Two-Track Conversations�
Sam Berstler (MIT)
Rutgers Non-Paradigmatic Pragmatics Workshop- 12 May 2025
slides available: www.samberstler.com
Question. Speakers sometimes conduct two conversations simultaneously. This strategy is cognitively demanding and massively increases the risks of miscommunicating. So why do speakers do it?
Tl;dr
Question. Speakers sometimes conduct two conversations simultaneously. This strategy is cognitively demanding and massively increases the risks of miscommunicating. So why do speakers do it?
Standard answer. To minimize personal liability.
Tl;dr
Question. Speakers sometimes conduct two conversations simultaneously. This strategy is cognitively demanding and massively increases the risks of miscommunicating. So why do speakers do it?
Standard answer. To minimize personal liability.
My answer. To avoid runaway conflict escalation.
Tl;dr
Question. Speakers sometimes conduct two conversations simultaneously. This strategy is cognitively demanding and massively increases the risks of miscommunicating. So why do speakers do it?
Standard answer. To minimize personal liability.
My answer. To avoid runaway conflict escalation.
Why should you care? This analysis appeals to a communicative mechanism that I call practical display. This analysis is “proof-of-concept” of the explanatory power of practical display.
Tl;dr
Some features of two-track conversations
The first track is overt and official one.
The second track is covert and unofficial.
(Camp 2018, Berstler forth)
Some features of two-track conversations
No consistency requirement. Each track has its own common ground. These common grounds are typically jointly inconsistent.
(Berstler 2025, forth.)
Some features of two-track conversations
The first track is mandatory. In order to update the second track with an utterance U, a speaker must also thereby update the first track with U.
(Berstler 2025)
Some features of two-track conversations
No interpretative quarantining. In order to coordinate on the content of the speech acts in one track, speakers sometimes use their knowledge about what is going on in another track.
Some features of two-track conversations
Non-tonal. For the sake of the first track, speakers often presuppose information that they jointly know to be false. Nonetheless, speakers can make genuine and sincere assertions within the first track.
(pace Yalcin 2007)
What “tracks”?
An anti-contamination norm?
(Berstler forth.)
If a speaker S performs some communicative act H within the unofficial track, then:
(i) if the speaker would have violated the official track
norms (??), had she H-ed within it,
(ii) it is not socially permissible (??) to presuppose, for the purposes of communicating within the official track, that the speaker H-ed.
Better answer: a fake persona
(Goffman [1956] 1959: 194)
“It is a kind of collusive communication different from other types of collusion in that the character against whom the collusion is sustained are projected by the very persons who enter into the collusion.”
What “tracks”?
If a speaker S performs some communicative act H within the unofficial track, then:
(i) if the speaker would have violated the working consensus (face agreement) norm, had she H-ed within it,
(ii) it is not interactionally permissible to presuppose, for the purposes of communicating within the official track, that the speaker H-ed.
Better answer: a fake persona
What “tracks”?
If a speaker S performs some communicative act H within the unofficial track, then:
(i) if the speaker would have violated the working consensus (face agreement) norm, had she H-ed within it,
(ii) it is not interactionally permissible to presuppose, for the purposes of communicating within the official track, that the speaker H-ed.
Better answer: a fake persona
What “tracks”?
The question:
Why do antagonistic speakers do this?
The question:
Why do antagonistic speakers do this?
Standard answer:
The speakers want to reduce their liability for what they do within the second track. They want deniability for it.
Walton (1996); Pinker (2007); Pinker et al (2008); Lee and Pinker (2010); Fricker (2012);
Peet (2015); Camp (2018); Davies (2019); Mazzarella (2021); Dinges and Zakkou (2023); Berstler (forth),
The question:
Why do antagonistic speakers do this?
Standard answer:
The speakers want to reduce their liability for what they do within the second track. They want deniability for it.
Problem:
I don’t think this is a satisfying explanation of Huffington and Gurley’s behavior.
Gurley: Well, I appreciate you reaching out to get ourselves aligned on this. This is a—a bad situation.
Huffington: Are you threatening me?
Gurley: …Yes, Arianna.
An intelligible continuation:
The question:
Why do antagonistic speakers do this?
