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The “Rohingya” Crisis - Update on the conflict in Rakhine State and the situation in Bangladesh

www.aummi.edu.au

Australia Myanmar Institute Monthly Seminar Series

26th March 2018

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Presenters: �Anthony Ware was AMI’s first Acting Director. He is a Senior Lecturer in International & Community Development at Deakin University. Anthony’s current research focusses on post-conflict development prior to negotiated political settlements, as well as related interests in faith-based organisations and inter-religious partnerships in development, asset-based community development (ABCD), and using development assistance to support democratic. Much of his fieldwork is in Myanmar. Anthony is a regular reviewer of journal articles and is or has supervised or co-supervise 9 doctoral students in fields ranging from the impact of political transition on minority rights, to monitoring of NGO development program quality, to microfinance, child sponsorship, and cultural heritage.�Nichola Krey has been a humanitarian for 15 years and is currently the Head of Humanitarian Affairs for Save the Children Australia. Her previous roles as Country Director in Aceh, Vanuatu and Palestine saw her responding to emergencies such as the Asian Tsunami in Aceh, the 2009 Gaza War in Palestine, the Iraqi Refugee Crisis in Syria and Cyclone Pam in Vanuatu. Nichola now heads a team of 25 experienced humanitarians who are deployed to humanitarian crises and natural disasters all over the world.

Australia Myanmar Institute Monthly Seminar Series

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Date : Monday 30^th April 2018�Topic. : To be confirmed�Venue : To be confirmed��Please rsvp, for catering purposes: admin@aummi.edu.au �Sign up to our newsletters on www.aummi.edu.au�Follow us on Facebook – Australia Myanmar Institute https://www.facebook.com/aummi.edu�Engage with us – (tell us what you would like to hear, what AMI could help you with, what you think we should be doing)

Australia Myanmar Institute Monthly Seminar

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AMI Monthly Seminar

Save the Children offices

26 March, 2018

Dr Anthony Ware

Deakin University

anthony.ware@deakin.edu.au

Myanmar’s Rohingya Crisis

Update on the conflict in Rakhine

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My Research

Funding: Gerda-Henkel Foundation (AZ 12/KF/16) and GraceWorks Myanmar
12 Visits 2011-2017
Development programme (7 years, now 57 villages)
Nov 2015 elections & community visits
Interviews: UN, INGOs, LNGOs, political parties, community leaders
Participatory Conflict Analysis 170 villages, all 17 townships

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Outline

Context
Misconceptions / over-simplifications

Not recent or new
Not simple oppression of a minority
Not about denial of citizenship and statelessness

Events 2012 - 2018

2016 & 2017 ARSA attacks & military crackdown
Who has fled – who is left
Rakhine—Burman dimension
Economic interests

Rohingya return? Next steps / recommendations

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Context

isolated coastal littoral
Historically - Bay of Bengal … Arab / Persian traders
Mrauk-U 1430 - 1784
Burmese 1784, British 1824
2 million Rakhine Buddhists (arrived 10th C)
1.1 million ‘Rohingya’ (but when did they arrive?)
poorest part of country

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Misconception 1: �Not new, not recent

Four previous mass exoduses :

1784 – Burman conquest, 35,000 fled to (British) Chittagong
1942 - Muslims and Rakhine mobilised on opposite sides of WWII

massacres and ethnic cleansing on both sides

almost complete segregation

1978 – 200,000 Muslims fled to Bangladesh
1991-92 – 260,000 Muslims fled to Bangladesh

Profound social cleavages date back more than a century, and cyclical bouts of violence have occurred every few decades since at least World War II (WWII). Several of these were of comparable scale with 2017, and bear an eerie resemblance. The history is long and bloody, suggesting serious underlying issues that will not be easy to resolve—and that a sympathetic understanding of history is essential.

Burman conquest 35,000 people fled into British-held Chittagong to escape the “ruthless oppression”

sought to destroy independent Rakhine and Muslim identity

1942 – British would have been defeated in Arakan and the Japanese would have reached Chittagong, without Muslim help

Estimates of

25,000-100,000 Muslims fleeing / 35,000-45,000 ethnic Rakhine were permanently displaced from northern Rakhine

** Every bout of violence ever since has been deeply rooted in the memory of these injustices, the ongoing segregation, and the political implications of the withdrawal of British patronage for the Muslims at Independence

1978 – Operation Ye-The-Ha targeting Muslim, Rakhine and communist insurgents – plus Operation Nagamin heavy-handed operation to check identity papers in the border regions. 200,000 fled to 13 camps in Bangladesh. Humanitarian agencies documented numerous claims of violence and abuse. Most returned in subsequent years. Rakhine and others fled south

1991-2 heavy handed crackdown on Muslim and Rakhine insurgencies - 260,000 Muslims quickly flowed into Bangladesh, “…in one of the greatest humanitarian emergencies” that Asia had then witnessed. Rakhine and others fled south. General Saw Maung was replaced by General Than Shwe –> halt - 200,000 Muslims repatriated during 1993-94

