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Advanced TimeCard and SyncModule for Datacenter & ORAN Synchronization

01/06/22

Nir Laufer nlaufer@adva.com , Oscilloquartz/ADVA

OCP-TAP Project

© 2022 ADVA. All rights reserved. Confidential.

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Agenda

  • Intro to OSA 5400 TimeCard and SyncModule
  • GNSS antenna installtion and operation challenges
  • GNSS assurance
  • Syncjack – Sync probing and assurance
  • Jamming and spoofing detection
  • Holdover challenges

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Introduction to OSA 5400 TimeCard

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OSA 5400 TimeCardTM

      • IEEE 1588 PTP grandmaster/boundary/slave clock
        • Up to 64 unicast clients at 128pps
        • Multiple PTP profiles
        • PTP profiles conversion
      • GNSS receiver (L1 , L1+L5 coming soon)
      • NTP server
      • PTP input as backup to GNSS (APTS)
      • Sync probe (SyncjackTM)
      • GNSS assurance
      • Sync-E In/Out
      • Different variants of oscillators

Comprehensive sync capabilities

Extended holdover, connectors on the front panel and PCIe

SyncModule

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OSA 5400 TimeCardTM for accurately�synchronizing servers

Open compute server featuring PCIe card slots

OSA 5400 TimeCardTM 

Server

Interface

Timing appliance

Interface

Interface

Interface

PCIe bus

GNSS receiver

Oscillator (OCXO/DOCXO/Rb )

PCIe interface

PTP master

PTP probe�PTP slave

PTP BC�NTP server

Server

Server

Storage

Eth (copper)

Eth (fiber )

PPS/CLK

PPS+ToD

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OSA 5400 TimeCardTM

100M/1G copper +PoE Output

GNSS antenna input

PPS+TOD

CH1/CH2 I/O (PPS/CLK)

1G Fiber

Oscillator options: OCXO Qz/OCXO HQ+/DOCXO HQ++/Rb

OSA 5400 SyncModule

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OSA 5400 SyncModuleTM Capabilities

      • IEEE 1588 PTP grandmaster/boundary/slave clock
        • Up to 64 unicast clients at 128pps
        • Multiple PTP profiles
        • PTP profiles conversion
      • GNSS receiver (GPS/GLONASS/BEIDOU/GALILEO/SBAS/QZSS)
      • NTP server (500K TPS)
      • PTP input as backup to GNSS (APTS)
      • Sync probe (SyncjackTM)
      • Sync-E In/Out
      • OCXO based holdover

Comprehensive sync capabilities

    • Low-power solution <2.6W
    • Easily integrated into systems due to M.2 interface
    • Extended temperature range

42mm

22mm

AMC4 RF connector

GNSS Antenna

AMC4 RF connector

PPS/CLK

HDMI-D

1GbE copper

w/o magnetics

M.2 Interface

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OSA5400 TimeCard variants

Power consumption:

  • SyncModule: 2.6W
  • TimeCard Quartz: 6.5W
  • TimeCard Quartz HQ+: 8.5W
  • TimeCard Quartz HQ++:10.5W
  • TimeCard Rubidium: 12.5W

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Why to use PTP directly from TimeCard?

  • Simple and accurate Sync connectivity to external smart antenna (OSA 5405)
  • Accurate way to deliver timing to the application (e.g. ORAN LLS-C3)
  • PTP can be used a local interface to carry time and frequency (instead PPS+ToD)
  • Enable direct Sync probing of PTP traffic by the TimeCard

Copper port

Fiber port

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Precisely synchronizing a wide range of applications

