Case Study Method Simulations in Social Science�
Case Study Method Simulations�
Using Student Engagement to Develop Meta-Skills:�
President Obama’s Afghanistan Dilemma
Strategic Decision, 2009
In 2001, President Bush invades Afghanistan to remove the Taliban regime that provides sanctuary to �Osama Bin Laden’s Al-Qaeda—the perpetrators of �9-11 . . .
The War on Terror
The War on Terror
By 2002, with major combat operations over and the Taliban defeated, President Bush begins a new mission to reconstruct Afghanistan. The NATO-led International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) helps direct the country on a new course. The United States turns its attention to Saddam Hussein and Iraq . . .
Early 2009��Congratulations! You have just been sworn in as our 44th President of the United States.
I am afraid there is a situation that requires immediate action. The news from Afghanistan is troubling. With the U.S. focused on stabilizing Iraq, limited efforts at peacekeeping and reconstruction in Afghanistan have allowed the Taliban insurgency to grow in strength and threaten President Karzai’s government. Something must be done soon before our mission there fails.
The Situation
You gather your advisors to help make the first and most important decision of your young presidency . . .
The Situation
The Situation
Mission Goals:
Prevent
Support
Build up
Destroy
Maintain
Strategies and Terms:
Working to weaken the Taliban by militarily action and/or winning the trust of the indigenous population.
Focusing on larger combat operations against organized enemy groups (The Taliban).
Focusing on working with, and protecting, the indigenous population to build up trust and reliance, discouraging association with the insurgent Taliban.
Strategies and Terms:
Focusing military efforts on drone strikes, special forces raids, and destroying specific individuals and smaller groups (Al Qaeda) bent on terrorist attacks and activities.
Preparing the Afghan forces to stand on their own against the insurgent Taliban.
Increasing the amount of United States troops in Afghanistan.
Setting a date by which the United States would leave Afghanistan and leave the job of securing the country up to the Afghan government.
Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (CJCS), Admiral Mike Mullen
New Commander of US Forces Afghanistan, General Stanley McChrystal
Commander of U.S. Central Command (CENTCOM), General David Petraeus
Vice Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, General James Cartwright
Secretary of Defense, Robert Gates
Vice President Joe Biden
Special Representative, Richard Holbrook
It is time to decide on one of the most important decisions of your presidency. What is your course of action?
General McChrystal
Mr. President,
I have a course of action my staff and I recommend. We should add the following:
This would add an additional 135,000 troops. Also, I don’t recommend announcing a withdrawal date. This could help the enemy anticipate how to best defeat our plans.
General Petraeus
Mr. President,
I support General McChrystal’s plan. The situation is bad enough to require a large surge of troops committed to a wider range of missions. We especially need to train up the Afghan army and police forces, which are currently inadequate to stand up against the Taliban insurgents.
If we announce a withdrawal date, we could demoralize the Afghan government and encourage the Taliban to hide over the border in Pakistan and wait for us to draw down forces, making everything more dangerous for the troops still deployed.
Admiral Mullen
Mr. President,
I also agree with General McCrystal’s plan. We must go after the Taliban more aggressively with a larger amount of troops. President Karzai’s government is too weak for us to rely on their own troops without more training.
Vice President Joe Biden�
Mr. President,
Look, putting another 130,000 troops in is not what we campaigned on. We can’t do this and expect to find it easier to set a plan for getting out! We can’t lose track of the reality—the American people don’t want us there indefinitely, with no end in sight. We also have Midterm Elections next year!
We should focus on a smaller military deployment geared toward counterterrorism operations. We should do as much as we can to prepare Karzai’s government to succeed after our departure.
General Cartwright has a plan that I support 100 percent. General . . . ?
General Cartwright
Mr. President, Mr. Vice-President,
I propose sending only 20,000 additional troops—10,000 for counterterrorism and 10,000 for training the Afghan army. This would be consistent with keeping options for withdrawal more flexible and less committed to a longer strategy of counterinsurgency.
Also, having a time-table for withdrawal would encourage the Afghan government to take more seriously its preparation for our departure. This would complement our efforts at training their army.
Secretary Robert Gates�
Mr. President,
These plans all have merit. As an alternative, I recommend sending a compromise amount of troops, maybe 30,000, in a surge that would focus on both training of the Afghans and population-centric counterinsurgency. Also, to conduct counterterrorism operations as needed. This may be the best way to prepare the Afghan army for a planned and announced departure, while building popular support of the Afghan people for their government.
