Key Distribution
Alice
Bob
Goal: agree on a uniformly random secret key
. . .
Key Distribution
Alice
Bob
Once Alice and Bob have agreed on a secret key:
s = 01011
s = 01011
m = 11100
=
Key Distribution
Alice
Bob
s = 01011
s = 01011
m = 11100
= 1
Once Alice and Bob have agreed on a secret key:
Key Distribution
Alice
Bob
s = 01011
s = 01011
m = 11100
= 10
Once Alice and Bob have agreed on a secret key:
Key Distribution
Alice
Bob
s = 01011
s = 01011
m = 11100
= 101
Once Alice and Bob have agreed on a secret key:
Key Distribution
Alice
Bob
s = 01011
s = 01011
m = 11100
= 1011
Once Alice and Bob have agreed on a secret key:
Key Distribution
Alice
Bob
s = 01011
s = 01011
m = 11100
= 10111
Once Alice and Bob have agreed on a secret key:
Key Distribution
Alice
Bob
s = 01011
s = 01011
m = 11100
c = 10111
c = 10111
= 11100
= 10111
For all m, this ciphertext is uniformly distributed from the point of view of an eavesdropper who doesn’t know s.
(i.e. when s is uniformly random)
So, IF there were a way for Alice and Bob to perform “key distribution” (i.e. agree on a uniformly random secret key only known by the two of them), then they would be able to communicate with “unconditional” security!
Once Alice and Bob have agreed on a secret key:
Key Distribution
Alice
Bob
s = 01011
s = 01011
m = 11100
c = 10111
c = 10111
= 11100
= 10111
For all m, this ciphertext is uniformly distributed from the point of view of an eavesdropper who doesn’t know s.
(i.e. when s is uniformly random)
So, IF there were a way for Alice and Bob to perform “key distribution” (i.e. agree on a uniformly random secret key only known by the two of them), then they would be able to communicate with “unconditional” security!
Means that security holds no matter how much computational power an eavesdropper has
Once Alice and Bob have agreed on a secret key:
Key Distribution
Alice
Bob
Goal: agree on a uniformly random secret key
Eve
Key distribution with unconditional security is impossible classically.
. . .