PTP�G.8265.1

PTP/NTP�Enterprise

PTP�G.8275.2

PTP�G.8275.1

2G/3G/4G/5G�FDD

DOCSIS 3.1�Small Cells�APTS

Datacenters

5G/LTE TDD�LTE-A �Small Cells

PTP�broadcast

Professional�broadcast

Power utilities

PTP�Power

Managing and operating transport and synchronization networks

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Supported PTP Profiles

    • 802.1AS-2011
    • AES67 Media
    • SMPTE ST 2059-2

    • IEC-61850-9-3
    • C37.238 2011
    • C37.238 2017

Telecom

Broadcast/Automotive

    • G.8275.1
    • G.8275.2
    • G.8265.1
    • Telecom-2008
    • IEEE1588-2008 Annex F
    • Enterprise

Power

Master/Slave

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Example - 5G Open Radio Access Network

GM

PRTC/ePRTC

DU

BC

BC

CU

Midhaul

Fronthaul

O-RU

C-RAN

O-RAN

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Open-RAN Architecture

LLS-C3 Configuration

T-GM implemented in the fronthaul network to distribute timing to DU and CU

DU

RU

RU

RU

RU

Fronthaul Switches

BC/TC

BC/TC

Sync

O-RAN LLS-C3 Config

T-GM

LLS - Lower Layer Split

Local or remote PRTC source

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OSA5400 TimeCard Open RAN

O-RAN C3 Config

Fronthaul

RU

RU

RU

Sync

DU

Sync

  • ITU-T G.8275.1
  • DU GM

PTP Packets

T-GM

DU

RU

RU

RU

RU

Fronthaul Switches

BC/TC

BC/TC

Sync

O-RAN C3 Config

BC/TC

BC

1G Copper/fiber

OSA 5400 Timecard

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PTP Features

    • Full featured GrandMaster, Boundary Clock and Slave
    • PTP input to backup GNSS outage over network with partial/no timing support
    • VLAN (IEEE 802.1Q) or untagged
    • conversion between PTP profiles
    • Sync-E input to PTP output (frequency) conversion

IEEE1588 PTP

APTS

Conversion

VLAN support

    • Fixed and dynamic asymmetry compensation

Asymmetry compensation

    • Hardware base protection

DoS protection

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NTP Server summary

  • Smallest NTP server formfactor
  • Security-hardened NTP server with Hardware-based responder
  • Stratum 1 NTP server when locked to GNSS
  • NTP v1, v2, v3 ,v4 and SNTP over IPv4 /IPv6
  • Hardware-based timestamping
  • Within +/–100nsec from UTC
  • Hardware base DoS protection using NTP responder
  • Up to 500,000 (TPS) Transactions Per Second
  • Support PTP and NTP on same port
  • PTP to NTP translation
  • PTP backup in case of GNSS outage
  • Stationary or moving platforms

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GNSS Installation

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GNSS installtion challenges

Installing GNSS RF antenna is expensive and complicated

  • Most of the solutions (including TAP TimeCard) are connecting the GNSS receiver over RF cable (e.g. LRM 400)
  • While this may seem simple , installing RF cable can be challenging:
    • The Cable in expansive
    • Cable is thick and hard to maneuver inside the building
    • Cable delay must be known and compensated in the receiver
    • The distance between the GNSS receiver and the antenna is limited (typically needs to be under 150m)
    • Installing GNSS RF cable is complicated and requires expertise
    • Separation of the GNSS receiver from the TimeCard:
      • Optimize GNSS receiver to application (Single vs Multi band , L1+L2 vs L1+L5 etc’)

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Synchronizing sites and applications

Requirements

Simpler installation

Integrated solution

Higher accuracy

GNSS antenna

Coaxial cable

Standard TimeCard

Good enough ?

Optimized solution

OSA 5405-MB

    • Integrated antenna
    • Robust & accurate multi-band receiver
    • Ruggedized design
    • PTP/NTP directly from the smart antenna

PTP (over copper/fiber)

Extended range

OSA 5400 TimeCard

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Simplifying GNSS antenna installation with Smart antenna

COTS (e.g. DU)

PTP Over Copper/Fiber

OSA 5405 Outdoor

NIC

PPS/CLK/ToD

OSA 5400 TimeCard as PTP slave

Recover clock from OSA 5405 and provide it to NIC via PPS/CLK/ToD

PTP+PoE

PTP (G.8275.1) is used a local time transfer between smart antenna and the TimeCard

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OSA 5405 Outdoor Installation

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GNSS Assurance

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GNSS vulnerabilities and threats

GNSS for�timing

Jamming and �spoofing

Obstruction

Interference with�transmitters at adjacent bands

ionospheric disturbance, solar activity

GNSS segment errors

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What is the resilient PNT mandate/standard?

