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Rent Regulation and Housing Supply: Economists’ Views (2/5/22)

Steve Malpezzi

sjmmad@gmail.com

http://reudviewpoint.blogspot.com/

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Introduction

My perspectives are those of an outside economist, broadly familiar with, but not deeply expert in, Scottish and UK housing markets and policy.
I have undertaken studies of rent controls and related subjects in a range of countries; Turner and Malpezzi (2003) is a good place to start.
In preparing these remarks I have benefited enormously from:

Scottish Government’s A New Deal for Tenants.
Video contributions and papers by colleagues including but not limited to Ken Gibb, Duncan Maclennan, Steve Pomeroy and Christine Whitehead.
Recent research; a list of citations is available in the PowerPoint accompanying these remarks, available upon request.

Comments and corrections are most welcome. Contact me at sjmmad@gmail.com.

Thank you for the opportunity to address the Scottish Housing Policy Conference. I’m an economist by training and I’ve studied rent controls and related issues for about 40 years in a range of countries. I’m broadly familiar with housing markets in Scotland and the United Kingdom but I’m not an expert. My role today is to bring some outside perspectives to the discussion of potential changes in rent regulations in Scotland.

This is a brief video, and rent control is a complex subject. There are literally hundreds of academic papers on the subject and hundreds more policy and advocacy documents. I have a few slides I’ll present, and I have a somewhat larger version of this which is available upon request.

The larger version includes sources and recommended readings. I strongly recommend you read some of the excellent recent reviews of controls, especially those by Ken Gibb and his associates, and by Christine Whitehead and Peter Williams.

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Today’s discussion

Some current events
Economists’ views on rent controls
Economists’ views on housing supply
Lessons, questions, next steps?
Sources and further reading

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Today’s discussion

Some current events
Economists’ views on rent controls
Economists’ views on housing supply
Lessons, questions, next steps?
Sources and further reading

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It's easy to find

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Kettunen and Ruonavaara (2021) classify 33 European rent regimes, circa 2017

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Source: Malpezzi (2022)

I recently published a paper for Contemporary Economic Policy that reviewed how housing markets reacted in the first year of the Pandemic. This chart shows that the United Kingdom (denoted GBR in the chart) had a fairly modest increase in rents, both in the year before the pandemic and in the in the first year of the pandemic.

I haven’t charted more recent data yet, but I have examined it, and to my knowledge aggregate UK rent growth has remained fairly modest in the second year of the pandemic.

Figure 3 presents OECD-collated data on year-on-year growth rates in rents as of fourth quarter 2020 instead of the last month of 2020. Because there is wide variation in inflation rates across countries, Figures 3 through 6 present growth rates adjusted for country-level inflation.

This sample of 40 countries is diverse, but it is not rigorously globally representative. Most of the data comes from high-income countries although China, Colombia, Chile, Mexico, South Africa, and Turkey are included in the sample. Five diverse locations are highlighted: the U.S., China, South Korea, the United Kingdom and South Africa. The wide variation in these 40 national estimates of growth in real rents is obvious.

The fastest growth in real rents was 4.4 percent in Austria; Belgium, Portugal, Greece, Lithuania and the Netherlands were also around 2 percent during the Pandemic year. At the other extreme, Latvia, Slovenia, Russia, Turkey and Estonia show real declines 3 percent or more. The unweighted average of the 40 countries is near zero (0.1 percent). There is no obvious serial correlation in these real rental growth rates, with only 0.2 percent of the variation in the Pandemic year’s rents “explained” by the previous year’s growth rate.

Data are from https://data.oecd.org/price/housing-prices.htm. Three-letter ISO country codes can be found at https://www.nationsonline.org/oneworld/country_code_list.htm. The data used in these figures is available upon request.

In our country sample, inflation rates (based on CPIs) varied from 14 percent inflation in Turkey to a price decline of 2 percent in Greece. Ideally in Figures 3 through 6 we would use price indexes net of shelter. but these are not readily available, so we follow OECD’s practice, using their data on CPIs for each country.

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This BoE forecast is for England, not Scotland,�but gives pause

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Today’s discussion

Some current events
Economists’ views on rent controls
Economists’ views on housing supply
Lessons, questions, next steps?
Appendices
Sources and further reading

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Rent control: a common view of economists

The theoretical analysis of rent control rests on some principles which are quite elementary, indeed distressingly so. They are so obvious that one would feel the greatest reluctance to repeat them in a professional journal were it not that a great public policy has been erected upon either ignorance or a repudiation of them.
Grampp (1950)

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Rent control: a more nuanced view?

