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Scope Of Article 3 Of The Kyoto Protocol

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The Kyoto Protocol

  • The Kyoto Protocol to the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) was adopted on 11 December 1997 and entered into force on 16 February 2005. There are currently 191 parties who have signed and ratified it.

  • It sets binding obligations on industrialized countries to reduce emissions of greenhouse gases.

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  • 37 industrialized countries and the then European Community (comprising of 15 states) [Annex I parties] committed themselves to limit or reduce their emissions of greenhouse gases. They agreed to reduce their greenhouse gas emissions by 5.2% on average for the period 2008-2012, relative to their annual emissions in a base year, usually 1990.

  • However, not all United Nations members have ratified it. The countries that have not ratified the Protocol or have subsequently withdrawn from it are: U.S.A., Canada, Afghanistan, Andorra and South Sudan.

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Article 3: Quantified Emission Limitation and Reduction Commitments

  • Article 3.1 – brings together the various elements of the emission commitments made by Annex I parties in an umbrella provision. It emphasizes on the legally-binding nature of the commitments made by the parties and goes on to specify the dates of the commitment period (2008-2012) and the baseline for emission levels (1990 levels). The reduction of emission levels was set as a ‘collective target’ to be achieved by the aggregate reductions of all the Annex I parties.

  • Article 3.2 – mandates ‘demonstrable progress’ by Annex I parties towards the achievement of their commitments.

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  • Article 3.4 and 3.4 – Discuss changes in greenhouse gas emissions as a direct result of human induced land-use change and forestry activities and their contribution towards achieving commitments made under the Kyoto Protocol

  • Article 3.5 and 3.6 – Flexibilities – Recognize that ‘Economies in transition’ (EIT’s) may face severe problems when attempting to fulfill their commitments under the Protocol and granted then a certain degree of flexibility with regards to their baseline.

  • Article 3.7 – lays down a mechanism for the calculation of ‘assigned amounts’ for each Annex I party.

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  • Article 3.8 – lays down a separate baseline for hydrofluorocarbons, perfluorocarbons and sulphur hexafluoride of 1995 levels for calculations under Article 3.7.

  • Article 3.9 – requires considerations about subsequent commitment periods to be commenced atleast seven years before the end of the first commitment period (2008 – 2012).

  • Article 3.10 and 3.11 – Permit the modification of assigned amounts through ‘joint implementation’ and ‘emissions trading’.

  • Article 3.12 – Permits the adjustment of assigned amounts in accordance with the ‘Clean Development Mechanism’ defined in Article 12 of the Protocol.

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  • Article 3.13 – allows for ‘banking’ of emission reductions when a party achieves reductions greater than its assigned amount. These excess reductions are permitted to be carried over to commitments made in the subsequent periods.

  • Article 3.14 – mandates that the implementation of commitments shall be done in such a manner that   there is minimum adverse social, environmental and economic impact on developing country parties (identified in Article 4, paragraphs 8 and 9, of the Convention).

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Limited practical effectiveness of the goals under the Kyoto Protocol

  • Even if the Kyoto Protocol were to be strictly observed, the reduction in global greenhouse gas emissions during the period 2008 to 2012 would still be considerably lower than 5.2% as developing nations have no clear-cut obligations.

  • Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) research clearly shows that, in the cases of unconstrained non-Annex I nations, the Kyoto mechanisms are unlikely to stabilize current atmospheric CO2 levels; the probability of the Kyoto mechanisms stabilizing atmospheric CO2 levels before 2020 is actually very low and will only serve to delay and not prevent the increase in atmospheric Co2.

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The ‘Hot Air’ Problem

  • The Kyoto Protocol takes the year 1990 as a baseline. This was a time of upheaval in the former Soviet Union and Eastern Europe, when greenhouse gas emissions in the region decreased at the same drastic rate at which national economies shrank. For this reason, even if no emission reduction measures were adopted by Russia, the Ukraine or other Eastern European nations, their emission levels during the period 2008–2012 would still be considerably lower than those stipulated in the Protocol. The difference between emission quotas and emission quantity has come to be known as ‘hot air’. Russia, Ukraine, and other nations in that region could, according to the Protocol emissions trading mechanism, sell their ‘hot air’ surplus emission quotas to the West for foreign currency. This approach could help realize the emission reduction goals stipulated in the Protocol but, from the point of view of mitigating global warming, would essentially be without benefit.
  • Thus, the Kyoto Protocol’s is primarily symbolic and its actual effectiveness is ‘virtually non-existent’.