Driven by US federal gov’s executive order 13905 of Feb 2020

  • Protect critical gov & industry infrastructure against PNT disruptions from GPS/GNSS jamming/spoofing & other cyberattacks

  • Define critical infrastructure under national security threats
      • Power grid
      • Finance
      • Transportation
      • Communications (5G, broadcast, defense, etc)
      • Data centers

  • Use published resilient PNT guidelines & standard in progress

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DHS PNT Resilience Levels

End-user select a level based on risk tolerance, budget, application critically

Resilience levels

    • Level 1
      • Support full system recovery
      • Include ability to securely update firmware
    • Level 2
      • Identify compromised PNT sources
      • Support Automatic recovery
    • Level 3
      • Must ensure that corrupted data from one PNT source cannot corrupt data from another PNT source
      • Cross verify between PNT solutions all PNT sources
    • Level 4
      • Ability to operate through any compromising events without degradation to the PNT solution
      • Diversity of PNT source technology to mitigate common mode threats

PNT Sources examples:

  • GNSS receivers, networked and local clocks, inertial navigation systems, timing services provided over wired or wireless connection

Upper-level resilience behavior requires all resilience behavior from lower levels

Verification

PNT source

PNT system

PNT source 2

PNT source 1

PNT system

Verification

Resilience processing

Automatic recovery

PNT source N

PNT source 2

PNT source 1

Verification

Advanced resilience processing

Automatic recovery

PNT system

Architecture requires future development to ensure inclusion of next generation PNT systems

Level 1

Level 2

Level 3

Level 4

Low level receiver is not necessarily better or worse. It simply reflects a level that meets the user’s particular needs

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Multilayer Detection

4: Network Management

3: Device

2: GNSS Receiver

1: GNSS Antenna

Layer 1

Layer 3

Layer 4

Layer 1: GNSS Antenna

    • Use anti-jam/spoof antennas, with threat alarms

Layer 2: GNSS Receiver

    • Use multi-constellation/-band receivers, with jam/spoof & satellite count monitoring, integrated spoof detection and threat alarms
    • Use advanced spoofing detection

Layer 3: Device Level

    • SyncJack to mitigate spoofed GNSS vs PTP signals

Layer 4: Network Management

    • Manage/monitor/compare/verify all network clocks (GNSS/PTP/ etc.) in real-time, with performance threat alarms/analytics

Layer 2 Advanced spoofing detection

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Spoofing methods

    • Low budget attack
      • SDR (Software defined radio)
        • 100$ attack i.e. HackRF+Github SW
    • Hard-take-over
      • Spoofing signal is not aligned with prototype in terms of time and Doppler
      • High-power (>30dB) brute-force attack recognized as strong interference at first and forcing receiver to switch to Signal Acquisition Mode
        • After that receiver lock to the stronger spoof signal
    • High cost of the attack
      • High accuracy signal necessary (offset<500ns)
    • Smooth-take-over attack
      • Generates signal identical to genuine GNSS (time, location, almanac, ephemeris)
      • Increase the power smoothly and receiver lock to spoofer when power is higher
        • Spoof signal is ~4dB higher than prototype
      • Receiver identify synchronous signal as genuine
      • Spoofer may smoothly shift time when device took-over

Asynchronous attack

Synchronous attack

GNSS Spoofer

with GNSS receiver

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Layer 2+ – Device level detection

    • Detect spoofing even if device started under spoofing conditions
    • Detect spoofing attack to the device location
    • Generate dedicated alarm when advanced spoofing detected
    • Detect spoofing attacks with no time jump

