US- Ukraine Security Dialogue: Options for Defence Industry��Reuben F. Johnson�Breaking Defense�reuben.johnson@sambadoaviao.org�+1.703.201.6069

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Petersen-Rockefeller Hall

Washington, DC– 29 February 2024

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Defence Establishment� Overview

National Threat Assessment

National Security Concept

National Military Strategy

MINISTER

Defence Establishment

Ministry

Staff

GAF

Train, Organize, Equip

Sustain & Operate

Institutional Base

• Headquarters
• Staffs
• Schools
• Facilities

Operating Forces

• Land Force
• Air Force
• Naval Force
• Facilities

• Force Generation
• Force Sustainment

Train,

Operate,

Readiness

Dependable Force

Recruit,

Pay, Support,

School, Teach,

Maintain, etc.

Over Time

Priorities, Tasks & Realities

• Sovereign Defence Requirements
• NATO Accession
• GWOT
• Deployments
• Democratic Principles
• Competition for Resources
• Resources to the Institution
• Resources to the Operating

Force

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Ukraine Industry Faces Multiple Challenges Requiring Foreign Assistance

• Supporting and Servicing Foreign-Supplied Hardware
• Repair and Overhaul of All Platforms in Inventory
• Integration of Foreign Components/Weapons Onto Soviet-Era Platforms (SAMs, AAMs, ASMs, ARMs)
• Development/Production of Indigenous Projects (Neptune, Bliskavka)

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Push For Modernisation

• Upgrading of Older Soviet-Era Platforms (Buk, S-200/300) With Non-Russian Solutions
• Re-Configuration to NATO Standards
• Development Of External Supplier Network
• Addressing Requirements With New And/Or Western Products Of Similar Pedigree
• New Ukrainian-Design Programmes

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Involvement of Ukraine Industry Most Important Element In Defence Modernisation

• Repair Plants – L’viv, Zaporizhye (MiGRemont), Odessa, Mikolaiyev, Lutsk
• Major Manufacturers - Motor Sich, DKB Luch, Artem, PivdenMash
• Defence Electronics and Other Innovations – Radionix

Ukraine Firms Can Mean The Difference Between A New Weapon System Being a Game-Changer or an Expensive Headache

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Ukraine Industry’s Function �In The Soviet Era

• Repair and Overhaul Networks - ”Parallel Universe”
• Major Subsystem Suppliers
• Radar, Electronics, Missiles, Armoured Vehicles
• Heavy-Lift
• EW

Post-Soviet Era Created Export-Driven Customer Base

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Adaptive Measures

• “Triage” in Utilising Industrial Facilities
• Contracted Maintenance and Training
• Creating Partnerships With Foreign Industry
• Commercialising of MoD Functions or Out-Sourcing
• Simplifying Export Licencing and Minimising State Obstruction

As With The Military Industry Will Require Restructuring Along An Israeli-Type Model

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Introduction of Westen Aircraft�Into Post-Soviet Era Armed Forces - 1

• Induction of new fighter types typically requires 3-4 years depending on existing degree of preparedness.
• Quick delivery of aircraft is not a panacea - training, maintenance, weapons, and infrastructure must all be matured in parallel to achieve required readiness.
• These will take time and there can be no shortcuts.  Training of fast jet qualified pilots requires12 and 35 months (depending on pilot skill level and assuming pre-existing English language proficiency).

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Introduction of Westen Aircraft�Into Post-Soviet Era Armed Forces - 2

• Maintenance concepts for Western and Soviet aircraft are vastly different. Western aircraft have migrated to two-level, on-condition maintenance. Depot level maintenance has been minimised in favour of streamlined inspection schedules.  
• Built-in/on-board diagnostics, and sophisticated test equipment is the norm for Western aircraft.
• Dependence on electronic tech orders, optimised supply chain management techniques and maintenance information systems.

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Introduction of Westen Aircraft�Into Post-Soviet Era Armed Forces - 3

• Soviet origin aircraft still adhere to long-duration depot maintenance intervals, antiquated warehousing policies, and manual processes.  These differences must be reflected in the required maintenance training, or the entire introduction of a new western aircraft will fail.
• A western aircraft will have transformational effects on any air force that acquires it after a history of operating Russian platforms.

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Introduction of Westen Aircraft�Into Post-Soviet Era Armed Forces - 4

• Tactics differ for Western and Soviet aircraft.  The latter rely on GCI while Western aircraft employ a system-of-systems philosophy which maximises pilot situational awareness and autonomous decision making.
• Because of differences in CNI equipment and data links, missions involving both western and Russian aircraft would be problematic.  The Polish Air Force are the most reliable experts on this question.

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Introduction of Westen Aircraft�Into Post-Soviet Era Armed Forces - 5

• Acquisition of western TACAIR platforms are unavoidable for the long term. However, what missions are the essential function these aircraft must perform.
• The cost of introduction of these aircraft is influenced considerably by how many missions and weapons loadings the aircraft will be configured for.
• Cost per flight hour varies greatly from one aircraft type to another – an expense that is far more important than acquisition cost.

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US Cost Definitions – Total Ownership�Cost is the Complete Budgetary Burden

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Examples of Procurement Rationales

• F-16 Poland – NATO Interoperability
• JAS-39E/F Brazil – Industrial Modernisation
• Mirage 2000-9 UAE – EW + Exercising Non-Western Option
• Rafale India – Customer Intimacy
• F-35 Japan – US Partnership for F-3 Japan Fighter Programme
• F-15SG Singapore – First AESA-Equipped Export Model

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Air and Missile Defence Issues - 1

• How Ukraine might learn from the Polish experience of procuring air defence systems.
• Poland has purchased the Patriot missile system and the IBCS command and control system under the WISŁA programme and will be acquiring the MBDA CAMM missile system under the NAREW programme.
• These systems will take several years to be delivered, and in the case of NAREW, co-developed under an agreement between PGZ and MBDA. This will be a formidable task to undertake, and it is not clear how either of these programmes will integrate with Polish Soviet-era systems.

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Air and Missile Defence Issues - 2

• Ukraine should observe the Polish IAMD efforts but obtain working knowledge of NATO and other US partner nation programmes. Within NATO, the Germa /Dutch APOLLO consortium is designing an architectural roadmap.
• NATO has invested heavily in IAMD architectures, building the NATO ACCS system as while concurrently incrementally investing in the NATO ALTBMD System Engineering and Integration programme.
• Both Israel and Japan provide exemplary successes to bi-lateral missile defence cooperation.

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Air and Missile Defence Issues - 3

• Interoperability between NATO/US and Soviet-era air defence systems will consume extensive engineering talent and budget.
• Older Soviet era equipment can be deployed separately from newer equipment. Transforming a Soviet-era Command and control system to integrate with US systems should only be performed following an honest assessment of the Soviet-Era equipment and architecture. The approach taken should be analogous to the former Warsaw Pact countries rapidly adapting mobile telephone architectures while making modest investments in their land lines.

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Air and Missile Defence Issues - 4

• The US Army defines the organisational establishment across the integrated air and missile defence architectures, which include PAC-3, THAAD, and GMD. NASAMS is predominantly used in a homeland defence mission.
• Effective AMD systems are all about effective layering and the ability to replace damaged or degraded systems with timely repair and replacement.

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Layered/Tiered AMD Concept

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Full-Scale Layered AMD Architecture�Requires a Multi-National Effort

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