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Trust in Government Policies

Korea’s Approach to COVID-19

Chris Lee

chris.lee@mydata.org

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Transparent, Useful Policies

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Initiatives for Containing COVID-19 (ref.)

Emergency Alerts

  • Sent to everyone in vicinity of new cases (sometimes not even close to where I am)�
  • At its peak, too often too much…�(three alerts in a row at 7 AM… NO, STOP!)� General sense of SECURITY

Restrictions on face-mask purchases

  • Purchase only on designated days
  • Limit of two face masks per week
  • Seems extreme, but clearly fair�General sense of FAIRNESS

Corona-data is Open Data

  • Critical information shared immediately and transparently → General sense of URGENCY
  • Numerous updates daily �→ Always-fresh data�
  • Open APIs by multiple entities �→ Open Innovation Free-For-All

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Government Efforts Unmistakable at All Levels

National Level Efforts

City Level Efforts

+

Source: cdc.go.kr, seoul.go.kr

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Government Efforts Unmistakable at All Levels

National Level Efforts

City Level Efforts

+

Pre-Symptomatic�

Symptomatic

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Symptomatic → 40% (0.8 out of 2.0)

National Level Efforts

City Level Efforts

+

Contact Tracing

Contact tracing of Symptomatic patients

can lead to significantly

reduced transmission by Pre-Symptomatic patients

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Contact Tracing

Detailed travel history records for every single case in readable format

Relationships are found → Cases are linked

Source: coronaboard.kr/en

(Case Details machine translated)

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Example of Contact Tracing to the 5th Degree

3rd

6th

83rd

136th

112th

Order of Confirmation

(When it was documented)

Order of Transmission

(Who it came from)

=

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[NEW] Obtaining Location Data Without Consent

[UPDATE Mar. 28, 2020] Time to get location data reduced from 24 hours to 10 minutes (ref)�Obtaining location data this way took on average 24 hours. On Mar. 26, 2020, this system was replaced with a new system that can acquire location data of new confirmed patients in 10 minutes.

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[OLD] Obtaining Location Data Without Consent (ref)

Phase 1: �Identifying the data

  • Upon testing positive for COVID-19, a person is documented as a confirmed patient by a LPO1)
  • A patient’s personal statement is the first travel history openly published for the general public
  • If their statement is questionable or incomplete, a patient’s location data can be obtained via the private sector:
    • Location of credit card use
    • Mobile GPS data

1) LPO: A local public office managing confirmed cases

2) KCDC: Korea Centers for Disease Control & Prevention

3) MOHW: Ministry of Health and Welfare

4) NPA: National Policy Agency

5) RG: Regional Government. Korea has 17 regional governments, including Seoul Metropolitan Government, Busan Metropolitan City, Daegu Metropolitan City + 14 more)

Phase 2: �Requesting the data

Phase 3:�Processing the data

  • Unable to access from private companies, an LPO1)’s request is sent to KCDC2)
  • If approved by KCDC2) the request is sent to MOHW3)
  • If approved by MOHW3) �the request is sent to NPA4)
  • NPA4) handles request as local police work
  • Local police requests data from private company

  • Law mandates compliance with police requests for personal data with or without consent
  • Police gives data to LPO
  • LPO translates the data into physical locations and travel history that humans can read
  • LPO sends daily updates on their assigned cases to RG5)
  • RG5) collects and aggregates all updates their LPO1)s submit
  • RG5) publishes the new data in human-readable text on the web, free and open for all

[UPDATE Mar. 28, 2020] New System in Place

Time to get location data reduced from 24 hours to 10 minutes (ref)�Obtaining location data this way took on average 24 hours. On Mar. 26, 2020, this system was replaced with a new system that can acquire location data of new confirmed patients in 10 minutes.

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[OLD] Obtaining Location Data Without Consent (ref)

Confirmed Patient

Local Public Office

Local Police

Telcos

I don’t want to tell you where I’ve been. No consent!

Patient’s Location Data

Request for

Patient’s

Location Data

National �Police Agency

Request for

Patient’s

Location Data

Patient’s

Location

Data

[UPDATE Mar. 28, 2020] Time to get location data reduced from 24 hours to 10 minutes (ref)�Obtaining location data this way took on average 24 hours. On Mar. 26, 2020, this system was replaced with a new system that can acquire location data of new confirmed patients in 10 minutes.