In recent years, however, there has been a wave (or at least a swirl) of revisionism among housing economists on the subject of rent control. While few actually advocate controls, most are considerably more muted and qualified in their opposition. Perhaps a majority, at least among the younger generation, would agree with the statement that a well-designed rent control program can be beneficial.
Arnott (1995)

Real-world rent controls and their collateral regulations are often complicated things, and sometimes the simple textbook analysis is insufficient. The best point of entry into the next level of economic analysis is a classic 1995 paper by my friend Richard Arnott.

Richard and perhaps a dozen other housing economists began to study rent controls in more details in the 1980s and 1990s and found that, especially from a theoretical perspective, the simple supply and demand model, while a great starting point, can fail to incorporate important features of actual controls.

I’ve taken this quotation from his classic paper. I heartily agree with the first sentence. I think the second sentence is also a fair statement. I think the third sentence is a little strong. For what it’s worth. let’s have a quick look at a recent poll of leading economists.

The Modern History of Rent Control

Rent controls are often instituted in response to a major economic or political shock which limits the responsiveness of the housing market. Most European nations introduced rent control during World War One, only to liberalize in the inter-war years. Controls were re-introduced in World War Two in Europe, North America, and, under European colonial influence, the developing world as well. Most jurisdictions in the U.S. and Canada removed controls in the post war years; however, controls were maintained in Europe and the developing world. Many European nations adopted a post-war goal of guaranteeing housing to all individuals, and rent control was often used as a mechanism to ensure affordability. In less developed countries, the post-war years saw a rapid increase in the rate of urbanization. Local housing markets were frequently deemed unable to adjust with sufficient speed, and it was argued in some countries that rent control was required to keep local rents from rising to prohibitive levels.

In the 1970's many industrialized nations reintroduced controls or slowed the decontrol process. High inflation and (for some) falling real incomes led to a series of wage and price controls--and a "second generation" of rent controls was included in the package. In developing countries, it has been hypothesized that a combination of increased demand (from rapid urbanization) along with falling real incomes and general inelasticity of supply has contributed to pressure for controls. These hypotheses will be investigated later in this chapter.

These two "generations" of controls summarize the two most common reasons for the introduction of rent control: a rapid increase in the demand for housing and a general increase in inflation. Rent controls have also been maintained to meet a third goal: a governmental commitment to housing as a basic right, and the use of rent control to ensure affordability.

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Chicago Booth/IGM Forum �economists’ opinion poll on rent control

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Textbook model of rent control: a price ceiling is like a tax on housing capital. At the lower price, demand increases to Q^RC2 but supply decreases to Q^RC1, leading to a shortage.

Chart from Gibb Soaita and Marsh (2021)

Thanks to Ken Gibb and colleagues, here’s the familiar standard representation of the textbook model of rent controls that predicts reduced rent but at the cost of a shortage of rental housing.

Chart from Gibb Soaita and Marsh (2021)

In this first, simplest version of a market, we simplify by only looking at an isolated rental market, where all units are the same. (Other models relax these assumptions but we need not consider that here.)

In an uncontrolled market, landlords would supply Q* units at price P*.

Suppose controls are imposed that lower rents to P*. (Under the assumption that all units are the same, we’re abstracting from the possibility that landlords could allow units to deteriorate, reducing the effectiveness of controls. We can relax that assumption later).

At the lower rent, with a downward-sloping demand curve, more households want to rent (move to our city, or form new households, or move from other sectors like owner-occupation. We don’t worry about the sources for the moment). At the controlled price, households demand QRC2 units.

But suppliers (landlords) work off their supply curve, and at the lower price PRC they only supply QRC1. There’s a shortage of rental units, as drawn (QRC2 minus QRC1). And compared to an uncontrolled market, supply has fallen by (Q* minus QRC1).

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Arnott’s (1995) critique of the “standard” view

The standard view focuses on comparative static analysis of a “first generation” rent freeze in a competitive market.
“Second generation” control regimes, which allow but limit increases, may be less draconian in their effects.

