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�� Maj Gen P K Mallick,VSM (Retd)

New Delhi

10 July 2023

PLASSF: Revolutionising Warfare

through Technical Superiority

https://indianstrategicknowledgeonline.com/

CAVEAT

Chinese Theory of Warfare

• The Era of Mao Zedong (1927–1976): The Curse of the Final War and Active Defence

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• The Era of Deng Xiaoping (1976–1989): A Break from the Final War and a Shift to Local War

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• The Era of Jiang Zemin (1989–2004): Local Wars under High-Tech Conditions

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• The Era of Hu Jintao (2004–2012): Informatized Local Wars.

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• The Era of Xi Jinping (2012–Present): Intelligentized Warfare

Changes in China’s Military Strategy

China’s Leaders and Military Strategy

Strategic Support Force (SSF)

WHY SSF?

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• Before the reforms, the rapid development of the technical proficiencies of Chinese cyber, space and EW forces stood in glaring contrast with the PLA’s stagnant operational structure.
• There was a growing realisation that the PLA’s structure and organisation, not its technological capabilities, had become the primary roadblock facing PLA modernisation efforts.
• Vital organisations responsible for space, cyber and electronic warfare missions were silo-based where operational necessity demanded greater integration of these forces.
• PLA took this opportunity to realign its growing space, cyber and electronic warfare capabilities into a unified force.

��Tasks��

• To provide the PLA with strategic information support through space and network-based capabilities, including communications, navigation and positioning, intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance, and military information infrastructure protection.
• To conduct information operations, including space and counter space, cyber, electromagnetic warfare and psychological operations.
• To convert advanced technologies into military capabilities.
• Enabling PLA power projection.
• Enabling joint operations.

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ORG

CHINA

Network-Electronic Units in Transition

The SSF is largely composed of operational units and organisations from the PLA’s former four “General Departments”

The General Staff Department (GSD), General Armaments Department (GAD), and General Political Department (GPD) units responsible for space, cyber, electronic, and psychological warfare.

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• Cyber.
• Cyber espionage was handled by the Third Department of the former GSD (3PLA). 3 PLA has also been responsible for traditional signals and communications intelligence.
• Cyber offensive elements were handled by the Fourth Department (4PLA)
• Cyber defence. former Informatization Department undertook Defensive aspects.

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• Electronic Warfare

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• The former GSD Fourth Department (4PLA), also known as the Electronic Countermeasure and Radar Department, has been transferred to the SSF.
• Its subordinate electronic warfare brigades have been incorporated into the SSF.

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• Earlier each service and military region (MR) maintained its own Technical Reconnaissance Bureau (TRB), responsible for signals intelligence and cyber espionage.

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Strategic Support Force (SSF)

Staff Department

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Political Works Department

Discipline Inspection Commission

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Space Systems Department

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Network Systems Department

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Logistics Department

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Equipment Department

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Jiuquan Satellite Launch Centre

Taiyuan Satellite Launch Centre

Taiyuan Satellite Launch Centre

Wenchang Spacecraft Launch Site

Xi’an Satellite Control Centre

Satellite Maritime Tracking and Control Dept

Beijing Aerospace Flight Control Center

Satellite Communication Main Station

Satellite positioning �Main Station

Aerospace Reconnaissance bureau

Aerospace Engineering University

China Astronauts Group

Aerodynamic R&D Center

China Nuclear Test Base

3 PLA Signal/Cyber Units & 56/57/58 Rls

4 PLA EW �Brigade & 54 RI

Information Engineering University

311 Base

Space System Department Unit

Network

Systems Department Units

Key Departments and Roles of the SSF

Source: http://www.nids.mod.go.jp/publication/chinareport/pdf/china_report_EN_web_2021_A01.pdf

Units of Network System Department (NSD)

• Responsible for information warfare with the tasks of cyber warfare, electronic warfare (EW), technical reconnaissance and psychological warfare.
• Network Systems Department gives intelligence support to the theater commands by taking advantage of a diverse suite of ground based technical collection assets to provide a common operating picture to geographically dispersed operational units
• SIGINT Operational Bureaus
• Technical Reconnaissance Bureaus (TRB )
• Operational Bureaus and Technical Reconnaissance Bureaus (TRB) are separate.

