Enabling Humanitarian Applications with �Targeted Differential Privacy*
Nitin Kohli
MeasureDev 2026 – April 29, 2026
Staff Scientist, UC Berkeley Center for Effective Global Action
*Joint work with Professor Joshua Blumenstock
2
Novissi in Togo
TOGO
Two Stage Approach
3
Extended Data Figure 1A: Aiken et al. (2022) Nature.
Stage 1: Identify Poorest Regions
Stage 2: Identify Poorest Individuals
Source: Aiken et al. (2022) Journal of Development Economics; Figure 4 Supplemental Information
Poor
Non-poor
Validation of Step 2 of Original Novissi on Older Data (2018)
4
Figure 1B: Aiken et al. (2022)
5
Issue: Mobile phone metadata can reveal sensitive information
Fig. 2 in de Montjoye et al. (2013); Scientific Reports
Provable privacy meets humanitarian targeting
A: Non-Private Data
(Owned by Telco)
C: Privatized Data
(Provided to gov’t, bank, researchers, etc.)
D: Labels
| | | | | | | |
| | | | | | | |
| | | | | | | |
| | | | | | | |
| | | | | | | |
| | | | | | | |
| | | | | | | |
| | | | | | | |
E: Machine Learning
Digital Loans
Humanitarian aid
| | | | | | | |
| | | | | | | |
| | | | | | | |
| | | | | | | |
| | | | | | | |
| | | | | | | |
| | | | | | | |
| | | | | | | |
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
Details: Kohli and Blumenstock (2024), “Enabling Humanitarian Applications with Targeted Differential Privacy”
Candidate Approach: Differential Privacy (DP)
DB with your data as x
Randomized Algorithm
Synthetic Dataset
DB with your data as x’
With
“essentially the same” probability
Intuition
Adversary cannot discern
individual’s true data
But “classic stats” approaches are ill-suited for targeting
| | | | | | | |
0 | 0 | 0 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 0 | 1 |
1 | 0 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 0 |
1 | 0 | 0 | 1 | 0 | 1 | 0 | 0 |
0 | 0 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 |
1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 1 | 0 | 1 |
0 | 0 | 0 | 1 | 0 | 0 | 1 | 1 |
0 | 1 | 0 | 1 | 0 | 0 | 1 | 1 |
| | | | | | | |
0 | 1 | 0 | 0 | 1 | 1 | 0 | 1 |
1 | 0 | 0 | 1 | 0 | 1 | 0 | 0 |
0 | 0 | 1 | 1 | 0 | 1 | 0 | 0 |
0 | 0 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 0 | 1 | 0 |
1 | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 1 | 0 | 0 |
0 | 0 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 0 | 0 | 1 |
1 | 0 | 0 | 1 | 0 | 0 | 1 | 1 |
| | | | | | | |
1 | 0 | 1 | 1 | 0 | 0 | 1 | 0 |
1 | 0 | 0 | 1 | 0 | 1 | 0 | 0 |
0 | 0 | 1 | 1 | 0 | 1 | 0 | 0 |
0 | 0 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 0 | 1 | 0 |
1 | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 1 | 0 | 0 |
0 | 0 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 0 | 0 | 1 |
1 | 0 | 0 | 1 | 0 | 0 | 1 | 1 |
Poor
Non-Poor
Randomized Computation
With
“essentially the same” probability
Difficult for
ML to
learn
target
DB with your data as x
Private Algorithm
Output
DB with your data as x’
With
“essentially the same” probability
�Targeted
Differential Privacy
Intuition
Adversary can discern between “dissimilar” inputs but not confidently for “similar” inputs
Contribution 1a: Targeted Differential Privacy
Necessary condition for accurate targeting
10
Contribution 1b: Projection Algorithm
D: Targets
B: Private Projection Algorithm
| | | | | | | |
0 | 1 | 0 | 0 | 1 | 1 | 0 | 1 |
1 | 0 | 0 | 1 | 0 | 1 | 0 | 0 |
0 | 0 | 1 | 1 | 0 | 1 | 0 | 0 |
0 | 0 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 0 | 1 | 0 |
1 | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 1 | 0 | 0 |
0 | 0 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 0 | 0 | 1 |
1 | 0 | 0 | 1 | 0 | 0 | 1 | 1 |
E: Machine Learning
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
Private Projection Algorithm (details)
The Targeting Setting
| | | | | | | |
0 | 0 | 0 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 0 | 1 |
1 | 0 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 0 |
1 | 0 | 0 | 1 | 0 | 1 | 0 | 0 |
0 | 0 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 |
1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 1 | 0 | 1 |
0 | 0 | 0 | 1 | 0 | 0 | 1 | 1 |
0 | 1 | 0 | 1 | 0 | 0 | 1 | 1 |
0 | 1 | 0 | 0 | 1 | 1 | 0 | 1 |
Digital Loans
Humanitarian aid
0 | -1 | 1 | 0 | 1 | 1 | 0 | -1 |
-1 | -1 | 0 | 1 | 1 | -1 | 0 | 1 |
0 | 1 | -1 | -1 | 1 | -1 | 0 | 1 |
…
R(1)
R(2)
R(k)
F: Applications
G: Individual i’s personal data
0 | 0 | 0 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 0 | 1 |
Contribution 1: TDP + Projection Algorithm
Our algorithm for targeted differential privacy substantially outperforms differential privacy, when evaluated using Togo data
Accuracy of humanitarian aid allocation using different PETs
115K and 240K additional
exclusion errors
2K additional exclusion errors
No Privacy
Differential
Privacy
k-Anonymity
Targeted Diff.
Privacy
Contribution 2: Privacy-Program Effectiveness Tradeoff
Results:
Status quo:
No provable
privacy protections
Strong protections,
minor exclusion error
Strongest protections,
untenable exclusion error
No Privacy
Targeted Differential Privacy
Differential Privacy
Targeting of Anti-Poverty Assistance in Togo
Takeaway
Appendix Slides
17