The Grice is Right: Grice’s Non-Cooperation Problem�and the Structure of Conversation

Sam Berstler – MIT

Workshop on Genre and Conversation

Reykjavík, Iceland – 5 June 2024

The Grice is Right: Grice’s Non-Cooperation Problem�and the Structure of Conversation

Sam Berstler – MIT

Workshop on Genre and Conversation

Reykjavík, Iceland – 5 June 2024

Now with genre

two hugely influential �(also insane?) ideas�about conversation

​

1. Interlocutors jointly aim to exchange information with each other about some topic.

​

• Interlocutors ought to conform and expect each other to conform to the Cooperative Principle.

​

two hugely influential �(also insane?) ideas�about conversation

​

1. Interlocutors jointly aim to exchange information with each other about some topic.

​

• Interlocutors ought to conform and expect each other to conform to the Cooperative Principle.

​

Cooperative Principle

Make your contribution such as is required, at the stage at which it occurs, by the accepted purpose or direction of the talk exchange in which you are engaged.

` Grice (1989 [1967]: 26)

two hugely influential �(also insane?) ideas�about conversation

​

1. Interlocutors jointly aim to exchange information with each other about some topic.

​

• Interlocutors conform and expect each other to the Cooperative Principle.

​

Cooperative Principle

Make your contribution such as is required, at the stage at which it occurs, by the accepted purpose or direction of the talk exchange in which you are engaged.

` Grice (1989 [1967]: 26)

Speakers lie.

Speakers bullshit.

Speakers intimidate.

Speakers badger.

Speakers manipulate.

Speakers show-off.

Speakers derogate.

Speakers one-up.

Does one of the most influential theories in twentieth-century philosophy of language rest on a basic mistake?

​

this talk’s proposal

​

1. Interlocutors individually or jointly aim to appear to exchange information with each other about some topic.

​

• Interlocutors ought to appear to conform and expect each other to appear to conform to the Cooperative Principle.

​

some theory about genre

​

In order to make my case, I will need to investigate the structure of supposed “non-cooperative” conversations.

​

And to do that, I will propose five sub-types of conversations:

​

1. Basic conversations

2. Transparently fabricated conversations

3. Opaquely fabricated conversations

4. Shelled conversations

5. Ostensified conversations

​

Types 2-5 are transformations of basic conversations.

some theory about genre

​

In order to make my case, I will need to investigate the structure of supposed “non-cooperative” conversations.

​

And to do that, I will propose five sub-types of conversations:

​

1. Basic conversations

2. Fabricated conversations

3. Splintered conversations

4. Shelled conversations

5. Ostensified conversations

​

Types 2-5 are transformations of basic conversations.

​

We’ll see that my taxonomy is (I think?) consistent with Dan and Elmar’s.

outline

13

1. Introduction
2. Grice’s theory of conversation
3. The non-cooperation problem
4. The gist of the solution
5. The taxonomy
6. Splintered Conversations

​

outline

14

1. Introduction
2. Grice’s theory of conversation
3. The non-cooperation problem
4. The gist of the solution
5. The taxonomy
6. Splintered Conversations

​

Theory of conversation

Theory of conversational implicature

Grice’s “Logic and Conversation”

1. Grice used his theory of conversation to motivate his theory of implicature.

​

2. The Non-Cooperation Problem arises within the theory of conversational implicature.

​

3. I will theorize more about conversation in order to resolve the Non-Cooperation Problem.

What is a conversation?

​

​

The hallmark of a conversation is “the common purpose or set of purposes” that motivates the interlocutors to talk and explains why they are talking in the way that they do.

​

(Grice (1989 [1967]: 26)

What is a conversation?

What is a conversation?

types of goals

Exchanging information about some question

​

Making a decision

​

Giving and receiving instructions

​

Passing the time in an entertaining way

​

Negotiating or shoring up our relationships

What the Cooperative Principle says

1. Speakers rationally ought to conform and expect each other to conform to the CP in virtue of sharing a joint goal.

​

• To know how to conform to the CP, speakers must know the “accepted purpose or direction of the talk exchange in which they are engaged,” that is, their conversational goal.

