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USE OF EMERGING TECHNOLOGIES IN SUB CONVENTIONAL WARFARE�

THE INDUS INTERNATIONAL RESEARCH FOUNDATION, INDIA, in association with Amity Institute of International Studies, Amity University

Maj Gen P K Mallick, VSM (Retd)

09 and 10 December 2021

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CYBER

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GAZA, May 2021

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Artificial Intelligence (AI)

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"It remains our collective responsibility to ensure trust in how AI is used. Algorithm transparency is key to establishing this trust. Equally important is accountability. We must protect the world against the weaponisation of AI by non-state actors."

Prime Minister Narendra Modi addresses The Responsible AI for Social Empowerment virtual summit in New Delhi on October 5, 2020

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THE MINISTRY OF COMMERCE AND INDUSTRY �REPORT ON THE ISSUE OF NATIONAL SECURITY

  •  AI can be a force-multiplier for several national security missions.

  • Potential applications include Autonomous Underwater Vehicles (AUVs) and Unmanned Combat Aerial Vehicles (UCAVs) for underwater and aerial defence operations as well as coastal and border surveillance.

  • Robot mules for unburdening soldiers.

  • Robots for counter-IED and counter-terrorism operations.

  • Close-in- protection systems against cruise missiles and similar aerial threats.

  • Securing public and critical infrastructure, especially urban centers, against terrorism by predicting terror attacks.

  • Tracking terror financing and recruitment.

  • Monitoring cross-border infiltration.

  • Strengthening cyber security.

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USE OF AI TECHNOLOGY BY ARMED FORCES

  • Cyberspace.
  • Information processing.
  • Unmanned vehicle swarms.
  • Intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance.
  • Logistics.
  • Command and control.
  • Autonomous vehicles.
  • Target recognition.
  • Battlefield healthcare.
  • Combat simulation & training.
  • Threat monitoring & situational awareness.
  • Algorithmic targeting.
  • Mission handoff.
  • Automated planning and manpower allocation.
  • Lessons learned.
  • Options analysis for capability development.

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Examples

  • Israel’s Iron Dome system detects incoming rockets, predicts their trajectory, and then sends this information to a human soldier who decides whether to launch an interceptor rocket
  • A sentry robot SGR-A1 built by Samsung, used along the Korean Demilitarized Zone. It uses a low-light camera and pattern-recognition software to detect intruders and then issues a verbal warning. If the intruder does not surrender, the robot has a machine gun that can be fired remotely by a soldier the robot has alerted, or by the robot itself if it is in fully automatic mode.

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DRONE

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Features that made Drones attractive �to terrorist groups

  • Low acquisition costs
  • A variety of purchasing pathways
  • Potential for high accuracy
  • Operational flexibility
  • High likelihood of air defence penetration
  • High survivability pre-launch
  • Low levels of infrastructure needed to support their deployment.

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Examples of Armed Drone Attack

  • Attempt to assassinate Venezuela's President Nicolas Maduro with an explosive-laden drone on 4 August 2018.
  • Use of long-range drones by Houthi rebels in attempts to assassinate Yemeni military leaders and strike infrastructure deep inside Saudi Arabia demonstrates that armed drone systems are now an integral part of the military and propaganda arsenal of certain non-state groups.
  • On 14 May 2019, ten coordinated attacks using suicide drones caused fires at a central oil processing facility and nearby oil and gas fields in the Abqaiq processing facility of ARAMCO. This attack led to around 50% of the Saudi daily petrol production being suspended.
  • Killing of General Qasem Soleimani, head of Iran's elite Quds Force at Baghdad airport, on 03 Januaury 2020.

