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�� Maj Gen P K Mallick,VSM (Retd)

Lucknow

16 Sep 23

Information Warfare

Demystifying the Concept

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https://www.strategicstudyindia.com/

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https://indianstrategicknowledgeonline.com/

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Difference Between Information Warfare and Information Operation

  • “Information warfare takes place at the strategic level, while information operations (IO) involve using various information-related capabilities to implement the strategy.”

  • However, unlike IO, IW is not defined in any contemporary U.S. military doctrine

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THE INFORMATION ENVIRONMENT (IE)

The information environment (IE) is defined as the aggregate of social, cultural, linguistic, psychological, technical and physical factors that affect how humans and automated systems derive meaning from, act upon, and are impacted by information, including the individuals, organizations, and systems that collect, process, disseminate, or use information.

Source: JP 3-0 and JP 3-04, Information in Joint Operations

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Context for Operations in the Information Environment (OIE)

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EVOLUTION OF IW

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Technical Operations Vs Inform and Influence Operations

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CEMA

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Convergence of Cyberspace Operations and Electronic Warfare

Porche, et al., “Redefining Information Warfare Boundaries for an Army in a Wireless World,” p.51

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CONFUSION IN TERMINOLOGIES

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Information advantage

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A Recent U.S. NDU Study Says

The United States, and the West, struggle to understand and respond to irregular warfare, whether by states or non-state actors. Attempts to master the art have generated much new jargon, ranging from “hybrid war” to “the gray zone,” and most recently “integrated deterrence.” The terminology belies a struggle to overcome entrenched presumptions about war—a confusion that generates cognitive friction with implications for strategy.

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“What's in a name? That which we call a rose/ By any other name would smell as sweet.” 

---- William Shakespeare

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First Edition : October 2004

Published By : Headquarters Army Training Command

Copyright Reserved : Headquarters Army Training Command

Shimla – 171003

India

PART - I

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Indian Army Doctrine

  • Forms of IW (October 2004, pg 20)
    • Command and Control Warfare (C2W)
    • Intelligence Based Warfare (IBW)
    • Electronic Warfare (EW)
    • Psychological Warfare
    • Cyber Warfare
    • Economic Information Warfare
    • Network Centric Warfare (NCW)
  • IW battle space deals with physical, information infrastructure and perceptual realms. From IA’s perspective, IW will comprise Cyber Warfare, Psychological Warfare and EW. (November 2010, pg 53)

  • Land Warfare Doctrine, 2018 also states IW consists of EW, Cyber and

Psychological Warfare, Page 10.

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ELECTRONIC WARFARE (EW)

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CYBER WARFARE

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Components of Cyber Warfare

  • Computer Network Attack (CNA), Computer Network Defence (CND) and Computer Network Exploitation (CNE).

  • Computer Network Exploitation (CNE). CNE uses actions and operations to obtain information that would otherwise be kept classified and is resident on or transiting through an adversary's computer systems or networks. Cyber exploitations are usually covert in nature. They do not seek to disturb the normal functioning of a computer system or network. The best cyber exploitation is one that a user never notices. It is non-destructive.

  • Fundamental difference between a cyber attack and cyber exploitation is the payload's nature to be executed. A cyberattack payload is destructive, whereas a cyber exploitation payload acquires information non-destructively.

  • Intent has to change.

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Cyber Operations Capabilities in Tactical Battle Area

  • Collect intelligence by rapidly exploiting captured digital media.
  • Counter and exploit adversaries’ unmanned aerial systems by exploiting data feeds.
  • Protect friendly unmanned aerial systems functioning in the area of operations.
  • Gaining access to closed networks in or near the area of operations, including extracting and injecting data.
  • Using electronic warfare systems as “delivery platforms for precision cyber effects.”
  • Exploiting new devices emerging from new trends and opportunities.
  • Conducting cyberspace intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance operations.
  • Engaging in offensive social media operations.

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Findings of the Study

  • United States and allied partners have tremendous, unique advantages in the ability to design, build, field and use globe spanning complex systems integrating enormous amounts and varieties of data, platforms, munitions, personnel, doctrines and ways of thinking.
  • Yet governments cannot keep pace with the implications of emerging technologies alone, necessitating an unprecedented public-private partnership in developing new information capabilities.
  • Governments and stakeholders can act now to succeed in the future, by bringing new skills and capabilities to addressing the challenges posed by technological changes and by raising the prominence and importance of developing practical ways to visualise information operations in a way that support field operations, strategic analysis and command decisions.

