and Hazlett's battery on Little Round Top, but they kept pushing forward. CPT Smith's NY BAT was under severe pressure from three sides, but its supporting IN REGs were suffering severe casualties and could not protect it. Three 10-pound Parrott rifles were lost to the 1st TX, and they were used against Union troops the next day.

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Birney scrambled to find reinforcements. He sent the 40th NY and 6th NJ from the Wheatfield into Plum Run Valley [6] to block the approach into Ward's flank. They collided with Benning's and Law's men in rocky, broken ground that the survivors would remember as the "Slaughter Pen“[10]. (Plum Run itself was known as "Bloody Run"; Plum Run Valley as the "Valley of Death".) COL Egan, commanding the 40th NY, was called on by Smith to recover his guns. The men of the "Mozart" REG slammed into the 2nd and 17th GA REG, with initial success. As Ward's line along Houck's Ridge continued to collapse, the position manned by the 40th became increasingly untenable. However, Egan pressed his REG onward, according to COL Hodges of the 17th GA, launching seven attacks against the Confederate positions within the boulders of Slaughter Pen [10[ and Devil's Den [5]. As the men of the 40th fell back under relentless pressure, the 6th NJ covered their withdrawal and lost a third of its men in the process. The pressure on Ward's BDE was eventually too great, and he was forced to call for a retreat. Hood's DIV secured Devil's Den and the southern part of Houck's Ridge. The center of the fighting shifted to the NW, to Rose Woods [7] and the Wheatfield, while five REG under Law assaulted Little Round Top to the east. Benning's men spent the next 22 hours on Devil's Den, firing across the Valley of Death on Union troops massed on Little Round Top.

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Little Round Top

About 1600 on July 2, 1863, Confederate LTG Longstreet's First Corps began an attack ordered by Lee that was intended to drive northeast up the Emmitsburg Road in the direction of Cemetery Hill, rolling up the Union left flank. MG Hood's division was assigned to attack up the eastern side of the road, MG McLaws's division the western side. Hood's division stepped off first, but instead of guiding on the road, elements began to swing directly to the east in the direction of the Round Tops. Instead of driving the entire division up the spine of Houck's Ridge (the boulder-strewn area known to the soldiers as the Devil's Den), parts of Hood's division detoured over Round Top and approached the southern slope of Little Round Top.

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There were four probable reasons for the deviation in the division's direction: first, regiments from the Union III Corps were unexpectedly in the Devil's Den area and they would threaten Hood's right flank if they were not dealt with; second, fire from the 2nd U.S. Sharpshooters at Slyder's farm drew the attention of lead elements of Brig. Gen. Evander M. Law's brigade, moving in pursuit and drawing his brigade to the right; third, the terrain was rough and units naturally lost their parade-ground alignments; finally, Hood's senior subordinate, General Law, was unaware that Hood had been wounded and he was now in command of the division, so he did not exercise control.

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In the meantime, Little Round Top was undefended by Union troops. Maj. Gen. George Meade, commander of the Army of the Potomac, had ordered Maj. Gen. Daniel Sickles's III Corps to defend the southern end of Cemetery Ridge, which would have just included Little Round Top. Sickles, defying Meade's orders, moved his corps a few hundred yards west to the Emmitsburg Road and the Peach Orchard. This caused a large salient in the line, which was also too long to defend properly. His left flank was anchored in Devil's Den.

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When Meade discovered this situation, he dispatched his chief engineer, BG Warren, to attempt to deal with the situation south of Sickles's position. Climbing Little Round Top, Warren found only a small Signal Corps station there. He saw the glint of bayonets in the sun to the SW and realized that a Confederate assault into the Union flank was imminent. He hurriedly sent staff officers, including Washington Roebling, to find help from any available units in the vicinity. The response to this request for help came from MG Sykes, commander of the Union V Corps. Sykes quickly dispatched a messenger to order his 1st Division, commanded by BG Barnes, to Little Round Top. Before the messenger could reach Barnes, he encountered COL Vincent, commander of the third brigade, who seized the initiative and directed his four regiments to Little Round Top without waiting for permission from Barnes. He and Oliver W. Norton, the brigade bugler, galloped ahead to reconnoiter and guide his four regiments into position.

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Upon arrival on Little Round Top, Vincent and Norton received fire from Confederate batteries almost immediately. Arriving only ten minutes before the Confederates, Vincent ordered his BDE to take cover and wait, and he ordered COL Chamberlain, commander of the 20th Maine, to hold his position, the extreme left of the AoP [1]. Chamberlain and his 385 men waited for what was to come. Dispatching the 4th, 15th, and 47th Alabama, and the 4th and 5th Texas to Little Round Top, Law ordered his men to take the hill. The men were exhausted, having marched more than 32 km that day to reach this point. The day was hot and their canteens were empty; Law's order to move out reached them before they could refill their water. Approaching the Union line on the crest of the hill, Law's men were thrown back by the first Union volley and withdrew briefly to regroup. The 15th Alabama, commanded by COL Oates, repositioned further right and attempted to find the Union left flank.

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Seeing the Confederates shifting around his flank, Chamberlain first stretched his line to the point where his men were in a single-file line, then ordered the southernmost half of his line to swing back during a lull following another Confederate charge. It was there that they formed an angle to the main line in an attempt to prevent the Confederate flanking maneuver. Despite heavy losses, the 20th Maine held through two subsequent charges by the 15th Alabama and other Confederate regiments for a total of ninety minutes. Chamberlain knowing that his men were out of ammunition, his numbers were being depleted, and his men would not be able to repulse another Confederate charge, ordered his men to equip bayonets and counterattack. He ordered his left flank, to advance in a 'right-wheel forward' maneuver. As soon as they were in line with the rest of the regiment, the remainder of the regiment would charge akin to a door swinging shut. This simultaneous frontal assault and flanking maneuver halted and captured a good portion of the 15th Alabama. While Chamberlain ordered the advance, LT Melcher spontaneously and separate to Chamberlain's command initiated a charge from the center of the line that further aided the regiment's efforts.