Mr. President, I disagree with these military and politically motivated options. We should not add significant forces to Afghanistan. You need to bargain with the Taliban. There is no destroying them. And bargain with Pakistan, which is not only unwilling to help against the Taliban, but also supply and protect them. We need to use money and manipulation to get any kind of stability for Afghanistan against the Taliban. I can try to get the Afghan government to fight corruption, but it is so entrenched that I doubt we can count on them to stand up to the Taliban.
Special Representative Richard Holbrook�
Decision
COA #1: General McChrystal’s large troop surge with training for Afghans, enemy-centric counterinsurgency, population-centric counterinsurgency, counterterrorism, and no announcement of a withdrawal date.
COA #2: General Cartwright and Vice-President Biden’s reduced deployment of 20,000 troops to focus on training the Afghans, working on counterterrorism and announcing a date for withdrawal.
COA #3: Secretary Gates’ recommendation for a compromise of a 30,000-strong troop surge with a focus on training the Afghan army, counterinsurgency, and counterterrorism with an announced withdrawal date.
COA #4: Special Representative Richard Holbrook’s rejection of large military options. Instead, work for a negotiated peace with the Taliban by paying and manipulating Pakistan and the Taliban for promises of cooperation with Karzai’s government.
COA #1
COA #1
E-COIN. The increase in troops leads to more engagements with the Taliban, which leads to higher casualties—civilian and military.
P-COIN. The civilian population is, at best, indifferent. Even Afghanis that side with the US and the Afghan government are afraid of the Taliban and unwilling to show support.
Training is difficult, as the Taliban infiltrate the police and Afghan military.
The corruption and inefficiency of Karzai's government limits control of the country. Not setting a withdrawal timetable has helped the Afghan government for the time being, but the American public sees the large commitment of troops to Afghanistan as an open-ended escalation of the war. This will hurt your reelection efforts , while bolstering Republicans in the House and Senate.
You have delayed the advance of the Taliban but have lost political influence at home.
PARTIAL VICTORY
Mission Goals:
Prevent
Support
Build up
Destroy
Maintain
President Obama’s Afghanistan Dilemma
Strategic Decision, 2009
COA #2
COA #2
Your limited deployment of 20,000 troops reduces casualties, civilian and military. This strengthens the support of the Afghan government.
Training proves more difficult, as the Taliban infiltrate the police and Afghan military.
Your focus on counterterror is effective in illuminating threats to the United States and its military.
The corruption and inefficiency of Karzai's government limits control of the country. Setting a withdrawal timetable will hurt the Afghan government in the future, but the American public sees an end to the commitment of troops to Afghanistan. This will help your reelection efforts and bolster Democrat gains in the House and Senate.
Afghanistan may be an unwinnable cause, but it will not hurt your presidency.
VICTORY
Mission Goals:
Prevent
Support
Build up
Destroy
Maintain
President Obama’s Afghanistan Dilemma
Strategic Decision, 2009
COA #3
COA #3
Your limited deployment of 30, 000 troops and COIN strategy reduces casualties, civilian and military. This strengthens the support of the Afghan government.
Training proves more difficult, as the Taliban infiltrate the police and Afghan military.
Your focus on Coin is mostly ineffective—the civilian population is, at best, indifferent. Even Afghanis that side with the US and the Afghan government are afraid of the Taliban and unwilling to show support.
The corruption and inefficiency of Karzai's government limits control of the country. Setting a withdrawal timetable will hurt the Afghan government in the future, but the American Public sees an end to the commitment of troops to Afghanistan. This will help your reelection efforts, and only slightly affect Democrat power in the House and Senate.
Afghanistan may be an unwinnable cause but it will not hurt your presidency. You have delayed the advance of the Taliban and have not lost significant political influence at home.
VICTORY
Mission Goals:
Prevent
Support
Build up
Destroy
Maintain
President Obama’s Afghanistan Dilemma
Strategic Decision, 2009
COA #4
Your limited deployment of troops reduces casualties, civilian and military, but fails to strengthen the support for the Afghan government.
The money paid to the Taliban and Pakistan fails to produce the results you were hoping for. Worse, Pakistan and the Taliban do not follow through on their promises.
The corruption and inefficiency of Karzai's government limits effective control of the country. Kabul is on the verge of collapse, and the Taliban seems ready to retake the entire country.
Not only do you allow the Republicans to win the House and Senate, you are at risk of losing reelection in 2012. Afghanistan is an immediate disaster.
Defeat
Mission Goals:
Prevent
Support
Build up
Destroy
Maintain
President Obama’s Afghanistan Dilemma
Strategic Decision, 2009
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