Tabletop Exercise:
Data Theft Financial and Reputational Impact
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About This Exercise
This exercise was developed by the MiSecure team for school districts to enhance their preparedness for cybersecurity events and incidents. In this exercise, Executive Team takes the lead in responding to a data theft scenario, exploring the impact on operations and reputation, and exploring response strategies and resources.
This exercise is customizable and includes template exercise objectives, scenarios, and discussion questions as well as a collection of references and resources. While this exercise can be used as-is, it can and should be customized to be more realistic for your organization. For example, you can name systems that you operate and department or team names that are specific to your organization. If you are a school district in Michigan and need assistance running a tabletop exercise, reach out to the MISecure team.
This presentation is shared under Creative Commons Licensing CCBY https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/.
To make the exercise more valuable, consider choosing a facilitator who is not a participant in the exercise.
We strongly recommend that you develop a cybersecurity incident response plan prior to running tabletop exercises. For a starting point, try the MiSecure Incident Response Planning templates (existing content).
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Exercise Goal | Key Participants | Length | Incident Severity |
Rehearse a coordinated high level response to a severe data breach. | District Executive Team and IT Leadership | 1-1.5 hours | High |
Welcome and Intros
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What is a Tabletop Exercise (TTX)?
Definition:
Purpose:
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Participant Engagement & Expectations
Goals:
Acquaintance Building:
Active Participation:
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Exercise Roles
Players: �Perform their regular roles and responsibilities, talking through the simulated scenario as they would in a real emergency.
Facilitators: �Provide situation updates, moderate discussions, and resolve questions to keep the exercise on track.
Observers: �Ask relevant questions and offer expertise to support player responses without directly influencing outcomes.
Notetakers: �Document discussions and key takeaways for the After-Action Report.
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Expected Outcomes
Documenting Findings:
Update Plans:
Enhanced Coordination through shared Experience:
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Assumptions & Artificialities
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Operational Security
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The Scenario
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Day 1: 6:00 AM: Data Theft Ransom Email
Your HR Director receives a ransom email from threat actor “SkoolKids” stating that they have stolen sensitive data from your district and will make it publicly available if you do not pay a ransom of 28₿ (bitcoin).
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Discussion
HR Director: what would you do as a result of receiving an email threatening to expose sensitive data?
When the HR Director informs others, what actions would they take?
Where did this data come from? What system or systems contain �sensitive information?
Are you working from you Incident Response Plan now?
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Day 1 - 11 AM: Board President Reports Email
Your school board president informs the superintendent that she received an email from “SkoolKids” with a sample of stolen data.
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Discussion
The Board President received threatening email - does that change your response?
What would you do to validate SkoolKids claim?
Who is involved at this point? Would you contact external resources?
What actions are being taken? Are these actions documented in incident response plans?
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Day 2: 10:00 AM: Call from the FBI
Your IT director gets a call from an FBI Special Agent with information about leaked data found on a threat actor’s system. FBI shares dates of access, internal user ID, and external IP address. Initial access was 3 months ago.
SkoolKids emails the HR director and Board President and informs them that you have 24 hours to pay or they will publish or sell the data.
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Discussion
How do you accept and verify calls from law enforcement or third parties?
Describe your incident response team and how new information from IT director would be passed to other team members.
What is the actual or potential business impact at this point?
Would you engage with the threat actor SkoolKids or consider�paying ransom?
What internal and external communications are you �considering or initiating?
Are you following documented plans?
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Your teams confirm unauthorized access and that data is likely to have been stolen from your systems.
Day 3: 5:00 PM: Quiet Incident Goes Public
Local news site receives a tip that sensitive information from your district has been stolen and a sample is available on the dark web. A reporter asks the superintendent for comment.
A union representative requests information on what the district will do to protect privacy of teacher data.
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Discussion
What is the messaging strategy for various stakeholders?
What internal communications are necessary to keep employees informed?
Would someone speak to the media about this incident?
What does your incident response team look like at this point?
What would you do to ensure that the threat actor no longer has access?
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Hotwash/Key Takeaways
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Thank You!
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Resources
MISecure Incident Response Planning Tools
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MISecure Cybersecurity Tabletop Exercise Library
Full TTX Library at: https://misecure.org/tabletop-exercises/
Michigan Incident Response Contacts
For School Districts in Michigan:
MISecure Operations Center �989-763-5797 �misecure@gomaisa.org
For School DIstricts and other entities in Michigan:
Michigan State Police Cyber Command Center �877-MI-CYBER �mc3@michigan.gov
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Agenda and Timing
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Item | Time/Time |
Introduction + About TTX’s | 9:00-9:10 - 10 minutes |
Inject 1 - HR Dir Email | 9:10-9:20 - 10 minutes (8 minute timer) |
Inject 2 - Board President Email | 9:20-9:35 - 15 minutes (10 minute timer) |
Inject 3 - FBI Confirms | 9:35-9:50 - 15 minutes (facilitator times) |
Inject 4 - Media/Staff Questions | Skip |
Hot Wash/Wrap Up | 9:50-10:00 |