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What If The Gulf War Had Gone On Longer�Unintended Consequences & Wargaming

Matthew B. Caffrey Jr.

Chief, Wargame Development and Education

Air Force Research Laboratory

AFRL 06-0054

Distribution A: Approved for Public Release; Distribution Unlimited

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My Bio

  • DoD Civil Servant – previous positions
    • Professor of Wargaming, ACSC
    • Research Associate, SAAS
  • Col USAFR (ret.) - USAFR Assignments
    • Senior Reservist, AFRL, Info Directorate
    • Chief Wargaming, AF/XOOC (Checkmate)
  • Author/speaker
    • Co-author Gulf War Fact Book
    • Many articles, chapters, hundreds of talks

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Overview

  • Three disclaimers
  • Then why consider alternatives at all?
  • The Facts
  • The Alternative – continue the fight?
  • The plausible outcomes
    • military
    • “end state”
  • Are there any lessons for the present?

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Disclaimer One

The views expressed in this briefing are those of the speaker and do not necessarily represent the views of the Air Force Research Laboratory or the United States Air Force.

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Disclaimer Two

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My theories do NOT have the certainty of mathematics.

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Disclaimer Three

They do not even have the confidence of a forecast

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Why consider alternatives?

  • History has practical value

  • We can discern more lessons by listening for whispers

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History has practical value

I know of no way of judging of the future but by the past.

Patrick Henry

23 March 1775

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Learning the Most From History

Clausewitz’s Critical Analysis

  • What were the facts.
  • What alternatives were feasible.
  • What were the likely outcomes of those alternatives

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The Facts

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Was There an Alternative?

  • Continue 36 hours – surround Republican Guard.
  • Without Republican Guard Saddam can not repress revolts in north and south
  • Need for US support shapes new government

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Militarily Feasible?

  • Most Republican Guard were inside the sack
  • US Forces had plan, lift and bridging equipment to surround
  • US Forces were short on gas, but:
    • CinCs fuel reserve
    • C-130 fleet could do it again
  • US Forces were short on sleep, but:
    • Sleep discipline partially effective
    • Seniors/24 Mach Infantry more than most

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Politically/Diplomatically Feasible

  • Politically
    • Large majority of Americans wanted Saddam removed
    • Polling indicated “causality tolerance” at about 30K US
  • Diplomatic
    • Syria likely to object
    • Many confused when US stopped�(plea bargain analogy)

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Why Did US Stop?

Will never know with certainty, plausibly:

  • Wargames indicated 42,000 to 46,000 coalition casualties, of which ¾ would be US – just to liberate Kuwait
  • Polling indicated popular support to fall below the 50% mark at about 30,000 US
  • Hence before counter offensive objective limited to liberation�(Falklands example seen as applicable)

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Likely Outcome

  • Military
    • Some additional US casualties as soldiers got punchy and Guard realized they were cornered
    • Few if any Guard escape, virtually no equipment
    • Revolts successful

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Likely Outcome

  • End State
    • Quicker recovery of Iraq – avoids 12 years of Saddam eating the seed corn.
    • Less effective Bathist insurgency
      • Does not have 12 years to prepare
      • 1991 freedom fighters not killed/disillusioned
    • Islamic terrorist movement just evolving
      • Worst case - slower to intervene
      • Best case - never grows

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Lessons for the Present

  • Wargaming inaccuracy ill serve decision makers and us all
  • Decisions/campaign plans need to be made with long term consequences in mind