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Wargaming�Aerospace Power

Matt Caffrey

Professor of Wargaming

Air Command and Staff College

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My Bio

IMA to AF/XOOC (CHECKMATE)
Professor of Wargaming and Campaign Planning, Air Command and Staff College
Co-author Gulf War Fact Book
Originator of the Connections conference
Designer of several wargames
Originator of the Commercial Wargames db

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Why Care

Airpower is a fickle panacea

Too powerful to ignore
Too inconsistent not to study

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What is a Wargame

13

0-3a-6

CGN

12 - * - 5

B7 - 0 - Z

6-4-8

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What is a Wargame

Reality

Simulation

Model

Sim Game

Wargame

Proportional Representation

Over Time

Multi Sided

Armed Conflict

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Why is This Hard

Aerospace Relatively New - yet:

Human flight around for 200 years
Heavier than air flight almost 100 years
Space flight almost 50 years

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Why is This Hard

Aerospace Relatively New
Combat Pairs Relatively Great

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Combat Pairs Relatively Great

vs

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Combat Pairs Relatively Great

vs

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Combat Pairs Relatively Great

vs

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Combat Pairs Relatively Great

vs

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Combat Pairs Relatively Great

vs

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Combat Pairs Relatively Great

vs

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Why is This Hard

Aerospace Relatively New
Combat Pairs Relatively Great
Scholarship Relatively Thin, Unhelpful

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The Cycle

History

Theory

Doctrine

Strategy

Execution

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Personalities

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In The Beginning

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Seeing is Believing

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On The Brink

Germany 230
Austro-Hungary 48

UK 260
France 136
Russia 244

US 23

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1914�Information Operations

Reconnaissance

Failure

French v German wheel
German v BEF

Success

French & UK at Marne
Germany at Tannenberg

Surveillance

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Surveillance

Balloon

+ cheap, defensible, good comm

- relatively low view angle, fixed

Aircraft

+ mobile, any view angle

- comm initially a problem

1914�Information Operations

As spectacular as these successes were the airpower mission that undoubtedly contributed the most to producing the terrible carnage of World War I was the day in day out mission of surveillance.

To understand this why changes in warfare must be explained first.

For about 1750 to 1850 artillery was often a decisive offensive element in battle. However, with the advent of riffled muskets artillery effectively lost their range advantage. If the artillerists were close enough to the enemy to aim their pieces, the enemy was close enough to shoot the gunners, a priority target. This led to the development of indirect artillery fire. A forward observer would tell the artillerists (well concealed to the rear) where to shoot. This worked OK early in World War I but with the coming of the trenches the forward observer had increasing difficulty seeing the enemy - though increasingly proficient enemy sharp shooters, at times, saw him.

Aircraft largely solved both the vision and the vulnerability problems. Balloons were on average more effective early on because telephones lines could be run from them to the batteries. As enemy camouflage got better and radios got lighter and more dependable, aircraft gradually became the preferred means.

Either way the information provided by aircraft allowed the artillery to become the great killer of World War I.

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1915�Counter Air

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1915�Counter Air

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1916�Airpower Synchronization

VERDUN

German - initial massive air superiority

Take out balloons - block Recce
Bomb troops, RRs, Bridges - sole LOC

France - counter attack began in air

Anti balloon munitions
lots of almost as good aircraft

1916 saw the employment of airpower being more fully integrated into campaign plans. Germany lead the way during their Verdun campaign. German airpower blinded French commanders and artillery while photo reconnaissance and observation balloons provided German commanders and artillerists an unprecedented situation awareness. Because of this German artillery took a terrible toll on French artillery and men while French artillery could not mount effective counter battery fire. In addition German airpower attacked French troop concentrations, RR and bridges. France’s one LOC into Verdun was kept under continual pressure by artillery within its range and by air beyond. Initially, for these reasons and others France suffered far more casualties then the Germans.

France’s counter attack began in the air. Newer French aircraft was still a bit inferior to the German but France brought far more aircraft into the fight. They also fielded special munitions specifically designed to take down German balloons. With the coming of air superiority it was the French’s turn to see while German commanders were blind. Not surpassingly loss rates flip flopped with the Germans now suffering more heavily.

