STRUCTURAL TRANSFORMATION & LABOUR

A presentation at APU for the advanced UG & also the PG beginners

Saumya Chakrabarti, Shouvik Chakraborty & Zico Dasgupta

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With support from – Himadrija Chakraborty & Rahul Pal

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Visva-Bharati, Santiniketan, India

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SECTION 1�DEVELOPMENT & STRUCTURAL TRANSFORMATION

• Structural transformation is a crucial part of the process of development, as proposed by a variety of theoretical discourses of the 20^th century (the precursors have been Ricardo-Malthus & Marx).
• The processes of structural transformation have been analyzed & polices proposed by different economists during 1920s-80s (Preobrazhensky 1926, Rosenstein-Rodan 1943, Nurkse 1953, Lewis 1954, Kalecki 1955, Fei & Ranis 1961, Harris & Todaro 1970, Fields 1990.
• Some of the important frameworks we are going to discuss are: Lewis-Ranis-Fei, Harris-Todaro-Fields (as critique), & Kalecki et al (extending to include Harvey, Sanyal et al, too, as critiques)¹.

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¹ Standard growth models have not considered the process of structural transformation inducing growth via relocation of labour from low to high productivity sector: Harrod-Domar 1939-1946, Solow 1956, Kaldor 1957

SECTION 2�STRUCTURAL TRANSFORMATION: MAINSTREAM APPROACH (1 OF 3)

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In the process,

TS contracts & eventually becomes a

Capitalistic MS

Capital Accumulation

Capitalistic Growth

Increase in PCI

Development²

Labour & resource mobilisation from the Non-capitalistic Traditional Sector (TS)

Capitalistic Modern Sector (MS) expansion

² As conceptualized by the Traditional Development Economics discourses (1930s-80s)

Trickle down effect

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Non-capitalistic Traditional Sector

participation as per ability & distribution as per average

Capitalistic Modern Sector

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Competition drives investment, technology & innovation, inducing productivity, creating surplus that is reinvested & we have accumulation.

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STRUCTURAL TRANSFORMATION: MAINSTREAM APPROACH (2 OF 3)

DEVELOPMENT & STRUCTURAL TRANSFORMATION (3 OF 3)

• Development: Increase in per capita income via capitalistic transformation (using market);
• If capital & market are inefficient/absent/imperfect, governments participate in accumulation & distribution processes (a mixed economy model).

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Allocation & Distribution principle: SHARING

(Community)

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Allocation & Distribution principle: MARGINALISM (Market)

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Capitalistic

Modern Sector (MS)

Labour

Resources

Via Market

Becomes Capitalistic MS

Non-capitalistic Traditional Sector (TS)

Structural

Transformation

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→ Industrial expansion not only enlarges the modern part of the economy but also transforms the traditional sector.

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Allocation & Distribution principle: MARGINALISM

LEWIS-RANIS-FEI (LRF) FRAMEWORK

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Traditional Sector

MP_N = 0

0 < MP_N ≤ AP_N

MP_N > AP_N

Surplus labour (MP_N=0) migrates: TS to MS → No fall in output/SS of ‘food’ from TS to MS → No change in p_f → No change in per capita food consumption in MS → No change in W (This process will continue for Aa).

As migration continues → In TS, MP_N > 0 but MP_N ≤ AP_N → Supply of food ↓ → p_f ↑ (commodification of food) but no change in a_f^o yet → Wi ↑ & ∏ ↓ : First turning point (K₁) of Lewis (ab zone)

If migration continues beyond b → In TS, MP_N > AP_N → Distribution principle changes from sharing to marginalism in TS (commodification of labour in TS) → (a_f & p_f)↑↑ → W↑↑ & ∏↓↓ → Second Turning point (K₂)

POLICY PRESCRIPTION OF LRF MODEL

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As industrial wage starts rising, MS experiences Ricardian Profit squeeze → Wage rises & profit share reduces → Unbridled flow of resources is constrained (SS side constraint) → restricted industrialisation due to profit & hence investment squeezes.....

So, what is the way to remove these supply-side constraints?