Why else might antagonistic speakers two-track?
Any deviation, then, on any one occasion when the rule is supposed to apply can give the impression that the actor may be delinquent with respect to the whole class of events. And any compliance can carry assurance regarding the actor’s handling of all other events that come under the rule…This tendency of individuals to read acts as symptoms gives an important expressive or indicative quality even to acts of a quite substantive kind, carrying as they do evidence of the actor’s general relation to a rule and, by extension, his relation to the system of rules of which the one in question is a part. And, of course, such information is often taken as relevant for an appraisal of the actor’s moral character.
(Goffman 1971: 97)
An act that is subject to a rule of conduct is, then, a communication, for it represents a way in which selves are confirmed—both the self for which the rule is an obligation and the self for which it is an expectation. An act that is subject to rules of conduct but does not conform to them is also a communication—often even more so—for infractions make news and often in such a way as to disconfirm the selves of the participants. Thus rules of conduct transform both action and inaction into expression, and whether the individual abides by the rules or breaks them, something significant is likely to be communicated.
(Goffman 1967: 51)
Do you take credit cards?
The basic social signal
Whenever an agent G’s in a context c, she provides infallible evidence that:
(i) she can G, and
(ii) in c, she is disposed to G.
The basic social signal
Whenever an agent G’s in a context c, she provides infallible evidence that:
(i) she can G, and
(ii) in c, she is disposed to G.
Practical display
In performing some act G, an agent A practically displays that she has some disposition, ability, or skill X (relative to some audience B) iff:
(i) the fact that A has X explains why or how A G-ed,
(ii) in virtue of (i), A provides B with evidence that she has X.
The basic social signal
Whenever an agent G’s in a context c, she provides infallible evidence that:
(i) she can G, and
(ii) in c, she is disposed to G.
Practical display
In performing some act G, an agent A practically displays that she has some disposition, ability, or skill X (relative to some audience B) iff:
(i) the fact that A has X explains why or how A G-ed,
(ii) in virtue of (i), A provides B with evidence that she has X.
Signal strength
(i) The less likely it is (relative to B’s information state) that A could have G-ed without having X, the stronger the signal.
(ii) The more likely it is (relative to B’s information state) that A G-ed in virtue of X, the stronger the signal.
(Adapted from Skyrms 2010)
Do you take credit cards?
Practical display
In performing some act G, an agent A practically displays that she has some disposition, ability, or skill X (relative to some audience B) iff:
(i) the fact that A has X explains why or how A G-ed,
(ii) in virtue of (i), A provides B with evidence that she has X.
Feigning
In performing some act G, an agent A feigns (relative to some audience B) that she has some disposition, ability or skill iff:
(i) A believes that she does not have X,
(ii) in G-ing, A intends for B to infer that A G-ed because she has X.
Signal strength
(i) The less likely it is (relative to B’s information state) that A could have G-ed without having X, the stronger the signal.
(ii) The more likely it is (relative to B’s information state) that A G-ed in virtue of X, the stronger the signal.
(Adapted from Skyrms 2010)
Display and Rules
When I conform to a rule, I practically display that I can and will conform to the rule.
If I practically display that I can conform to the rule, I signal that I know what the rule is and how to conform to it.
An act that is subject to a rule of conduct is, then, a communication, for it represents a way in which selves are confirmed—both the self for which the rule is an obligation and the self for which it is an expectation. An act that is subject to rules of conduct but does not conform to them is also a communication—often even more so—for infractions make news and often in such a way as to disconfirm the selves of the participants. Thus rules of conduct transform both action and inaction into expression, and whether the individual abides by the rules or breaks them, something significant is likely to be communicated.
(Goffman 1967: 51)
Bronislow Malinowski:
Small talk as good vibes ritual
Small talk is a form of phatic communication. When we engage in small talk, we express and lather ourselves within prosocial affective attitudes. This is a form of interpersonal ritual.
Erving Goffman:
Small talk as rational ritual
Small talk defines a set of rules that properly function, in part, to enable us to practically display that we can and will conform to basic social etiquette with each other. This, in turn, enables us to signal that we are reliable partners for further social interaction.
