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�� Maj Gen PK Mallick,VSM (Retd)

CLAWS

04 July 2023

Information Warfare Decoded

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Dispelling Misconceptions and Unveiling the Realities

https://indianstrategicknowledgeonline.com/

Difference Between Information Warfare and Information Operation

• “Information warfare takes place at the strategic level, while information operations (IO) involve using various information-related capabilities to implement the strategy.”

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• However, unlike IO, IW is not defined in any contemporary U.S. military doctrine

THE INFORMATION ENVIRONMENT (IE)

The Information Environment (IE) is defined as the aggregate of social, cultural, linguistic, psychological, technical and physical factors that affect how humans and automated systems derive meaning from, act upon, and are impacted by information, including the individuals, organizations, and systems that collect, process, disseminate, or use information.

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Source: JP 3-0 and JP 3-04, Information in Joint Operations

Context for Operations in the Information Environment (OIE)

OIE Related Operations, Activities and Investments (OAI)

• Exercises
• Force Posture
• Audience Engagements
• Foreign Military Sales
• Security Cooperation
• Dynamic Force Employment
• Flexible Deterrent Options
• Show of Force
• Crisis Response
• Operation Plan (OPLAN) Execution

EVOLUTION OF IW

Technical Operations Vs Inform and Influence Operations

CEMA

Electromagnetic Spectrum Operations Are Composed of �Two Coordinated Efforts

The Electromagnetic Spectrum

Cyber and Electromagnetic Operating Context

Components of Cyber/Electromagnetic Activities �as per FM 3-0

• Cyber Situational Awareness
• Networks Operations
• Cyber Warfare
• Electronic Attack
• Electronic Protection
• Electronic Support
• Electromagnetic spectrum operations

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Convergence of Cyberspace Operations and Electronic Warfare

Porche, et al., “Redefining Information Warfare Boundaries for an Army in a Wireless World,” p.51

Decoding the Jargon: Exploring Terminology Confusion

Terminology

• Information Operation
• Psychological Operation
• Strategic Communications
• Influence Operations
• Perception Management
• Cyber-enable Influence/Information warfare and Manipulation (IIWAM)
• Cognitive Operation
• Political Warfare
• Public Information Warfare
• Public Field Diplomacy
• Information advantage
• Or other similar terms?

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A Recent U.S. NDU Study Says

The United States, and the West, struggle to understand and respond to irregular warfare, whether by states or non-state actors. Attempts to master the art have generated much new jargon, ranging from “hybrid war” to “the gray zone,” and most recently “integrated deterrence.” The terminology belies a struggle to overcome entrenched presumptions about war—a confusion that generates cognitive friction with implications for strategy.

“What's in a name? That which we call a rose/ By any other name would smell as sweet.” 

---- William Shakespeare

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Indian Army Doctrine

• Forms of IW (October 2004, pg 20)
• Command and Control Warfare (C²W)
• Intelligence Based Warfare (IBW)
• Electronic Warfare (EW)
• Psychological Warfare
• Cyber Warfare
• Economic Information Warfare
• Network Centric Warfare (NCW)
• IW battle space deals with physical, information infrastructure and perceptual realms. From IA’s perspective, IW will comprise Cyber Warfare, Psychological Warfare and EW. (November 2010, pg 53)

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• Land Warfare Doctrine, 2018 also states IW consists of EW, Cyber and Psychological Warfare, Page 10.

ELECTRONIC WARFARE (EW)

CYBER WARFARE

Components of Cyber Warfare

• Computer Network Attack (CNA), Computer Network Defence (CND) and Computer Network Exploitation (CNE).

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• Computer Network Exploitation (CNE). CNE uses actions and operations to obtain information that would otherwise be kept classified and is resident on or transiting through an adversary's computer systems or networks. Cyber exploitations are usually covert in nature. They do not seek to disturb the normal functioning of a computer system or network. The best cyber exploitation is one that a user never notices. It is non-destructive.

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• Fundamental difference between a cyber attack and cyber exploitation is the payload's nature to be executed. A cyberattack payload is destructive, whereas a cyber exploitation payload acquires information non-destructively.

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• Intent has to change.

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Cyber Operations Capabilities in Tactical Battle Area�

• Collect intelligence by rapidly exploiting captured digital media.
• Counter and exploit adversaries’ unmanned aerial systems by exploiting data feeds.
• Protect friendly unmanned aerial systems functioning in the area of operations.
• Gaining access to closed networks in or near the area of operations, including extracting and injecting data.
• Using electronic warfare systems as “delivery platforms for precision cyber effects.”
• Exploiting new devices emerging from new trends and opportunities.
• Conducting cyberspace intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance operations.
• Engaging in offensive social media operations.