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Misconception 2: �Not simple oppression of a minority

Tripartite - Security Dilemma:

Rakhine—Muslim: communal, long history, WWII – mutual fears
Rakhine—Burman State: independence / autonomy – Rakhine insurgency
Muslim—Burman State: independence / autonomy – colonial overtones

plus military <--> government power struggle

Certainly, significant violence has been perpetrated against the Muslims, by both local Rakhine and the Tatmadaw, and they have long been the group most marginalised and heavily impacted by the conflict. Nonetheless, Muslims have also perpetrated significant violence against both the Rakhine and Burman, and significant violence has been perpetrated between Rakhine and Burman without involving the Muslims. This is thus a multipolar conflict in which at least three groups react defensively, out of deeply compelling existential fears.

Security dilemma: times of heightened uncertainty due to political transition can facilitate heightened fears between rival ethnic or cultural groups and make them more vulnerable to extremist narratives and recourse to violence.

1. Communal tension between Buddhists and Muslims has a long history, right across Myanmar

Demographic security dilemma

2. historic political struggle for independence or greater self-determination

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Misconception 3: �Not denial of citizenship and statelessness

NOT about:

denial of citizenship, or
bigoted attempt at ethnic cleansing per se

RATHER:

are the Rohingya an indigenous ‘national race’ - or are they a disparate group of immigrants now seeking group political rights?
about the extent of inclusion or exclusion in Myanmar polity, statelessness more a by-product than primary exercise

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2012 Conflict

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2012 Conflict

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2012 Conflict

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2012-17

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2016 Conflict

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2016 Conflict

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2017 Conflict

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2017 Conflict

671,000 since 25 Aug 2017
885,000 last 18 months …
total 1.07 million Rohingya in Bangladesh

FIGURES (as at Feb 2018)

Displaced: 671,000 Muslims since 25 Aug 2017 / 885,000 over last 18 months …

total 1.07 million according to Bangladeshi Immigration and Passports Department

26,747 non-Muslims

This looks very much like ethnic cleansing, whether intentional or not. It is certainly one of the fastest refugee exoduses in modern times, representing over 60% of the former Muslim population of the whole of Rakhine State, and resulting in the largest refugee camp in the world.

Several mass graves found – including one of a Hindu village – several more claimed

insufficient firm evidence to confirm who has committed which mass crimes, although atrocities have clearly been committed and the charges are very serious. The government and military have issued blanket denials of any wrongdoing, which is highly improbable and only reinforces a climate of impunity (ICG 2017). The only exception has been in relation to the massacre at Inn Din, central Maungdaw Township, on 9 October 2017. The admission by the Tatmadaw of involvement only came after Reuters released a detailed investigation report, with witness statements by local Buddhists and photographic evidence (Wa Lone, et. al, 2018). The announcement that 16 people, including some military officials, will be held to account (Nyan Hlaing Lynn, 2018) is welcome, but very insincere given two of the Reuter’s journalists involved have been charged under the Official Secrets Act for obtaining and publishing the facts around the story.

Denial of all other wrongdoing, though, is thus very hard to believe, especially given the Tatmadaw’s brutal history and the constant testimony of those who have fled to Bangladesh

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2017 Conflict

Figures – data hard to get – military control / operations ++ no baseline Rohingya data (2014 census)

An estimated 90% of the Muslim population of the 3 northern-most townships—Maungdaw, Buthidaung and Rathedaung—have now fled Myanmar

26,747 non-Muslims also displaced - > 50% from 3 affected townships

BUT Maungdaw was previously 93% Muslim - virtually the entire Muslim population of fled

Dead (MSF 2017): >6,700 Rohingya

Burned: 354 villages in Maungdaw = >75% of all villages in Maungdaw�6,842 houses, 324 shops / 53 of 59 villages are Muslim

This now leaves just 79,000 or so Muslims in these 3 townships -

and no more than 300,000 in central Rakhine (37% in internally displaced persons’ [IDP] camps around Sittwe).

This looks very much like ethnic cleansing, whether intentional or not – the test will be whether they are welcomed back with appropriate security, protection and rights

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2017 Conflict

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2017 Conflict – Rakhine-Burman Dimension

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2017 Conflict – Rakhine-Burman Dimension

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2017 Conflict – Rakhine-Burman Dimension

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2017 Conflict – Rakhine-Burman Dimension

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Economic Factors:

Kaladan River Multi-Modal Project
Maungdaw Economic Zone
Belt and Road Initiative

titanium & aluminium
tourism
agriculture
fishing
gas

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Recommentaions:

return must be FAST or …
return must be safe, voluntary, with rights
document verification with return
Kofi Annan recommendations
must deal with history
must have independent enquiry re mass crimes