Capacity Modification
in the Stable Matching Problem
Salil Gokhale
IIT Delhi
Samarth Singla
IIT Delhi
Shivika Narang
UNSW
Rohit Vaish
IIT Delhi
Stable Matchings
Many-to-one stable matching mechanisms are everywhere.
Stable matching mechanisms are well studied.
Capacity Modification is Ubiquitous
The Model
___
___ ___
is a blocking pair
Responsive, strict preferences over all subsets of workers
Strict preferences
The Model
___
___ ___
Stable Matching
Strict preferences
WPDA: Worker-proposing deferred acceptance algorithm
FPDA: Firm-proposing deferred acceptance algorithm
Responsive, strict preferences over all subsets of workers
Modifying Capacity: An Example
___
___ ___
___
___
Decrease capacity of f2
Technical Contribution
1. Who benefits by increasing capacity?
2. Can we use capacity modification to get desired outcomes in polynomial time?
3. Preference Manipulation v/s Capacity Modification
1. Tayfun Sönmez. Manipulation via Capacities in Two-Sided Matching Markets. Journal of Economic Theory, 1997
2. David Gale and Marilda Sotomayor. Some Remarks on the Stable Matching Problem. Discrete Applied Mathematics, 1985
3. Alvin E Roth and Marilda Sotomayor. Two-Sided Matching: A Study in Game-Theoretic Modeling and Analysis, 1990
FPDA
WPDA
Yes
[Sönmez, 1997]
Yes
[Sönmez, 1997]
Can the firm
improve?
Yes
Yes
Can the firm
worsen?
Yes
Yes
Can all workers
improve?
No
[Gale and Sotomayor, 1985]
[Roth and Sotomayor, 1990]
No
[Gale and Sotomayor, 1985]
[Roth and Sotomayor, 1990]
Can some worker
worsen?
Increasing Capacity can worsen a firm in WPDA�
1. Tayfun Sönmez. Manipulation via Capacities in Two-Sided Matching Markets. Journal of Economic Theory, 1997
Increase capacity of
___ ___
___
___
___
2. Achieving Goals using Capacity Modification
Goals:
Adding/Deleting Capacity
Achieved by:
Constraints:
Global Budget/Individual Budget on capacity change
Summary of Computational Results
Several results via canonical reduction to one-to-one setting. Some one-to-one control problems previously solved by Boehmer et al.
1. Niclas Boehmer, Robert Bredereck, Klaus Heeger, and Rolf Niedermeier. Bribery and Control in Stable Marriage. Journal of Artificial Intelligence Research, 2021
Delete Capacity
Add Capacity
Delete Capacity
Add Capacity
Poly Time
Poly Time
Poly Time
Poly Time
Global Budget
Poly Time
Poly Time
NP
-
hard
NP
-
hard
Individual Budget
Delete Capacity To Stabilize Matching under Global Budget
Input:
Question:
Step 1: Reducing to one-to-one instance
Input:
Question:
Input:
Question:
Step 2: Algorithm for the one-to-one problem
Idea: To resolve a blocking pair, we necessarily need to delete an agent participating in the blocking pair.
Algorithm: Keep deleting men in blocking pairs until we either run out of budget or no blocking pairs are left.
3. Preference Manipulation v/s Capacity Modification�
Introducing Peak
:= Peak of a firm is the maximum number of workers that can be matched to it under any capacity with the preferences kept fixed.
Observations
Comparison of Manipulation Actions via Peak
Add
Pref
Del
Del
Pref
Add
Del
Pref
Add
Above Peak
Add
Pref
Del
At Peak
Add
Pref
Del
Below Peak
WPDA
FPDA
An arrow from action X to action Y denotes the existence of an instance where X is strictly more beneficial for the firm than Y. Each missing arrow denotes that there is (provably) no instance where X is more beneficial than Y.
Future Directions
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