During their retreat, the Confederates were subjected to a volley of rifle fire from Company B of the 20th Maine, commanded by CPT Morrill, and a few of the 2nd U.S. Sharpshooters, who had been placed by Chamberlain behind a stone wall 150 yards to the east [2]. This group, who had been hidden from sight, caused considerable confusion in the Confederate ranks. While the Alabamians had pressed their attacks on the Union left, the 4th and 5th Texas were attacking Vincent's 16th Michigan, on the Union right. Rallying the crumbling regiment (the smallest in his brigade, with only 263 men) several times, Vincent was mortally wounded during one Texas charge and was succeeded by COL Rice. Before the Michiganders could be demoralized, reinforcements summoned by Warren—who had continued on to find more troops to defend the hill—had arrived in the form of the 140th New York and a battery of four guns—Battery D, 5th U.S. Artillery, commanded by LT Hazlett.

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The 140th charged into the fray of the battle, driving the Texans back and securing victory for the Union forces on the hill. COL O'Rorke, who personally led his regiment in the charge, was killed. Reinforced further by Stephen Weed's brigade of the V Corps, Union forces held the hill throughout the rest of the battle, enduring persistent fire from Confederate sharpshooters stationed around Devil's Den. GEN Weed was among the victims, and as his old friend Charles Hazlett leaned over to comfort Weed, the artilleryman was also shot dead.

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Western Slope of Little Round Top

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The first engagement in the Wheatfield was actually that of Anderson's BDE attacking the 17th Maine of Trobriand's BDE, a spillover from Hood's attack on Houck's Ridge. Although under pressure and with its neighboring regiments on Stony Hill withdrawing, the 17th Maine held its position behind a low stone wall with the assistance of Winslow's battery, and Anderson fell back. By 1730, when the first of Kershaw's regiments neared the Rose farmhouse [1], Stony Hill [2] had been reinforced by two BDEs under BG Barnes, those of COL Tilton and Sweitzer. For some reason, Barnes withdrew his understrength division about 270 m to the N; without consultation with Birney's men, to a new position near the Wheatfield Road. Trobriand and the 17th Maine had to follow suit, and the Confederates seized Stony Hill.

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Earlier that afternoon, as Meade realized the folly of Sickles's movement, he ordered Hancock to send a DIV to reinforce the III Corps. Hancock sent the 1st DIV under BG Caldwell from its position behind Cemetery Ridge. It arrived at 1800 and three BDEs, under COL Zook, Kelly, and Cross moved forward; the fourth BDE was in reserve. Zook and Kelly drove the Confederates from Stony Hill, and Cross cleared the Wheatfield, pushing Kershaw's men back to the edge of Rose Woods [3]. When Cross's men had exhausted their ammunition, Caldwell ordered Brooke to relieve them. By this time, however, the Union position in the Peach Orchard [4] had collapsed, and Wofford's assault continued down the Wheatfield Road [4], taking Stony Hill and flanking the Union forces in the Wheatfield. Brooke's BDE in Rose Woods had to retreat in some disorder. Sweitzer's BDE was sent in to delay the Confederate assault, and they did this effectively in vicious hand-to-hand combat. The Wheatfield changed hands once again.

McLaw’s Assault – Wheatfield Initial Assault

Confederates Size the Wheatfield

The Peach Orchard – Initial Assault

While the right wing of Kershaw's BDE attacked into the Wheatfield, its left wing wheeled left to attack the Pennsylvania troops in the brigade of Brig. Gen. Charles K. Graham, the right flank of Birney's line, where 30 guns from the III Corps and the Artillery Reserve attempted to hold the sector [1]. The South Carolinians were subjected to infantry volleys from the Peach Orchard and canister from all along the line. Suddenly someone unknown shouted a false command, and the attacking regiments turned to their right, toward the Wheatfield [2], which presented their left flank to the batteries. Kershaw later wrote, "Hundreds of the bravest and best men of Carolina fell, victims of this fatal blunder.“

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Meanwhile, the two brigades on McLaws's left [3]—Barksdale's in front and Wofford's behind—charged directly into the Peach Orchard, the point of the salient in Sickles's line. Gen. Barksdale led the charge on horseback, long hair flowing in the wind, sword waving in the air. Brig. Gen. Andrew A. Humphreys's division had only about 1,000 men to cover the 500 yards (460 m) from the Peach Orchard northward along the Emmitsburg Road to the lane leading to the Abraham Trostle farm. Some were still facing south [4], from where they had been firing on Kershaw's brigade, so they were hit in their vulnerable flank. Barksdale's 1,600 Mississippians wheeled left against the flank of Humphreys's division, collapsing their line, regiment by regiment. Graham's brigade retreated back toward Cemetery Ridge; Graham had two horses shot out from under him. He was hit by a shell fragment, and by a bullet in his upper body. He was eventually captured by the 21st Mississippi. Wofford's men dealt with the defenders of the orchard.

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DAY 2 (02JUL63)

Additional Union troops had arrived by this time. The 2nd Division of the V corps, under BG Ayres. In their advance across the Valley of Death [1] they had come under heavy fire from Confederate sharpshooters in Devil's Den [2]. As the regulars advanced, the Confederates swarmed over Stony Hill [3] and through Rose Woods, flanking the newly arrived BDEs. The regulars retreated back to the relative safety of Little Round Top in good order, despite taking heavy casualties and pursuing Confederates. The two regular BDEs suffered 829 casualties out of 2,613.

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This final Confederate assault through the Wheatfield continued past Houck's Ridge into the Valley of Death at about 1930. The BDEs of Anderson, Semmes, and Kershaw were exhausted from hours of combat in the summer heat and advanced East with units jumbled up together. Wofford's BDE followed to the left along the Wheatfield Road. As they reached the northern shoulder of Little Round Top [4], they were met with a counterattack from the 3rd DIV of the V Corps, under BG Crawford. The BDE of COL McCandless, including a company from the Gettysburg area, spearheaded the attack and drove the exhausted Confederates back beyond the Wheatfield to Stony Hill [3]. Realizing that his troops were too far advanced and exposed, Crawford pulled the BDE back to the east edge of the Wheatfield [5].

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The bloody Wheatfield remained quiet for the rest of the battle. But it took a heavy toll on the men who traded possession back-and-forth. The Confederates had fought six brigades against 13 (smaller) Federal brigades, and of the 20,444 men engaged, about 30% were casualties. Some of the wounded managed to crawl to Plum Run but could not cross it. The river ran red with their blood.