Psychological Warfare

Findings of the Study

• United States and allied partners have tremendous, unique advantages in the ability to design, build, field and use globe spanning complex systems integrating enormous amounts and varieties of data, platforms, munitions, personnel, doctrines and ways of thinking.

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• Yet governments cannot keep pace with the implications of emerging technologies alone, necessitating an unprecedented public-private partnership in developing new information capabilities.

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• Governments and stakeholders can act now to succeed in the future, by bringing new skills and capabilities to addressing the challenges posed by technological changes and by raising the prominence and importance of developing practical ways to visualise information operations in a way that support field operations, strategic analysis and command decisions.

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Core Challenges of Understanding �and Visualising the Information Domain

• Information space is a chaotic system, in which slight variations in conditions can dramatically impact how information traverses space and time.

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• Any visualisation of this mixture of data points—data from the entire information space that includes mass and social media as well as cultural and socioeconomic networks—must be useful to decision makers at multiple echelons and overlayed onto visualisations of land, air, sea, space and cyber domains.

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• Vast information domain must remain bounded to build effective visualisations.

How do you influence the mind of Opposing Commander

Hostile Social Manipulation

How to Plan- Ask Questions

• What types of information do you want to communicate and how will this help in achieving the goals you have aimed for?
• What categories of target audiences will it help you the most to influence in your intended ways?
• What do you know about the target audiences? What do those audiences want, value, need, fear, etc.?
• What are the favourite means of information sharing and communication among the target audiences?
• How do the target audiences now view the influencer? What are those views based on?
• While pursuing your influence campaign objectives what peer competition, potential allies, and enemies should you keep in mind?
• How will you know which types of information resonate among target audience and how will you adjust your efforts according to that analysis?
• Will you need to disguise the origins of the influence campaign using deception, proxies, and digital influence mercenaries?
• How will you recognise you have achieved your influence goals? What data will you analyse and when will you assess this?

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A typical offensive strategy against a target population may consist of following steps

• Break down population into communities based on number of criteria like hobbies, politics, interests, concerns, needs etc.

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• Find the social dynamics of communication and flow of ideas within each community.

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• Locate who in each community is most susceptible to given types of messages.

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• Find out what narratives of different types lead the discussion in each community.

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• Using all of the above design and push a narrative likely to succeed in displacing a narrative unfavourable to you with one that is more favourable.

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• Use continuous monitoring and interaction to determine the success of your effort and adjust in real time.

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Questions for Oversight. Answering these questions would give a fair idea in which state of preparedness currently we are in.

• What action is MoD taking to inform service members and their families and protect them from misinformation and disinformation by adversary states?
• What steps have been taken to clearly communicate that malinformation generated by service members, civilian employees and contractors is unacceptable and that they will be held accountable should they disseminate such material?
• What can MoD do to educate MoD personnel including military, civilians, contractors and dependents to protect themselves from threat actors who can micro-target them as a result of publicly available information?
• What action is MoD taking to manage the publicly available information of its personnel, units and operations?
• How can MoD improve digital literacy for service members to understand the importance information plays in protecting our country?
• How can MoD develop consistent policies, plans, doctrine and a common lexicon for the Department as a whole?
• What actions can MoD take to ensure that command-and-control decisions are made with timely, accurate and reliable information?
• Should MoD organise the Office of the RM and other MoD components to have centralised or distributed information-based organisations focused on its cyber, electronic, space and information warfare missions and capabilities?
• How do MoD policies and approaches to address threats in the information environment posed by nation-state actors differ from those designed to address non-state actors?
• What actions can MoD take to protect itself from insider threats? What actions can pre-emptively address situations that may lead a service member or other MoD employee to act against its own interests?

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Questions for Oversight. Answering these questions would give a fair idea in which state of preparedness currently we are in.

• What controls can MoD put in place to enhance the cybersecurity of IT systems and networks owned by DRDO, DPSUs, Defence Industrial Base, contractors and civilian companies that MoD relies on for its operations?
• What actions and training can MoD put in place to educate personnel including dependents to understand the operations security or intelligence value of even what may appear to be innocuous postings on social media to protect our personnel and actions?
• What action is MoD taking to inform service members and their families and protect them from misinformation and disinformation by adversary states?
• What steps have been taken to clearly communicate that malinformation generated by service members, civilian employees and contractors is unacceptable and that they will be held accountable should they disseminate such material?
• What can MoD do to educate MoD personnel including military, civilians, contractors and dependents to protect themselves from threat actors who can micro-target them as a result of publicly available information?
• What action is MoD taking to manage the publicly available information of its personnel, units and operations?
• How can MoD improve digital literacy for service members to understand the importance information plays in protecting our country?
• How can MoD develop consistent policies, plans, doctrine and a common lexicon for the Department as a whole?
• What actions can MoD take to ensure that command-and-control decisions are made with timely, accurate and reliable information?
• Should MoD organise the Office of the RM and other MoD components to have centralised or distributed information-based organisations focused on its cyber, electronic, space and information warfare missions and capabilities?