[UPDATE Mar. 28, 2020] New System in Place

Time to get location data reduced from 24 hours to 10 minutes (ref)�Obtaining location data this way took on average 24 hours. On Mar. 26, 2020, this system was replaced with a new system that can acquire location data of new confirmed patients in 10 minutes.

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Voluntary & Proactive

Civilian Participation

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Back to Contact Tracing

Detailed travel history records for every single case in readable format

Relationships are found → Cases are linked

Source: coronaboard.kr/en

(Case Details machine translated)

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Contact Tracing Doesn’t Have to be Digital to be Useful

Detailed location history is recorded for every single case confirmed

Relationships between cases are also being found and documented (Contact Tracing)

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Contact Tracing Doesn’t Have to be Digital to be Useful

Detailed location history is recorded for every single case confirmed

Relationships between cases are also being found and documented (Contact Tracing)

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Contact Tracing Doesn’t Have to be Digital to be Useful

Detailed location history is recorded for every single case confirmed

Relationships between cases are also being found and documented (Contact Tracing)

These are not digitally obtained information. �They came from the patient’s personal statement.

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Contact Tracing Doesn’t Have to be Digital to be Useful

Detailed location history is recorded for every single case confirmed

Relationships between cases are also being found and documented (Contact Tracing)

CONFIRMED

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Corona Data as Open Data�Open Innovation Free-For-ALL

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Korea’s Government-Developed Self-quarantine App

What does the app do?

  • Enables checking-in with government during quarantine
  • Submit self-diagnosis without involvement of case officer
  • Send alerts to both parties upon exiting quarantine zone

How is the app used?

  • Check-in twice a day by submitting four yes/no questions
  • Government monitors location of quarantine subject

Why does the app work?

  • Checking-in via the app is quicker/more convenient than the alternative of calling the case worker twice a day
  • Violation of quarantine terms can lead to serious repercussions

Who can use the app?

  • ONLY government-ordered self-quarantine subjects (and their assigned case workers)

Who are the government-ordered self-quarantine subjects?

  • People who test positive for COVID-19 (until they recover in full)
  • People who came within 2 meters of a confirmed patient
  • People in the same room as a confirmed patient when they coughed or sneezed
  • People arriving to Korea from abroad

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Consents Given to the Self-quarantine App

Personal Information Collected

  • Name, Date of Birth, Gender, Nationality, Mobile No.
  • Passport No. (for foreigners)

Personal Data Collected

  • Health data
    • temperature, cough, sore throat, dyspnea
  • Location data
    • GPS on device

Purpose of Collection

  • Protection of self-quarantined person
  • Prevention/containment of outbreak

Holding Period

  • Two months after quarantine is lifted

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Contact Tracing Data + Open Public Data + Corona Data

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These 15-year olds from Daegu, though...

Made a Killer App

1 million users in 15 daysMade a Big Difference

Real-time updates on testing clinics, hospital beds, face-mask availability

Made a 100% Donation

100% profits donated to face-masks for those in need

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Even the less tech savvy are making

the Government’s Open Corona Data more accessible

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References from Digital Contact Tracing (Slide)

References

Government COVID-19 Dashboards

Self-Quarantine App

Korea Centers for Disease Control and Prevention

National Research Institute of Health

Center for Infectious Disease Control

  • National quarantine station

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Thank you.

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APPENDIX

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NOTE:

The situation in Korea should be understood in context. There were several bad decisions made which led to a spike in the number of cases. To really understand what happened in South Korea, I recommend reading two articles reported by the New York Times.

Feb. 27 South Korean Leader Said Coronavirus Would ‘Disappear.’ It Was a Costly Error.

Mar. 23 How South Korea Flattened the Curve

(Note: This article incorrectly states that government-ordered self-quarantine subjects must download another app. In order to use the app, one MUST be ordered into self-quarantine by the government with a case officer assigned to them.)

South Korea’s real hero is Jung Eun-kyeong, director of the Korea Centers for Disease Control and Prevention.

She continues to warn that the fight is not yet over, and has asked the public to continue practicing physical distancing until April 5. On April 6, public schools are scheduled to re-open.

One of the many reasons why Korea’s situation escalated quickly early on was because of political power plays both domestic and abroad. To this day there remain many unanswered questions, especially around Korea’s current leadership and China.

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Quarantine System

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