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As Barksdale's men pushed toward Sickles's headquarters near the Trostle barn [1], the general and his staff began to move to the rear, when a cannonball caught Sickles in the right leg. He was carried off in a stretcher, sitting up and puffing on his cigar, attempting to encourage his men. That evening his leg was amputated, and he returned to Washington, D.C. Gen. Birney assumed command of the III Corps, which was soon rendered ineffective as a fighting force.[39]

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The relentless infantry charges posed extreme danger to the Union artillery batteries in the orchard and on the Wheatfield Road, and they were forced to withdraw under pressure. The six Napoleons of Capt. John Bigelow's 9th Massachusetts Light Artillery, on the left of the line, "retired by prolonge," a technique rarely used in which the cannon was dragged backwards as it fired rapidly, the movement aided by the gun's recoil. By the time they reached the Trostle house, they were told to hold the position to cover the infantry retreat, but they were eventually overrun by troops of the 21st Mississippi, who captured three of their guns.

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Humphreys's fate was sealed when the Confederate en echelon attack continued and his front and right flank began to be assaulted by the Third Corps division of Richard H. Anderson on Cemetery Ridge.

Peach Orchard – Routing of Humphrey’s DIV

Anderson’s Assault – Cemetery Ridge

Battle East of Cemetery Hill

DAY 2 (02JUL63)

The remaining portion of the en echelon attack was the responsibility of MG Anderson's DIV of A.P. Hill's Third Corps, and he attacked starting at about 1800 with five BDEs in line, commencing on the right with BG Wilcox, followed by the remainders [1]. The BDEs of Wilcox and Lang hit the front and right flank of Humphreys's line, dooming any chance for his DIV to maintain its position on the Emmitsburg Road. On Cemetery Ridge, GEN Meade and Hancock were scrambling to find reinforcements. Meade had sent virtually all of his available troops to his left flank to counter Longstreet's assault. There was insufficient infantry on Cemetery Ridge and only a few artillery pieces, rallied from the debacle of the Orchard by LTC McGilvery.

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The long march from Seminary Ridge had left some of the Southern units disorganized, and their commanders paused at Plum Run to reorganize. Hancock led the II Corps BDE of COL Willard to meet Barksdale's BDE as it moved toward the ridge. Willard's New Yorkers [2] drove the Mississippians back to Emmitsburg Road. As Hancock rode north to find additional reinforcements, he saw Wilcox's BDE nearing the base of the ridge, aiming at a gap in the Union line. The timing was critical, and Hancock chose the only troops at hand, the men of the 1st Minnesota, Harrow's Brigade, of the 2nd Division of the II Corps. They were originally placed there to guard Thomas's U.S. Battery. He pointed to a Confederate flag and shouted to COL Colvill, "Advance, Colonel, and take those colors!" The 262 Minnesotans charged the Alabama BDE [3] with bayonets fixed, and they blunted their advance at Plum Run but at horrible cost, 215 casualties (82%), including 40 deaths. Despite overwhelming Confederate numbers, the small 1st Minnesota, with the support of Willard's BDE on their left, checked Wilcox's advance and the Alabamians were forced to withdraw.

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The third Confederate BDE in line, under Wright, crushed two REG posted N of the Codori farm [4], captured the guns of two batteries, and advanced toward a gap in the Union line just S of the Copse of Trees. Wright's GA BDE may have reached the crest of Cemetery Ridge and beyond. In his AAR, which, if correct, would mean he passed the crest of the ridge before being struck in the flank and repulsed by Union reinforcements. Wright told Lee it was relatively easy to get to the crest, but it was difficult to stay. Two BDEs were on Wright's left and could have reinforced his success. Posey's BDE made slow progress [5] and never crossed the Emmitsburg Road, despite protestations from Wright. William Mahone's BDE inexplicably never moved at all. GEN Anderson sent a messenger with orders to advance, but Mahone refused.

After the Confederates attacked Culp's Hill at about 1900 and as dusk fell around 1930, Ewell sent two BDEs from the DIV of Early against East Cemetery Hill from the E, and he alerted the DIV of MG Rodes to prepare an assault against Cemetery Hill proper from the NW. The two BDEs from Early's DIV were commanded by BG Hays: his own LA Tigers BDE and Hoke's BDE [1]. They stepped off from a line parallel to Winebrenner's Run SE of town. Harris' BDE [2] was at a low stone wall on the northern end of the hill and wrapped around the base of the hill onto Brickyard Lane. Von Gilsa's BDE was scattered along the lane as well as on the hill. Two REGs, the 41st NY and the 33rd MA, were stationed in Culp's Meadow [3] beyond Brickyard Lane in expectation of an attack by Johnson's DIV. More westerly on the hill were the DIVs of MG Steinwehr and Carl Schurz. The steep slope of East Cemetery Hill made artillery fire difficult to direct against infantry because the gun barrels could not be depressed sufficiently, but they did their best with canister and double canister fire.

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Attacking against the Ohio REGs and the 17th CN in the center, Hays' forces bounded over a gap in the Union line at the stone wall. Through other weak spots some Confederates reached the batteries at the top of the hill [4] and others fought in the darkness with the 4 remaining Union REGs on the line at the stone wall. On the crest of the hill against the gunners of Wiedrich's NY battery and Ricketts' PA battery 75 North Carolinians of the Sixth REG and 12 Louisianan's of Hays's BDE cleared the heights and silenced the guns. The 58th and 119th NY REG of Krzyżanowski's BDE reinforced Wiedrich's battery from West Cemetery Hill [5], as did a II Corps BDE under COL Carroll from Cemetery Ridge arriving in the dark double-quick over the hill's south slope through Evergreen Cemetery as the Confederate attack was starting to ebb. Carroll's men secured Ricketts's battery and swept the NCs down the hill and Krzyżanowski led his men to sweep the LA attackers down the hill until they reached the base and "flopped down" for Wiedrich's guns to fire canister at the retreating Confederates. BG Ramseur, saw the futility of a night assault against artillery-backed Union troops in 2 lines behind stone walls. Ewell had ordered BG Lane, in command of Pender's DIV, to attack if a "favorable opportunity presented", but when notified Ewell's attack was starting and Ewell was requesting cooperation in the unfavorable attack, Lane sent back no reply. Losses on both sides were severe.

