The Big Green Button:
Stratospheric Aerosol Injection As A Geopolitical Dilemma During US – China Great Power Competition
Agenda
Jeff Nielsen
Operational Planner
The views presented here are those of the author and do not necessarily represent those of the US Army or Department of Defense.
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Background – Warming
Accelerated Warming Projection
Source: James Hansen et al., “Global Warming in the Pipeline.” Oxford Open Climate Change, III, no 1, November 02, 2023. Accessed December 21, 2023.
What are the risks? “Who” are the US and China?
National Security Strategy 2022: “potentially existential for all nations.”
China National Climate Change Adaptation Strategy 2035: a “serious threat […] to the present and future survival and development of mankind.”
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Background – Geopolitical Realism
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Background – An Option
Source: White House Office of Science and Technology Policy. Congressionally Mandated Research Plan and an Initial Research Governance Framework Related to Solar Radiation Management. Washington, DC, June 2023.
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In the Literature: Risk vs Risk Decision-making
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Assumptions
Scope
Limitations
This Study: Threat-based Decision-making
SAI
Start Year
SAI Mass
+20 years?
+50 years?
+100 years?
What are the adversary’s start criteria?
How can we effect the criteria?
What are the program goals?
When does the program end?
How does this impact us?
How can we react?
Adversary
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State A Unilateral SAI Impacts onto State B Vital National Interests | |||
Interest Impact | Protect the Homeland and Citizens | Protect Economic Prosperity | Protect National Way of Life |
1. Potential Termination Shock |
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2. Environmental Damage |
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3. Weaponization |
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4. Geopolitical Influence |
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Green items are SAI opportunities. Red items are SAI threats. | |||
SAI Impacts on Vital National Interests
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Four Futures
Dyadic Analysis of United States and China SAI Scenarios | ||
| Compete | Cooperate |
Deter SAI | 1. Both states compete while deterring SAI. “Great Power Status Quo.”
| 2. Both states cooperate to deter SAI. “Decarbonization G2.”
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Deploy SAI | 3. At least one state is competing to deploy SAI. “Race to the Stratosphere.”
| 4. Both states cooperate to deploy SAI. “Aerosol G2.”
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Plausible Transitions
Dyadic Analysis of United States and China SAI Scenarios | ||
| Compete | Cooperate |
Deter SAI | 1. Both states compete while deterring SAI. “Great Power Status Quo.” | 2. Both states cooperate to deter SAI. “Decarbonization G2.” |
Deploy SAI | 3. At least one state is competing to deploy SAI. “Race to the Stratosphere.” Least preferred for both states. | 4. Both states cooperate to deploy SAI. “Aerosol G2.” |
Plausible
Plausible
Plausible
Plausible
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Less Plausible Transitions
Dyadic Analysis of United States and China SAI Scenarios | ||
| Compete | Cooperate |
Deter SAI | 1. Both states compete while deterring SAI. “Great Power Status Quo.” | 2. Both states cooperate to deter SAI. “Decarbonization G2.” |
Deploy SAI | 3. At least one state is competing to deploy SAI. “Race to the Stratosphere.” Least preferred for both states | 4. Both states cooperate to deploy SAI. “Aerosol G2.” |
Low SSP
Cold Feet
Plausible
Plausible
Plausible
Plausible
Radical Change
Radical Change
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SAI Decision Advantage Security Gap
Notional
Mid-Century Deployment Decision
Earlier Decision
Later Decision
Earlier in the century.
Later in the century.
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Current Security Plans
Optimistic State A or B SAI policy decision point (less policy time pressure).
SAI Security Gap
Potential State A or State B SAI policy decision point (more policy time pressure).
What does SAI Strategic Surprise Look Like?
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Findings
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Discussion
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Backup Sides
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Information Operations
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US Options
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US Security Organization
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SAI Conventional Deterrence Suitability
Can you economically deter PRC SAI?
No, China already has:
Experience
Precedent
Incentive
enables
Can you militarily deter PRC SAI?
No:
Crisis of PRC unilateral SAI:
Option A: escalate towards a direct existential threat against the Chinese homeland, risking both armed conflict and increasing climate impacts. Not credible.
Option B: leverage non-military tools to mitigate other SAI risks while potentially receiving SAI free rider benefits.
Conventional Deterrence
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Joint Force Integrated Deterrence
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Impacts of Failed Chinese SAI on United States Vital National Interests | |||
Impact | Protect and Secure American Citizens | Expand Economic Prosperity | Realize and Defend Democratic Values |
Impact 1. Failed SAI: Termination Shock |
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Impact 2. Failed SAI: Cooling Overshoot |
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Impact 3. Failed SAI: Environmental Damage |
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Impacts of Successful Chinese SAI on United States Vital National Interests | |||
Impacts | Protect and Secure American Citizens | Expand Economic Prosperity | Realize and Defend Democratic Values |
Sustains Impact 1 of Failed SAI, Termination Shock, past program end date. | |||
Sustains Impact 3 of Failed SAI, Environmental Damage | |||
Impact 4. Successful SAI: Weaponization (Direct or Indirect) | Potential, though unlikely, novel weapon to manipulate frequency and severity of extreme weather events. |
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Impact 5. Successful SAI: PRC Prestige Victory |
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Non-DIME US Policy Options for Chinese Stratospheric Aerosol Injection | ||||
| Option | Suitability | Feasibility | Acceptability |
Non-DIME | Implement no policies regarding SAI. |
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Information United States Policy Options for Chinese SAI | ||||
| Option | Suitability | Feasibility | Acceptability |
Information | Expand SAI Research |
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Shape Positive SAI Perception |
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Shape Negative SAI Perception |
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Economic United States Policy Options for Chinese SAI | ||||
| Option | Suitability | Feasibility | Acceptability |
Economic | Expand global climate change mitigation. |
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Expand Chinese climate change adaptation. Not feasible or acceptable. |
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Conduct conventional economic deterrence. |
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Military United States Policy Options for Chinese SAI | ||||
| Option | Suitability | Feasibility | Acceptability |
Military | Conduct conventional military deterrence. Not feasible. |
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Expand Integrated Deterrence for SAI’s unique planning factors. |
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Diplomatic US Policy Options for Chinese SAI | ||||
| Option | Suitability | Feasibility | Acceptability |
Diplomatic | Ratify Multilateral “No First-Strike” Treaty. Not feasible. |
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Deploy SAI multilaterally. Not feasible. |
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Deploy SAI mini-laterally including with China. |
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Deploy SAI unilaterally. Not feasible or acceptable. |
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United States SAI Deterrence Options | ||||
| Option | Suitability | Feasibility | Acceptability |
Information | Expand SAI Research |
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Shape Negative SAI Perception |
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Economic | Expand global climate change mitigation. |
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Military | Expand Integrated Deterrence for SAI’s unique planning factors. |
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United States SAI Cooperation Options | ||||
| Option | Suitability | Feasibility | Acceptability |
Information | Expand SAI Research |
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Shape Positive SAI Perception |
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Economic | Expand global climate change mitigation. |
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Diplomatic | Deploy SAI mini-laterally with China. |
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Source: IPCC, AR6 Synthesis Report (Cambridge, United Kingdom: Cambridge University Press, 2022), 14-15.
Background (Impacts)
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