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ORGANIZATION OF THE OPERATIONAL BUREAUS OF THE �THIRD DEPARTMENT

• 1st Bureau (61786 Unit)—decryption, encryption, information security
• 2nd Bureau (61398 Unit)—US and Canada focus
• 3rd Bureau (61785 Unit)—line of sight radio communications, direction finding, emission control
• 4th Bureau (61419 Unit)—Japan and Korea focus
• 5th Bureau (61565 Unit)—Russia focus
• 6th Bureau (61726 Unit)—no mission given; Wuhan U. network attack and defense center is located in this area of operation
• 7th Bureau (61580 Unit)—some computer network attack and computer network defense, some work on the US network-centric concept, psychological and technical aspects of reading and interpreting foreign languages
• 8th Bureau (61046 Unit)—Western and Eastern Europe, Middle East, Africa, Latin America
• 9th Bureau (unknown Unit)—strategic intelligence analysis/data base management, the most opaque bureau
• 10th Bureau (61886 or 7911 Unit)—Central Asia or Russia, telemetry missile tracking, nuclear testing
• 11th Bureau (61672 or 2020 Unit)—Russia
• 12th Bureau (61486 Unit)—satellites, space-based signals intelligence (SIGINT) collection

Operational Bureaus are separate from the Technical Reconnaissance Bureaus (TRB) under the previous seven military region headquarters. The TRBs of the military regions (MRs) include the following responsibilities

• Beijing MR (66407 Unit)—Russia, along the Inner Mongolian border

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• Chengdu MR (78006 and 78020 Unit)—2 TRBs; English, computer network exploitation operations

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• Guangzhou MR (75770 Unit)—Internet viruses, voice over Internet protocol

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• Jinan MR (72959 Unit)—oversees 670 technical specialists, microwave relay intercepts, Korean, Japanese, English, and other language specialists

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• Lanzhou MR (68002 and 69010 Units)—monitor border military activities

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• Nanjing MR (73610 and 76630 Units)—Western Pacific, Taiwan

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• Shenyang MR (65016 Unit)—Russia, Korea, Japan targets.

LANZHOU MILITARY REGION

• The Lanzhou MR oversees two TRBs. The Lanzhou MR First TRB (68002 Unit) is centered in the southern Lanzhou City‘s Qilihe District. Dai Shemin serves as the bureau‘s political commissar.

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• Unlike other MRs, no subordinate offices under the Lanzhou MR First TRB could be identified. However, the Lanzhou MR‘s Second TRB (69010 Unit) appears to be a play an important and unique role in China‘s SIGINT community.

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• The Lanzhou MR Second TRB is headquartered in Ürümqi‘s Shuimogou village and has its roots in a section of the Third Department‘s Second Bureau based in Xinjiang. It merged with the Xinjiang MR, becoming the Lanzhou MR‘s second TRB in the mid-1980s.

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• It has subordinate offices located in Kashi‘s Shule County, Altay, and Yining that likely monitors Signals Intelligence and Cyber Reconnaissance Infrastructure and military activities along China‘s borders with India, Pakistani, Afghanistan, Tajikistan, Kyrgyzstan, Kazakhstan, Russia, and Mongolia

PLASSF Space Systems Department

• Space Systems Department (SSD) places all major components of China’s space program under a unified command structure.

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• Responsible for nearly all PLA space operations, including space launch and support, space surveillance, space information support, space telemetry, tracking and control and space warfare.

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• Integrates space-related Research, Development and Acquisition, operations and training under a single authority.

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• Already fielded electro-optical (EO), radar and other space-based sensor platforms that can transmit images of the Earth’s surface to ground stations in near-real-time. China is investing heavily in EO, synthetic aperture radar (SAR) and electronic reconnaissance surveillance capabilities.