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Culp's Hill was occupied initially on the evening of July 1, 1863, by troops of the Union Army, along with neighboring Cemetery Hill, as a rallying point from the retreat following the Confederate victory that day north and west of town. LG Ewell had discretionary orders to seize the heights south of town, and he believed that Culp's Hill was unoccupied and therefore a good target, one that would make the Union position on Cemetery Hill untenable. His third division, under MG Johnson, had just arrived on the battlefield, and Johnson was ordered to take the hill if he had not already done so.

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Johnson did not take Culp's Hill. He sent a small party to reconnoiter, and they encountered the 7th IN Infantry of the I Corps, part of BG Wadsworth's DIV, which had been in the rear guarding the corps trains and was now linked up with the Iron Brigade, digging in following their fierce battle on Seminary Ridge. Johnson's party was taken by surprise and almost taken prisoner before fleeing.

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Ewell's failure to take Culp's Hill or Cemetery Hill that evening is considered one of the great missed opportunities of the battle. Another reason for his reluctance to proceed was intelligence that Union troops were approaching from the east on the Hanover Road. This was the vanguard of the XII Corps under MG Slocum. If those troops had arrived at the wrong time, Ewell's flank would have been turned.

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Second day

By mid-morning of July 2, the XII Corps arrived and fortified the hill. BG Greene, who at 62 was the oldest Union general on the field, was a BDE commander in the division of MG Geary. As a civil engineer before the war, he had a natural understanding of the value of defensive works. His division and corps commanders did not believe they would be stationed at Culp's Hill very long and did not share his enthusiasm for constructing breastworks, but they did not oppose his efforts. He set his troops to the task of felling trees and collecting rocks and earth to create very effective defensive positions.

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The Union defensive positions on July 2 began in the north with artillery batteries on Stevens's Knoll, followed by Wadsworth's DIV of the I Corps, Greene's New York BDE in positions running N to S on the upper slope, and the BDE of BG Kane connecting to Greene's line behind breastworks on the lower slope. Behind these front lines were, from left to right, the brigades of COL Candy, COL McDougall, COL Colgrove, and BG Lockwood, extending past Spangler's Spring and through McAllister's Woods. That morning, Confederate GEN Lee ordered attacks on both ends of the Union line.

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Culp’s Hill

DAY 2 (02JUL63)

LG Longstreet attacked with his First Corps on the Union left (Little Round Top, Devil's Den, the Wheatfield). Ewell and the Second Corps were assigned the mission of launching a simultaneous demonstration against the Union right, a minor attack that was intended to distract and pin down the Union defenders against Longstreet. Ewell was to exploit any success his demonstration might achieve by following up with a full-scale attack at his discretion.

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Ewell began his demonstration at 1600 upon hearing the sound of Longstreet's guns to the S. For three hours, he chose to limit his demonstration to an artillery barrage from Benner's Hill, about a mile (1,600 m) to the northeast. But despite this demonstration, Ewell did not hold the attention of MG Meade. Meade was occupied with the fierce fighting on his left flank and was scrambling to send as many reinforcements as possible. He ordered Slocum to send the XII Corps in support. It is unclear whether he ordered the entire corps or instructed Slocum to leave one BDE behind, but the latter is what Slocum did, and Greene's BDE was left with the sole responsibility for defending Culp's Hill.

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Greene extended his line to the right to cover part of the lower slope, but his 1,400 men would be dangerously overextended if a Confederate attack came. They were only able to form a single battle line, without reserves. Only three of the five BDEs of Union troops that were dispatched from the hill saw combat. The remainder of Geary's DIV marched down the Baltimore Pike and missed a key right hand turn. By the time they realized where they were, the crisis on the Union left flank and center had subsided. Around 1900, as dusk began to fall, and the Confederate assaults on the Union left and center were slowing, Ewell chose to begin his main infantry assault. He sent three brigades (4,700 men) from the division of MG Johnson across Rock Creek and up the eastern slope of Culp's Hill. The BDEs were, from left to right, those of BG Steuart, COL Williams, and BG Jones. The Stonewall Brigade, under BG Walker, was occupied with Union cavalry on Brinkerhoff's Ridge to the rear.

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As the fighting started, Greene sent for reinforcements from the I Corps and XI Corps to his left. Wadsworth was able to send three regiments, and MG Howard on Cemetery Hill was able to send four, altogether 750 men, who served as Greene's reserve and help to restore dwindling supplies of ammunition. On the Confederate right flank, Jones's BDE of Virginians had the most difficult terrain to cross [1], the steepest part of Culp's Hill. As they scrambled through the woods and up the rocky slope, they were shocked at the strength of the Union breastworks on the crest. Their charges were beaten off with relative ease by the 60th New York, which suffered very few casualties. Confederate casualties were high, including GEN Jones, who was wounded and left the field. One of the NY officers wrote "without breastworks our line would have been swept away in an instant by the hailstorm of bullets and the flood of men."

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In the center [2], Nicholls's LA BDE had a similar experience to Jones's. The attackers were essentially invisible in the dark except for brief instances when they fired, but the defensive works were impressive, and the 78th and 102nd NY REGs suffered few casualties in a fight that lasted four hours. Steuart's REGs on the left occupied the empty breastworks [3] on the lower hill and felt their way in the darkness toward Greene's right flank. The Union defenders waited nervously, watching as the flashes of the Confederate rifles drew near. But as they approached, Greene's men delivered a withering fire. The 3rd NC "reeled and staggered like a drunken man."

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Two REGs on Steuart's left, the 23rd and 10th VA, outflanked the works of the 137th NY. Like the fabled 20th ME of COL Chamberlain on Little Round Top earlier that afternoon, COL Ireland of the 137th NY found himself on the extreme end of the Union army, fending off a strong flanking attack. Under heavy pressure, the New Yorkers were forced back to occupy a traversing trench that Greene had engineered facing south [4]. They essentially held their ground and protected the flank, but they lost almost a third of their men in doing so. Because of the darkness and Greene's BDE’s heroic defense, Steuart's men did not realize that they had almost unlimited access to the main line of communication for the Union army, the Baltimore Pike, only 600 yards to their front. Ireland and his men prevented a huge disaster from befalling Meade's army, although they never received the publicity that their colleagues from Maine enjoyed.