(a) Technological improvement in TS, which will relax the resource constraint by increasing productivity and, at the same time, create surplus labour in TS (relaxing labour shortage for MS); i.e. Green Revolution.

(b) International labour migration

LIMITATIONS OF LRF MODEL

• It assumes Say’s law (no demand problem): no problem of realisation of profit for MS; & the labour mobilised/supplied for MS (from TS) is fully employed (no involuntary unemployment).
• It considers only supply-side problems: resource (financial & physical) & labour supply constraints for the MS.
• According to LRF, resource transfer from TS to MS occurs smoothly via an impersonal/voluntary market mechanism. However, the expansion of MS requires commoditization of TS labour & resource, for which dissociation of labour & means of labour in TS (by economic, legal, political & physical forces) is necessary (primitive capital accumulation³ / accumulation by dispossession. This critical aspect is downplayed by LRF.
• As MS expands, K/N (organic composition of capital) rises. MS would be unable to absorb the surplus labour released from TS → thus we have a reserve army of labour for the MS.

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³ “The process … that clears the way for the capitalist system, can be none other than the process which takes away from the labourer the possession of his means of production; a process that transforms, on the one hand, the social means of subsistence & of production into capital, on the other, the immediate producers into wage labourers.” (Marx, 1867, Chap 26, pp. 507–508) .

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1. While in LRF, industrialization itself not only enlarges the MS but also transforms the TS, Kalecki considers modern industrial expansion & simultaneously, a policy-induced structural transformation of agriculture.
2. In Kalecki, agriculture is backward because of pre-capitalistic relations, but capitalistic industry (instead of naïve assumption of competitive capitalism of 18^th century, as in Lewis) is having an oligopolistic structure.
3. Kalecki considers both demand & supply side problems. Industry suffers from effective demand problem & agriculture from supply-side. Unlike Lewis, finance is not a problem for industry. Capitalists have access to finance due to their ownership over capital. However, physical & mainly structural constraints are binding.
4. Kaleckian framework is sensitive to ‘primitive capital accumulation’ / ‘accumulation by dispossession’; hence, it proposes a policy accordingly (discussed later), instead of a naive dependence on ‘free’ market.
5. Transfer/mobilization of labour from TS to MS is not that important for Kalecki. Because, on the one hand, industry is having reserve army & on the other, agriculture could experience a policy-driven transformation in its employment structure via productive absorption of labour. Essentially, the issue of migration is subsumed.

SECTION 3

STRUCTURAL TRANSFORMATION: STRUCTURALIST DISCOURSE (FOCUS: KALECKI, 1955)

BACKWARD CAPITALISM: STRUCTURALIST TWO DEPARTMENT MODEL (A SHORT-RUN CLOSED-ECONOMY BASE MODEL)

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• Vertically integrated modern industry with capitalist class – working class dichotomy.
• Oligopoly + Reserve army => Excess capacity & UN

• Pre-capitalistic backward agriculture with landlord – tenant dichotomy.
• Structural Constraints => Capacity constraint & UN

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• T-class (tenants) participates in production for survival & produces “food”. They have to transfer a large portion of their produce to the L-class (landlords). After transferring a part of their produce, they are left with a residual amount. This residual amount of food is just sufficient for their consumption requirements of food (from Dept II itself) & of (exchanged) non-food (from Dept I). L-class doesn’t produce anything but acquires rent by virtue of ownership over land & participates in the economy only for conspicuous consumption.

• C-class saves the profit fully (s_c = 1, simplifying assumption) & W-class saves a part of its wage bill (0 < s_w << 1) for future consumption, not for accumulation.

• L-class saves a large part of rent (0 << s_l < 1) for future consumption, but not for accumulation. On the other hand, the savings propensity of T-class is zero (s_t = 0).

• C-class expenditure is autonomously set through loan finance; loan accessed by virtue of ownership over capital (as collateral). However, W-class expenditure is determined only by their wage bill (own income).

• L-class expenditure is set by the rent that they acquire from T-class. T-class expenditure is determined only by the residual amount of food they are left with.