Electronic Warfare

PLA 3rd Party Team for Information Warfare,�one of four EW divisions on parade

PLA’s Electronic Warfare Aircraft (Y-9G)

Yaogan-30 Signals Intelligence Satellite

Organisation of PLA EMSO Units in SSF and Theater Commands

PLASSF’s Electronic Warfare Capabilities

• PLA’s EW capability almost equivalent to that of developed countries.
• EW equipment has been advanced based on land, sea and air.
• PLA possesses ground-based EW equipment, a wide spectrum of air-based signals intelligence collection and reconnaissance aircraft, unmanned aircraft and some electronic warfare fighter aircrafts.
• Several passive radar operations, synthetic aperture radar satellites, and signals intelligence satellites.
• Chinese army possesses manned electronic aircraft, which are Y-8 or Y9.
• PLA developed 11 types of special air mission flights such as electronic aircraft in which the Army attached electronic warfare equipment into the former Y-8 and Y-9 flight types. The latest one out of 11 types is Y-9JB (Gaoxin-8) electronic intelligence collection, Y-9XZ (Gaoxin-10) electronic/psychological warfare aircraft and Y-9G (Gaoxin-11) electronic warfare reconnaissance aircraft, all of which are the electronically renovated version of the existing Y-9 flights.

DRONES

• China produces 70 percent of all the drones in the world.
• PLA has developed ChiHong-5/7 and stealth UAVs, which can be utilised for electronic warfare.
• Once EW equipment are installed, UAVs would transform into unmanned electronic warfare aircraft

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PLA’s Satellites for Electronic Warfare

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• Chinese army has secured a large number of satellites.
• By utilising optical, communicational, and SAR satellites as Low Earth Orbit and geostationary orbit satellites, PLA has used them for supervising and reconnaissance. The signals intelligence satellites allow it to conduct electronic warfare with satellites.
• The PLA’s signals intelligence satellites are mostly composed of the Yaogan series of satellites. In 2019, the PLA launched the Yaogan-30, a low-Earth orbit satellite which is known to collect signals information by operating a set of three satellites.
• China collects electronic information around the target area using signals intelligence and reconnaissance satellites. SSF is directly in charge of those reconnaissance satellites: the Space Systems Department of the SSF, in particular, manages four Space Launch Bases and satellite Ground Control Centers. It is expected that the signals intelligence collected via satellites would be analysed and evaluated by the electronic warfare units in the SSF.

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Implications for IA

• Importance of electronic warfare aircraft.
• Unmanned electronic warfare aircraft equipped with radar jamming, communication disrupting and more active electronic warfare capabilities will be employed.
• Non-destruction weapons system will be advanced that combatants can achieve military purposes without killing people.
• Electromagnetic pulse (EMP) weapons, high-power micro (HPM) weapons and high-energy lasers (HEL) weapons are good examples of non-destruction weapons.

Future Steps that IA Should Take.

• IA should develop an operational concept based on EW in joint ops scenario. EW should be defined on the grounds of the Soft Kill concept. IA needs to establish and develop the concept of electronic warfare as a means of Soft Kill to cope with electronic warfare with China.
• In response to China’s EW, IA should practice the ways of operations. If the activities of China’s manned electronic warfare flights are expected and detected, then the IA needs to deter and refuse the Chinese army from collecting its electronic intelligence, like radio waves, by quickly turning off major radars and communication devices. IA should develop a countermeasure system against China’s electronic warfare aircraft.
• There are two mechanisms:
• A passive way based on denial devices that prevent the counterpart from gathering its data. Revealing fake radiation when Chinese electronic aircraft fly is one such denial mechanism. In that case, the Chinese aircraft would gain fake information, not the actual radiations of its devices.
• Another active mechanism is based on collecting devices that allow the army to gain the counterpart’s data. Wide-area electronic aircraft and signals reconnaissance satellites are the best examples for collecting devices. The United States developed and renovated the C-130 transport into the EC- 130H (Compass Call), which is known to be a remotely-piloted electronic warfare aircraft. This type of aircraft is capable of distorting and disturbing a counterpart’s electronic signals even from hundreds of kilometers away for operational electric units
• Signals reconnaissance satellites will allow the IA to improve signal collection capability even from space. The army with the satellites can secure electronic signals collection capability for a wider area—the signal information on land, sea, and air of neighboring countries, including Pakistan.

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Cyber Warfare

Components of Cyber Warfare

• Computer Network Attack (CNA), Computer Network Defence (CND) and Computer Network Exploitation (CNE).
• Computer Network Exploitation (CNE). CNE uses actions and operations to obtain information that would otherwise be kept classified and is resident on or transiting through an adversary's computer systems or networks. Cyber exploitations are usually covert in nature. They do not seek to disturb the normal functioning of a computer system or network. The best cyber exploitation is one that a user never notices. It is non-destructive.
• Fundamental difference between a cyber attack and cyber exploitation is the payload's nature to be executed. A cyberattack payload is destructive, whereas a cyber exploitation payload acquires information non-destructively.
• Intent has to change.

