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Naval orientation - 3

Naval campaigns and Operations

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Liberation of Goa

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Portuguese entry in india

  • Afonso de Albuquerque came to India in 1503 and became Governor of Portuguese India in 1509.
  • He captured Goa from the Bijapur Sultanate in 1510 and developed it as a trading and military center.

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Portuguese territories in india

  • By the late 1500s, the Portuguese controlled many areas along the Indian coast
  • These included: Diu, Daman, Goa, Bassein, Chaul, Bombay, San Thome (Chennai), and Hooghly (Bengal)
  • By 1947, only Goa, Daman, and Diu remained under Portuguese control
  • India liberated these in 1961

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Portuguese defence setup

  • Goa: 3 infantry battalions (about 2,200 troops), 4 armoured units, 3 artillery batteries, anti-aircraft and coastal guns.
  • Daman and Diu: About 360 troops each and local police
  • Total strength: ~5,200 in Goa, ~800 each in Daman and Diu
  • They also had naval ships and a small air force in Goa

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Indian forces

Army

  • 2 infantry brigades, 1 para brigade, 1 light battalion, 2 armoured regiments, artillery, engineers

Air Force

  • Support ground troops
  • bomb runways
  • interdict enemy aircraft
  • air drop supplies

Navy

  • blockade of the ports of Marmagao, Panjim, Daman and the islands of Diu and Anjadip
  • prevention of the removal of important stores and equipment
  • close support by Naval aircraft if required
  • close support by naval guns in an emergency

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Triggering events

  • On Nov 17, 1961, the Portuguese fired on Indian ship Sabarmati near Anjadip Island.
  • On Nov 24, they fired on Indian fishermen.

After that

  • Two ships of the Indian Navy, Rajput (destroyer) and Kirpan (antisubmarine frigate) were deployed off the Karwar coast on 28 Nov 61 and started patrolling the area

INS RAJPUT

INS KIRPAN

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Naval patrol begins

  • On Dec 1, Indian Navy started Operation Chutney—patrolling and watching Portuguese activities
  • INS Rajput and INS Kirpan are withdrawn
  • Ships INS Betwa (anti-aircraft frigate) and INS Beas (anti-aircraft frigate) monitored enemy movements and confirmed limited Portuguese air and naval power

INS BETWA

INS BEAS

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Operation Vijay begins

  • On Dec 18, 1961, the Indian Navy and Army launched Operation Vijay to liberate Goa.
  • INS Trishul bombed Anjadip island early morning and sent troops for landing.
  • Portuguese showed a white flag but then opened fire, so Indian forces responded strongly.

INS TRISHUL

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Battle with Afonso de Albuquerque

  • Portuguese frigate Afonso de Albuquerque opened fire at Indian aircraft and ships
  • Indian Navy gave a warning to surrender, but the ship refused.
  • INS Betwa, INS Beas, and INS Cauvery attacked.
  • After a 10-minute battle, Albuquerque was badly damaged.
  • The ship raised a white flag, beached, and was abandoned by her crew

Afonso de Albuquerque

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Final victory

  • Indian forces began their final attack on the night of Dec 17-18, 1961.
  • Goa was fully liberated by the evening of Dec 19, 1961.
  • This ended 450 years of Portuguese colonial rule in India.

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Indo Pak war 1971

(Bangladesh creation)

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🔰 Introduction

The 1971 war between India and Pakistan was not just a military confrontation—it was a direct consequence of political, ethnic, and administrative exploitation.

The Pakistani government, dominated by West Pakistan (now Pakistan), continuously marginalized the Bengali-speaking population of East Pakistan (now Bangladesh), ignoring their democratic rights even after they secured a clear majority in elections.

This led to:

  • A brutal crackdown by the Pakistani Army in East Pakistan.
  • Millions of refugees fleeing to India.
  • India getting involved both on humanitarian and security grounds.

India officially entered the war on 3rd December 1971. Within 13 days, the Indian military achieved a decisive victory, leading to the creation of Bangladesh.

Naval operations played a crucial role in isolating Pakistan, cutting off its supplies, and exerting strategic dominance.