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During the heat of the fighting, the sound of battle reached II Corps commander MG Hancock on Cemetery Ridge, who immediately sent additional reserve forces. The 71st PA filed in to assist the 137th NY on Greene's right. By the time the rest of the XII Corps returned late that night, Confederate troops had occupied some of the Union defensive line on the southeastern slope of the hill, near Spangler's Spring. This caused considerable confusion as the Union troops stumbled in the dark to find enemy soldiers in the positions they had vacated. GEN Williams did not want to continue this confused fight, so he ordered his men to occupy the open field in front of the woods and wait for daylight. And while Steuart's BDE maintained a fragile hold on the lower heights, Johnson's other two BDEs were pulled off the hill, also to wait for daylight. Geary's men returned to reinforce Greene. Both sides prepared to attack at dawn.

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Lee’s Plan

DAY 3 (03JUL63)

GEN Lee wished to renew the attack on Friday, July 3, using the same basic plan as the previous day: Longstreet would attack the U.S. left [1], while Ewell attacked Culp's Hill [2]. However, before Longstreet was ready, Union XII Corps troops started a dawn artillery bombardment against the Confederates on Culp's Hill in an effort to regain a portion of their lost works. The Confederates attacked, and the second fight for Culp's Hill ended around 1100. Harry Pfanz judged that, after some seven hours of bitter combat, "the Union line was intact and held more strongly than before.“

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Lee was forced to change his plans. Longstreet would command Pickett's Virginia division of his own First Corps, plus six brigades from Hill's Corps, in an attack on the U.S. II Corps position at the right center of the Union line on Cemetery Ridge [3]. Prior to the attack, all the artillery the Confederacy could bring to bear on the U.S. positions would bombard and weaken the enemy's line.

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Much has been made over the years of General Longstreet's objections to General Lee's plan. In his memoirs, Longstreet described their discussion as follows:

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[Lee] rode over after sunrise and gave his orders. His plan was to assault the enemy's left centre by a column to be composed of McLaws's and Hood's divisions reinforced by Pickett's brigades. I thought that it would not do; that the point had been fully tested the day before, by more men, when all were fresh; that the enemy was there looking for us, as we heard him during the night putting up his defenses; that the divisions of McLaws and Hood were holding a mile [1,600 m] along the right of my line against twenty thousand men, who would follow their withdrawal, strike the flank of the assaulting column, crush it, and get on our rear towards the Potomac River; that thirty thousand men was the minimum of force necessary for the work; that even such force would need close co-operation on other parts of the line; that the column as he proposed to organize it would have only about thirteen thousand men (the divisions having lost a third of their numbers the day before); that the column would have to march a mile [1,600 m] under concentrating battery fire, and a thousand yards [900 m] under long-range musketry; that the conditions were different from those in the days of Napoleon, when field batteries had a range of 550 m and musketry about 55 m.

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He said the distance was not more than 1280 m. General Meade's estimate was a mile or a mile and a half (Captain Long, the guide of the field of Gettysburg in 1888, stated that it was a trifle over a mile). He then concluded that the divisions of McLaws and Hood could remain on the defensive line; that he would reinforce by divisions of the Third Corps and Pickett's brigades, and stated the point to which the march should be directed. I asked the strength of the column. He stated fifteen thousand. Opinion was then expressed that the fifteen thousand men who could make successful assault over that field had never been arrayed for battle; but he was impatient of listening, and tired of talking, and nothing was left but to proceed.

Culp’s Hill

On July 3, GEN Lee's plan was to renew his attacks by coordinating the action on Culp's Hill with another attack by Longstreet and A.P. Hill against Cemetery Ridge. Longstreet was not ready for an early attack, and the Union forces on Culp's Hill did not accommodate Lee by waiting. At dawn, five Union batteries opened fire on Steuart's BDE in the positions they had captured [1] and kept them pinned down for 30 min. before a planned attack by two of Geary's BDEs. However, the Confederates beat them to the punch. An attempt by Lee to hold off the start of the fighting was fruitless. Ewell sent back a terse reply by messenger: "Too late to recall." Fighting continued until late in the morning and consisted of three attacks [2] by Johnson's men, each a failure. The attacks were essentially a replay of those the previous evening, although in daylight.

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Since the fighting had stopped the previous night, the XI Corps units had been reinforced by troops from the I and VI Corps. Ewell had reinforced Johnson with additional BDEs from the DIV of MG Rodes, under BG Daniel and Smith and COL O'Neal. These forces were insufficient to deal with the strong Union defensive positions. Greene repeated the tactic of rotating REGs in and out of the breastworks while they reloaded, enabling them to keep up a high rate of fire. In the final of the three Confederate attacks, around 1000, Walker's BDE and Daniel's NC BDE assaulted Greene from the E, while Steuart's BDE advanced over the open field [1] toward the main hill against the BDEs of Candy and Kane, which did not have breastworks. Both attacks were beaten back with heavy losses. The attacks against the heights were again fruitless, and superior use of artillery on the open fields to the south made the difference there. The 1st MD was badly shot up struggling for a stone wall crossing the open field parallel to the line of works. Geary replaced them with the 147th PA of Candy's BDE, which charged successfully.

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The end of the fighting came near noon, with a futile attack by two Union REGs near Spangler's Spring [3]. GEN Slocum, observing from the distant Powers Hill, believing that the Confederates were faltering, ordered Ruger to retake the works [4] they had captured. Ruger passed the order to Silas Colgrove's BDE, and it was misinterpreted to mean a direct frontal assault on the Confederate position. The two REG selected for the assault, the 2nd MA and the 27th IN, consisted of a total of 650 men against the 1,000 Confederates behind the works with 100 yards of open field in front. When LTC Mudge of the 2nd MA heard the order he insisted that the officer repeat it. He was then quoted as saying "Well, it is murder, but it's the order." The two REGs attacked in sequence with the MA men in front, and they were both repelled with terrific losses: 43% of the MA soldiers, 32% of the Hoosiers. GEN Ruger spoke of the misconstrued order as "one of those unfortunate occurrences that will happen in the excitement of battle."

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Despite receiving reinforcements and attempting his assaults again, Johnson was repulsed with terrible losses from one end of his line to the other. COL O'Neal wrote that his BDE "charged time and again up to their works but were every time compelled to retire. Many men were lost." The losses at Culp's Hill included 2,000 men in Johnson's DIV. An additional 800 fell from the reinforcing BDEs on July 3. The XII corps lost about 1,000 men over both days, including 300 men in Greene's BDE. Williams summed up the futility of this fighting: "The wonder is that the rebels persisted so long in an attempt that the first half hour must have told them was useless."