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�Xi Jinping’s Speech at the National Cybersecurity and Informatization Work Conference, Beijing, 20 April 2018�

• Without cybersecurity, there is no national security, the economy and society will not operate in a stable manner, and the broad popular messes’ interests will be difficult to guarantee.
• We must establish a correct cybersecurity view, strengthen cybersecurity protection of information infrastructure, strengthen the construction of comprehensive cybersecurity information mechanisms, methods and platforms, strengthen the construction of cybersecurity incident response command capabilities, vigorously develop cybersecurity industries, ensure we move first to strategic passes, and prevent all possible trouble.
• We must implement critical information infrastructure protection responsibilities, as critical information infrastructure operators, sectors and enterprises bear a dominant protection responsibility, controlling departments are to implement their supervision and management responsibilities well.
• We must, according to the law, severely attack online hacking, telecommunications and network fraud, infringement of citizens’ personal privacy and other such unlawful and criminal conduct, sever cyber crime profit chains, continue to create a high-pressure situation, and safeguard the lawful rights and interests of the popular masses.
• We must deeply launch cybersecurity and knowledge technology propaganda and dissemination, and raise the broad popular masses’ cybersecurity consciousness and protection capabilities.

Examples

• Keith Alexander, a former NSA Director, said that the Chinese operations enabled the “greatest transfer of wealth in history.”
• Chinese hackers have done cyber espionage at emerging high-technology advanced manufacturing companies of industries, like semiconductors, biotechnology and aerospace in the U.S., Japan, Europe and Southeast Asia.
• They were interested in the financial information and negotiation strategies of companies in the banking, energy, law and pharmaceutical sectors.
• Chinese hackers stole critical files relating to missile defence, including “the advanced Patriot missile system, and the Navy’s Aegis ballistic missile defence system.”
• The hackers also gathered information on planes, helicopters, and ships, including “the F/A-18 fighter jet, the V-22 Osprey, the Black Hawk helicopter and the Navy’s new Littoral Combat Ship, which is designed to patrol waters close to shore.” These were the weapons on which the United States would rely in a fight with China

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Psychological Operations

PRC Influence Operations

Coordinated at the high level and executed by a range of actors

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• PLA Political Work Department
• United Front Work Department (UFWD)
• International Liaison Department
• The Ministry of State Security (MSS)
• The PLA Strategic Support Force (SSF)
• Members of the former General Political Department, specifically the 311 Base responsible for PLA PSYOP, are now part of new Political Work Department of the PLASSF to unify cyber, EW, and psychological warfare capabilities.

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�Chinese Influence Operations�

• The PLA has emphasized the development of its “Three Warfares” concept—comprised of psychological warfare, public opinion warfare, and legal warfare—in its operational planning since at least 2003.
• The PRC conducts influence operations to achieve outcomes favourable to its strategic objectives by targeting cultural institutions, media organizations, business, academic, and policy communities in the United States, other countries, and international institutions.
• The CCP seeks to condition domestic, foreign and multilateral political establishments and public opinion to accept Beijing’s narratives.
• CCP leaders consider open democracies, including the United States, as more susceptible to influence operations than other types of governments.

Cognitive Domain Operations (CDO)

• Seizing mind dominance in the cognitive domain and subduing the enemy without fighting is the highest realm of warfare.
• CDO actions integrate military, political, economic, public opinion, psychology, legal theory and other means to achieve strategic national security goals that affect a target’s cognition, decision making, and behaviour.
• Emerging technology such as artificial intelligence and big data are key to creating profound advancements in CDO.

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How do you influence the mind of Opposing Commander

Question Marks

��Question Marks�

• PLA has its weaknesses and limitations like limited combat experience, the inadequate capability to conduct joint operations, limited expeditionary capabilities, a new and mostly untested organisational structure and dependence on foreign suppliers for certain critical equipment and materials. PLA is aware of its shortcomings
• Chinese cyber threat is often overstated and not placed into proper context, especially by the Americans. A well known China expert, Greg Austin, draws attention to factors such as:
• Commercial lobbying and attention-seeking by American cybersecurity firms.
• Media environment too receptive to cyberspace intrigues and anti-China rhetoric.
• General lack of knowledge even among the highest decision-makers on the details and conduct of the US’s own cyber espionage and operations against China.