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Naval operations in Arabian sea (western theatre)

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Missile Boat Attack on Karachi

First Strike (Operation Trident – 4 Dec)

  • Indian Navy used Vidyut-class missile boats with Soviet-made SS-N-2 Styx missiles.
  • A Pakistani destroyer (PNS Khyber) and a minesweeper were sunk.
  • Karachi's fuel storage tanks were hit and set ablaze, causing massive fires visible from 60 km.

Second Strike (Operation Python – 8/9 Dec)

  • To distract Pakistan from the missile strike on Karachi, a decoy attack was launched on Jiwani, a coastal location near the Iran border.
  • Cruiser INS Mysore, along with other ships, apprehended (arrested) the merchant ship Madhumati which had sent an SOS — this served as the perfect diversion.
  • Meanwhile, missile boats hit Karachi again, damaging the harbour and tanker PNS Dacca at anchorage.

Outcome:

  • Karachi port became unusable.
  • Western Fleet achieved sea dominance in the Arabian Sea.
  • Severely limited Pakistan’s ability to resupply and reinforce by sea.

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Sinking of INS Khukri

  • Date: 9 December 1971
  • Background: An enemy submarine was detected off Bombay.
  • Ships Involved: INS Khukri and INS Kirpan were sent to counter the submarine threat.

Tragic Event:

  • Pakistani submarine PNS Hangor, operating off the Gujarat coast, launched torpedoes.
  • INS Khukri was hit and sunk, resulting in the loss of 18 officers and 176 sailors — the only warship India lost during the war.
  • Despite multiple anti-submarine operations launched afterwards, Hangor escaped and returned to Karachi.

Lesson Learned:

  • Submarines, especially in shallow and noisy coastal waters, are extremely hard to detect and deadly. A multi-domain anti-submarine approach (air, surface, sonar) is essential.

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Naval operations in Bey of Bengal (Eastern theatre)

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Sinking of Pakistani Submarine Ghazi

  • Ghazi was Pakistan's most advanced submarine, sent from Karachi to target INS Vikrant, India’s aircraft carrier.
  • Ghazi laid mines off Visakhapatnam port.
  • It exploded and sank on 3 Dec—due to Indian Navy’s INS RAJPUT depth charges.
  • This eliminated any underwater threat in the east, giving India complete naval control in Bay of Bengal.

INS RAJPUT

PNS GHAZI

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Carrier and air operations

INS Vikrant, operating from the Bay of Bengal, launched air strikes via Sea Hawk aircraft.

  • Ports: Chittagong, Cox’s Bazar, Khulna, and Mongla.
  • Pakistani naval vessels and escape routes.
  • Airfields to prevent any aerial escape by Pakistani officers.

Effect:

  • Total blockade of East Pakistan.
  • No escape possible to Burma (Myanmar) or by sea.
  • Control of the seas ensured that Indian Army could advance without threat from behind.

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Final outcome in east

  • Eastern Fleet enforced a naval blockade and prepared for amphibious landings if needed.
  • Pakistani forces in East Pakistan surrendered on 16 Dec 1971 in Dhaka.
  • Bangladesh was born.

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Lessons learnt by Indian navy

Improvisation Success:

  • Missile boats had short range. Indian Navy towed them closer using larger ships — a brilliant and risky strategy that worked flawlessly.

Submarine Warfare is Critical:

  • Submarines can operate undetected and inflict heavy losses, as seen in the case of INS Khukri.
  • Need for integrated anti-submarine tactics involving air patrols, sonar, and better submarine detection.

Rise of Missiles over Big Guns:

  • Traditional big naval guns were not used much.
  • The war proved anti-ship missiles are future of naval warfare, not battleship-style engagements.

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Operation Cactus (1988)

– Indian Armed Forces in the Maldives Crisis

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Background – The Attempted Coup in Maldives

  • On the night of 2–3 November 1988, about 300–500 armed mercenaries, believed to be Tamil-speaking Sri Lankan militants (members of the PLOTE – People's Liberation Organisation of Tamil Eelam), invaded the Maldives.
  • They entered Malé harbour in boats from a mother ship, stormed key locations, and attempted a coup d'état.
  • President Maumoon Abdul Gayoom, fearing for his life, went into hiding and sent an urgent SOS to India seeking military intervention.
  • The Maldivian National Defence Force was small and overwhelmed. Without quick external support, the government could have been overthrown.