Arnott argues that housing markets are imperfectly competitive.
Allowable increases may be related to inflation, cost pass-throughs, allowances for landlord hardship, provision of fair rates of return. New construction may be treated differently than existing units. Details will matter.
Units may re-price, at market or a higher controlled price, when vacant. Recent literature sometimes refers to these separately as “third generation” controls.

Arnott also notes that rent controls are often coupled with regulations on security of tenure, which further complicate analysis.
Arnott’s bottom line is not that second generation controls are per se desirable, but that “second-generation controls should be judged on the empirical evidence and, since the programs are so varied, on a case-by case basis.”

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Alternative adjustment mechanisms which can equilibrate a notionally controlled market

Markets must adjust in some fashion in a long run, given alternative opportunities for landlords and a housing stock of limited durability.
Four of the adjustments can be embodied in rent control laws:

indexing (keeping real rents constant)
reassessment for new tenants,
differential pricing of new and existing units,
differential pricing for upgraded units.

Four are market responses

outright evasion
side payments such as “key money”
adoption by tenants of maintenance expenditures,
accelerated depreciation and abandonment,
distortions in consumption, not only in the composite housing services but also crowding, length of stay, mobility and tenure choice.

There many variations on the theme, many disparate elements that make up any particular second generation rent control system. In the end markets do adjust in some fashion; there are a number of ways this can happen:

Rents can be indexed,
Rents can be reset whenever tenants turn over.
There can be differential pricing of new and existing tenants for example when new units are exempt from controls in their in similar fashion there can be differential pricing for upgraded units.
Tenants can pay (usually illegal) side payments sometimes refer to as key money.
Tenants can take on maintenance and other expenditures that are traditionally paid by landlord.
Inadequately maintained units can depreciate rapidly and eventually be abandoned.
And of course if enforcement is not effective some landlords will simply evade the rules.
The final type of adjustments is a little jargon-y, but basically notes that in a market where you have a controlled unit you may trade off a lower rent for some sub-optimal size or quality of unit, you may be in a location that limits your employment prospects or forces you into a longer commute.

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Kholodilin (2022) surveys some of the empirical literature on the direction of some rent control effects

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Today’s discussion

Some current events
Economists’ views on rent controls
Economists’ views on housing supply
Lessons, questions, next steps?
Sources and further reading

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Three broad ways to categorize sources of supply

Tenure: own or rent?

More complex: what is the bundle of property rights, e.g. what sort of tenure security/lease provisions do renters enjoy?
Own structure on leased land?

Public, private, or something in between?

Public, e.g. council or local authority housing
Private
Social housing; housing supplied by non-profit, non-governmental entities

New construction, or the existing stock?

New construction
Maintenance, upgrading/remodeling
Conversions from one form to another, e.g. convert rental units to condominiums; or subdivide a large house to multiple apartments

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Let’s take a look at new construction with some simple exploratory data analysis. The next two figures, from a blog entry on rent controls in the U.S. (Malpezzi 2017) plot housing permits per 1000 population, and population growth rates, for two samples of metro areas: uncontrolled metro areas, and metro areas whose principal city has some form of rent control.

It’s often asserted that rent controls will reduce housing supply. What do simple descriptive data tell us about that? The next two Exhibits examine building permits per thousand population, a simple measure of new housing supply, as a function of metropolitan population growth.

Exhibit 3 shows a fairly strong correlation between population growth and building permits; about 84 percent of the variation in permits per thousand is associated with population growth. For every 1 percentage point increase in population growth, building permits per thousand go up by about 2.7. At a population growth rate of zero, the regression predicts a location will still be building about 2.2 units per thousand. At 1 percent population growth, developers build an average of about 5 units per thousand, at 2 percent about 7.7 units per thousand, at 3 percent about 10.4 per thousand, and at 4 percent growth about 13 per thousand.

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Notice the intercept (or baseline level of per capita permits) and coefficient (whether permits keep up with population growth) and R2 (how strongly these things are correlated) are all higher for the uncontrolled markets.

So at least in the U.S., rent controlled markets build less housing per capita. That’s interesting, but we should remember that these simple plots don’t control for anything except population and the presence of controls. Among other things, we’re not yet controlling for other determinants of supply, including land use and development regulations, about which more shortly.