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Psychological Warfare

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PSYOPS involve the prepared use of information (propaganda) to influence the emotions, objective reasoning, motives and, ultimately, the behaviour of foreign governments, organisations, groups and individuals

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Cyber-Enabled Information Operations (CIO)

  • Conduct of IW that uses modern information technologies like the Internet, social media, search engines, artificial intelligence and traditional communications media technologies.
  • Whether the target for decision-makers is political or military, reliance is mostly on internet-enabled infrastructure—from data stored in computers and codes that makes them work to sensors employed on the battlefield.
  • There is a difference between cyber-enabled psychological operations and offensive cyber operations.
  • For defence against psychological operations, the practitioners need to learn techniques for inoculating against misinformation.

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Hostile Social Manipulation

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Use of Emerging Technologies - AI

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Who are the Stakeholders

  • MHA, Public Diplomacy Division
  • MOD
  • MEA
  • Int Agencies
  • Ministry of Information and Broadcasting
  • Ministry of Electronics and Information Technology (MeitY)
  • Ministry of Communications (DoT)
  • Ministry of Law and Justice
  • Ministry of Education
  • Others like academia, subject matter experts, technical specialist etc

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How do you influence the mind of Opposing Commander

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How a Psy Ops Campaign is Organised

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How to Plan- Ask Questions

• What types of information do you want to communicate and how will this help in achieving the goals you have aimed for?

• What categories of target audiences will it help you the most to influence in your intended ways?

• What do you know about the target audiences? What do those audiences want, value, need, fear, etc.?

• What are the favourite means of information sharing and communication among the target audiences?

• How do the target audiences now view the influencer? What are those views based on?

• While pursuing your influence campaign objectives what peer competition, potential allies, and enemies should you keep in mind?

• How will you know which types of information resonate among target audience and how will you adjust your efforts according to that analysis?

• Will you need to disguise the origins of the influence campaign using deception, proxies, and digital influence mercenaries?

• How will you recognise you have achieved your influence goals? What data will you analyse and when will you assess this?

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A typical offensive strategy against a target population may consist of following steps

Break down population into communities based on number of criteria like hobbies, politics, interests, concerns, needs etc.

• Find the social dynamics of communication and flow of ideas within each community.

• Locate who in each community is most susceptible to given types of messages.

• Find out what narratives of different types lead the discussion in each community.

• Using all of the above design and push a narrative likely to succeed in displacing a narrative unfavourable to you with one that is more favourable.

• Use continuous monitoring and interaction to determine the success of your effort and adjust in real time.

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Questions for Oversight. �Answering these questions would give a fair idea in which state of preparedness currently we are in.

  • What action is MoD taking to inform service members and their families and protect them from misinformation and disinformation by adversary states?
  • What steps have been taken to clearly communicate that malinformation generated by service members, civilian employees and contractors is unacceptable and that they will be held accountable should they disseminate such material?
  • What can MoD do to educate MoD personnel including military, civilians, contractors and dependents to protect themselves from threat actors who can micro-target them as a result of publicly available information?
  • What action is MoD taking to manage the publicly available information of its personnel, units and operations?
  • How can MoD improve digital literacy for service members to understand the importance information plays in protecting our country?
  • How can MoD develop consistent policies, plans, doctrine and a common lexicon for the Department as a whole?
  • What actions can MoD take to ensure that command-and-control decisions are made with timely, accurate and reliable information?
  • Should MoD organise the Office of the RM and other MoD components to have centralised or distributed information-based organisations focused on its cyber, electronic, space and information warfare missions and capabilities?
  • How do MoD policies and approaches to address threats in the information environment posed by nation-state actors differ from those designed to address non-state actors?
  • What actions can MoD take to protect itself from insider threats? What actions can pre-emptively address situations that may lead a service member or other MoD employee to act against its own interests?
  • What controls can MoD put in place to enhance the cybersecurity of IT systems and networks owned by DRDO, DPSUs, Defence Industrial Base, contractors and civilian companies that MoD relies on for its operations?
  • What actions and training can MoD put in place to educate personnel including dependents to understand the operations security or intelligence value of even what may appear to be innocuous postings on social media to protect our personnel and actions?

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Perception Management

Psychological Operations

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ARE YOU SERIOUS?

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Ethnography �A typical professional ethnographers does the following

Learns the local language.

• Works to build rapport with key members of the local community and gains “entry” into that community.

• Spends multiple hours per day for months or even years observing how people go about their everyday business and recording these observations.