​

​

​

What the Cooperative Principle doesn’t say

1. The CP is not the injunction to act pro-socially or morally in a conversation.

​

• The CP is not the injunction to act politely or to adopt whatever desires your interlocutor expresses in the conversation.

​

​

​

Sam knows that Henry is secretly plotting to kill Rachel’s dog. In a conversation with Rachel about the new House of the Dragon series, Sam doesn’t tell Rachel about Henry’s plot.

​

​

Sam knows that Henry is secretly plotting to kill Rachel’s dog. In a conversation with Rachel about the new House of the Dragon series, Sam doesn’t tell Rachel about Henry’s plot.

​

​

• Intuitively uncooperative? YES!

Intuitively uncooperative? YES!

Sam is not prosocial.

​

A violation of the Cooperative Principle? NO!

Sam doesn’t undermine their shared conversational goal.

​

​

Gordon is the chef of a kitchen. Polina hands him a plate of stake. Gordon says, “You dingbat! This is RAW! Do it again, idiot!”

​

​

Gordon is the chef of a kitchen. Polina hands him a plate of stake. Gordon says, “You dingbat! This is RAW! Do it again, idiot!”

​

​

• Intuitively uncooperative? YES!

Intuitively uncooperative? YES!

Gordon doesn’t do what Polina wishes he would.

​

A violation of the Cooperative Principle? NO!

Gordon doesn’t undermine their shared conversational goal.

​

​

The Four Maxims

​

Quality: speak truly; do not say things for which you

lack adequate evidence

Quantity: say no more or less than is required

Relation: be relevant

Manner: be perspicuous

(Grice 1989 [1967]: 26-27)

The Four Maxims

​

Quality: speak truly; do not say things for which you

lack adequate evidence

Quantity: say no more or less than is required

Relation: be relevant

Manner: be perspicuous

(Grice 1989 [1967]: 26-27)

“the following of [these Maxims] will, in general, yield results in accordance with the Cooperative Principle”

(Grice 1989 [1967]: 26-27)

Not Maxims

​

Be polite

Conform to social norms

Foster your relationships

Construct your linguistic persona 

(Grice 1989 [1967]: 26-27)

Grice: We do these things within a conversation but not because of the goal that motivates us to talk to each other.

Occasional goal

​

Interlocutors in a conversation c share an occasional goal g iff they jointly share g in c and the fact that they share g in c explains why they are having c.

(Grice 1989 [1967]: 26-27)

occasional joint goals exchanging information

making a decision

non-occasional joint goals

saving face

obeying the rules of morality

negotiating our level of intimacy

[A]nyone who cares about the goals that are central to conversation / communication (such as giving and receiving information, influencing and being influenced by others) must be expected to have an interest, given suitable circumstances, in participation in talk exchanges that will be profitable only on the assumption that they are conducted in general accordance with the Cooperative Principle and the maxims.

​

(Grice 1989 [1967]: 30)

​

[A]nyone who cares about the goals that are central to conversation / communication (such as giving and receiving information, influencing and being influenced by others) must be expected to have an interest, given suitable circumstances, in participation in talk exchanges that will be profitable only on the assumption that they are conducted in general accordance with the Cooperative Principle and the maxims.

​

(Grice 1989 [1967]: 30)

​

Grice’s Genre Problem

​

There are many kinds of conversations in which:

​

(a) we jointly share some occasional goal g,

(b) the fact that we jointly share g does not give us

reason to conform to the Four Maxims.

Eliot and his mortal nemesis Dan are trash talking each other by telling “Yo Mama” jokes. The person who wins is either the person who tells the cleverest joke or the person who first loses his temper.