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Operation Cactus – Indian Response

India acted swiftly and decisively under PM Rajiv Gandhi to prevent a hostile takeover in the Indian Ocean’s neighbourhood.

Objectives:

  • Rescue President Gayoom and restore order in Malé.
  • Ensure the territorial integrity and sovereignty of the Maldives.
  • Prevent any foreign interference in India’s strategic backyard.

Army/Air Force Action Plan:

  • Immediate airlifting of para-commandos (50th Independent Para Brigade) to secure the Hulhulé Airport (close to Malé).
  • Establish a bridgehead and move into Malé to neutralize mercenaries and restore control.

Navy’s Mission:

  • Establish a naval blockade around the Maldives using Maritime Reconnaissance (MR) aircraft and warships.
  • Intercept any escape attempts by sea.
  • Provide naval gunfire support, evacuation, and command coordination.

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Naval Deployment Timeline

📅 Date

🕒 Event

3 Nov (morning)

Indian Navy ships Tir and Godavari (near Maldives) diverted to Malé. Frigate Betwa sailed from Cochin.

3 Nov (afternoon)

Ships Rajput, Ranjit, Gomati, Trishul, Nilgiri, Kumbhir, Cheetah, and fleet tanker Deepak prepared to sail. MR aircraft launched to monitor sea traffic.

3/4 Nov (night)

IAF C-130 aircraft landed Indian troops on Hulhulé airfield. Mercenaries, realizing the danger, fled with hostages on a merchant ship MV Progress Light.

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Interception of MV Progress Light – The Sea Chase

  • Mercenaries seized hostages, including Maldivian Minister of Transport, and escaped Male by sea aboard the MV Progress Light.
  • Indian MR aircraft tracked their route through radar surveillance
  • INS Betwa was directed to intercept the ship, shadowing it during the night of 4/5 Nov

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Negotiation and Escalation at Sea

  • On 5 Nov, Godavari’s Sea King helicopter picked up a negotiation team from Colombo and flew it onboard Godavari.
  • Negotiators tried to persuade the mercenaries to surrender and divert the ship—but the rebel leader refused, demanding safe passage to Colombo and international mediation.

Political Context:

  • Sri Lanka officially warned it would not allow the ship to enter its waters.
  • Maldives urged India to prevent escape to Colombo.

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Pressure and Firepower – Tactical Use of Force

Initial Actions:

  • Godavari tried non-lethal pressure:
    • Warning shots across the bow.
    • Gunfire at masts to disable communications.
    • Accidentally destroyed their escape boat.

Final Action:

  • Godavari dropped depth charges in front of the ship.
  • At 0825 hrs. on 6 Nov, Betwa fired a shell midship, hitting Progress Light and causing a fire.
  • Mercenaries panicked and surrendered at 0854 hrs.

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Rescue and aftermath

  • Indian naval teams boarded Progress Light, rescued all hostages, and captured mercenaries.
  • 8 injured hostages (including a cabinet minister) were airlifted to Military Hospital, Trivandrum.
  • Despite salvage efforts by Betwa, Progress Light caught fire and capsized (pani me palat gayi) on 7 Nov (56 miles southwest of Colombo).
  • On 8 Nov, Godavari returned to Malé with rescued hostages. President Gayoom personally welcomed them.

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Strategic lessons

🧩 Lesson

Description

Rapid Deployment Works

Quick coordination between Army, Navy, and Air Force enabled a smooth and swift operation in a foreign land.

🚁 Need for Naval Helo Assault Capability

The operation emphasized the importance of navy’s own helicopters for inserting troops or supporting quick reaction missions.

🌐 Strategic Diplomacy

India acted without UN or foreign intervention, showcasing regional leadership and protecting the Indian Ocean from external interference.

🕊️ Respect for Sovereignty

India’s voluntary withdrawal enhanced its reputation as a responsible regional power.

🌊 Naval Presence = Strategic Influence

The Indian Navy’s ability to track, intercept, and pressure hostile elements in the open sea reinforced India’s blue-water navy status.

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