• Transcribes and codes these observations into field journals to be used as primary source materials.

• Analyses this data to assess patterns of behaviour.

• Conducts formal and informal interviews with key informants, focus groups or target populations to cross-reference different interpretations and learn the underlying meaning.

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Joint Doctrine for Perception Management and Psychological Operations

Joint Doctrine for Perception Management And Psychological Operations, JP-9 was published by Headquarters Integrated Defence Staff in March 2010.

Perception Management. The Doctrine says Perception Management comprise the following operations:

  • Public Diplomacy.
  • Public Information.
  • Information Operations.
  • Psy Ops.

Perception Management is basically undertaken against the foreign audience.

Psy Ops are conducted against friendly forces and civil population as well as adversary’s forces and hostile people. Psy Ops are public presentation of the truth (not mis-information or propaganda).

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DOTMLPF-P

  • DOCTRINE
  • ORGANISATION
  • TRAINING
  • MATERIEL.
  • LEADERSHIP AND EDUCATION
  • PERSONNEL
  • FACILITIES. Infrastructure that supports the daily operations and activities of the Army as an institution.
  • POLICY

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CHINA

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Cognitive Domain Operations (CDO)

  • Seizing mind dominance in the cognitive domain and subduing the enemy without fighting is the highest realm of warfare.
  • CDO actions integrate military, political, economic, public opinion, psychology, legal theory and other means to achieve strategic national security goals that affect a target’s cognition, decision making, and behaviour.
  • Emerging technology such as artificial intelligence and big data are key to creating profound advancements in CDO.
  • Shortcomings the PLA is facing: not enough high-level planning, not enough joint integration across the other domains and not enough innovation. PLA has little research on the technology and equipment for cognitive domain operations on mainstream social networking platforms. It needs to improve its big data, natural language processing, and deep learning capabilities.
  • PLA should use artificial intelligence (AI) to run its bot network on social media, which would be able to create content based on human guidance, select the appropriate time to post on social media and be able to coordinate between these “sockpuppet” accounts.

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Social Media Warfare - Borrowing a Boat Out to Sea�

  • Long-standing Chinese government strategy to exploit foreign media to deliver Chinese propaganda.
  • Chinese military views social media as a tool for influence and broader information operations at home and abroad.
  • PLA has a de facto presence on Western platforms through Chinese state-run media accounts on Facebook, Twitter, YouTube, Instagram, and others that relay its messages to unwitting audiences and help the military collect data on its effectiveness.
  • PLA is developing technologies for subliminal messaging, deep fakes, overt propaganda and public sentiment analysis on Facebook, Twitter, LINE and other platforms

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Media

  • Government has invested €1.3 billion annually since 2008 to impose a tighter control over its global image.
  • Major Chinese media outlets have a global presence, in several languages, on several continents, and on all social networks, including those blocked in China (Twitter, Facebook, YouTube, and Instagram).
  • Beijing seeks to control the Chinese-language outlets abroad, which has proven so successful that the CCP now effectively enjoys a near- monopoly among them.

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PLA Objectives with Social Media

  • Seeks to achieve narrative dominance through the use of official social media accounts to overtly spread Chinese propaganda and, thereby, shape public perceptions and policies toward China and its military.
  • Seeks to use official social media accounts for deterrence purposes to communicate deterrence signals, which specifically demonstrate China’s capabilities and credibility while also undermining an enemy’s resolve through psychological warfare.
  • Seeks to leverage social media for political interference in order to degrade the credibility of a foreign political system, undermine support for a foreign government and its policies, as well as support China’s preferred political candidates in an election.
  • These objectives are neither mutually exclusive nor exhaustive, but provide a framework for PLA influence operations on social media.

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Recent Example of Chinese Psy Ops

*Today’s Article in Chinese media*

*The situation on Sino-Indian border has changed. A no fly zone has been announced. India’s commitment to China to maintain peace has lasted for just about half a month*

_A bit longish read therefore following are the excerpts._

- A *No fly Zone(NOTAM)* was issued by India very close to the Western Sector

- This area is near the *Galwan Valley* and the delineated part is just 10 Kms from our forward troops

- The Indian Army is conducting *Some fire power exercise* in this area for upto a week

- This is Despite the fact that our Foreign Affairs Director, Wang Yi and Indian FM Jaishankar had *acknowledged maintaining peace and balance* on the Borders

- Also, this time of firepower Exercise has been *deliberately chosen to be close to the 01 August PLA Day*

*The reason why Indian Government and Army is doing this are as follows*:

> India’s cozying up to the US and now providing it some *deliverables *

> Show it’s relevance to Indo Pacific and *Quad*

> Indian Government facing a No Confidence motion in ongoing *Parliament*

> Creating distraction from its *Manipur situation*

> Present Government losing *Karnataka elections*

While all above maybe Indian Governments *Internal problems* and needs but during run up to the 2024 elections, the present Government is sensing bigger challenges from opposition. It therefore may *take decisions not conducive for maintaining stability on Sino India borders*.