​

​

Eliot and his mortal nemesis Dan are trash talking each other by telling “Yo Mama” jokes. The person who wins is either the person who tells the cleverest joke or the person who first loses his temper.

​

​

• Intuitively uncooperative? YES!

In virtue of jointly aiming to play an insult game, are Dan and Eliot required to conform to Quality? NO!

​

​

Ethan and Henry are “vibing” (cf. Nowak and Nguyen MS). They are drunkenly and aimlessly riffing on what each other says.

​

​

Ethan and Henry are “vibing” (cf. Nowak and Nguyen MS). They are drunkenly and aimlessly riffing on what each other says.

​

​

• Intuitively uncooperative? YES!

In virtue of jointly aiming to vibe, are Ethan and Henry required to conform to Relevance and Manner? NO!

​

​

Grice’s Non-Cooperation Problem

​

1. The Genre Problem arises because interlocutors don’t share the right kind of joint goal.

​

• The Non-Cooperation Problem arises because interlocutors don’t seem to share any goal that could play the target theoretical role.

outline

37

1. Introduction
2. Grice’s theory of conversation
3. The non-cooperation problem
4. The gist of the solution
5. The taxonomy
6. Splintered Conversations

​

outline

38

1. Introduction
2. Grice’s theory of conversation
3. The non-cooperation problem
4. The gist of the solution
5. The taxonomy
6. Splintered Conversations

​

Theory of conversation

Theory of conversational implicature

Grice’s “Logic and Conversation”

The Non-Cooperation Problem arises from within Grice’s theory of conversational implicature.

What did you think of that bar?

The music was too loud.

What did you think of that bar?

I have a headache now.

Karen means: I didn’t like it because the music was too loud. I have a headache now.

What did you think of that bar?

I have a headache now.

Karen means: I didn’t like it because the music was too loud. I have a headache now.

Assertion: I have a headache now.

​

Conversational implicature: I didn’t like it because the music was too loud.

Conversational implicature

Q1. How does Peter know what Karen meant?

​

Q2. Why can Karen reasonably expect Peter to know what she means?

What did you think of that bar?

I have a headache now.

Conversational implicature

Q1. How does Peter know what Karen meant?

​

A. Inference to the best explanation. What intentions should Peter impute to Karen that best explain her conversational act?

What did you think of that bar?

I have a headache now.

Bach 2013; Schiffer 2001; Harris 2016;

Buchanan and Schiller 2021

Conversational implicature

Q1. How does Peter know what Karen meant?

​

A. Inference to the best explanation. What intentions should Peter impute to Karen that best explain her conversational act?

What did you think of that bar?

I have a headache now.

Bach 2013; Schiffer 2001; Harris 2016;

Buchanan and Schiller 2021

But without language to guide Karen and Peter, how does this happen?

Conversational implicature

1. Karen and Peter are relying on jointly known features of their practical situation.

​

• Since Karen is rational and Karen and Peter jointly share the goal of exchanging information about the bar, Peter knows that Karen will not respond in certain ways to him. He can narrow down the class of possible hypotheses

Conversational implicature

1. Karen and Peter are relying on jointly known features of their practical situation.

​

• Since Karen is rational and Karen and Peter jointly share the goal of exchanging information about the bar, Peter and Karen jointly know that Karen will not respond in certain ways to him. Peter can narrow down the class of possible hypotheses

Common Knowledge

A and B jointly know that p iff

A and B know that p,

A and B know that A and B know that p,

A and B know that A and B know that A and

B know that p,

et cetera…

​

(Lewis 1969)

​

Karen and Peter jointly know their shared occasional goal.

​

So they jointly know (roughly) the rational constraints on them.

​

So they jointly know (roughly) the conversation’s basic structure.

(Grice 1989 [1967]: 26-27)

Gricean reasoning

Karen expects Peter to reason as follows (and Peter knows that Karen expects him to reason as follows and Karen knows that….)

​

What did you think of that bar?