Turning now to our small sample of rent controlled metropolitan areas and divisions in Exhibit 4, we do see lower housing production, conditional on population growth. This time only about 48 percent of the variation in permits per thousand is associated with population growth. For every 1 percentage point increase in population growth, building permits per thousand go up by about 1.9 (compared to 2.7 above). At a population growth rate of zero, the regression predicts a location will still be building about 1.9 units per thousand, not too much of a reduction from 2.2 we found in Exhibit 3. But the gap increases as population growth increases. At 1 percent population growth, developers in controlled markets build an average of about 3.9 units per thousand (compared to 5 above), at 2 percent about 5.9 units per thousand (compared to 7.7), at 3 percent about 7.9 per thousand (compared to 10.4), and at 4 percent growth about 9.9 per thousand (compared to 13).

To reiterate, we point out again that the simple two-way plots are far from the last word. The charts presented here are simple measures of association. There purely descriptive, they don’t “prove” that rent control causes any increase or decrease in rents or housing construction. Correlation is not causality is drummed into every student of economics or statistics, and for good reason. Nevertheless, examining such descriptive patterns is always a good starting point for examining any important question.

Taking these exploratory results at face value for the moment, controlled markets don’t seem to exhibit lower rent-to-income ratios than uncontrolled markets; if anything they are larger. U.S. markets which are controlled do have some new construction; other research has split this out into building for rental units versus for homeowners and have occasionally found increases in rent control stringency pushing more construction into the homeowner sector, which would be no surprise.

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Malpezzi (1996): Rent control and reduced per capita housing building permits across 58 U.S. metropolitan areas

Taken together, changing state and metro level land use variables from first to third quartile values, and adding rent control, reduces normalized building permits by 42 percent.

For some insights here we can turn to a paper 1996 paper where I developed some measures of several land use and development regulations for U.S. metro areas, including a very simple dummy variable for the presence of rent controls.

The non-rent control measures were based on metro and state level information on things like the time required for regulatory approvals, what sort of state environmental rules were in place, and so on.

This table presents the basic regression for metro-level building permits, normalized by population. The key result for our purposes is that, even after controlling for other development regulations, metro areas with rent controls had lower total housing construction.

In a second state, I defined an arbitrary “lightly regulated” city and a “heavily regulated city.” This was done by calculating the first quartile of regulatory indices SREG1, REGTEST and REGSQ, as well as the third quartile; for the lightly regulated first quartile, RCDUM was set to zero. For the heavily regulated third quartile, RCDUM was set to one.

Taken together, changing state and metro level land use variables from first to third quartile values, and adding rent control, reduces normalized building permits by 42 percent.

S. Malpezzi, Housing Prices, Externalities and Regulation in U.S. Metro Areas, Journal of Housing Research, 1996

Objective: Cost-Benefit Analysis

Are planners biased towards benefits?

Are economists biased towards costs?

Measuring Regulation by MSA

Index based on answers to the following:

Recent changes in approval time for single family housing development

Time required for rezoning and permitting for a small residential subdivision

Ditto, for a large subdivision

Single family zoning, compared to demand

Multifamily zoning, compared to demand

Percent of zoning changes approved

Index of adequate infrastructure (roads and sewers)

Index values range from 7 (permissive) to 35 (most stringent)

Other indexes constructed for state regulations, rent control.

Define an arbitrary “lightly regulated” city and a “heavily regulated city”

We use moving from the first quartile of regulatory indices to the third quartile.

Infinitely many other changes can be simulated

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Caldera and Johansson: Price responsiveness of housing supply and speed of supply response for 21 OECD countries

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Caldera and Johansson: Cross-country correlation between supply responsiveness, and number of days required to obtain a building permit

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Except in the very long run, most housing – especially most affordable* housing – comes from the existing stock

Some rough back-of-the-envelope comparisons (neglecting annual volatility, vacant and second homes, etc.):

In the U.S., new construction is generally 1-3% of the total stock in any given year. Nationally, it’s rare to hit near 2 percent in a boom year.
In China, roughly 15M housing units are built every year in a country with 500M units of existing stock, i.e., new construction is around 3 percent or so.
The UK builds about 200K housing units per year for 28M households, or about 0.7 percent of the existing stock.

Scotland builds under 25K units annually, compared to about 2.4 million households; this comprises about 1 percent of the existing stock.
Outside of public production programs most affordable housing comes from “filtering.”