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Nagorno-Karabakh War

Azerbaijan

  • Azerbaijan used diverse arsenal of missiles rocket and drones. Had Tochka missiles of Soviet Union vintage, Israeli LORA ballistic missile and EXTRA (EXTended Range Artillery) guided rocket.
  • Azerbaijan had an impressive drone arsenal composed of Turkish and Israeli UAVs. It acquired the Turkish purchased numerous Israeli loitering munitions, known as “suicide” or “kamikaze” drones, including the Harop, Orbiter, and SkyStriker UAVs. Modified its Soviet-era An-2 Colt biplanes with remote-control systems, flying them to the front lines to draw out Armenian air defences.
  • Invested heavily in rocket artillery. The Turkish TRG-300 and Belarusian Polonez MLRS had the ability to range targets up to 120 and 200 km away. The BM-30 Smerch was Azerbaijan’s rocket of choice.
  • UAVs were operationally integrated with fires from manned aircraft and land-based artillery. Frequently used their own ordinance to destroy high-value military assets.
  • Turkish-made Bayraktar TB2
  • Demonstrated the versatility of UAV platforms.
  • TB2 drones cost as little as $1m to $2m each.
  • TB2 carries four Smart Micro Munition laser-guided missiles,
  • has a flight time of 24 hours and a communication range of almost 100 miles,
  • can carry a maximum payload of more than 55kg.
  • Create a disturbing sound when approaching their targets, which can be psychologically unsettling.
  • Information Operations. The Azerbaijani Ministry of Defence has released daily updates utilizing drone footage on its YouTube and Twitter accounts.

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Nagorno-Karabakh War

Armenia

  • Bulk of Armenia’s air defences consisted of obsolete Soviet-era systems.
  • Armenia’s larger air defences like the S-300 are not designed for counter-UAV missions and were targeted early in the conflict by Azerbaijani loitering munitions.
  • Armenia lost 224 tanks compared with 36 from Azerbaijan.
  • Armenia’s passive defence was poor. Operated out in the open, static or moving slowly, poorly camouflaged and clumped in tight, massed formations.

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Nagorno-Karabakh War

Lesson Learnt

  • Without adequate sensors, electronic warfare cover and counter-drone weaponry traditional ground units are in trouble.
  • Integration of land-based fire-support and drones inevitable in modern warfare. Azerbaijani artillery and rocket systems fought in close coordination  with drone warfare assets. Turkey and Russia developed ‘drone – artillery complexes’ during their Syria expeditions. Russia now integrates Orlan-10 drones  to the 152mm-class artillery.
  • Intra-war deterrence gain importance.
  • Drones make good SEAD assets against low-to-mid-range air defences.
  • Israeli loitering munitions Harop has anti-radiation capabilities, can detect and autonomously home onto radar emissions. This has been sensationally manifested in Azerbaijan’s targeting of the Armenian air defense forces’ Russian-manufactured S-300 strategic SAM (surface-to-air missile) system.
  • Despite the drone age, military geostrategic calculus still matters. As the Azerbaijani push developed, It’s military planning transformed from a drone-driven, overwhelming war of attrition into a more combined arms warfare effort, pursuing a more balanced approach. Conventional warfighting capabilities to clear, hold and deny territory remains crucial.

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OSINT

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3D PRINTING

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IoT Applications in Defence�

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������Gather Battlefield awareness in advance��Pro-active monitoring of Combat health��Augmented Reality Remote Training��Vehicle and Equipment Fleet Management in Real-Time��Target Recognition and Autonomous Reconnaissance��Transportation��Data Processing using AI and Machine Learning���

IoT APPLICATIONS

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Conclusion

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In a speech to the U.S. Military Academy in 2011, then Secretary of Defense Robert Gates said,

“When it comes to predicting the nature and location of our next military engagements, since Vietnam, our record has been perfect. We have never once gotten it right, from the Mayaguez to Grenada, Panama, Somalia, the Balkans, Haiti, Kuwait, Iraq, and more—we had no idea a year before any of these missions that we would be so engaged.”

Robert Gates, “Speech to the United States Military Academy,” speech

at the U.S. Military Academy, West Point, N.Y., February 25, 2011.

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WHO IS WINNING

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CAVEAT

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Frank G. Hoffman , Examining Complex Forms of Conflict Gray Zone and Hybrid Challenges

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Thank You