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��Organisational Issues (SSF)�

• It is still not clear how the PLA will integrate the SSF’s cyber operations, which is mostly focused on espionage and offence, with the PLA’s cyber defence mission.
• Does the SSF have the responsibility for the cyber defence of private, civilian and critical infrastructure networks? It is not clear from where the SSF would get the resource in terms of the personnel or capabilities to fulfil this role. The SSF would need to create this capability from scratch.
• The coordination between SSF cyber defence and protection mission and the Ministry of Public Security and Cyberspace Administration of China, both charged with maintaining the security and defence of China’s critical information infrastructure, is not clear.
• To protect critical infrastructure security, China would face challenges in explaining roles and responsibilities and establishing necessary legal, procedural, and technical means of operational coordination and incident response. This would require a lot of maturity and foresight as civilian and military authorities' requirements are sometimes contradictory or overlapping.
• PLA units responsible for operations planning have little experience in anticipating and balancing between the two missions of CNA and CNE. The PLA has not developed a doctrine for the use of force in cyberspace under which consistent judgments can be made in a crisis.
• The PLA will have to decide critical issues about peacetime and wartime targeting, escalation in situations where peacetime and wartime divide is blurred, battlespace prepositioning and the viability and wisdom of utilizing cyber operations to achieve specific strategic military objectives.

Command and Control

• SSF is under the direct command of the CMC rather than being commanded by theatre commands. The SSF will act as a service. It is not clear if the CMC will also treat it as an operational entity or how the CMC will operationalise forces that are under its administrative purview.
• Whether the SSF has a role in ballistic missile defense (BMD). Alternatively, this missions may be assigned to the PLA Rocket Force, which already has a role in missile operations or the PLA Air Force, which have already demonstrated a limited capability in both anti-satellite missiles and ballistic missile.
• Theatre commands will not have operational authority over strategic level cyber units, electronic warfare units or space assets. These capabilities will be commanded directly by the CMC. This is contradictory to the logic that services focus on force construction rather than operations and warfare.
• Effectiveness of China’s SSF in overcoming the PLA’s organisational and technical weaknesses and integrating successfully China’s war-fighting capabilities to fulfill joint operations requirements on the modern battlefield, remains to be seen.
• It is not clear what are the SSF’s precise responsibilities for kinetic counter-space capabilities like ASATs, directed energy weapons, lasers, and how it will coordinate with the PLA Rocket Force to win future informatised warfare.
• The progress of China’s next-generation dual-use innovations like quantum computing, cyber-warfare, space-based ISR, directed energy devises, AI etc.

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��China’s Limitations��

• Hardware and Software. China still needs to depend on foreign corporations in most sub-fields of cyber core technologies. These companies all have core technology in some sub-fields. Eight U.S. companies which China terms “eight King Kongs”: Cisco, IBM, Google, Qualcomm, Intel, Apple, Oracle, and Microsoft, are identified by China’s state-run media as US government proxies that posed a “terrible security threat.”
• Many Chinese experts believe that U.S. companies report to the U.S. government. They also feel that the United States can disrupt or corrupt the functioning of any device with U.S.-made software.
•  Most of China’s personal computers use pirated versions of Microsoft Windows operating systems. The extensive use of illegal software comes from unreliable sources. These pirated systems are harder to keep patched than their legal counterparts.
• Network Management. Compared to U.S., China’s network management can be termed as between underdevelopment and modernity.
• China’s internet is one of the most commonly attacked. China suffered the highest rate of distributed denial of service attacks (DDOS) globally in 2018, averaging over 800 million attacks per day. An increasing percentage came mostly from the U.S., South Korea and Japan. The attacks that targeted government and financial websites mostly outnumbered those on other targets.
• China’s efforts to keep its “Great Firewall” provide indictors of its cyber competence level. The result is mixed. Internet users in China use diverse methods, including virtual private networks (VPNs), proxy servers and mirror sites of blocked pages hosted on U.S. cloud computing services to circumvent censorship.
• Centralised structure of internet governance. It is difficult to disable internet in countries where different internet providers operate networks. It is much easier to paralyse the Chinese internet through sophisticated attacks.