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DAY 3 (03JUL63)

The infantry charge was preceded by what Lee hoped would be a powerful and well-concentrated cannonade of the Union center, destroying the Union artillery batteries that could defeat the assault and demoralizing the Union infantry. But a combination of inept artillery leadership and defective equipment doomed the barrage from the beginning. Longstreet's corps artillery chief, COL Alexander, had effective command of the field; Lee's artillery chief, BG Pendleton, played little role other than to obstruct the effective placement of artillery from the other two corps. Despite Alexander's efforts, then, there was insufficient concentration of Confederate fire on the objective.

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The July 3 bombardment was likely the largest of the war, with hundreds of cannons from both sides firing along the lines for one to two hours, starting around 1300 Confederate guns numbered between 150 and 170 and fired from a line over two miles long. BG Law wrote, "The cannonade in the center ... presented one of the most magnificent battle-scenes witnessed during the war. Looking up the valley towards Gettysburg, the hills on either side were capped with crowns of flame and smoke, as 300 guns, about equally divided between the two ridges, vomited their iron hail upon each other."

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Despite its ferocity, the fire was mostly ineffectual. Confederate shells often overshot the infantry front lines in some cases because of inferior shell fuses that delayed detonation and the smoke covering the battlefield concealed that fact from the gunners. Union artillery chief BG Hunt had only about 80 guns available to conduct counter-battery fire; the geographic features of the Union line had limited areas for effective gun emplacement. He also ordered that firing cease to conserve ammunition, but to fool Alexander, Hunt ordered his cannons to cease fire slowly to create the illusion that they were being destroyed one by one. By the time all of Hunt's cannons ceased fire, and still blinded by the smoke from battle, Alexander fell for Hunt's deception and believed that many of the Union batteries had been destroyed. Hunt had to resist the strong arguments of Hancock, who demanded Union fire to lift the spirits of the infantrymen pinned down by Alexander's bombardment.

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The day was hot, 87 °F by one account, and humid, and the Confederates suffered under the hot sun and from the Union counter-battery fire as they awaited the order to advance. When Union cannoneers overshot their targets, they often hit the massed infantry waiting in the woods of Seminary Ridge or in the shallow depressions just behind Alexander's guns, causing significant casualties before the charge began.

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Longstreet wanted to avoid personally ordering the charge by attempting to pass the mantle onto young COL Alexander, telling him that he should inform Pickett at the optimum time to begin the advance, based on his assessment that the Union artillery had been effectively silenced. Although he had insufficient information to accomplish this, Alexander eventually

notified Pickett that he was running dangerously short of ammunition, sending the message "If you are coming at all, come at once, or I cannot give you proper support, but the enemy's fire has not slackened at all. At least eighteen guns are still firing from the cemetery itself." Pickett asked Longstreet, "General, shall I advance?" Longstreet recalled in his memoirs, "The effort to speak the order failed, and I could only indicate it by an affirmative bow."

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Longstreet made one final attempt to call off the assault. After his encounter with Pickett, he discussed the artillery situation with Alexander, and was informed that Alexander did not have full confidence that all the enemy's guns were silenced and that the Confederate ammunition was almost exhausted. Longstreet ordered Alexander to stop Pickett, but the young colonel explained that replenishing his ammunition from the trains in the rear would take over an hour, and this delay would nullify any advantage the previous barrage had given them. The infantry assault went forward without the Confederate artillery close support that had been originally planned.

Artillery Barrage

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Pickett’s Charge

The entire force that stepped off toward the Union positions at about 1400 consisted of about 12,500 men. Although the attack is popularly called a "charge", the men marched deliberately in line, to speed up and then charge only when they were within a few hundred yards of the enemy. The line consisted of Pettigrew and Trimble on the left, and Pickett to the right. The nine brigades of men stretched over a mile-long (1,600 m) front. The Confederates encountered heavy artillery fire while advancing nearly three quarters of a mile across open fields to reach the Union line and were slowed by fences in their path. Initially sloping down, the terrain changed to a gentle upward incline approximately midway between the lines. These obstacles played a large role in the increasing number of casualties the advancing Confederates faced. The ground between Seminary Ridge and Cemetery Ridge is slightly undulating, and the advancing troops periodically disappeared from the view of the Union cannoneers. As the three Confederate divisions advanced, awaiting Union soldiers began shouting "Fredericksburg! Fredericksburg! Fredericksburg!" in reference to the disastrous Union advance on the Confederate line during the 1862 Battle of Fredericksburg. Fire from LTC McGilvery's concealed artillery positions north of Little Round Top raked the Confederate right flank, while the artillery fire from Cemetery Hill hit the left. Shell and solid shot in the beginning turned to canister and musket fire as the Confederates came within 400 yards of the Union line. The mile-long front shrank to less than half a mile (800 m) as the men filled in gaps that appeared throughout the line and followed the natural tendency to move away from the flanking fire.

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On the left flank of the attack, Brockenbrough's BDE [1] was devastated by artillery fire from Cemetery Hill. They were also subjected to a musket fusillade from the 8th OH IN REG [2]. The 160 Ohioans, firing from a single line, so surprised Brockenbrough's Virginians, already demoralized by their losses to artillery fire, that they fled back to Seminary Ridge, crashing through Trimble's DIV and causing many of his men to bolt as well [3]. The Ohioans followed up with a successful flanking attack on Davis's BDE of Mississippians and

North Carolinians, which was now the left flank of Pettigrew's DIV. The survivors were subjected to increasing artillery fire from Cemetery Hill. More than 1,600 rounds were fired at Pettigrew's men during the assault. This portion of the assault never advanced much farther than the sturdy fence at the Emmitsburg Road [4]. By this time, the Confederates were close enough to be fired on by artillery canister and Hays' DIV unleashed very effective musketry fire from behind 260 yards of stone wall, with every rifleman of the division lined up as many as four deep, exchanging places in line as they fired and then fell back to reload.

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Trimble's DIV of two brigades followed Pettigrew's, but made poor progress. Confusing orders from Trimble caused Lane to send only three and a half of his North Carolina regiments forward. Renewed fire from the 8th OH and the onslaught of Hays's riflemen prevented most of these men from getting past the Emmitsburg Road. Scales's NC BDE, led by COL Lowrance, started with a heavier disadvantage, they had lost almost two-thirds of their men on July 1. They were also driven back and Lowrance was wounded. The Union defenders also took casualties, but Hays encouraged his men by riding back and forth just behind the battle line, shouting "Hurrah! Boys, we're giving them hell!". Two horses were shot out from under him.