• C-class (capitalists) acquires/accumulates profit that is realized surplus (value of output minus wage bill) by virtue of ownership over capital. W-class (workers) has to sell their labour power, to survive, against the (real) wage bill, W = {(w_m⁰ . N) / p_i⁰} (w_m = w_m⁰, due to the presence of reserve army in industry).

BACKWARD CAPITALISM: STRUCTURALIST TWO DEPARTMENT MODEL (A SHORT-RUN CLOSED-ECONOMY BASE MODEL)

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Advanced capitalistic sector with excess capacity & UN:

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=> Demand-determined output Y

Marketable output: F = [A_o – A(p_f/p_i) – B_o] = F(p_f/p_i); where:

A: Total food supply; A = A_o , as resource & structural constraints.

A(p_f/p_i): Asset holding by L-class; following regressive expectation: A^/ < 0.

B_o: Given subsistence consumption of food for the T-class.

All these => marketable output, F = F(p_f/p_i); with F^/ > 0.

=> Demand-determined Flex-Price p_f

BACKWARD CAPITALISM: STRUCTURALIST TWO DEPARTMENT MODEL (A SHORT-RUN CLOSED-ECONOMY BASE MODEL)

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Producing:

• Machines for C-class & luxury consumption goods (food/basmati & non-food/BMW) for C-class & L-class; mass consumption goods (non-food/mobile) & raw materials (fertilizer) for T-class; & mass consumption goods (non-food/mobile) for W-class.

Producing:

• “Food” A, of which F is the marketable amount, over & above self-consumption by T-class (B_o) & asset holding by L-class {A(p_f/p_i)}.

• C-class invests (I) & consumes (Cc) Y-good; L-class consumes Y-good (C_li); W-class consumes both Y-good (C_wi) & F-good (C_wf) & T-class uses both Y-good (E_ti) & food (self-consumption). Thus, demand-determined industry output: Y = I + Cc + C_wi+ Ef; where, Ef = C_li + E_ti

• W-class consumes both Y-good (C_wi) & F-good (C_wf) & T-class uses both Y-good (Eti) & food (self-consumption). Thus, aggregate demand for the marketable amount of F-good is C_wf

• C-class uses luxury consumption goods & machines produced in Dept I.
• W-class consumes mass consumption goods produced in Dept I & “food” produced in Dept II.

• L-class consumes only luxury consumption goods produced in Dept I.
• T-class uses mass consumption goods & inputs produced in Dept I & “food” produced by themselves (self-consumption).

STRUCTURALIST TWO DEPARTMENT MODEL�CIRCULAR FLOW OF INCOME (ALL IN INDUSTRIAL UNIT)

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Reserve army of labour

W-class expenditure on industrial output C_wi

L-class expenditure on conspicuous consumption goods from Dept I (food & non-food) (C_li)

L-class saves a major part

(0 << s_l < 1)

Total produce (food) in Dept II by T-class (direct producer)

T-class does not save

s_t = 0

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Landlord (L) class’s marketable amount of food (acquired from T-class)

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T- class consumption of non-food (acquired via exchange of own food o/t with Dept I)

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Self-consumption of food by T-class

(B_o)

W-class saves a small part of their income

0 < s_w <<1

Dept I

Dept II

C-class expenditure is autonomously set through loan finance by virtue of ownership over K

C-class saves fully

s_c = 1

Residual produce for T-class after transferring rent to L-class

Asset holding of L-class A(p_f/p_i)

Total marketable amount of food for the W-class F(p_f/p_i)

Leakage from the circular flow

Leakage from the circular flow

Vertically integrated capitalistic industry

Pre-capitalistic agriculture

Expenditure of W-class on food from T-class & L-class (Dept II) (C_wf)

T-class expenditure on mass consumption good & agricultural inputs from Dept I (C_ti)

DEMAND-DETERMINED OUTPUT IN DEPT-1, INDUSTRY

Demand determined output Y + Cost determined fix-price p_i⁰

Y = W-class spending on Y + C-class spending on Y + L-class spending on Y + T-class spending on Y (All measured in industrial unit)

= Cwi + (Cc + I) + Cli + Eti = {(1 – s_w).W – Cwf} + (Cc + I) + Ef; here: [s_w = savings propensity of W-class; Cwi = {(1 – s_w).W – Cwf} & (Cli + Eti) = Ef].