We must be *cautions and wary* of this.

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RECOMMENDATIONS

  • MHA or NSCS be overall responsible for Psy Warfare. Army be the lead agency in CI/ CT Ops for Perception Management.
  • Concentrate on armed forces domain. What is across.
  • Use the right term.
  • Formulate IW Strategy and Doctrine.
  • Train the armed forces to recognise and resist foreign disinformation campaigns. Build a database of adversarial disinformation operations to identify patterns and vectors of delivery.
  • Establish a presence on opponents’ social media platforms.
  • Use Int org and staff.

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RECOMMENDATIONS cont’d

  • As a part of the Three Warfare strategy China is likely to launch a robust Psychological Warfare campaign aimed at "generating dissent and discord, creating friction and fracturing links between the population and the leadership, between allies and between the military and civilian leadership." The campaign may be crude and heavy-handed in form.
  • India should have its own mitigation strategy to thwart any such Psychological Operations campaign and should be able to launch its own Psychological Operations campaign with due subtlety. The preparation, themes, delivery mechanism and other details should be worked out well in advance.
  • The government may even consider joining Chinese social media platforms like Weibo and WeChat to reach most of the Chinese population and put forward India’s viewpoints.

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Conclusion

  • War in Ukraine revealed that cognitive warfare and cyber warfare conducted in non-physical domains — do not alone provide strategic advantages.
  • Neither Sun Tzu, who idealised subduing the enemy without fighting nor British strategist B.H. Liddell Hart, who advocated the indirect approach strategy, gave specific advice on how to put it into practice.
  • In the long history of warfare, it has been physical battles that subdued the enemy’s will.

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Amos Yadlin , Executive Director of Tel Aviv University's Institute for National Security Studies (INSS) and former IDF's chief of Military Intelligence

As a fighter pilot, I have a great deal of respect for airpower but it cannot determine the battle on its own and neither can the cyber realm. It is an important realm, but not one that can replace the physical dimension or combat. With all due respect to the cyber realm at the end of the day, we need soldiers on the mountaintops to finalise matters….. As to the future of the cyber realm, it may be that ‘winter is coming,’ or a Pearl Harbor, but we aren’t there yet.

How it could be if the cyber realm is such a powerful dimension, that the Russians have already been fighting in Syria for three years and have not yet decided the campaign? How have the Americans been fighting in Afghanistan for 17 years?”

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Q & A

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ARMY – 1ST INFORMATION OPS COMD (1ST IO CMD)

Mission

1st Information Operations (IO) Command (Land) provides IO support to the Army and other Military Forces through deployable IO support teams, IO reach back planning and analysis, and the synchronization and conduct of Army Computer Network Operations (CNO) in coordination with other CNO and Network Operations stakeholders, to operationally integrate IO, reinforce forward IO capabilities, and to defend Cyberspace in order to enable IO throughout the Information Environment

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Core challenges of understanding and visualising the information domain

  • Information space is a chaotic system, in which slight variations in conditions can dramatically impact how information traverses space and time.
  • Any visualisation of this mixture of data points—data from the entire information space that includes mass and social media as well as cultural and socioeconomic networks—must be useful to decision makers at multiple echelons and overlayed onto visualisations of land, air, sea, space and cyber domains.
  • Vast information domain must remain bounded to build effective visualizations

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OIE Related Operations, Activities and Investments (OAI)

  • Exercises
  • Force Posture
  • Audience Engagements
  • Foreign Military Sales
  • Security Cooperation
  • Dynamic Force Employment
  • Flexible Deterrent Options
  • Show of Force
  • Crisis Response
  • Operation Plan (OPLAN) Execution

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Cyber and Electromagnetic Operating Context

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If you want to keep for civilization that portion of land called home, you still need to be willing to put your sons and daughters in the mud to defend it.

-- T. R. Fehrenbach

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Electromagnetic Spectrum Operations Are Composed of Two Coordinated Efforts

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The Electromagnetic Spectrum