As homes age, they often “filter down” to become affordable housing.
NB filtering can work in both directions (see gentrification). Many studies suggest most filtering is downward, not upward but this can vary by country/market.

*Definitions of affordable differ. See Meen (2018)

Next let’s note that new construction is important, but that except in the very long run, most housing – especially most affordable* housing – comes from the existing stock. Some rough back-of-the-envelope comparisons (neglecting annual volatility, vacant and second homes, etc.):

In the U.S., new construction is generally 1-3% of the total stock in any given year. Nationally, it’s rare to hit near 2 percent in a boom year.
In China, roughly 15M housing units are built every year in a country with 500M units of existing stock, i.e., new construction is around 3 percent or so.
The UK builds about 200K housing units per year for 28M households, or about 0.7 percent of the existing stock.
Scotland builds under 25K units annually, compared to about 2.4 million households; this comprises about 1 percent of the existing stock.

Outside of public production programs most affordable housing comes from “filtering.”

As homes age, they often “filter down” to become affordable housing.

Filtering can work in both directions. Upward filtering is called gentrification. Many studies suggest most filtering is downward, not upward, but the degree of each can vary by country/market.

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Today’s discussion

Some current events
Economists’ views on rent controls
Economists’ views on housing supply
Lessons, questions, next steps?
Sources and further reading

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A few questions

A New Deal for Tenants mentions several important topics in passing:

Housing benefit/allowances
Planning, land use and development regulations
Measuring costs and benefits of controls, both efficiency and distributional effects; effects on landlords as well as tenants
Data requirements monitoring housing conditions
More explicit discussion of political economy, including “insider/outsider” interests, issues of short-run versus long-run outcomes
Housing and related stresses during the COVID-19 pandemic

Should these receive deeper treatment, be more fully integrated into the discussion of rent regulation?
Could the objectives of the legislation be specified more precisely? E.g., enhance affordability? (How is affordability defined?) Provide an alternative to social, local authority housing?

What other actions could address these objectives?

Have spillovers to other sectors of the housing market, labor markets, public finance, been fully considered?
Once initiated, how will rent regulations be monitored and, if necessary, modified? Are the same rules appropriate before and after the Pandemic emergency? Are sunset provisions needed?

I’ll end with a few questions that I hope we can discuss throughout the Conference.

A New Deal for Tenants mentions or alludes to several important topics in passing:

Housing benefit/allowances
Planning, land use and development regulations
Measuring costs and benefits of controls, both efficiency and distributional effects; effects on landlords as well as tenants
Data requirements monitoring housing conditions
More explicit discussion of political economy, including “insider/outsider” interests, issues of short-run versus long-run outcomes
Housing and related stresses during the COVID-19 pandemic

Should these receive deeper treatment, be more fully integrated into the discussion of rent regulation?

Could the objectives of the legislation be specified more precisely? E.g., enhance affordability? (How is affordability defined?) Provide an alternative to social, local authority housing?

What other actions could address these objectives?

Have spillovers to other sectors of the housing market, labor markets, public finance, been fully considered?

Once initiated, how will rent regulations be monitored and, if necessary, modified? Are the same rules appropriate before and after the Pandemic emergency? Are sunset provisions needed?

Finally, let me end by thanking you again for the opportunity and your attention. I look forward to the conference, and do not hesitate to contact me if you want the longer version of these remarks.

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Sources, and further reading:

See the notes below this slide.

Ahlfeldt, Gabriel M, Stephan Heblich, and Tobias Seidel. "Micro-Geographic Property Price and Rent Indices." (2021).

Arnott, Richard. "Time for Revisionism on Rent Control?". The Journal of Economic Perspectives 9, no. 1 (1995): 99-120.

Barker, Kate. Barker Review of Land Use Planning: Final Report, Recommendations. UK Treasury: Her Majesty's Stationery Office Books (TSO), 2006.

———. Barker Review of Land Use Planning: Interim Report. UK Treasury, 2003.

———. Housing: Where’s the Plan? : Do Sustainability, 2014.

Bertaud, Alain. Order without Design. MIT Press, 2018.

Bloomberg, Lawrence N. "Rent Control and the Housing Shortage: A Commentary on" Roofs or Ceilings?" By Friedman and Stigler." The Journal of Land & Public Utility Economics 23, no. 2 (1947): 214-18.