Stateless detection

Position discrepancy

Time discrepancy

Alarm

    • Detect multi-constellation and multi-band spoofing attacks

Multi-constellation & Multi-band inconsistencies

    • Detect spoofing attacks started with high power jamming attack

Jamming+spoofing

Jamming / Basic Spoofing detection/ Advanced Spoofing Detection

    • Spoofing mitigation algorithm is able to distinguish signals from satellites and from SDR

Advanced algorithm

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TimeCard PNT Resilience Levels

Level 4 device with ENC Firewall Support

Level 1

Level 2

Level 3

Level 4

    • Ability to operate through compromising events without degradation to the PNT solution
    • Diversity of PNT source technology to mitigate common mode threats

Level 4

PTP

SyncE

GNSS

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Centralized GNSS monitoring and assurance

GNSS Receiver

GNSS Receiver

GNSS Receiver

GNSS Receiver

GNSS monitoring and assurance

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Centralized GNSS monitoring and assurance

GNSS Receiver

GNSS Receiver

GNSS Receiver

GNSS Receiver

GNSS monitoring and assurance

Use ML and AI

Instructions are sent back to the relevant devices (e. go to holdover or switch to backup)

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What data can we get for a GNSS receivers ?

The following data is available from most of the commercial GNSS receivers via API

Can be collected remotely over secured interfaces (e.g. CLI-SSH/SNMPv3)

  • Location :
    • Latitude , Longitude, Altitude

  • Satellites related data
    • SV , Carrier to Noise , Health , Azimuth, Elevation ,AGC

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Blind spot example – customer site

Poor signal from the tower direction

High tower

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Useful data displays

C/No heatmap (indication of directional GNSS signal strength).

Satellites usage heatmap

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Site Analysis – “Bad” Site

Help identify local reception issue

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Site Analysis – “Good ” Site

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GNSS Assurance – GNSS firewall - AI/ML React

Intelligent automated solution for sync quality issues prevention and correction

Key features

  • Utilize AI for automated detection of potential GNSS vulnerabilities
  • Use predictive maintenance to safeguard GNSS signal reception
  • A SW based solution, no additional hardware
  • Allows user to define preventive actions to automatically stop using the GNSS when Alarm (either from NE or from ML/AI on ENC) is raised; the “clear” action can be defined to use GNSS again as Time Clock reference when Alarm is cleared

Benefits

  • Provides a key solution to fight against GNSS cyber attacks
  • Utilize ML/AI for automated optimization and security protection of GNSS
  • Simplifies manual operations in reaction to device and/or ENC reported synchronization alarms

Firewall reference switch triggers

Device Level

AI/ML Level

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Sync Assurance

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Why „In Service“ Sync Assurance is needed ?

In service monitoring sync critical component in NG networks

  • Large number of application are highly dependent on accurate synchronization
  • Making sure synchronization is working as designed is not trivial task
  • Networks are dynamic- PDV, asymmetry and environmental conditions can affect the Synchronization quality
  • Ways to ensure proper synchronization should be integrated into Sync distribution/delivery functions or accompanied by cost effective Sync assurance tools
  • Lab test equipment is too expansive for “in service” installation in multiple locations
  • Other aspects such as power consumption and OSS should also be taken into consideration

Challenges

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SyncJack

  • Collect RAW measurement data
  • Monitor:
      • TIE/TE
      • Const TE
      • TIE/TE (LPF)
      • TDEV
      • MTIE

RAW data.txt file

FTP Server

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Sync probe “Tester” in TimeCard

GNSS/PTP/SYNC-E/PPS/CLK as source

GNSS/PTP/SYNC-E/PPS/CLK as reference

Sync “tester’

TE hardware counters (nsec accuracy)

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Centralized in service Sync monitoring and assurance

