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U.S.-China Relations Today � �Lessons from the Cold War�

Michael McFaul

China Chats with Stanford Faculty

June 25, 2021

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Old Conventional Wisdom: �China was joining “Liberal International Order”��New Conventional Wisdom: �Cold War 2.0��My View: �Both old and new conventional wisdom are partly right and partly wrong

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The New Cold War?

“Under Trump, U.S. enters a new ‘Cold War’ with China” – The Washington Post, October 2018

“A New Cold War Has Begun” – Foreign Policy, January 2019

“America’s Cold Warriors Hold the Key to Handling China” – Bloomberg, January 2019

“The U.S. and China are on the brink of Cold War 2.0. This is how to avoid it.” – The Washington Post, November 2018

“The Trump Administration Debates a Cold War With China” – The Atlantic, November 2018

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“China and the US: trade war or cold war?” – Financial Times, December 2018

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2017 National Security Strategy

Three main sets of challengers—the revisionist powers of China and Russia, the rogue states of Iran and North Korea, and transnational threat organizations, particularly jihadist terrorist groups—are actively competing against the United States and our allies and partners.

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Former National Security Adviser Robert O’Brien �(June 2020)

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“The Chinese Communist Party is Marxist-Leninist… The party General Secretary Xi Jinping sees himself as Josef Stalin’s successor.”

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“We could not have been more wrong [in assuming that China would democratize and liberalize as developed economically]— and this miscalculation was the greatest failure of American foreign policy since the 1930s.”

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Secretary of State Nominee, Antony Blinken �(January 19, 2021)

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“President Trump was right in taking a tougher approach to China. I disagree very much with the way that he went about it in a number of areas, but the basic principle was the right one, and I think that’s actually helpful to our foreign policy.”

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President Joseph Biden in

Foreign Affairs (2020):

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“The period that was broadly described as engagement has come to an end. …. The dominant paradigm is going to be competition. Our goal is to make that a stable, peaceful competition that brings out the best of us.”

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- Kurt Campbell, Deputy Assistant to the President and Coordinator for Indo-Pacific Affairs, National Security Council

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��Similarities with the Cold War and U.S.- China Relations Today

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U.S. - China

  • Two Superpowers
  • Global Competition regarding Economic Assistance, Trade, Investment
  • Ideological Competition
    • Democracy vs. Autocracy
    • State-led vs. Free Market Economies
    • But many more democracies today than during Cold War
  • Propagation of Political and Domestic Ideas Abroad
  • Duration (will last for decades)

U.S. – Soviet Union

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Differences from the Cold War & U.S.-China Relations Today

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  • Unequal balance of power
  • Military and nuclear balance are asymmetric
  • Weaker ideological contest
  • Highly intertwined economies and connected societies
  • STEM and AI competition, IPR theft/competition
  • Growing Chinese economy, but gap in GDP per capita
  • No proxy wars
  • More extensive bilateral and multilateral cooperation
  • Weak enthusiasm for fighting Cold Wars
  • U.S. retrenching

U.S. - China

  • Two unquestioned superpowers
  • Military parity
  • Robust ideological contest
  • Little mutual trade, investment, cultural exchanges
  • U.S. technological superiority
  • Economic asymmetries, waning Soviet economy
  • Proxy wars and military overextension
  • Limited agenda of bilateral/multilateral cooperation
  • Continued support for fighting Cold Wars
  • U.S. leader of liberal world order

U.S. – Soviet Union

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More Challenging for the United States

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Less Challenging for the United States

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Similarities with

the Cold War

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  • Bipolarity along many domains

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  • Chinese model is attractive

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  • Chinese global reach greater (BRI, AIIB, etc.)

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  • Duration could be longer

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  • Democracy still preferred ideology in world

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  • Less intense ideological competition

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  • Many more democracies today than during Cold War

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Differences with

the Cold War

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  • Highly intertwined economies and connected societies

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  • STEM, tech, and AI competition

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  • Growing Chinese economy

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  • U.S. retrenching with isolationist tendencies

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  • Military and nuclear balance are asymmetric

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  • Weaker ideological contest

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  • No proxy wars (yet)

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  • More extensive bilateral and multilateral cooperation

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  • Greater societal connectivity

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Lessons from the Cold War to Avoid Today

    • Threat Misperceptions
      • “Missile Gap” (unnecessary arms race)
      • McCarthyism
      • Vietnam War
      • Evolutionary political change in eastern Europe
        • Hungary 1956, Czechoslovakia 1968, Poland 1981

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    • Overreach
      • Soviet Invasion of Afghanistan
      • U.S. support for “freedom fighters” in Afghanistan, Angola, and Nicaragua

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    • Embracing “good” dictators
      • Apartheid South Africa
      • Pinochet in Chile
      • Suharto in Indonesia
      • Shah in Iran

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    • “Zastoi” (Stagnation) in the USSR in the 1970s
      • Adventurism abroad while neglecting needed reforms at home

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Lessons from the Cold War to Emulate Today

Can Cooperate and Confront Simultaneously

      • Smallpox Eradication
      • NPT
      • Arms Control
      • Helsinki Accords
      • Space

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Developed Mechanisms to Reduce Misperceptions and Misunderstandings

      • Crisis prevention
      • Crisis management
      • Diplomacy between governments
      • Contacts between civil societies
      • Track two dialogues/learning at universities

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Current U.S. Misperceptions

    • Overestimating Chinese Power

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    • Overestimating PRC Commitment to Exporting M-L & Autocracy

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    • Underestimating the Costs of Cold War 2.0 (“Decoupling”, Global Containment)

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My Concerns on U.S.-China

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Can U.S. and Chinese Leaders Get Used to Living with Geopolitical and Ideological Tensions?