Display and High Stakes
Under perceivedly [high-stakes] circumstances…and only in close connection with them, a second set of capacities or properties appear. An individual’s sudden sense of what might shortly occur can have a marked effect on his behavior, with respect to both social ties and task performance. In case of relations to others, the principled behavior he manages to exhibit during ordinary occasions may break down…The capacities (or lack of them) for standing correct and steady in the face of sudden pressures are crucial; they do not specific the activity of the individual, but how he will manage himself in this activity. I will refer to these maintenance properties as an aspect of the individual’s character.
(Goffman 1967: 216-217)
Under perceivedly [high-stakes] circumstances…and only in close connection with them, a second set of capacities or properties appear. An individual’s sudden sense of what might shortly occur can have a marked effect on his behavior, with respect to both social ties and task performance. In case of relations to others, the principled behavior he manages to exhibit during ordinary occasions may break down…The capacities (or lack of them) for standing correct and steady in the face of sudden pressures are crucial; they do not specific the activity of the individual, but how he will manage himself in this activity. I will refer to these maintenance properties as an aspect of the individual’s character.
(Goffman 1967: 216-217)
Can she really pull it off?
In strategic contexts, we are often uncertain about more than our adversary’s skills and resources. We are uncertain about her nerve or character: her self-control under pressure.
…strength of will: the ability to execute at all
…presence of mind: the ability to execute well
…emotional poise: the ability not to “flood out” with emotion
Practical display is one of the only ways to credibly signal that you have strong character.
I am trying to extort Dan. I say, “If you don’t publish my work in Philosophy Compass, I’m going to break your kneecaps.” He doesn’t believe me, so I pick up a baseball bat and smash the windows out of his car.
Huffington and Gurley
are showing off
Highly demanding speech practices, like two-tracking, in high stakes situations enable both parties to practically display at least two kinds of skills:
(i) their communicative footwork
(ii) their nerviness: their ability to perform the footwork rapidly and accurately under stress
Gurley: Well, I appreciate you reaching out to get ourselves aligned on this. This is a—a bad situation.
Huffington: Are you threatening me?
Gurley: …Yes, Arianna.
An intelligible continuation:
In asking, “Are you threatening me?” Huffington signals that she cannot accurately and rapidly perform conversational footwork under stress. Gurley has “won” their game of skill.
The puzzle
This explains why Huffington and Gurley want to perform their two-tracking well.
But why two-track at all? Why couldn’t they (like cable news political pundits) instead compete on who can most cleverly lace overt insults through the negotiation?
Covertness is an essential tool for engaging in limited war. Tacitly cooperating to hide the most extreme forms of rivalry allows adversaries to operate within a kind of backstage and preserve the appearance of limited cooperation. Sequestering activity in the covert sphere reduces mobilization of external audiences, the reputational and domestic stakes involved in an incident, and hard-to-control escalation pressures…To develop this argument I draw on insights about secrecy from the sociology of Erving Goffman…Rivals may tacitly cooperate to steer dangerous encounters to the backstage as a way to safeguard to external impression of their encounter as a limited conflict. (Carson 2016: 103-104)
At an MIT faculty meeting, we are debating whether to institute a new logic requirement. During negotiations, Sam and Justin lobby passive-aggressive insults at each other. Sam and Justin intend for their other colleagues not to recognize what they’re doing. Why?
At an MIT faculty meeting, we are debating whether to institute a new logic requirement. During negotiations, Sam and Justin lobby passive-aggressive insults at each other. Sam and Justin intend for their other colleagues not to recognize what they’re doing. Why?
Containing reputational effects: If Justin knows that Brad realizes that Sam has insulted Justin, Justin has additional reason to retaliate/ retaliate more harshly against Sam. He doesn’t want Brad to think he’s a wuss!
At an MIT faculty meeting, we are debating whether to institute a new logic requirement. During negotiations, Sam and Justin lobby passive-aggressive insults at each other. Sam and Justin intend for their other colleagues not to recognize what they’re doing. Why?
Containing allies: Suppose that Alex and Sam belong to faction A and Justin belongs to faction B. If Alex knows that Sam and Justin are sniping, Alex has reason to join in on the snipefest against Justin. Rinse, repeat for all members of faction A and B.
