FROM CARTESIAN TO 4E’s BOUNDED RATIONALITY

Riccardo Viale

(University of Milano Bicocca)

Milano 19/5/2022

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RATIONALITY

• In brief, we can distinguish two main schools of thought on rationality
• In the first, the classical philosophical tradition, reason is the strength that liberates us from prejudices, and which allows a universal or common criterion to be established for all areas of human conduct. This discursive and linguistic character, as summarised in Aristotle’s syllogistic or in the Cartesian ideal of the chains of reasoning in geometry, leads to the formal development of the theory of rationality in the past century.
• In the second position expressed by Neoplatonism, StThomas, medieval scholastics, Francis Bacon and, to a large extent, Kant, reason is subject to the primacy of intellect. Intellect should be regarded as superior because it is equipped with that intuitive and immediate character that allows it to gain a direct understanding of empirical reality, .

RATIONALITY?

• The von Neumann–Morgenstern axioms of�Expected Utility Theory��There are four axioms of the expected utility theory that define a rational decision maker: completeness; transitivity;

independence of irrelevant alternatives; and continuity.

• Savage's subjective expected utility �representation��  It combines two concepts: first, a personal utility function, and second a personal probability distribution (usually based on Bayesian probability theory). ��

MISINTERPRETATION OF VON NEUMAN, MORGSTERN AND SAVAGE

• Von Neuman and Morgenstern (1944), never intended axiomatic rationality to describe what humans and other animals do or what they should do. Von Neumann and Morgenstern’s great contribution was to prove that if an individual satisfies the set of axioms, then their choices can be represented by a utility function— nothing more.
• Savage explicitly limited the theory to small worlds, that is, situations in which the exhaustive and mutually exclusive set of future states S and their consequences C are known.

OPTIMIZATION UNDER CONSTRAINTS: UNBOUNDED BOUNDED RATIONALITY (1)

• Optimization is under contraints?
• The constraints are in stopping searching when the costs of further search exceeds its benefits (Stigler, 1961)
• Economic choice is BOUNDED by the search and computational costs
• Arrow (2004): «boundedly rational procedures are in fact fully optimal procedures when one takes account of the cost of computation in addition to the benefit and cost inherent in the problem as originally posed»
• Sargent (1993): «Bounded rationality makes optimization more difficult, and unbounded rationality ends up as the simpler and tractable alternative»

�May the Axiomatic Rationality characterize descriptively human decision making?��SOME EMPIRICAL ANOMALIES: �FROM ALLAIS AND ELLSBERG PARADOXES �TO HEURISTICS AND BIASES PROGRAMME AND BEHAVIORAL ECONOMICS���In their initial research, Tversky and Kahneman �proposed three heuristics—availability, �representativeness, and anchoring and adjustment. �Subsequent work has identified many more. ��Heuristics that underlie judgment are called �"judgment heuristics". Another type, called �"evaluation heuristics", are used to judge the �desirability of possible choices.���

BOUNDED RATIONALITY (2) as MAP of SYSTEMATIC DEVIATIONS from AXIOMATIC RATIONALITY -> �PATHOLOGY OF RATIONALITY

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• Daniel Kahneman with Amos Tversky and others, � established a cognitive basis for common human errors �that arise from heuristics, and developed �prospect theory as a substitute of utility theory.
• Their empirical findings aim to challenge the �assumption of human rationality prevailing in modern �economic theory.��

CAN HUMAN IRRATIONALITY BE �EXPERIMENTALLY �DEMONSTRATED? (Jonathan Cohen, 1981)

• The presence of fallacies in reasoning is

evaluated by referring to normative criteria which ultimately derive their own credentials from a systematization of the intuitions that agree with them.

• These normative criteria cannot be taken, as some have suggested, to constitute a part of natural science, nor can they be established by metamathematical proof. Since a theory of competence has to predict the very same intuitions, it must ascribe rationality to ordinary people.

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FEASIBILITY PRINCIPLE

• Cognitive feasibility: cognitive science can tell us which

aims and what inferential procedures are clearly outside

the scope of human cognitive capacities.

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• The theory of bounded rationality would rest on the

solid foundations of a theory of bounded reasoning

(without making any claim to identify either of the two theories).

NATURALIZING RATIONALITY

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• Quine: The question of how we actually arrive at our beliefs is therefore relevant to the question of how we ought to arrive at our beliefs.
• Epistemology becomes as a chapter of psychology and hence of natural science.
• In the programme of naturalizing epistemology, therefore, an important chapter is occupied by a study of the natural mechanisms of reasoning, judgement, and decision making which must be immune from any kind of logicist preconception and apriorism.

BOUNDED RATIONALITY (3) AS NARRATIVES OF REASONABLE DEVIATIONS

• Models of Bounded Rationality (Ariel Rubinstein, 1998) are models that include explicit references to procedural aspects of decision making, which are crucial for the derivation of the analytical results.
• It is true that rationality is a special assumption since it is viewed by many as being normative whereas models of bounded rationality are viewed as dealing with deviations from normative behavior.
• Not every model that is inconsistent with some aspect of rationality is a model of bounded rationality. A model in which rational agents ignore some aspect of rationality is a bad model rather than a model of bounded rationality. A good model of bounded rationality should include a procedure of reasoning that "makes sense" and is somewhat related to what we observe in real life.
• Should the narrative about an agent behavior be hermeneutically interpreted or cognitively explained?