= (1 – s_w).W + (Cc + I) – (Cwf – Ef) = (1 – s_w).W + (Cc + I) – (R – Ef); here: [R = Real income of L & T classes from the marketed food = Real expenditure of W-class on food].

= (1 – s_w).W + (Cc + I) – S_L = [{(1 – s_w).a.Y} + (Cc + I) – {(s_l.p_f.F(p_f/p_i))/p_i⁰}]; here: a = W/Y; & (R – Ef) = S_L = [{s_l . p_f . F(p_f/p_i)} / p_i⁰} = L-class savings = ‘Import-surplus’ of industry vis-a-vis agriculture = Leakage of purchasing power from circular flow of income = Demand leakage from Dept I.

Continued...........

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DEMAND-DETERMINED OUTPUT IN DEPT-1, INDUSTRY

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Next, {p_f . F(p_f/p_i) / p_i⁰} = R = W-class expenditure on marketed food (as T-class food consumption already netted out)

= p_f X per capita food-demand of W-class (a_f) X employment for W-class (N)

= p_f . a_f(w_m⁰/p_i⁰,w_m⁰/p_f) . N = p_f . a_f(p_f) . Y; as N/Y is constant under CRS (& is equal to 1, say) due to excess capacity & unemployment; with, a_f′(p_f) < 0 & price-elasticity of a_f < 1; i.e. [a_f = d – (e.p_f)], with e < 1.

Hence, Y = [{a . (1 – s_w) . Y} + (Cc + I) – {(s_l . p_f . F(p_f/p_i)) / p_i⁰}]

= [{a . (1 – s_w) . Y} + (Cc + I) – {(s_l . p_f . a_f(p_f) . Y) / p_i⁰}]; with, a_f′(p_f) < 0 & price-elasticity of a_f < 1.

Therefore, Y* = (Cc + I) / [1 – {a . (1 – s_w)} + {(s_l . p_f . a_f(p_f)) / p_i⁰}]

Finally, Y* = (Cc⁰+I⁰) / [1 – {a.(1-s_w)} + {(s_l . p_f . a_f(p_f)) / p_i⁰}], as C-class has the power to set Cc & I (loan-financed, by virtue of ownership over K).

Hence, Y* = Y (p_f); with Y’ < 0, as [price-elasticity of a_f] < 1.

ROLE OF SUPPLY CONSTRAINT IN STRUCTURALIST MODEL

Thus, Y = Y(p_f), with Y’<0 as [elasticity of per capita food-demand of W-class] < 1.

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Further, N = N(p_f), with N’<0 as N=Y (CRS).

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Next, aggregate food-demand from industry:

D_f = a_f (p_f) . N(p_f) = D_f(p_f), with D_f’<0

(downward sloping aggregate food-demand curve).

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On the other hand, F(p_f/p_i) is an upward sloping supply curve as F^/ > 0.

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Hence, food-market equilibrium condition is:

F(p_f/p_i) = D(p_f); this determines p_f* which, in turn, determines N* = Y*(p_f*) & a_f*(pf*).

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D_f¹

E’

p_f¹

p_f

SUPPLY CONSTRAINT LED REDISTRIBUTION & LEAKAGE� IN STRUCTURALIST MODEL: CLASS CONFLICT

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Who gains & Who loses

As the industry expands, the C-class benefits from increased output & profit (although not fully, because of the depressed multiplier effect), while the L-class & T-class gain unequivocally through higher revenue due to a rise in food price (as explained earlier). The W-class benefits from increased employment, but loses real purchasing power as food price rises while their money wages remain fixed, reducing their real income & hence standard of living.

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Continued...........