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On the right flank, Pickett's Virginians crossed the Emmitsburg road and wheeled partially to their left to face northeast [5]. They marched in two lines, led by the brigades of BG Kemper on the right and BG Garnett on the left; BG Armistead's BDE followed closely behind. As the division wheeled to the left, its right flank was exposed to McGilvery's guns and the front of Doubleday's Union DIV on Cemetery Ridge. Stannard's Vermont BDE marched forward [6], faced north, and delivered withering fire into the rear of Kemper's BDE. At about this time, Hancock, who had been prominent in displaying himself on horseback to his men during the Confederate artillery bombardment, was wounded by a bullet striking the pommel of his saddle, entering his inner right thigh along with wood fragments and a large bent nail. He refused evacuation to the rear until the battle was settled.

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As Pickett's men advanced, they withstood the defensive fire of first Stannard's BDE, then Harrow's, and then Hall's, before approaching a minor salient in the Union center, a low stone wall taking an 80-yard right-angle turn known afterward as "The Angle". It was defended by BG Webb's Philadelphia BDE. Webb placed the two remaining guns of (the severely wounded) Lt. Cushing's Battery A, 4th U.S. Artillery, at the front of his line at the stone fence, with the 69th and 71st PA REGs of his BDE to defend the fence and the guns. The two guns and 940 men could not match the massive firepower that Hays's DIV, to their right, had been able to unleash.

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Two gaps opened up in the Union line: the commander of the 71st PA ordered his men to retreat when the Confederates came too close to the Angle; south of the copse of trees, the men of the 59th NY inexplicably bolted for the rear. In the latter case, this left CPT Cowan and his 1st NY Independent Artillery Battery to face the oncoming infantry. Assisted personally by artillery chief Henry Hunt, Cowan ordered five guns to fire double canister simultaneously. The entire Confederate line to his front disappeared. The gap vacated by most of the 71st PA, however, was more serious, leaving only a handful of the 71st, 268 men of the 69th PA, and Cushing's two 3-inch rifled guns to receive the 2,500 to 3,000 men of Garnett's and Armistead's BDEs as they began to cross the stone fence. The Irishmen of the 69th PA resisted fiercely in a melee of rifle fire, bayonets, and fists. Webb, mortified that the 71st had retreated, attempted to bring the 72nd PA (a Zouave regiment) forward, but for some reason they did not obey the order, so he had to bring other REGs in to help fill the gap. During the fight, LT Cushing was killed as he shouted to his men, three bullets striking him, the third in his mouth. The Confederates seized his two guns and turned them to face the Union troops, but they had no ammunition to fire. As more Union reinforcements arrived and charged into the breach, the defensive line became impregnable and the Confederates began to slip away individually, with no senior officers remaining to call a formal retreat.

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The monument on the Gettysburg Battlefield marking the approximate place where Armistead was fatally wounded. The wall behind the monument marks the Union lines.

The infantry assault lasted less than an hour. The supporting attack by Wilcox and Lang on Pickett's right was never a factor; they did not approach the Union line until after Pickett was defeated, and their advance was quickly broken up by McGilvery's guns and by the Vermont BDE.

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DAY 3 (03JUL63)

East Cavalry Field – Initial Positions

At about 1100 on July 3, Stuart reached Cress Ridge [1], just north of what is now called East Cavalry Field, and signaled Lee that he was in position by ordering the firing of four guns, one in each direction of the compass. This was a foolish error because he also alerted Gregg to his presence. The brigades of McIntosh and Custer were positioned to block Stuart. As the Confederates approached, Gregg engaged them with an artillery duel and the superior skills of the Union horse artillerymen got the better of Stuart's guns.

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Stuart's plan had been to pin down McIntosh's and Custer's skirmishers around the Rummel farm [2] and swing over Cress Ridge, around the left flank of the defenders, but the Federal skirmish line pushed back tenaciously; the troopers from the 5th Michigan Cavalry were armed with Spencer repeating rifles, multiplying their firepower. Stuart decided on a direct cavalry charge to break their resistance. He ordered an assault by the 1st Virginia Cavalry, his own old regiment, now in Fitz Lee's brigade. The battle started in earnest at approximately 1300, at the same time that Col. Edward Porter Alexander's Confederate artillery barrage opened up on Cemetery Ridge. Fitz Lee's troopers came pouring through the farm of John Rummel, scattering the Union skirmish line.

Gregg ordered Custer to counterattack with the 7th Michigan. Custer personally led the regiment, shouting "Come on, you Wolverines!". Waves of horsemen collided in furious fighting along the fence line [1] on Rummel's farm. Seven hundred men fought at point-blank range across the fence with carbines, pistols and sabers. Custer's horse was shot out from under him, and he commandeered a bugler's horse. Eventually enough of Custer's men were amassed to break down the fence, and they caused the Virginians to retreat. Stuart sent in reinforcements from all three of his brigades: the 9th and 13th Virginia (Chambliss' Brigade), the 1st North Carolina and Jeff Davis Legion (Hampton's) and squadrons from the 2nd Virginia (Lee's). Custer's pursuit was broken, and the 7th Michigan fell back in a disorderly retreat.

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Stuart tried again for a breakthrough by sending in the bulk of Wade Hampton's brigade, accelerating in formation from a walk to a gallop, sabers flashing, calling forth "murmurs of admiration" from their Union targets. Union horse artillery batteries attempted to block the advance with shell and canister, but the Confederates moved too quickly and were able to fill in for lost men, maintaining their momentum. Once again the cry "Come on, you Wolverines!" was heard as Custer and Col. Charles H. Town led the 1st Michigan Cavalry into the fray, also at a gallop. A trooper from one of Gregg's Pennsylvania regiments observed,

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As the two columns approached each other the pace of each increased, when suddenly a crash [2], like the falling of timber, betokened the crisis. So sudden and violent was the collision that many of the horses were turned end over end and crushed their riders beneath them.