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1916�Counter Information

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1915�Strategic Attack�Targeting vs Terror

French bombing of German Industry

Countered by Eindekker

German “Terror” bombing of London

Only effective defense offense

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1915 - Terror

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1916�The Dawn After The Nightmare

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1917�Prologue To The Future

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1916�Counter Land Forces

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1917�Prologue To The Future

Arras - Bloody April

50% in a single month
Life expectancy 93 flying hours/21 days
8:1 Loss ratio

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No

Mans

Land

*

Max

Arty

Range

1917�The Nature of the Beast

To understand why airpower made such a difference at Cambrai you must understand why the stalemate in the west had occurred.

Increasingly heavy artillery would kill many of the front line defenders and suppress many of the survivors. While crossing “no mans land” still extracted fearful casualties attacks did at times carry the enemy’s trench line. Then unable to communicate with his artillery (no radios) the attacks usually stalled. If somehow the attack continued they always stopped dead at the limit of their artillery’s range. By the time artillery was dragged across the moonscape of no mans land the enemy would have plenty of time to bring in reserves and dig new trenches.

Aerial photography and improvements in the artilerymen’s craft allowed shorter bombardments to hit more enemy targets, while producing less sever moonscape. Still, the the key contribution was close air support. Aircraft could see and strike the enemy beyond artillery range. And while aircraft’s light bombs and machine guns seldom injured entrenched infantry they could produce a terrible carnage against reserved moving up or in hasty defenses. More often the aircraft simply delayed the enemy and forces them to keep there heads down -- which was good enough to permit friendly infantry to continue their advance.

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1917�Prologue To The Future

1917�Counter Land Forces

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1918�Air Campaign

Saint Michael - OB

Allies

696 fighters
366 reconnaissance
323 day bombers
91 night bombers
20 observation balloons

Germany

Initial: 100 fighters - 200 others
Reinforcing: 80 fighters

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Saint Michael

Allies

Coalition Air Commander
Comprehensive use of airpower
Attacked enemy throughout his depth

Germany

Too little too late

1918�Air Campaign

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Palestine

Inside out War
Highway of Death
First Field Army Destroyed From The Air

1918�Air Campaign

An even more impressive use of Airpower took place in Palestine during the last year of the war. The British theater commander had a lot going for him. The services of “Lawrence of Arabia” some outstanding Australian cavalry and his own strategic smarts. Still, airpower played an enormous and to often overlooked part in one of the great victories of the war.

First, the campaign opened with the AT&T building being bombed in what is today Amman, Jordan. With their communications cut off the various Turkish armies defending Palestine could not assist each other. In fact one army did not even know the campaign had opened for several days. Airpower attacked the Turks throughout the depth of their armies, degrading their ability to fight as a cohesive force. At one point Allied airman spotted a Turkish army on the road moving through a desert pass. The later descriptions of this “Highway of Death” would sound strangely familiar to contemporary readers. Turkish losses were so great that army ceased to be a operational unit - it had been defeated, indeed effectively destroyed by airpower.

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1938 - 1940�The War Hitler Won

Czechoslovakia - The highest form of victory

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1939 - 1940�The War Hitler Won

Poland - Operational Airpower & Coercion
Norway - Victory through Counter Sea
Holland - Victory from above
France - Strategic CAS
Britain - “A Damn near run thing”

“We have won the war,

now all we have to do is end it”

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Balkans - air vs history
Crete - the price of victory
USSR

Early - to loose an Air Force
Mid - Springtime for the Luftwaffe
Late - outrunning your airpower

Pearl Harbor - Strategic Surprise

1941�The World Held Its Breath

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The German Airlift that worked
Doolittle does a lot
British Bombs begin to bite
British counter land matures
Coral Sea & Midway - if there were any doubts
Guadalcanal - like day and night
First 60 B-17 raid on occupied Europe

1942�By a Knife’s Edge

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1943�The Tide Turns

The German airlift that did not.
Kasserine Pass -- be careful what you ask for
The Palm Sunday Massacre & the forgotten Stalingrad
Hamburg - death of a great city
Sicily - “a mere tactical operation”
A Ball bearing too far

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1944�Harvest of Doom

Strangle - the campaign and the spin
Big Week
The race for the Normandy buildup
Air as a maneuver element
Turning off Germany
The Battle over the Bulge

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1945�Victory Through Airpower?

Germany Paralyzed - at a cost
Japan Starved - in large part due to subs
Blinded by the light

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Was War Obsolete?

UN
A-Bomb

What forces were now obsolete?

Cavalry?
BB, CVs, Navies?
Fighters?

1946-48�A New World?