TimeCard�Probe

TimeCard�Probe

TimeCard�Probe

TimeCard�Probe

Centralized monitoring and assurance

Raw measurements

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Probing a boundary clock

GM

BC

BC

BC

TimeCard �Probe

Slave

NMS

PTP/Sync-E

TE/TIE/MTIE/TDEV

PTP

Raw measurement

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Probing a slave clock

GM

BC

TimeCard�Probe

Slave

NMS

SUT:

PPS/CLK/BITS/Sync-E

TE/TIE/MTIE/TDEV

Raw measurement

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Probing the network

GM

TimeCard probe

NMS

PTP

Asymmetry / pktSelected2wayTE

PTP

Raw measurement

Network

PTP

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Oscillators and holdover

The “good” the “bad” and the“ugly”

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It can get ugly…

GNSS failure

    • Jamming
    • Antenna breakdown (lightning , cable cut)

Equipment failure

    • Hardware failure

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Long-term Holdover

  • Required in case of long GNSS outage e.g., antenna failure due to lightning
  • Duration : Few hours – 3 days
  • Holdover performance depends on oscillator type

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Will temperature be constant during long holdover?

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Oscillator Types – Aging and Temperature Stability

Temperature Stability

over temp. range

Aging/Day

≤10ppb

≤1ppb

≤0.1ppb

≤0.01ppb

≤0.001ppb

≤1ppb

≤0.1ppb

≤0.01ppb

≤0.001ppb

≤0.0001ppb

OCXO

Rubidium

x2-x10 better Aging Vs Super DOCXO

≤0.0001ppb

Super

DOCXO

X5 better Temperature Stability Vs Rb

Super

DOCXO

Aging compensation using GNSS

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Oscillator Types - Who is the “good” and who is the “bad” ?

Clock Type #

Cost

Temperature range

Temp Stability

Aging/Day

OCXO

Low

(10%)

-40 to 85 C

1-10 ppb

1ppb

Super DOCXO

Medium

(100%)

-40 to 85 C

0.01 ppb

0.05 ppb

Rubidium

A

High

(300%)

-10 to 75 C

0.05 ppb

0.025ppb

Rubidium

B

High

(300%)

-10 to 60C

0.4ppb

0.005ppb

Rb High cost , limited operational temperature and instability under temperature variation

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Testing Holdover in Realistic Conditions

  • The objectives of the test were to measure the real performance of the Super DOCXO Vs Rubidium in lock and in holdover modes
  • Two PTP grand masters were placed in the same oven under same temperature conditions
  • Vendor A with Super DOCXO and Vendor B with Rubidium (Rb market leader)
  • Both devices were connected to the same GPS simulator using a GNSS splitter
  • Both device were powered at the same time and have been locked to GPS for 72 hours before holdover initiated
  • The temperature in the oven varied between 25C to 35C

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Test Setup – The Duel

Super DOCXO

GNSS

Splitter

GNSS RF

GPS

Simulator

Cs Clock

10MHz

Rubidium

Tester

PPS REF

PPS

PPS

Oven

Vendor A

Vendor B

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Temperature Profile

The oven was running the following temperature profile during the entire measurement:

    • 25C for 4 hours
    • Ramp from 25C to 35C at 1.5C/min
    • 35C for 4 hours
    • Drop from 35C to 25C at 1.5C/min
    • Back to #1

25C

25C

4 Hours

35C

25C

35C

1.5C/Min

1.5C/Min

1.5C/Min

4 Hours

4 Hours

4 Hours

4 Hours

1.5C/Min

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TE Test Results – Locked to GPS (25-35C)

Rb output “peaks” during temperature changes

1 Days

Super DOCXO is agnostic to temperature variation

Green – Super DOCXO

Red – Rubidium

Blue – Temperature Profile

35C

25C

35C

1.5C/Min

1.5C/Min

1.5C/Min

1.5C/Min

25C

TE

0nsec

30nsec

30nsec

40nsec

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TE Test Results – Holdover (25-35C)