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Questions for Oversight. Answering these questions would give a fair idea in which state of preparedness currently we are in.

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• How do MoD policies and approaches to address threats in the information environment posed by nation-state actors differ from those designed to address non-state actors?
• What actions can MoD take to protect itself from insider threats? What actions can pre-emptively address situations that may lead a service member or other MoD employee to act against its own interests?
• What controls can MoD put in place to enhance the cybersecurity of IT systems and networks owned by DRDO, DPSUs, Defence Industrial Base, contractors and civilian companies that MoD relies on for its operations?
• What actions and training can MoD put in place to educate personnel including dependents to understand the operations security or intelligence value of even what may appear to be innocuous postings on social media to protect our personnel and actions?
• What actions can MoD take to prepare and protect service members, civilian employees, and contractors from falling victim to IW campaigns by malicious actors?
• What is MoD’s plan to ensure long-term commitment to gain EMS superiority and should MoD consider establishing a structure similar to that used in the cyber domain?
• To what extent has the MoD established a comprehensive plan identifying information environment-related personnel requirements and how to fulfill them?
• To what extent does the MoD have visibility on the budgetary resources presently allocated for information environment requirements?
• To what extent has the MoD established a comprehensive plan identifying information environment-related IT requirements and how to fulfill them?
• To what extent has the MoD es¬tablished a plan outlining the priorities for use and protection of the information environment?
• To what extent has the MoD es¬tablished a plan outlining the priorities for training and exercises concerning the information environment?

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ARE YOU SERIOUS?

Ethnography �A typical professional ethnographers does the following

• Learns the local language.
• Works to build rapport with key members of the local community and gains “entry” into that community.
• Spends multiple hours per day for months or even years observing how people go about their everyday business and recording these observations.
• Transcribes and codes these observations into field journals to be used as primary source materials.
• Analyses this data to assess patterns of behaviour.
• Conducts formal and informal interviews with key informants, focus groups or target populations to cross-reference different interpretations and learn the underlying meaning.

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Joint Doctrine for Perception Management and Psychological Operations

Joint Doctrine for Perception Management And Psychological Operations, JP-9 was published by Headquarters Integrated Defence Staff in March 2010.

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Perception Management. The Doctrine says Perception Management comprise the following operations:

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• Public Diplomacy.
• Public Information.
• Information Operations.
• Psy Ops.

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Perception Management is basically undertaken against the foreign audience.

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Psy Ops are conducted against friendly forces and civil population as well as adversary’s forces and hostile people. Psy Ops are public presentation of the truth (not mis-information or propaganda).

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DOTMLPF-P

• DOCTRINE
• ORGANISATION
• TRAINING
• MATERIEL.
• LEADERSHIP AND EDUCATION
• PERSONNEL
• FACILITIES. Infrastructure that supports the daily operations and activities of the Army as an institution.
• POLICY

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Conclusion

Amos Yadlin , Executive Director of Tel Aviv University's Institute for National Security Studies (INSS) and former IDF's chief of Military Intelligence

As a fighter pilot, I have a great deal of respect for airpower but it cannot determine the battle on its own and neither can the cyber realm. It is an important realm, but not one that can replace the physical dimension or combat. With all due respect to the cyber realm at the end of the day, we need soldiers on the mountaintops to finalise matters….. As to the future of the cyber realm, it may be that ‘winter is coming,’ or a Pearl Harbor, but we aren’t there yet.

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How it could be if the cyber realm is such a powerful dimension, that the Russians have already been fighting in Syria for three years and have not yet decided the campaign? How have the Americans been fighting in Afghanistan for 17 years?”

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If you want to keep for civilization that portion of land called home, you still need to be willing to put your sons and daughters in the mud to defend it.

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-- T. R. Fehrenbach

Q & A

ARMY – 1^ST INFORMATION OPS COMD (1^ST IO CMD)

Mission

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1st Information Operations (IO) Command (Land) provides IO support to the Army and other Military Forces through deployable IO support teams, IO reach back planning and analysis, and the synchronization and conduct of Army Computer Network Operations (CNO) in coordination with other CNO and Network Operations stakeholders, to operationally integrate IO, reinforce forward IO capabilities, and to defend Cyberspace in order to enable IO throughout the Information Environment

Cyber and Electromagnetic Operating Context