SUPPLY CONSTRAINT LED REDISTRIBUTION & LEAKAGE� IN STRUCTURALIST MODEL: CLASS CONFLICT & MITIGATION

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“(T)he rise in investment may create a strong pressure on the available supplies of food while at the same time it is possible to increase the production of industrial ….. goods in line with demand….

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….. (I)n some instances the rigidity of the supply of food may lead to the under-utilization of productive facilities in non-food …. goods….

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This will not be the case if the peasants profit from the increases in food prices, because then they buy more industrial ….. goods out of higher incomes….

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However, if the benefits of higher food prices accrue to landlords ......, then the reduction in real wages due to the increase in food prices will not have as a counterpart the increased demand for (industrial) …… goods on the part of the countryside; for increased profits will not be spent at all or will be spent on luxuries….. In this case the high demand generated by a rapid development involving large-scale investment will not create a market for industrial ….. goods.

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As is clearly seen from the above, two factors will be involved here: (a) the inelastic supply of food leading to a fall in real wages, (b) the benefit of food price increases accruing not to small proprietors but to capitalists” ……

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……. Thus it is clear from the above that the expansion of food production, paralleling the industrial development, is of paramount importance for avoiding inflationary pressures. Investment in industry, transportation, public utilities & even long-run development projects in agriculture should be accompanied by measures which would expand agricultural production in the short period. These measures range from land reform & cheap bank credit for peasants to improvements in the method of cultivation, small-scale irrigation, & cheap fertilizers.

(Kalecki, 1955, page 7-8). …………. Continued……..

SECTION 4:� STRUCTURALIST POLICY PRESCRIPTION

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• Instead of a path of technological transformation (labour displacing) as proposed by LRF, Kalecki proposed the policy of land reforms (land redistribution along with easy access to credit, small scale irrigation, inputs (seed, cheap fertiliser), infrastructure etc.

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Land reforms → Land redistribution from L-class to T-class → ↓ sectoral (Dept II) savings propensity, as s_l > s_t = 0 →

Y* = (Cc⁰+I⁰) / [1 – a(1-s_w) + {s_l.p_f.a_f(p_f)}/p_i⁰] → BECOMES → Y* = [(Cc⁰+I⁰) / 1–a(1-s_w)]; as petty T-class does not save. Hence, Y is a function of: only … Cc, I, a, s_w , & not of p_f →

problem of leakage of purchasing power from the circular flow is mitigated → the induced demand problem for industry is mitigated.

PLUS…….

Land reforms → ↑ Incentive to work, innovate & invest for tenants (due to access to land & improved institutional, technical & infrastructural facilities) → ↑ Productivity → ↑ Output in agriculture → Supply-constraint for industry gets relaxed → Industrialisation boosted.

COMPARING THE LRF & KALECKIAN MODELS OF DEVELOPMENT

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Lewis-Ranis-Fei:

1. Industrial expansion not only enlarges the MS but also reduces & subsequently, transforms the TS into an MS.
2. Competitive market structure for capitalistic MS. Non-capitalistic TS with collaborative framework (allocation & distribution principle: sharing).
3. Say’s law holds for MS: no demand problem for MS; MS surplus fully sold & profit fully invested; further, full employment in MS.
4. Only supply-side constraints for MS: financial constraint from the very beginning & eventually physical resource & labour constraints.
5. Suppressed the processes of PCA/ABD & emphasised the functioning of “free market”.
6. I↑ → N↑ → DD_f↑ → p_f↑ (given F⁰) → w_m↑ (w_m / p_f = ø , full employment) → (p_i⁰ / w_m) ↓ → ∏↓ → Ricardian profit squeeze → I↓.

