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Review for Exam 2��

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Roman Sheremeta, Ph.D.

Professor, Weatherhead School of Management

Case Western Reserve University

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Chapters in the Book

  • Extensive form games (Chapters 2 & 14)
    • What is an extensive-form game?
    • What are the main elements of a game tree?

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  • Subgame perfect equilibrium (Chapter 15)
    • What is a SPNE?
    • How to find a SPNE using backward induction?
    • Non-credible threats (NE vs SPNE)

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Chapters in the Book

  • Stackelberg model of duopoly (Chapters 15 & 16)
    • Stackelberg model
    • Model of duopoly with advertising

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  • Imperfect information (Chapters 15 & 16)
    • Information set
    • Entry game with imperfect information
    • Assured destruction game

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Chapters in the Book

  • Repeated games (Chapter 22)
    • Proposition 1: unique equilibrium
    • Proposition 2: multiple equilibria

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  • Infinitely repeated games (Chapters 22 & 23)
    • Discounted payoff
    • Grim trigger strategy
    • Proposition 3
    • Dynamic oligopoly and collusion
    • Dynamic contests and cooperation

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Thank you!

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Roman Sheremeta, Ph.D.

Professor, Weatherhead School of Management

Case Western Reserve University

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