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1949�Victory (without war) Through Airpower?

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1950�Then Came Korea

The World Turned Upside Down

War not obsolete
The shovel can beat the bomber

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1964 - 1968�Rolling Thunder

Flaming Dart -- “I think we sent the wrong message”
The real 94 target list
The Price of Airpower Folly

922 Aircraft
60,000 Total KIA

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1965�The Battle for Kashmir

The fight

Stalemate in the air
Stalemate on the ground

Lessons?

Evenly matched airpower not decisive
Gnat wave of future?

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1967�6 Day War

Holland 1940 -- Egypt 1967
Strategic CAS -- Again

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1968-1970�The War of Attrition

Egypt’s strategy

Don’t start a war / Don’t make peace
Indirect attack Israel's economy

Israel's strategy

Ground eyes, air muscles
Political embarrassment through SOF

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1971�Battle for Bangladesh

East Front -- the decisive combination

Offensive Counter Air (OCA)
Air Mobility

West Front -- the decisive draw

Air Parity
Ground Stalemate

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1973�Linebacker I & II

The Bankruptcy of Airpower

a.k.a. -- Kenney was right -- twice

Dawn of the precision revolution
Rebirth of Air Campaigning

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1973�Arab Israeli War

The Victory of Air Defense

Politics - war by other means
Hardening - operating under attack
Integrating - Air Defense as a system

Limits of Air Defense

Air and the holding of ground
Breaking the system

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1975�The Fall of Freedom

South Vietnam 6th largest Air Force - But

Sortie rates low

Self inflicted cyber attack
Congressional funding

Attrition high

Communist mobile Air Defense Artillery
South Vietnam had no smart bombs

Ground power defeats Air Power

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1982�Malvinas / Falkland

Airpower as mobile as its base

UK: Importance of CVs -- again
Argentina: base not established

Airpower is as secure as its base

UK: Impact of Anti-Ship Missiles
Argentina: Impact of SAS

Airpower the impact of munitions

UK: AIM-9L
Argentine: But for the right fuse

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1983�The Lebanon Conflict

Air Defenses can be overcome - still

Campaign approach
Joint attack

Cities limit effect of airpower - still

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1990�Desert Shield

Iraq

Ground based Offensive Counter Air
Land based battle of the Coral Sea

US / Coalition

Saudi air credible from day one
US Airframes - fast
Nail biter for munitions

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1991�Desert Storm

If the PTO was a naval campaign Then the second Gulf war was an air campaign

Planning started with the end state
Inside out campaign
Increased precision permitted parallel attack
Parallel attack permitted paralysis

Yet ground could have played decisive role

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1995�Bosnia

Victory through airpower alone?

Before Airpower intervention

Serbian heavy weapons
Bosnian numbers

After Airpower intervention

Serbian’s hide heavy weapons
Bosnians know without air they can be used

Is this really victory through Airpower alone?

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The Cycle

History

Theory

Doctrine

Strategy

Execution

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Categories of�Aerospace Power

Aerospace Power Contributes to Victory by creating/increasing differentials in:

Information
Aerospace Forces
Surface Forces
Mobility
Economy

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Information

The impact of a information differential must be depicted

Impact of friendly and enemy attrition
Decisions made by AI routines

Aerospace power can both

Increase friendly information
Decrease enemy information

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Counter Aerospace Forces

Air Force vs Air Force

Information differential
Quality of aircraft
Quality of Aircrew
Local Superiority - distance/sortie rates matter

Air/Ground Force vs Air Bases

Dispersal, revetments, shelters
Ground Defenses
Space ground stations

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Counter Aerospace Forces

Air Force vs Ground Based Air Defense

Information differential matters
Suppress vs Kill
Air denial vs air superiority

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Air vs Surface Forces

Posture of Ground Force Matters
Surface cover matters -- ocean > jungle
Defenses can throw off aim
Friendly ground forces optional

Air Only - Midway, Bismarck Sea, 2nd Khafji
CAS - 1st Ardennes, 1967 Middle East War

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Mobility

Relative Mobility Key, Aerospace can:

Enhance friendly mobility

Directly - Airlift
Indirectly - GPS, spares

Degrade enemy mobility

Attacks on vehicles
Attacks on routes
Impacts of countermeasures

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Counter Economy

Through understanding of economy needed to accurately target:

rates of consumption/rates of production
how much on hand/how easy to import
How easy to hit/how easy to fix
Answering “so what”