Kalecki:

1. Industrial expansion & a parallel policy-induced transformation of agriculture are necessary for overall development.
2. Capitalistic industry with oligopolistic structure. Pre-capitalistic / Semi-feudal (backward) agriculture.
3. Effective demand problem in industry. Supply-constraint in agriculture.
4. Presence of reserve army of labour in industry. Surplus labour in agriculture.
5. Considers structural & physical resource constraints. But no financial resource issue. No theoretical limit to loan financed investment by C-class, by virtue of their ownership over “capital”.
6. Sensitive to PCA/ABD by MS. Hence, proposes Land-reforms.
7. TS to MS transfer of labour muted. It is because of the presence of reserve army of labour in industry & productive absorption of labour in agriculture through land-reforms policy.
8. (G/I/C_C)↑ → Y↑ → N↑ → D_f↑ → p_f↑ (as inelastic F) → (w_m/p_f)↓ (money wage fixed because of reserve army of labour) → Redistribution of purchasing power from W-class to L-class & T-class → Dept II’s R↑ → But, a_f(p_f)↓ (standard of living of industry workers decline which constrain the sustainability of the economy) => Constrained increase in Y, N & ∏.

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Now, let us look into the reality of our country…

FRACTURED STRUCTURE OF INDIAN WORKFORCE

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In the high growth period for India, data shows that reduction in agricultural employment is not getting replenished by the organized sectors

Instead, people exiting agriculture are entering into the informal sector (including informal construction) either as self-employed or in establishments

FRACTURED STRUCTURE OF INDIAN ECONOMY

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People are not gaining much in terms of earnings via this relocation from agriculture to informal sector!!

Data reveals the presence of heterogeneity/dualism (within the informal sector) between self-employed & establishments in terms of GVA per worker.

1.A. HARRIS-TODARO-FIELDS

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Demand-driven pulled migration based on wage differential between MS & TS → But MS unable to absorb the migrated labour fully → Creates unemployment who wait to be absorbed in MS in future (waiting hall hypothesis) → however, eventually they become informal sector workers/entrepreneur & unemployed.

1.B. HARVEY- SANYAL

For unhindered supply of resources for MS, labour & means of labour in TS have to be dissociated → Accumulation by Dispossession (ABD) → Supply-driven pushed migration for survival → Creates a wasteland of excluded/’surplus’ mass of people (a space outside the circuit of capital, not even able to enter into the waiting hall.

• Empirical evidence shows that structural transformation anticipated by either Lewis or Kalecki is not experienced by India. The presence of a huge space of informal sector is challenging the idea of structural transformation in classical sense. In fact, we are experiencing a different kind of transformation altogether.
• This challenge is analyzed in the existing literature critically.

INDIAN INFORMAL SECTOR: RECEIVED POSITIONS - 1

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Modern Sector

Unemployed mass

Informal Sector

“Wasteland”

(surplus population; out of the circuit of capital)

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Traditional Sector

Pushed Migration via the process of ABD

Waiting hall of Harris-Todaro-Fields model

Wasteland/need economy of Harvey-Sanyal discourse

INDIAN INFORMAL SECTOR: RECEIVED POSITIONS – 1A+1B

COMBINING H-T& ABD [PULL+PUSH]

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Despite MS expansion there is reproduction of the fractured structure of the economy. Therefore, it is crucial to move beyond the conventional industrialization policies & look for an alternative development strategy.

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Considering this context, what would constitute a comprehensive, labour-focused policy?

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Alternative Path of Development: product-specific & app-based cluster formations (Chakrabarti et al., 2020, Kundu et al., 2021) → strengthen the backward & forward production linkages & also create dynamic production processes by sharing tangible-intangible resources (despite private ownership) & tapping larger national/global markets (scale economies, & synergy effect) → foster competitiveness, & collective efficiency (Abid Hussain expert committee1997; Schmitz 1999; Sanyal 2011; Das 2017; Chakrabarti et al. 2020; Nagraj 2021).

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Some of the successful clusters in the Global south:

1. Shoe manufacturing cluster in Sinos valley (Southern Brazil) & Surgical instrument manufacturing cluster in Sialkot (Pakistan)³
2. Garment manufacturing cluster in the Tirupur (South India)⁴

³ see: Schmitz (1999)

⁴ see: Banerjee & Munshi (2004)

CLUSTER BASED DEVELOPMENT OF INFORMAL SECTOR

HOW TO ENGENDER CLUSTER BASED DEVELOPMENT??