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• Industrial Control Systems (ICS). China's Industrial Control Systems (ICS) are exposed to damaging attacks. Over 80% of China's economy and critical infrastructure involve some type of industrial control system. These systems are vulnerable to attack due to :
• Operators have low security awareness and ICS are connected to the internet.
• Chinese industry is heavily reliant on foreign suppliers for ICS and these suppliers have access to service or update software.
• Space. China’s space systems face a variety of potential threats. China’s greater reliance on space brings increased vulnerability. The countries that are developing counter space capabilities could threaten Chinese satellites.
• Thinking on offensive aspects. China tends to inflate the effectiveness of cyber weapons. Chinese military experts overemphasise the positive benefits of offensive Information Warfare while downplaying the limitations. This selective analysis can adulterate the decision-making process.
• China’s integrated air-defense systems; maritime intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance systems and dual-use networks would be “obvious targets” for cyber operations in the event of a conflict.
• China's writings on information warfare show a lack of thorough research and analysis on its use and consequences.
• Chinese operational research on cyber warfare has also not reached a sufficient level of sophistication.

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Emerging Technologies

PLA and Emerging Technologies

• National Defense White Paper China’s National Defense in the New Era (NDWP 2019), published in July 2019 states: “Driven by the new round of technological and industrial revolution, the application of cutting-edge technologies such as artificial intelligence (AI), quantum information, big data, cloud computing and the Internet of Things (IoT) is gathering pace in the military field.”
• PLA recognises that military use of such state-of-the-art technologies holds the key to the outcome of future warfare. Adopting the new trend for military revolution may enable the PLA to overtake [the U.S. forces] at the bend.
• China’s private sector, led by Internet companies Baidu, Alibaba, and Tencent and telecommunications equipment manufacturers Huawei and Zhongxing Telecommunications Company Ltd. (ZTE), is driving the development of emerging technologies, such as facial recognition and 5G, by establishing innovation centers and funding technology startups.
• PRC is pursuing a number of advanced military capabilities with disruptive potential such as hypersonic weapons, electromagnetic railguns, directed energy weapons, and counter space capabilities.

PLA’s Warfighting Theory and Doctrine fully Capitalise on Disruptive Technologies

• Researchers at the China Academy of Sciences developed an early version of an AI- powered decision-support system that the PRC Ministry of Foreign Affairs is field-testing with its diplomats.
• PRC is pursuing potential military applications of some emerging technologies include :
• AI and Advanced Robotics: enhanced data exploitation, decision support, manufacturing, unmanned systems, and command, control, communications, computers, intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (C4ISR).
• Semiconductors and Advanced Computing: enhanced cyber operations and weapons design, and shortened R&D cycles.
• Quantum Technologies: secure global communications, enhanced computing and decryption capabilities, undersea target detection, and enhanced submarine navigation.
• Biotechnology: enhanced warfighter selection and performance, advanced human-machine teaming.
• Hypersonic and Directed Energy Weapons: global strike and defeat of missile defense systems, anti- satellite (ASAT)/missile/ unmanned aircraft system capabilities.
• Advanced Materials and Alternative Energy: improved military equipment and weapon systems.

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�2017 National Artificial Intelligence Plan describes steps for China to become the “World’s major AI innovation center” by 2030 �

• China is expected to more than double its investment in the technology to nearly $27 billion by 2026, accounting for 8.9% of global AI investments.
• During 2021, China produced about one-third of AI journal papers and AI citations worldwide
• Currently engaged in a big push to develop its own large language models (LLMs), with nearly 80 launched over the last three years,
• Using AI to process information from sources including unmanned systems, satellites and undersea sensors surrounding China for the purposes of surveillance and military planning.
• Of the 12 major military applications of AI that China is developing, at least five are integral to the SSF’s mission: intelligent satellites, intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR) software, automated cyberattack software, cognitive electronic software and possibly autonomous vehicles.
• In 2019, scientists in the PRC claimed to have developed a human brain-computer interface to send targeting information directly to a search-and-rescue drone. A separate group of scientists claimed to have developed a brain-computer interface that enabled human-thought control of a rat in a maze, signifying China’s interest advanced human-machine teaming technologies.
• Other plans address the development of various sectors of China’s robust Internet ecosystem, including cloud computing, big data, e-commerce and next-generation broadband wireless communications networks, including fifth-generation (5G) wireless networks.
• Since at least 2019, PLA researchers have called on the PLA to improve their big data, natural language processing, and deep learning capabilities in order to improve its ability to create deep fakes, disseminate propaganda and analyse internet users’ sentiments.