I have a headache now.

1. If Karen had (just) meant what she said, she wouldn’t answer my question.
2. If Karen doesn’t answer my question, she’s not cooperative or rational.
3. Karen is cooperative and rational.
4. So Karen must have meant more than what she said!

Grice’s Hypothesis:

Interlocutors’ joint knowledge that they are conforming to the Cooperative Principle partially explains and justifies their joint knowledge that S conversationally implicated p.

​

What did you think of that bar?

I have a headache now.

Grice’s Hypothesis:

Interlocutors’ joint knowledge that they are conforming to the Cooperative Principle partially explains and justifies their joint knowledge that S conversationally implicated p.

​

What did you think of that bar?

I have a headache now.

Grice’s Non-Cooperation Problem

​

​

The Non-Cooperation Problem arises when

​

(a) a speaker successfully conversationally implicates that p,

​

(b) interlocutors’ joint knowledge that they are

conforming to the CP cannot explain how the speaker

and addressee jointly know that the speaker has implicated p,

and

​

(c) (b) is the case because the speakers aren’t cooperating

in the needed sense.

​

Have you ever had a Swiss bank account?

My company had one there for about six months.

Similar examples used in Asher (2012), Asher and Lascarides (2013), Stokke (2016), Keiser (2023), and Beaver and Stanley (2023)

Have you ever had a bank account in Zurich?

My company had one there for about six months.

Sam means: I never had a personal one but my company had one in Switzerland for about six months.

Two versions of the situation

Have you ever had a Swiss bank account?

My company had one there for about six months.

​

​

​

Incisive investigator:

Before the interview, Christiane already knows that Sam is laundering money through his personal account in Zurich, but Sam doesn’t know this.

Open antagonism:

Christine and Sam jointly know that Sam is laundering money through his personal account in Zurich.

…that’s good evidence Sam made the implicature

Have you ever had a Swiss bank account?

My company had one there for about six months.

Even in these scenarios, Christiane can follow up:

​

1. Why did you never bother to open an account there yourself?

2. If you never opened an account there yourself,

why did you travel to Zurich so often?

​

3. So you never had a personal bank account in

Switzerland. Am I understanding you right?

MAJOR�PROBLEM �INCOMING

Have you ever had a Swiss bank account?

My company had one there for about six months.

Gricean prediction

Have you ever had a Swiss bank account?

My company had one there for about six months.

Christiane reasons:

​

1. If Sam had (just) meant what he said, he wouldn’t answer my question.
2. If Sam doesn’t answer my question, he’s not cooperative or rational.
3. Sam is cooperative and rational.
4. So Sam must have meant more than what he said!

Gricean prediction

Have you ever had a Swiss bank account?

My company had one there for about six months.

Christiane reasons:

​

1. If Sam had (just) meant what he said, he wouldn’t answer my question.
2. If Sam doesn’t answer my question, he’s not cooperative or rational.
3. Sam is cooperative and rational.
4. So Sam must have meant more than what he said!

Gricean prediction

Have you ever had a Swiss bank account?

My company had one there for about six months.

Christine reasons:

​

1. If Sam had (just) meant what he said, he wouldn’t answer my question.
2. If Sam doesn’t answer my question, he’s not cooperative or rational.
3. Sam is cooperative and rational.
4. So Sam must have meant more than what he said!

Problems for Christiane

In both scenarios, Christine knows that Sam does not want to provide her with information about his Swiss bank account.

​

So Christine knows that Sam is not rationally required to answer her question.

Gricean prediction

Have you ever had a Swiss bank account?

My company had one there for about six months.

Christine reasons:

​

1. If Sam had (just) meant what he said, he wouldn’t answer my question.
2. If Sam doesn’t answer my question, he’s not cooperative or rational.
3. Sam is cooperative and rational.
4. So Sam must have meant more than what he said!

Problems for Sam

In the open antagonism variant (they jointly know about Sam’s money laundering), Sam has no reason to expect Christine to believe that he is cooperating with her.