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As the horsemen fought desperately in the center, McIntosh personally led his brigade against Hampton's right flank and the 3rd Pennsylvania and 1st New Jersey hit Hampton's left from north of the Lott house. Hampton received a serious saber wound to the head; Custer lost his second horse of the day. Assaulted from three sides, the Confederates withdrew. The Union troopers were in no condition to pursue beyond the Rummel farmhouse.

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The losses from the 40 intense minutes of fighting on East Cavalry Field were relatively minor: 254 Union casualties--219 of them from Custer's brigade--and 181 Confederate. Although tactically inconclusive, the battle was a strategic loss for Stuart and Robert E. Lee, whose plans to drive into the Union rear were foiled.

Confederate Cavalry Commander MG J.E.B. Stuart

Union Cavalry Commander

BG David McMurtrie Gregg

East Cavalry Field – Cavalry Charge

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DAY 3 (03JUL63)

South Cavalry Field

On the morning of July 3 Union Cavalry Corps commander Maj. Gen. Alfred Pleasonton ordered two of his brigades to the left flank of the Union army. He ordered Brig. Gen. Wesley Merritt's Reserve Brigade of Buford's division to move north from Emmitsburg to join Brig. Gen. Judson Kilpatrick's division, moving from Two Taverns on the Baltimore Pike to the area southwest of Round Top. By this time the only brigade in Kilpatrick's division was that of Brig. Gen. Elon J. Farnsworth, Custer's brigade having been detached for service with David Gregg at East Cavalry Field. It is unclear what Pleasonton hoped to accomplish. There is no record that he performed any reconnaissance in this area. It has been speculated that Army of the Potomac commander George G. Meade was preparing for a possible counterattack to follow the repulse of Pickett's Charge, which he had anticipated since the night before.

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Farnsworth reached the area at approximately 1300, about the time the massive Confederate artillery barrage started in preparation for Pickett's Charge, and his 1,925 troops took up a position in a line south of the George Bushman farm [1]. From left to right, the regiments were the 18th Pennsylvania Cavalry, the 1st West Virginia and 1st Vermont. Battery E, 4th U.S. Artillery, occupied a small, rocky knoll in the rear [2] and the 5th New York cavalry was placed in a nearby ravine to guard the artillery. Joined by Kilpatrick, they awaited Merritt's brigade, which arrived at about 1500. and took up a position straddling the Emmitsburg Road [3], to Farnsworth's left. By this time the infantry portion of Pickett's Charge had begun, and Kilpatrick was eager to get his men into the fight.

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On the Confederate line to the east of the Emmitsburg Road, only infantry troops were involved. The four brigades of Hood's division, under the command of Brig. Gen. Evander M. Law, had occupied the area from Round Top, through Devil's Den and back to the road since the battle on July 2. Initially, Law had just the 1st Texas Infantry (from Brig. Gen. Jerome B. Robertson's Texas Brigade) facing Farnsworth to the south, but he soon reinforced them with the 47th Alabama Infantry, the 1st South Carolina and artillery. To the west of the road, facing Merritt, was the Georgia brigade of Brig. Gen. George "Tige" Anderson.

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Young Kilpatrick had little experience in commanding cavalry, and he demonstrated that by attacking fortified infantry positions in a piecemeal fashion. West of the road Merritt went in first, with his 6th Pennsylvania cavalrymen fighting dismounted. Anderson's Georgians repulsed their attack easily. Farnsworth was to follow, but he was astonished to hear Kilpatrick's order for a mounted cavalry charge. The Confederate defenders were positioned behind a stone fence with wooden fence rails piled high above it, too high for horses to jump, which would require the attackers to dismount under fire and dismantle the fence. The terrain leading to it was broken, undulating ground, with large boulders, fences and woodlots, making it unsuitable for a cavalry charge. Accounts differ as to the details of the argument between Farnsworth and Kilpatrick, but it is generally believed that Kilpatrick dared or shamed Farnsworth into making the charge the latter knew would be suicidal. Farnsworth allegedly said, "General, if you order the charge I will lead it, but you must take the awful responsibility."

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First in the assault was the 1st West Virginia Cavalry, led by Col. Nathaniel P. Richmond. They rode in great confusion after coming under heavy fire from the 1st Texas, but they were able to breach the wall. Hand-to-hand fighting with sabers, rifles and even rocks ensued, but the attack was forced back. Of the 400 Federal cavalrymen in the attack, there were 98 casualties. The second wave came from the 18th Pennsylvania, supported by companies of the 5th New York, but they were also turned back under heavy rifle fire, with 20 casualties.

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It was finally the turn of the 1st Vermont Cavalry, about 400 officers and men, which Farnsworth divided into three battalions of four companies each under Lt. Col. Addison W. Preston, Maj. William Wells and Capt. Henry C. Parsons. Parsons' battalion led the charge, passing the Texans and riding north into the blinding sun toward the John Slyder farm. Evander Law sent three Georgia regiments (the 9th, 11th and 59th) to move to the support of the Texans and the artillery batteries. A staff officer carrying the order encountered the 4th Alabama, which also joined in support. An Alabama lieutenant yelled, "Cavalry, boys, cavalry! This is no fight, only a frolic, give it to them!" And the infantrymen found many easy targets.

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All three battalion advances were turned back with great losses. The final group, led by Wells and Farnsworth, circled back toward Big Round Top, where they met a line of the 15th Alabama across their front. Farnsworth's party had dwindled to only ten troopers as they weaved back and forth, trying to avoid the murderous fire. Farnsworth fell from his horse, struck in the chest, abdomen and leg by five bullets. Postwar accounts by a Confederate soldier who claimed Farnsworth committed suicide with his pistol to avoid capture have been discounted. Maj. Wells received the Medal of Honor for his heroism in leading the rest of his men back to safety. The Vermont regiment suffered 65 casualties during the futile assault.

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Kilpatrick's ill-considered and poorly executed cavalry charges are remembered as a low point in the history of the U.S. cavalry and marked the final significant hostilities at the Battle of Gettysburg. Six miles (10 km) west of Gettysburg one of Merritt's regiments, the 6th U.S. Cavalry, was defeated that afternoon at Fairfield by Brig. Gen. William E. "Grumble" Jones' "Laurel Brigade," an action not considered to be a formal part of the Battle of Gettysburg but one that had a critical role in the retreat of Lee's army. All of Pleasonton's cavalry brigades were exercised for the remainder of the Gettysburg Campaign in the lackluster pursuit of Lee's army back across the Potomac River.

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