• Needs careful mapping of regions/districts based on certain economic & other intangible cultural aspects.
• Indigenous skill formation along with fostering social capital to reap the benefits out of agglomeration economies to turn the clusters into endogenous growth poles.
• Cluster diagnostic studies must be conducted by the Govt/NGO & other institutions to identify the strengths & challenges of the clusters.
• Adequate action/interventions: Direct government support that ensures availability of cheap raw materials, credit, & other necessary inputs. Provide adequate support to the clusters, such as artisan training institutes/workshops, common facility centres (CFCs), health care centres etc.
• Government support for market access / trade fair.
• Land user right rather than land transfer right to informal units.

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Case Study 1: Tantipara, West Bengal

Instances of labour sharing & space sharing in Handloom cluster

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Case Study 2:

Dariyapur, West Bengal

Instances of labour sharing & infrastructure sharing in Dokra (handicraft) cluster

REFERENCES

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1. Banerjee, A., & Munshi, K. (2004). How efficiently is capital allocated? Evidence from the knitted garment industry in Tirupur. The Review of Economic Studies, 71(1), 19-42.
2. Chakrabarti, S. (2013). Interrogating inclusive growth: Formal-informal duality, complementarity, conflict. Cambridge Journal of Economics, 37(6), 1349-1379.
3. Chakrabarti, S. (2016). Inclusive growth & social change: Formal-informal-agrarian relations in India. New Delhi: Oxford University Press.
4. Chakrabarti, S., et al. (2020). India & the Covid-19 crisis: Radical measures needed. GDN.
5. Das, K. (2017). Industrial clustering in India: Local dynamics & the global debate. In K. Das (Ed.), Indian industrial clusters (pp. 1-20). Routledge.
6. Fields, G. S. (1990). Labour market modeling & the urban informal sector: Theory & evidence. World Development, 18(5), 615-627. https://doi.org/10.1016/0305-750x(90)90040-6
7. Harris, J. R., & Todaro, M. P. (1970). Migration, unemployment & development: A two-sector analysis. The American Economic Review, 60(1), 126-142.
8. Harvey, D. (2003). The 'new' imperialism. New York: Oxford University Press.
9. Hussain, A. (1997). Report of the expert committee on small enterprises. Ministry of Industry, Government of India, by National Council of Applied Economic Research.
10. Kalecki, M. (1934). On foreign trade & "domestic exports". Econometrica, 2(1), 1-20.
11. Kalecki, M. (1954). The problem of financing economic development in a mixed economy. Indian Economic Review, 2(4), 1-22.
12. Kundu, A., Bhattacharjee, M., Datta, P. K., Sadhu, K., & Chakrabarti, S. (2021). The pandemic & the informal sector of India: Probable impacts & strategic intervention. In R. Bhattacharya, A. Ghosh Dastidar, & S. Sikdar (Eds.), The Covid-19 pandemic, India & the world: Economic & social policy perspective (pp. 289-308). Routledge.
13. Lewis, W. A. (1958 [1954]). Economic development with unlimited supplies of labor. In A. N. Agarwala & S. P. Singh (Eds.), The economics of underdevelopment (pp. 400-449). New Delhi: Oxford University Press.
14. Marx, K. (1867). Capital: A critique of political economy, Volume I. Retrieved from https://www.marxists.org/archive/marx/works/download/pdf/capital-volume-i.pdf
15. Nagaraj, R. (Ed.). (2021). Industrialisation for employment & growth in India: Lessons from small firm clusters & beyond. Cambridge University Press.
16. Ranis, G., & Fei, J. C. H. (1961). A theory of economic development. The American Economic Review, 51(4), 533-565. http://www.jstor.org/stable/1812785
17. Sanyal, K. (2007). Rethinking capitalist development: Primitive accumulation, governmentality & post-colonial capitalism. Routledge.
18. Sanyal, K. (2011). Shat shatero: A collection of articles & other sundry writings. Anustup.
19. Schmitz, H. (1999). Collective efficiency & increasing returns. Cambridge Journal of Economics, 23, 465-483.

THANK YOU

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