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HERBERT SIMON (1916-2001)

THE LOGIC OF DISCOVERY CORRESPONDS TO THE PSYCHOLOGY OF DISCOVERY�Herbert A. Simon “Does scientific discovery have a logic?”�Philosophy of Science 40 (4):471-480 (1973)�

• A normative theory of discovery would be a set of criteria for judging the efficacy and efficiency of processes used to discover scientific theories.
• A normative theory rests on contingent propositions such as: «If process X is to be efficacious for attainting goal Y, then it should have properties A,B, and C»
• Better scientist is more likely to make discoveries.
• Simon’s proposal about problem solving (in science, technology and management) was both descriptive, prescriptive and enginering.

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PROCEDURAL BOUNDED RATIONALITY (4): Pragmatist Naturalistic Fallacy

BOUNDED RATIONALITY (5) AS ECOLOGICAL ADAPTATION: ECOLOGICAL RATIONALITY

• The goal of Ecological Rationality is to determine the match between heuristics and environment, that is the structure of environments that a given class of heuristics can exploit (Todd, Gigerenzer & the ABC Research Group, 2012).
• Adaptive toolbox of heuristics for specific classes of problems: features of the environment determine which heuristics are better.
• Accuracy, speed, frugality and simplicity are the pragmatic criteria to prefer the decision tool.
• People use ecologically rational heuristics most of the time

IS IT POSSIBLE A BOUNDED RATIONALITY WITHOUT THE SUPPORT OF A MODEL OF COGNITION? �

• Predicting vs. explaining human decisions and actions
• Implicit vs. explicit concepts of procedures in decision making
• Narratives based on metaphoric concepts vs. Theoretical models based on experimental data
• Epistemological choice between literary analysis and empirical science.
• Catching up of BR towards new advancement in cognitive sciences

WHAT IS THE MODEL OF THE FIRST BLADE OF THE SCISSOR, THE COGNITION?

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• 1) CARTESIAN MIND

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• 2) BRAIN IN A VAT

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• 3) NARROW EMBODIED COGNITION

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• 4) WIDE EMBODIED COGNITION

1) CARTESIAN MIND : Beahavioral Econo�mics; Procedural Rationality; (Narratives �of Reasonable Anomalies?)

MIND IS MODULAR (Fodor, 1975)

METHAFOR OF SOFTWARE AND HARDWARE

(Putnam, 1975)

PROPERTY DUALISM (Davidson, 1970)

THINKING IS ONLY DIGITAL COMPUTATION

MENTAL REPRESENTATIONS ARE AMODAL (Descartes)

MIND AS A SANDWICH (Hurley, 1998): Mind is the tasty ham between insipid slices of action and senses

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��How is it possible to avoid the neural constraints? How to explain:��

• Neuropathology effects?
• Neuropaharmacology effects?
• Psychiatric disorders?

2) BRAIN IN THE VAT: neuroeco�nomics

• Judgement And Decision Making Is Based On

Neuro Computations Judged By Formal Computational

Norms

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• Judgement And Decision Making Is Based On Amodal Representations: No Room For Modal Sensorial, Motor and Visceral Representations Of The Interaction With The Environment

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• Brain is detached from The Body and from the Environment: no embodiement and enactive adaptation

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• David Marr’s three levels of Cognition: COMPUTATIONAL, ALGORITHMIC, NEURAL

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How is it possible to avoid the causal influences of:

• Affective stimuli?
• Sensorial imputs?
• Motor and proprioceptive stimulations?
• Visceral sensations?

3) NARROW EMBODIED COGNITION �(NEC)

• NEC is in continuity with the Cartesian computational model

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• Goldman and Vignemont (2009) believe that the body plays

an important role through the brain modal representations

of its states.

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Every body representation are formatted in the brain ruling out

any role of anatomy and body activity (actions and postures).

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B-formats are purely internal to the brain. NEC has no interest in understanding the body interacting and embedded in the environment.

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How is it possible not to consider that:

• Body influences action without being represented in the brain?
• People act in relation to possible answers from the environment (Gallagher’s enacting and Husserl’s «I can»)?
• Situational context where the agent is embedded («Dasein»)?
• The active information are not not only deposited in the brain but are extended in the environment?
• Data coming from neuropsychology about the role of the entire body and of the environment to shape the action (embodied)?