Quantum Technology

• China conducted the first quantum-secured intercontinental videoconference in September 2017 and plans to have a satellite-enabled, global, quantum-encrypted communications capability operational by 2030.
• China is also building the world’s largest quantum research facility in the city of Hefei.
• China already has a 2,000 km secure quantum communication ground line between Beijing and Shanghai and plans to expand the line across China.
• PRC has two leading quantum communications start-up companies, Quantum CTek and Anhui Qasky. Quantum CTek, which had its initial public offering in June 2020, is becoming one of the largest manufacturers in the commercial quantum-communications technology sector.

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China’s Lines of Effort for ‘Innovative 5G Applications in the ‘14th Five-Year Plan for National Informatization’

PLA’s Weakness

• Lacks experience, trust, cross domain comn needed to effectively conduct joint and combined ops.
• Empowering soldiers at the lowest tactical levels. Rigid structure of PLA and conformist nature of communist political system and society do not promote or reward tactical initiative and rapid adaptation.
• Logistics.
• Allies, partners and global posture China has only one formal alliance North Korea.
• Long history of corruption and coup proofing.
• Lead to promotions based on political loyalty rather than competency.
• Lack of trust in junior leaders, lack of tactical initiative, aversion to speaking truth to power, ineffective decision making due to less candid discussion during planning process.
• Regime security overrides national security.
• One child policy weakens military strength. Casualties cause many families to lose their only child resulting demoralisation of population.

What Can India Do

• Gain and maintain software advantage. Quality of software will determine our primacy in collecting and analysing information, developing operating picture, thwarting enemy attacks, identifying opportunities in time and space to most effectively attack and helping with target selection.
• Constellation of low cost space based assets can play a critical role in defending against missile attack particularly hypersonic missiles.
• Create a career field of military pers for software developers, data scientists, AI engineers.
• Ensure resilience in our ability to sense, communicate, attack and supply.
• Undermine adversary’s censorship system.
• Undermine adversary command system.
• Evolve deliberate war planning.
• Implement public private partnership model between the government, industry, academia, investors and civil society.

Recommendations

Recommendations

• Strength of Army. 20 Lakh 35 thousand. PLA Army 9,65000, PLAN 2,60,000, PLAAF 3,95,000,PLARF 1,20,000, SSF 1,45,000, Others 1,50,000.
• Read, study China. Read Taiwan, Japan, South Korea, Singapore, Vietnam
• OSINT
• Jugad
• Talent Management
• Synergy
• Acquisition of Niche Technology
• Budget.
• Emerging Tech
• War Game
• Language
• Tech is important, so is trench. Trench will never go out of fashion.
• Enemy has a say

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OSINT

Courtesy: Brig Anshuman Narang

Recommendations

• Strength of Army. 20 Lakh 35 thousand. PLA Army 9,65000, PLAN 2,60,000, PLAAF 3,95,000,PLARF 1,20,000, SSF 1,45,000, Others 1,50,000.
• Read, study China. Read Taiwan, Japan, South Korea, Singapore, Vietnam
• OSINT
• Jugad
• Talent Management
• Synergy
• Acquisition of Niche Technology
• Budget.
• Emerging Tech
• War Game
• Language
• Tech is important, so is trench. Trench will never go out of fashion.
• Enemy has a say

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JUGAD

• Delta provides a comprehensive understanding of the battle space in real time, integrates information about the enemy from various sensors and sources, including intelligence on a digital map, does not require additional settings and can work on any device—laptop, tablet or even on a mobile phone. Delta is a modern real-time command map and troop control center.

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• Delta has ties into the NATO system, which draws data from both commercial and classified government systems. Delta uses AI developed by Palantir to analyse and send the data to the user speedily.

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• Ukrainian coders have created for ground commanders a field-expedient, inexpensive version of the Pentagon’s ambitious Joint All-Domain Command and Control (JADC2) system.