​

So Sam has no reason to expect Christine to reason to (3).

Grice’s Hypothesis:

Interlocutors’ joint knowledge that they are conforming to the Cooperative Principle partially explains and justifies their joint knowledge that S conversationally implicated p.

​

outline

63

1. Introduction
2. Grice’s theory of conversation
3. The non-cooperation problem
4. The gist of the solution
5. The taxonomy
6. Splintered Conversations

​

outline

64

1. Introduction
2. Grice’s theory of conversation
3. The non-cooperation problem
4. The gist of the solution
5. The taxonomy
6. Splintered Conversations

​

Two Key Insights

​

1. In a conversation, we can jointly presuppose p and so use p in order to coordinate, even when we jointly know that p is false.

​

• Our presuppositions about the kind of conversation we are in are presuppositions just like any other.

Some tools

A accepts that p for the sake of a conversation c iff she acts as if p for the sake of c.

​

p is common ground in c just in case A and B jointly accept p for the sake of c.

​

A presupposes that p for the sake of a conversation c iff they accept that p is common ground for the sake of c.

​

​

(Stalnaker 2014, cf. 2002)

​

A accepts that p for the sake of a conversation c iff she acts as if p for the sake of c.

​

p is common ground in c just in case A and B jointly accept that p for the sake of c.

​

A presupposes that p for the sake of a conversation c iff A accepts that p is common ground for the sake of c.

​

​

(Stalnaker 2014, cf. 2002)

​

The “playing ground” of the conversation; target of our speech acts; what we rely on in order to coordinate.

A accepts that p for the sake of a conversation c iff she acts as if p for the sake of c.

​

p is common ground in c just in case A and B jointly accept that p for the sake of c.

​

A presupposes that p for the sake of a conversation c iff A accepts that p is common ground for the sake of c.

​

​

(Stalnaker 2014, cf. 2002)

​

A can accept p when she doesn’t believe p.

A can fail to accept p when she believes p

A accepts that p for the sake of a conversation c iff she acts as if p for the sake of c.

​

p is common ground in c just in case A and B jointly accept that p for the sake of c.

​

A presupposes that p for the sake of a conversation c iff A accepts that p is common ground for the sake of c.

​

​

(Stalnaker 2014, cf. 2002)

​

A is “taking p for granted” or “treating it as background.”

Joint beliefs

​

Common Ground

(for c)

​

Joint

beliefs

​

Common Ground

(for c)

​

Common Ground

(for c)

​

Joint

beliefs

​

Pretense

​

Simple conversation

​

Assuming

​

Ignoring

​

Meta-conversational presuppositions

Apparent goals

.

Some set of interlocutors appear to share a goal g in a conversation c iff the common ground in c entails that they share g

​

In the target cases, interlocutors individually or jointly aim to appear to exchange information with each other about some topic.

​

​

Genre

.

We can use the relationship between the appearance of an occasional goal and the reality (or non-reality) of an occasional goal in order to taxonomize conversations.

​

​

Have you read the King of Iceland’s latest book?

Have you read the King of Iceland’s latest book?

1. Karen and Peter jointly know that Peter is referring to Elmar.
2. They jointly know that Elmar is not the King of Iceland.
3. They are presupposing it anyway, because otherwise, Elmar will get mad at them (or whatever).
4. So Karen and Peter can use information that they jointly know is false in order to coordinate on what they mean.

Have you ever had a Swiss bank account?

My company had one there for about six months.

Have you ever had a Swiss bank account?

My company had one there for about six months.

1. Christiane and Sam jointly know that Sam means that he didn’t have one.
2. They jointly know that Sam is not cooperating with Christiane.
3. They are presupposing the Sam is cooperating with Christiane.
4. Christiane and Sam can use information in order to coordinate on what they mean.

Have you ever had a Swiss bank account?

My company had one there for about six months.