Rubidium “drift” during temperature changes

300ns

800nse

2 Days

GPS

disconnected

Green – Super DOCXO

Red – Rubidium

TE

0nsec

100nsec

200nsec

800nsec

600nsec

Super DOCXO

is agnostic to temperature variation

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Conclusions

Select the type of oscillator based the expected thermal condition on site

No good or bad – finding the best fit to the application

  • The Rubidium clock tested was very sensitive to temperature variations Vs Super DOCXO
  • The Rubidium clock holdover performance under temperature variations were significantly degraded Vs constant temperature
  • Actual performance under temperature variation is not listed in the datasheet !
  • Test your clocks in realistic holdover scenarios which include temperature variation! Testing in constant temperature is not sufficient!
  • Consider worse case scenarios such as air condition failure or AC hysteresis

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OSA 5400 TimeCard enhancements

Taking the TimeCard to the next level!

  • PTP and NTP directly from the card
  • Simplify GNSS antenna installtion with smart antenna (OSA 5405)
  • Advanced jamming and spoofing detection
  • GNSS assurance
  • Syncjack – sync monitoring and assurance
  • Multiple oscillator/holdover options

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Additional info:

https://www.oscilloquartz.com/en/products-and-services/embedded-timing-solutions/osa-5400-timecard

    • OSA 5400 SyncModule product page:

https://www.oscilloquartz.com/en/products-and-services/embedded-timing-solutions/osa-5400-syncmodule

    • Datasheet:

https://www.oscilloquartz.com/en/resources/downloads/data-sheets/osa-5400-syncmodule

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nlaufer@adva.com

Thank you

IMPORTANT NOTICE

The content of this presentation is strictly confidential. ADVA is the exclusive owner or licensee of the content, material, and information in this presentation. Any reproduction, publication or reprint, in whole or in part, is strictly prohibited. �The information in this presentation may not be accurate, complete or up to date, and is provided without warranties or representations of any kind, either express or implied. ADVA shall not be responsible for and disclaims any liability for any loss or damages, including without limitation, direct, indirect, incidental, consequential and special damages, alleged to have been caused by or in connection with using and/or relying on the information contained in this presentation.�Copyright © for the entire content of this presentation: ADVA.

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OSA5400 SyncModule

Coax

GNSS

GPIOs 1-11, Eth2, Eth3

Timing Diagram

Eth1

M.2 Interface

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OSA5400 TimeCard – Power options

Power – three alternatives

PCI Express 225W/300W High Power Connector

External AC/DC power Converter

PCI-e

All TimeCard variants can be powered-up through PCI-e interface only, if PoE is disabled

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OSA5400 SyncModule Evaluation

Evaluation Board

  • Evaluate SyncModule without hosting device and M.2 interface integration
  • TimeCard Quartz variant as hosting device
  • Use External AC/DC power converter
      • Input 90-264VAC
      • Output 12VDC, max 3.3A
      • AC cable ordered separately

AC/DC power converter

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Management

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Management

Access

    • Remote auth RADIUS
    • Access Control Lists

Secured

    • Backup
    • Config Restore

ENC

    • SNMP v2, v3
    • Alarms, Inventory and traps reporting to NMS

Secure Access

IPv4 IPv6

ENC

Logs

CLI

Backup & Restore

Logs

    • Syslog
    • Alarm log

In-band management

    • IPv4 & IPv6 supported
    • Separate MGMT & PTP IP
    • VLAN support

Communication

    • CLI: Telnet, SSH
    • SW Download: TFTP, SCP

© 2022 ADVA. All rights reserved. Confidential.

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OSA5400 TimeCard – Holdover (constant temperature!)

200ns

400ns

1.1us

1.5us

Quartz

2 hours

3 hours

6 hours

6.5 hours

Quartz HQ+

5 hours

8 hours

16 hours

18.5 hours

Quartz HQ++

14.5 hours

16.5 hours

1.4 days

4.8 days

Rubidium

15 hours

26 hours

2 days

2.3 days

© 2022 ADVA. All rights reserved. Confidential.

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