Brueggeman, William, and Jeffrey D Fisher. Real Estate Finance and Investments. 13th ed.: McGraw Hill, 2006.

Caldera, Aida, and Åsa Johansson. "The Price Responsiveness of Housing Supply in Oecd Countries." Journal of Housing Economics 22, no. 3 (2013): 231-49.

Cavalleri, Maria Chiara, Boris Cournède, and Ezgi Özsöğüt. "How Responsive Are Housing Markets in the Oecd? National Level Estimates." (2019).

Cheshire, Paul, and Stephen Sheppard. "Land Markets and Land Market Regulation: Progress Towards Understanding." Regional Science and Urban Economics 34, no. 6 (2004): 619-37.

Davis, Morris A., Stephen Malpezzi and François Ortalo-Magné. "The Wisconsin Foreclosure and Unemployment Relief Plan (Wi-Fur)." James A. Graaskamp Center for Real Estate, http://www.bus.wisc.edu/realestate/wi-fur/.

Desmond, Matthew. Evicted: Poverty and Profit in the American City. Crown, 2016.

Diamond, Rebecca, Tim McQuade, and Franklin Qian. "The Effects of Rent Control Expansion on Tenants, Landlords, and Inequality: Evidence from San Francisco." American Economic Review 109, no. 9 (2019): 3365-94.

Downs, Anthony. Rental Housing in the 1980s. Brookings Institution Washington, DC, 1983.

Fetter, Daniel K. "The Home Front: Rent Control and the Rapid Wartime Increase in Home Ownership." The Journal of Economic History 76, no. 4 (2016): 1001-43.

Fingleton, Bernard. "Increasing Returns: Evidence from Local Wage Rates in Great Britain." Oxford Economic Papers 55, no. 4 (2003): 716-39.

Foote, Chris, Jeff Fuhrer, Eileen Mauskopf, and Paul Willen. "A Proposal to Help Distressed Homeowners: A Government Payment-Sharing Plan." Federal Reserve Bank of Boston, http://www.bos.frb.org/economic/ppb/2009/ppb091.htm.

Frankena, Mark. "Alternative Models of Rent Control." Urban Studies 12, no. 3 (1975): 303-08.

Friedman, Milton, and George Joseph Stigler. Roofs or Ceilings?: The Current Housing Problem. Foundation for Economic Education Irvington-on-Hudson, NY, 1946.

Galster, George. "Comparing Demand-Side and Supply-Side Housing Policies: Sub-Market and Spatial Perspectives." Housing Studies 12, no. 4 (1997): 561-77.

Gibb, Kenneth. "Divergent Approaches to Affordable Housing Supply in a Devolved Policy System: Scotland and England after 2010." International Journal of Urban Sciences 25, no. sup1 (2021): 218-40.

Gibb, Kenneth, Adriana Mihaela Soaita, and Alex Marsh. "Rent Control: A Review of the Evidence Base." Working Draft, Report for UK Collaborative Centre for Housing Evidence, 2021.

Glaeser, Edward L, and Erzo FP Luttmer. "The Misallocation of Housing under Rent Control." American Economic Review 93, no. 4 (2003): 1027-46.

Gordon, Jacques. "Housing Affordability: An Institutional Investor Perspective." In Commercial Real Estate Data Alliance Annual Conference. Univeristy of North Carolina-Chapel Hill, 2019.

Grampp, William D. "Some Effects of Rent Control." Southern Economic Journal (1950): 425-47.

Green, Richard, and Stephen Malpezzi. "Introduction to the Covid Pandemic and Its Impacts on Cities, Economies, and Housing." Presentation to the Homer Hoyt Institute, 2022.

Green, Richard K., Stephen Malpezzi, and Stephen K. Mayo. "Metropolitan-Specific Estimates of the Price Elasticity of Supply of Housing, and Their Sources." American Economic Review 95, no. 2 (May 2005): 334-39.

Gupta, Arpit, Vrinda Mittal, Jonas Peeters, and Stijn Van Nieuwerburgh. "Flattening the Curve: Pandemic-Induced Revaluation of Urban Real Estate." National Bureau of Economic Research, 2021.

Haffner, Marietta, Joris Hoekstra, Michael Oxley, and Harry Van der Heijden. "Bridging the Gap between Market and Social Rented Housing in Six European Countries." Amsterdam: IOS Press, 2009.