1. Christiane and Sam jointly know that Sam means that he didn’t have one.
2. They jointly know that Sam is not cooperating with Christiane.
3. They are presupposing the Sam is cooperating with Christiane.
4. Christiane and Sam can use information in order to coordinate on what they mean.

Why are they presupposing this? And why does this presupposition make it rational for Sam to answer Christiane?

outline

80

1. Introduction
2. Grice’s theory of conversation
3. The non-cooperation problem
4. The gist of the solution
5. The taxonomy
6. Splintered Conversations

​

outline

81

1. Introduction
2. Grice’s theory of conversation
3. The non-cooperation problem
4. The gist of the solution
5. The taxonomy
6. Splintered Conversations

​

the transformation strategy

​

​

In Frame Analysis, Goffman proposes that humans have a repertoire of basic activities. We can impose a frame to transform basic activities in non-basic ones:

​

Basic Activities

vacuuming

making out

solving a calculus problem

​

Transformed Activities

demonstrating how to use a vacuum

making out in a movie

solving a calculus problem as part of a test

​

the transformation strategy

​

​

I propose a Gricean-Goffmanian mash-up. We can define conversational transformations over basic conversations. We define basic conversations in terms of the occasional goals interlocutors jointly pursue in the simplest kinds of conversations.

​

One advantage: we don’t need to decide from the out-set what the class of occasional goals are.

​

​

Some interlocutors appear to jointly share a goal g in a conversation c iff the common ground in c entails that they jointly share g.

​

A joint goal is apparent in a conversation iff the interlocutors appear to jointly share it.

​

A joint goal is real in a conversation iff the interlocutors jointly share it.

​

If some interlocutors jointly share two goals g and g*, then g nests g* iff they share g in virtue of sharing g* but not the other way around. The highest goal in a nested chain is the occasional goal.

​

​

​

​

If some interlocutors appear to jointly share two goals g and g*, then g nests g* iff they appear to share g in virtue of appearing to share g* but not the other way around. The highest goal in a nested chain is the apparent occasional goal.

​

​

​

​

If some interlocutors jointly share two goals g and g*, then g nests g* iff they share g in virtue of sharing g* but not the other way around. The highest goal in a nested chain is the occasional goal.

​

​

​

​

If some interlocutors jointly share two goals g and g*, then g nests g* iff they share g in virtue of sharing g* but not the other way around. The highest goal in a nested chain is the occasional goal.

​

​

Pelpp.

​

​

​

​

In order to make a decision about where to eat, Peppa and Rachel are discussing what they know about two restaurants.

​

The goal of deciding what to do nests the goal of exchanging information.

​

​

​

​

​

If some interlocutors appear to jointly share two goals g and g*, then g nests g* iff they appear to share g in virtue of appearing to share g* but not the other way around. The highest goal in a nested chain is the apparent occasional goal.

​

​

​

​

An apparent goal g is pinned in a conversation c by some joint goal g* iff interlocutors appear to share g in virtue of actually sharing g.*

​

​

​

Pelpp.

​

​

Common Ground

​

What’s Really Going On

​

​

A conversation is basic iff

​

for each occasional goal g and each goal g* that g nests:

(a) g is an apparent goal,

(b) if g nests g*, it is common ground that g

nests g*,

​

And for each apparent occasional goal g and each goal g* that g nests:

(a) g is a real joint goal,

(b) g pins itself, and

(b) if it is common ground that g nests g*,

then g nests g*.

​

We jointly know that…

We aim to settle on a plan of action to debate how killed the gardener.

​

We aim to discuss which restaurant is better in order to pick a restaurant to go to.

​

​

It’s common ground that…

We aim to settle on a plan of action to debate how killed the gardener.

​

We aim to discuss which restaurant is better in order to pick a restaurant to go to.

​

​

Common Ground

​

What’s Really Going On

​

​

A conversation is fabricated iff some apparent occasional goal g or some apparent goal g* that g nests is unpinned.