DELTA COMMAND AND CONTROL SYSTEM OF UKRAINE ARMY

GIS Arta, shorthand for Geographic Information System of Artillery

Recommendations

• Strength of Army. 20 Lakh 35 thousand. PLA Army 9,65000, PLAN 2,60,000, PLAAF 3,95,000,PLARF 1,20,000, SSF 1,45,000, Others 1,50,000.
• Read, study China. Read Taiwan, Japan, South Korea, Singapore, Vietnam
• OSINT
• Jugad
• Talent Management
• Synergy
• Acquisition of Niche Technology
• Budget.
• Emerging Tech
• War Game
• Language
• Tech is important, so is trench. Trench will never go out of fashion.
• Enemy has a say

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Talent Management

ERIC SCHMIDT IN DEFENSE INNOVATION BOARD MEETING, ON U.S. TECHNOLOGY TALENT RECRUITMENT

“The talent is there, but I have a feeling they’re not coming to you. Trying not to be blunt . . . Why aren’t they coming to the Department of Defense? There is the obvious money problem. Silicon Valley artificial intelligence specialists are paid salaries up into the millions and tech giants are increasingly competitive as they vie against each other to recruit the best and the brightest in hard to fill technological fields. This has turned the current civilian technology arms race into a race for human talent, which is far more scare than either data or computing power.”

Recommendations

• Strength of Army. 20 Lakh 35 thousand. PLA Army 9,65000, PLAN 2,60,000, PLAAF 3,95,000,PLARF 1,20,000, SSF 1,45,000, Others 1,50,000.
• Read, study China. Read Taiwan, Japan, South Korea, Singapore, Vietnam
• OSINT
• Jugad
• Talent Management
• Synergy
• Acquisition of Niche Technology
• Budget.
• Emerging Tech
• War Game
• Language
• Tech is important, so is trench. Trench will never go out of fashion.
• Enemy has a say

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​

​

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Recommendations

• Strength of Army. 20 Lakh 35 thousand. PLA Army 9,65000, PLAN 2,60,000, PLAAF 3,95,000,PLARF 1,20,000, SSF 1,45,000, Others 1,50,000.
• Read, study China. Read Taiwan, Japan, South Korea, Singapore, Vietnam
• OSINT
• Jugad
• Talent Management
• Synergy
• Acquisition of Niche Technology
• Budget.
• Emerging Tech
• War Game
• Language
• Tech is important, so is trench. Trench will never go out of fashion.
• Enemy has a say

​

​

​

​

​

​

Recommendations

• Strength of Army. 20 Lakh 35 thousand. PLA Army 9,65000, PLAN 2,60,000, PLAAF 3,95,000,PLARF 1,20,000, SSF 1,45,000, Others 1,50,000.
• Read, study China. Read Taiwan, Japan, South Korea, Singapore, Vietnam
• OSINT
• Jugad
• Talent Management
• Synergy
• Acquisition of Niche Technology
• Budget.
• Emerging Tech
• War Game
• Language
• Tech is important, so is trench. Trench will never go out of fashion.
• Enemy has a say

​

​

​

​

​

​

Recommendations

• Strength of Army. 20 Lakh 35 thousand. PLA Army 9,65000, PLAN 2,60,000, PLAAF 3,95,000,PLARF 1,20,000, SSF 1,45,000, Others 1,50,000.
• Read, study China. Read Taiwan, Japan, South Korea, Singapore, Vietnam
• OSINT
• Jugad
• Talent Management
• Synergy
• Acquisition of Niche Technology
• Budget.
• Emerging Tech
• Language
• Tech is important, so is trench. Trench will never go out of fashion.
• Enemy has a say

​

​

​

​

​

​

Conclusion

Amos Yadlin , Executive Director of Tel Aviv University's Institute for National Security Studies (INSS) and former IDF's chief of Military Intelligence

As a fighter pilot, I have a great deal of respect for airpower but it cannot determine the battle on its own and neither can the cyber realm. It is an important realm, but not one that can replace the physical dimension or combat. With all due respect to the cyber realm at the end of the day, we need soldiers on the mountaintops to finalise matters….. As to the future of the cyber realm, it may be that ‘winter is coming,’ or a Pearl Harbor, but we aren’t there yet.

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How it could be if the cyber realm is such a powerful dimension, that the Russians have already been fighting in Syria for three years and have not yet decided the campaign? How have the Americans been fighting in Afghanistan for 17 years?”

Q & A