Hahn, Anja M, Konstantin A Kholodilin, and Sofie R Waltl. "Forward to the Past: Short-Term Effects of the Rent Freeze in Berlin." (2021).

Hilber, Christian AL. "Uk Housing and Planning Policies: The Evidence from Economic Research." LSE Centre for Economic Performance, 2015.

Hills, John, Franz Hubert, Horst Tomann, and Christine ME Whitehead. "Shifting Subsidy from Bricks and Mortar to People: Experiences in Britain and West Germany." Housing Studies 5, no. 3 (1990): 147-67.

Kansiime, Monica K, Justice A Tambo, Idah Mugambi, Mary Bundi, Augustine Kara, and Charles Owuor. "Covid-19 Implications on Household Income and Food Security in Kenya and Uganda: Findings from a Rapid Assessment." World development 137 (2021): 105199.

Kettunen, Hanna, and Hannu Ruonavaara. "Rent Regulation in 21st Century Europe. Comparative Perspectives." Housing Studies 36, no. 9 (2021): 1446-68.

Kholodilin, Konstantin. "Long-Term, Multicountry Perspective on Rental Market Regulations." Housing Policy Debate 30, no. 6 (2020): 994-1015.

Kholodilin, Konstantin, Jan Philip Weber, and Steffen Sebastian. "Rental Market Regulation over the Last 100 Years in an International Comparison." DIW Weekly report 8, no. 45 (2018): 453-64.

Kholodilin, Konstantin A. "Housing Policies Worldwide During Coronavirus Crisis: Challenges and Solutions." (2020).

———. "Measuring Stick-Style Housing Policies: A Multi-Country Longitudinal Database of Governmental Regulations." (2018).

Kholodilin, Konstantin A, and Sebastian Kohl. "Does Social Policy through Rent Controls Inhibit New Construction? Some Answers from Long-Run Historical Evidence." (2020).

———. "Rent Price Control–yet Another Great Equalizer of Economic Inequalities? Evidence from a Century of Historical Data." (2021).

Maclennan, Duncan. "The 1974 Rent Act-Some Short Run Supply Effects." The Economic Journal 88, no. 350 (1978): 331-40.

Malpezzi, Stephen. "Digging Deeper on Rent Controls." In Rutgers Center for Real Estate. Newark, NJ, 2017.

———. "Housing." In Designing Household Survey Questionnaires for Developing Countries: Lessons from Fifteen Years of the Living Standards Measurement Study. Volume 1, edited by Margaret Grosh and Paul Glewwe, 293-314. Washington, D.C.: World Bank, 2000.

———. "Housing “Affordability” and Responses During Times of Stress: A Preliminary Look During the Covid-19 Pandemic." Contemporary Economic Policy Online advance publication (2022): 1-32.

———. "Housing Prices, Externalities, and Regulation in U.S. Metropolitan Areas." Journal of Housing Research 7, no. 2 (1996): 209-41.

———. "Residential Real Estate in the U.S. Financial Crisis, the Great Recession, and Their Aftermath." Taiwan Economic Review 45, no. 1 (2017): 5-56.

———. "Welfare Analysis of Rent Control with Side Payments: A Natural Experiment in Cairo, Egypt." Regional Science and Urban Economics 28, no. 6 (November 1998): 773-95.

Malpezzi, Stephen, and Gwendolyn Ball. "Measuring the Urban Policy Environment: An Exploratory Analysis Using Rent Controls." Habitat International 17,

no. 2 (1993): 39-52.

———. Rent Control in Developing Countries. World Bank Discussion Papers, no. 129. Washington, D.C.: World Bank, 1991.

Malpezzi, Stephen, and Duncan Maclennan. "The Long-Run Price Elasticity of Supply of New Residential Construction in the United States and the United Kingdom." Journal of Housing Economics 10, no. 3 (September 2001): 278-306.

Malpezzi, Stephen, Henry O Pollakowski, and Tammie X Simmons-Mosley. "The Distribution of Rent Changes within a Market, and Implications for Second-Generation Rent Control." Unpublished Manuscript. University of Wisconsin (2005).

Meen, Geoffrey. "How Should Housing Affordability Be Measured." UK Collaborative Centre for Housing Evidence (2018).

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