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Enabling Humanitarian Applications with �Targeted Differential Privacy*

Nitin Kohli

MeasureDev 2026 – April 29, 2026

Staff Scientist, UC Berkeley Center for Effective Global Action

*Joint work with Professor Joshua Blumenstock

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Novissi in Togo

TOGO

  • Digital Emergency Cash Transfer Program
    • “Poorest individuals in the poorest regions”
    • $13-15 per month for 5 months
    • Launched: April 2020
    • Reach: 800K individuals

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  • Challenge: Targeting transfers without administrative data

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Two Stage Approach

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Extended Data Figure 1A: Aiken et al. (2022) Nature.

Stage 1: Identify Poorest Regions

Stage 2: Identify Poorest Individuals

Source: Aiken et al. (2022) Journal of Development Economics; Figure 4 Supplemental Information

Poor

Non-poor

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Validation of Step 2 of Original Novissi on Older Data (2018)

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Figure 1B: Aiken et al. (2022)

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Issue: Mobile phone metadata can reveal sensitive information

Fig. 2 in de Montjoye et al. (2013); Scientific Reports

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Provable privacy meets humanitarian targeting

  • Our technical work is enabling new use cases
  • Develop new privacy definitions and algorithms that provide strict privacy guarantees, while also facilitating downstream reuse, and applications of machine learning

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  1. Characterizing the real-world tradeoffs induced by increasing privacy

A: Non-Private Data

(Owned by Telco)

C: Privatized Data

(Provided to gov’t, bank, researchers, etc.)

D: Labels

 

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E: Machine Learning

Digital Loans

Humanitarian aid

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Details: Kohli and Blumenstock (2024), “Enabling Humanitarian Applications with Targeted Differential Privacy”

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Candidate Approach: Differential Privacy (DP)

  • Well-suited for “classic statistics”
  • Goal:
    • Learn about a population,
    • Without learning “too much” about any individual
  • Approach:
    • Add carefully-calibrated noise to mask the contribution of any individual datapoint

 

 

 

 

DB with your data as x

Randomized Algorithm

Synthetic Dataset

DB with your data as x’

 

With

“essentially the same” probability

 

 

Intuition

Adversary cannot discern

individual’s true data

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But “classic stats” approaches are ill-suited for targeting

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Poor

Non-Poor

 

Randomized Computation

With

“essentially the same” probability

 

Difficult for

ML to

learn

target

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  • Well-suited for targeting where individual learning is requiring
  • Goal:
    • Enable population level learning,
    • And “some” individual learning,
    • But “not too much”
  • Approach:
    • Add carefully-calibrated noise to mask the value of “sufficiently similar” individuals

DB with your data as x

Private Algorithm

Output

DB with your data as x’

With

“essentially the same” probability

�Targeted

Differential Privacy

 

Intuition

Adversary can discern between “dissimilar” inputs but not confidently for “similar” inputs

 

 

Contribution 1a: Targeted Differential Privacy

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Necessary condition for accurate targeting

  •  

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Contribution 1b: Projection Algorithm

 

 

D: Targets

B: Private Projection Algorithm

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E: Machine Learning

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Private Projection Algorithm (details)

The Targeting Setting

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Digital Loans

Humanitarian aid

 

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…

R(1)

R(2)

R(k)

F: Applications

G: Individual i’s personal data

 

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Contribution 1: TDP + Projection Algorithm

Our algorithm for targeted differential privacy substantially outperforms differential privacy, when evaluated using Togo data

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Accuracy of humanitarian aid allocation using different PETs

115K and 240K additional

exclusion errors

2K additional exclusion errors

No Privacy

Differential

Privacy

k-Anonymity

Targeted Diff.

Privacy

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Contribution 2: Privacy-Program Effectiveness Tradeoff

  • Singling-out attacks
  • Concern: Can an adversary isolate at least one individual in the real data (based on unique combinations of features)?

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  • Key idea: Privacy enhancing technologies can protect against such attacks, but their use reduces the performance: more non-poor individuals receive aid while more poor individuals do not, thereby reducing humanitarian effectiveness

Results:

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  • Relative to baseline: Singling out protection increases by ~8,500%, at the cost of 2K additional exclusion errors
  • Relative to differential privacy: Singling out protection decreases by ~12%; 113K fewer exclusion errors

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Status quo:

No provable

privacy protections

Strong protections,

minor exclusion error

Strongest protections,

untenable exclusion error

No Privacy

Targeted Differential Privacy

Differential Privacy

Targeting of Anti-Poverty Assistance in Togo

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Takeaway

  • Humanitarian applications are increasingly relying on sensitive data for interventions
  • For targeting applications, existing PETs are misaligned with the goals of targeting (i.e., individual-level learning)
  • Targeted differential privacy provides a contextual adaptation of differential privacy to facilitate humanitarian applications with strong privacy guarantees

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Appendix Slides

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