    • Managing Competition and Cooperation at the same time is difficult
      • U.S-Russia Reset in 2009 failed because of ideological differences when Putin returned to Kremlin in 2012
    • Can U.S. & Chinese leaders avoid framing every foreign policy issue through the lens of great power competition?

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Will Linkage Impede Cooperation?

    • Xi overreaction to U.S. promotion of universal values
    • U.S. domestic politics (Biden will always be cast as “weak” on China)

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Reasons for Hope and Confidence�(as an American)

  • U.S. Still More Powerful than China

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  • Declining Relative Power Not Inevitable

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  • Democracy is More Popular than Autocracy

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  • Demand for Renewed U.S. Leadership Around the World Remains High

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  • Leaders Matter

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MILITARY POWER

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Nuclear Power

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Conventional Power

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Number of Allies

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ECONOMIC POWER

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GDP in 2019 (current US$)

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U.S.: $21.433 trillion

China: $14.28 trillion

Russia: $1.7 trillion

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9 of 10 Largest Economies in the World are Democracies (billion U.S. dollars)

Source: IMF, Statista 2020

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GDP of G20 countries

in 2019 & projection for 2025

(in billion U.S. dollars)

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17 of 20 are democracies

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GDP Per Capita

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GDP per capita in 2019 (current US$)

U.S.: $65,297

Russia: $11,585

China: $10,216

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Source: International Monetary Fund - World Economic Outlook (WEO) Database, Knoema 2020

Top Countries Ranked by GDP per capita (in U.S. dollars)

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How Will Chinese Leaders Deal with Invisible China?

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World’s Top 50 Universities

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Top 10 Largest Companies in the World by Market Capitalization

(in billion U.S. dollars)

Source: Forbes, Statista 2020

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Source: Cheng, Hong, Ruixue Jia, Dandan Li, and Hongbin Li. “The Rise of Robots in China.” Journal of Economic Perspectives 33, no. 2 (Spring 2019): 71–88.

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The Rise of Robots in China

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Research & Development

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AI Competition in Talent, Research, and Development

Source: Castro, Daniel, Michael McLaughlin, and Eline Chivot. “Who is Winning the AI Race: China, the EU or the United States?” Center for Data Innovation. August 2019.

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AI Competition in Adoption, Data, and Hardware

Percentage of firms that have adopted AI or are piloting AI in China and the United States by industry, 2018

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Source: Castro, Daniel, Michael McLaughlin, and Eline Chivot. “Who is Winning the AI Race: China, the EU or the United States?” Center for Data Innovation. August 2019.

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IDEATIONAL POWER

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Support for Democracy Around the World Remains Strong

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Leaders Matter

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The U.S. Has a New Leader

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The Biden Foreign Policy Agenda�

Unilateral Policy Agenda

    • Strengthen U.S. Democracy at Home by Renewing Core Values
    • “Democracy that Delivers” (Infrastructure and R&D Investment)
    • Promote a Foreign Policy for the Middle Class

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Bilateral Policy Agenda

  • Craft a Sustainable Strategy of Containment and Engagement of China (and Russia)
  • Avoid the Extremes: Global Containment or Isolation

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Multilateral Policy Agenda

  • Revitalize/Reform Liberal Internationalism
  • Strengthen Alliances
  • Prioritize Climate, Non-Proliferation, and Pandemics

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America’s Image Abroad Rebounding under Biden

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Negative Views of China and Xi are rising

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America in the World After Biden?

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Continuity with Biden’s Foreign Policy of Liberal Internationalism?

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Return to Trump-era Foreign Policy of Unilateralism and Isolationism?

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Answer: I don’t know.

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Previous Periods of (Alleged) U.S. Decline

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Inter-War Period, 1930s

  • Rise of Autocrats
  • Decline of Democracies
  • Strengthening of Illiberal Ideologies
  • Decline of American Economic Performance

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Political Regime Map, 1930

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Communist Rise, 1950s

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Soviet Union Rise, 1970s

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Japan’s Rise in the 1980s

“It is a matter of urgent national interest for Americans to confront Japanese successes.”

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– Ezra Vogel, Japan As Number One (1980)

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Predictions of Permanent American Decline Are Premature

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Let’s Keep Talking

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@McFaul

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www.michaelmcfaul.com