​

Common Ground

​

Sam’s individual goal

​

​

Sam and Christiane share the goal of exchanging information about Sam’s bank accounts.

​

Christiane’s individual goal

​

​

trick Sam (into thinking I don’t know that he’s tricking me)

​

​

trick Christiane

​

​

A conversation is opaquely fabricated iff one or both parties intends for the other not to know that the conversation is fabricated.

​

A conversation is transparently fabricated iff both parties are indifferent to whether the other knows that the conversation is fabricated.

Common Ground

​

Sam’s individual goal

​

​

Sam and Christiane share the goal of exchanging information about Sam’s bank accounts.

​

Christiane’s individual goal

​

​

Christiane wants the audience to think she is taking Sam at face value (but has no intention of tricking Sam into believing this)

​

​

Sam wants the audience to think he is sincere and cooperative (but has no intention of tricking Christiane)

​

​

Because all interlocutors want to make themselves intelligible to each other, it is rational for them to align their presuppositions with each other.

​

If they have an apparent fabricated joint goal, they will still act so that the common ground entails that they are and ought to conform to the CP.

Common Ground

​

What’s Really Going On

​

​

A conversation is shelled iff either its occasional goal g or some goal g* that g nests is not apparent.

​

Informally, the main reason we’re talking is off-the-record.

​

Insight from Goffman and later social theorists:

if we are talking for a primarily social purpose, we often tacitly keep that social purpose non-apparent.

Common Ground

​

​

Ethan and Henry are talking about Henry’s latest publication.

​

​

They are doing this primarily because they want to reaffirm their respect and like for each other.

​

​

Ethan: # Hey, we haven’t talked in a while, so I want to make sure we’re still buddies. So to do that, how about you tell me about your latest publication?

​

Common Ground

​

​

Eliot and Dan are vibing.

​

​

They are doing this primarily because they want to compete to see who can make the better off-color joke a bout metaphysics.

​

​

Dan: # Ha, my joke was better than yours. I totally won that round.

​

​

Ostensification is a special kind of shelled conversation.

​

Ostensification occurs when the real joint goal that pins the apparent occasional joint goal is merely to maintain that appearance.

​

Ostensification is a widespread social strategy.

Common Ground

​

​

Sam and Justin are exchanging information.

​

​

Sam and Justin jointly aim to appear to exchange information…

​

…in order to shore up their relationship

Common Ground

​

​

Justin: Your work is really interesting.

​

Sam: # I know we’re just going through these motions in order to express that we each other as colleagues, but I appreciate it, and I respect you too.

​

Sam and Justin jointly aim to appear to exchange information…

​

…in order to shore up their relationship

​

Sam and Justin are exchanging information.

​

Common Ground

​

​

Sam and Justin are exchanging information.

​

​

Sam and Justin jointly aim to appear to exchange information…

​

…in order to compete to see who can make better passive aggressive remarks in a faculty meeting.

Common Ground

​

​

Sam and Justin are exchanging information.

​

​

Sam and Justin jointly aim to appear to exchange information…

​

…in order to compete to see who can make better passive aggressive remarks in a faculty meeting.

​

Justin: Of course you would like that candidate.

​

Sam: # I know you’re insulting me, but we’re pretending that we’re being nice to each other to play a little game.

Common Ground

​

​

Justin is inviting Sam to a party.

​

Sam and Justin jointly aim to appear as if Justin is inviting Sam to a party…

​

…in order to express respect for each other, even though Justin isn’t really inviting Sam

​

These interlocutors actually share the goal of keeping it common ground that they have some apparent joint goal g. In order to do that, they will act so that the common ground entails that they ought to and are conforming to the Cooperative Principle.

Why should I care?

There’s more to say, but in the meantime, tell me why I’m wrong.

​

​

​

​

​

​

I am slow on email, but emails are always welcome:

berstler@mit.edu