Example:

• The Role of Effort in Perceiving Distance�(Profitt, Stefanucci, Banton, and Epstein, 2003):
• People judged hill to be steeper and distant when they are wearing a heavy backpack. The same happens for overweight person, older, tired,….
• Good players compared to novices have different perception of the targets.
• Perception is ecologically rational: it changes according pragmatic reasons (physical and social)

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4) WIDE EMBODIED COGNITION (WEC)�4 E’s Embodied, Enacting, � Extended, Embedded: ecological rationality

• The psychological experience does not correspond only to the central computational cognitive functions but also to those of the body.
• The extra-neural structural features of the body shape our cognitive experiences.
• The way the body is made, its binocular vision, its vertical position, its peculiar rotation of the back and neck and its manual and movement skills are all characteristics that determine the perceptual and cognitive style.
• The visceral stimuli that derive from the intestine act on an emotional, sensorial, perceptual and cognitive level: the phenomenon of gut feeling (Gigerenzer, 2007) or the concept of somatic marker (Damasio, 1994)
• The body regulates the brain as much as the brain regulates the body.

WEC

• The fundamental mode of interaction with the environment is not to represent it, or even to exchange inputs and outputs with it; rather, the relation is better understood via the technical notion of coupling. ... The post-Cartesian agent manages to cope with the world without necessarily representing it. (Van Gelder, 1997)

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WEC

• NO SEQUENTIALITY: 1) PERCEPTION 2) THINKING 3) ACTION. BUT CIRCULARITY AND INTEGRATION
• ACTION INFLUENCES PERCEPTION AND THINKING AND IS INFLUENCED BY THEM
• COGNITION IS THE RESULTS OF SENSORYMOTOR FEEDBACK DYNAMICS BETWEEN AGENT AND ENVIRONMENT: PRAGMATIC UMWELT SURROUNDING OUR BODY
• PERCEPTION AND ACTION ARE INTEGRATED: AGAINST STATIC REPRESENTATION OF VISION AS A CAMERA
• HUSSERL: THE PARADIGMATIC MODEL OF PERCEPTION IS THE TOUCH (perceiving an object in your pocket by moving it)

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WEC�EMBODIED PERCEPTION AND ADAPTIVITY

• PERCEPTION IS SHAPED FOR A FUNCTION:

TO ALLOW THE BODY TO SURVIVE

• EXAMPLE: VISUAL APPARATUS OF THE FROG IS DIFFERENTIATED ACCORDING THE DIFFERENT INPUTS
• Visual Input of a Fly → activation of visual nervous pathway A → Action A (capture the fly)
• Visual Input of a Hawk → activation of visual nervous pathway B → Action B (escape the hawk)
• NO MODULARITY BUT PERMEABILITY TO ECOLOGICAL NEEDS

WEC�AFFORDANCES (James Gibson, 1950, 1979)�THE ENVIRONMENT SPEAKS TO THE AGENT: IT ACTIVATES SENSORY MOTOR SCHEMES TO INTERACT WITH IT

NEURAL PATHWAY OF AFFORDANCES

• DURING PERCEPTION OF AN OBJECT OUR MOTOR SYSTEM IS ACTIVATED TO INTERACT WITH IT (grabbing, pulling, pushing, grasping, …)
• There are 2 different pathaways:
• 1) VENTRAL: VISUAL CORTEX-TEMPORAL CORTEX (SEMANTIC RECOGNITION
• 2) DORSAL: VISUAL CORTEX-PARIETAL CORTEX (TRANSFORMATION IN ACTION)
• 2 a) DORSAL-DORSAL: ACTION
• 2 b) VENTRAL-DORSAL: MEMORY OF MOTOR PROGRAMMES
• 2 c) ANTERIOR INTRAPARIETAL AREA (AIP): MOTOR, VISUAL AND VISUAL-MOTOR NEURONS→AFTER PERCEPTION OF AN OBJECT AUTOMATIC PROGRAMMING OF AN ACTION OF GRASPING

AFFORDANCES ARE LEARNT AND CONTEXT DEPENDANT

• AFFORDANCES HAPPEN AFTER REPEATED CO-OCCURENCES OF VISUAL AND MOTOR PATTERNS (Robin Ellis and Mike Tucker, 1998, 2005)
• AFFORDANCES ARE MODULATED TOP-DOWN From the context of pragmatic aims and are task dependendant (Tipper et al, 2006)
• PHISICAL CONTEXT: Too far object does not stimulate
• SOCIAL CONTEXT: Object in personal space of another agent stimulates affordance (AVATAR EFFECT)

ANT ON THE BEACH (SIMON, SCIENCES OF ARTIFICIAL, 1969, 1981): BR AS ECOLOGICAL ADAPTATION

HOW DO BR OPTIONS COPE WITH THE ALTERNATIVE MODELS OF COGNITION?

• BR as OPTIMALITY UNDER COSTRAINTS is not explained by any empirically based models of cognition
• BR as PATHOLOGY OF RATIONALITY is explained by THE CARTESIAN MIND (behavioral economics) and by BRAIN IN THE VAT (neuroeconomics)
• BR as NARRATIVES OF REASONABLE ANOMALIES is explained by THE CARTESIAN MIND
• BR as PROCEDURAL BOUNDED RATIONALITY is explained by THE CARTESIAN MIND (Simon’s information processing psychology)
• BR as ECOLOGICAL RATIONALITY is explained by WIDE EMBODIED COGNITION

THANKS FOR YOUR BOUNDED ATTENTION