At an MIT faculty meeting, we are debating whether to institute a new logic requirement. During negotiations, Sam and Justin lobby passive-aggressive insults at each other. Sam and Justin intend for their other colleagues not to recognize what they’re doing. Why?
Containing pro-escalation forces: Suppose that Mattias likes drama. Anytime he witnesses a conflict, he always wants to make it worse. If he knows that Sam and Justin are sniping at each other, he’ll try to find a way to “stir the pot.”
At an MIT faculty meeting, we are debating whether to institute a new logic requirement. During negotiations, Sam and Justin lobby passive-aggressive insults at each other. Sam and Justin intend for their other colleagues not to recognize what they’re doing. Why?
In continuing to confine their antagonism to the second-track, Sam and Justin thereby practically display their willingness and ability to confine their antagonism to the second track. This, in turn, enables them credibly signal their commitment to and ability to conduct limited warfare.
At an MIT faculty meeting, we are debating whether to institute a new logic requirement. During negotiations, Sam and Justin lobby passive-aggressive insults at each other. Sam and Justin intend for their other colleagues not to recognize what they’re doing. Why?
In continuing to confine their antagonism to the second-track, Sam and Justin thereby practically display their willingness and ability to confine their antagonism to the second track. This, in turn, enables them credibly signal their commitment to and ability to conduct limited warfare.
While Sam and Justin want to deceive third parties, their primary aim is not to escape social sanctioning.
The big move
We sometimes two-track in a context in which we don’t need to deceive third parties in order to display our disposition and ability to two-track in a context in which we do. This, in turn, signals a general commitment to limited conflict.
Huffington and Gurley
are showing that they want to avoid escalation
Huffington and Gurley’s conversation works the same way. While they do not need to deceive anyone in this context, they two-track to practically display:
(i) their general continued commitment two-track their conflict
(ii) their continued ability to make good on this commitment.
This, in turn, signals their commitment to merely limited conflict. And that, in turn, actually does keep their conflict in check.
We should expect to find two-tracking when adversaries
(i) frequently communicate in the presence of third parties,
(ii) are in escalation-conductive environments.
Anecdotally, this seems right. We find pervasive two-tracking in work environments and families.
Two-tracking responds to eavesdroppers
When we use two-tracking to manage our conflict, we implicitly define a salient escalatory threshold. When someone suddenly makes the conflict explicit, she thereby signals her desire to escalate.
Making it explicit is escalation
Gurley: Well, I appreciate you reaching out to get ourselves aligned on this. This is a—a bad situation.
Huffington: Are you threatening me?
Gurley: …Yes, Arianna.
An intelligible continuation:
Depending upon Huffington’s overall attitude, she is not necessarily signaling incompetency. She could be checking whether Gurley wants to escalate. If Gurley says, “Yes, I’m threatening you,” they have both crossed the threshold.
Attempts to resolve interpersonal conflict through discussing the conflict explicitly, especially when some group members are not fully aware of it, may backfire and instead escalate the conflict.
NOT
Making it explicit can backfire
Through strategically deploying it, agents can reduce the scope of otherwise unavoidable conflicts. From a group-based perspective, we want to equip agents with these skills to minimize overall conflict within the group.
Conversational skill and nerve are self-defense
Question. Speakers sometimes conduct two conversations simultaneously. This strategy is cognitively demanding and massively increases the risks of miscommunicating. So why do speakers do it?
Standard answer. To minimize personal liability.
My answer. To avoid runaway conflict escalation.
Why should you care? This analysis appeals to a communicative mechanism that I call practical display. This analysis is “proof-of-concept” of the explanatory power of practical display.
Tl;dr
In order to explain the structure of many kinds of conversation—both strategic and non-strategic—we must consider the total information that we convey when we make speech acts. Much of this information is merely signaled or expressed.
General lesson no. 1:
End speech act domination
The “self” that we seek to construct or affirm within conversation is not just a self who inhabits a particular race, class, gender identity or who has a unique personality. She is also someone with a set of skills and a certain quality of will. It is the strategic expression of this self that explains much of what we do within conversation.
General lesson no. 2:
Expand identity
thank you